August 2013 - openSUSE Kernel - openSUSE Mailing Lists

[opensuse-kernel] Modular drivers which could be built-in
by Jean Delvare 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

Hi all, Having worked on built-in drivers which could be modularized, I am now looking for modular drivers which could be built-in. Our policy is that drivers which are not hardware-specific and are needed on a majority of systems should be built into the kernel directly. So I checked which modules were loaded on my 4 systems. After filtering out hardware-specific modules, I am left with the following list: ACPI and thermal drivers: * button * processor * thermal_sys Block device drivers * cdrom * scsi_dh * scsi_dh_alua * scsi_dh_emc * scsi_dh_hp_sw * scsi_dh_rdac * sg * sr_mod Graphics helper drivers * drm * drm_kms_helper * i2c_algo_bit Filesystem drivers: * fuse * lockd * sunrpc CPU drivers: * microcode Sound drivers: * pcspkr * snd * snd_page_alloc * snd_pcm * snd_seq * snd_seq_device * snd_timer * soundcore If anyone has an opinion on whether these should be built into the kernel or left as modules, this is the right time to discuss it. My personal thoughts, with mostly x86 in mind: * The ACPI button and processor drivers could be built-in. Most x86 systems use ACPI and they supposedly all have at least one processor and one power button ;) And thermal_sys is selected by processor. * While all my systems have an optical drive, I know they have disappeared from many systems, both very small and very large ones, so leaving cdrom and sr_mod as modules seems fine. * I have no idea why/how sg is being loaded, it has no modalias and no other module depend on it. But /dev/sd* nodes are created so it is certainly useful. Hannes? * No idea what the scsi_dh* modules are about either, no modalias and no dependencies either. Hannes? * With DRM/KMS being the norm now, I believe drm and drm_kms_helper could be built-in, even though the former is quite large. drm selects i2c-algo-bit, most (all?) DRM/KMS drivers use it. Even servers have graphics chips. * I suppose fuse is only used on desktop machines by default, for gvfs, so having it as a module seems OK. * lockd and sunrpc are dependencies of nfs and nfsd. I suppose there are many users out there who don't serve nor mount NFS shares so modules make sense. * I think microcode could be unloaded after use, maybe for security reasons it might even be preferable, or just because there is simply no point in keeping it in memory. Thomas? Either way we should keep it modular. * For sound drivers, Takashi should know better than me. I suppose that the rationale for having these modular is that servers have no sound chip? -- Jean Delvare Suse L3 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

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[opensuse-kernel] CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
by richard -rw- weinberger 14 Dec '13

14 Dec '13

Hi! I'm wondering why CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR is disabled on openSUSE. Debian and Fedora seem to enabled it per default. What's the deal? -- Thanks, //richard -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

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[opensuse-kernel] [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
by Lee, Chun-Yi 05 Sep '13

05 Sep '13

Hi experts, This patchset is the implementation for signature verification of hibernate snapshot image. The origin idea is from Jiri Kosina: Let EFI bootloader generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, then pass it to kernel for sign/verify S4 image. Due to there have potential threat from the S4 image hacked, it may causes kernel lost the trust in UEFI secure boot. Hacker attack the S4 snapshot image in swap partition through whatever exploit from another trusted OS, and the exploit may don't need physical access machine. So, this patchset give the ability to kernel for parsing the RSA private key from EFI bootloader, then using the private key to generate the signature of S4 snapshot image. Kernel put the signature to snapshot header, and verify the signature when kernel try to recover snapshot image to memory. ============== How To Enable ============== Set enable the CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION kernel config. And you can also choice which hash algorithm should snapshot be signed with. Then rebuild kernel. Please note this function need UEFI bootloader's support to generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, e.g. shim. Current shim implementation by Gary Lin: Git: https://github.com/lcp/shim/tree/s4-key-upstream RPM: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/home:gary_lin:UEFI/shim Please use the shim from above URL if you want to try. Please remember add the hash of shim to db in UEFI BIOS because it didn't sign by Microsoft or any OSV key. ========= Behavior ========= The RSA key-pair are generated by EFI bootloader(e.g. shim) in UEFI secure boot environment, so this function binding with EFI secure boot enabled. The kernel behavior is: + UEFI Secure Boot ON. Kernel found private key from shim: Kernel will run the signature check when S4. + UEFI Secure Boot ON. Kernel didn't find key from shim: Kernel will lock down S4 function. + UEFI Secure Boot OFF Kernel will disable S4 signature check, and ignore any keys from EFI bootloader. Unconditional allow hibernate launch. On EFI bootloader side, the behavior as following: + First, kernel will check the following 2 EFI variable: S4SignKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 [BootService] S4WakeKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 [Runtime][Volatile] S4SignKey and S4WakeKey is a RSA key-pair: - S4SignKey is a private key that's used to generate signature of S4 snapshot. The blob format of S4SignKey is PKCS#8 uncompressed format, it should packaged a RSA private key that's followed PKCS#1. - S4WakeKey is a public key that's used to verify signature of S4 snapshot. The blob format of S4WakeKey is X.509 format, it should packaged a RSA public key that's followed PKCS#1. + EFI bootloader must generate RSA key-pair when system boot: - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to kernel. + EFI stub kernel will load the S4SignKey blob to RAM before ExitBootServices, then copy to a memory page to maintain by hibernate_key.c. This private key will used to sign snapshot when S4. + When machine resume from hibernate: - EFI bootloader should copy the public key from boottime variable to S4WakeKey EFI variable. - Bootloader need generates a new key-pair for next round S4 usage. It should put new private key to S4SignKey variable. + EFI bootlaoder need check the following EFI runtime variable for regenerate new key-pair: GenS4Key-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 The size of GenS4Key is 1 byte, OS(kernel or userland tool) will set it to "1" for notify efi bootloader regenerate key-pair. ============== Implementation ============== Whole implementation including 3 parts: shim, asymmetric keys and hibernate: + shim: Current solution implemented by Gary Lin: https://github.com/lcp/shim/tree/s4-key-upstream Please use shim from the above URL if you want to try. Please remember add this shim to db because it didn't sign by Microsoft or any OSV key. + Asymmetric keys: This patchset implemented uncompressed PKCS#8 and RSA private key parser, it also implement the signature generation operation of RSASSA-PKCS1-v_5 in PKCS#1 spec. [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2] Set CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_PARSER=y will give kernel the abilities to parsing private key in uncompressed PKCS#8 blob and generate signature. + Hibernate: Set CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION=y will enable the function of snapshot signature generation and verification. I reserved 512 byes size in snapshot header for store the signature that's generated from the digest with SHA algorithms. For adapt S4 signature check to secure boot, I have porting 3 patches from Fedora kernel, authors are Josh Boyer and Matthew Garrett. I also add Cc. to them. Please help review this RFC patchset! Appreciate for any comments! v3: - Load S4 sign key before ExitBootServices in efi stub. - In Makefile, moved hibernate_keys.o before hibernate.o for load S4 sign key before check hibernate image. It makes sure the new sign key will be transfer to resume target kernel. - Set "depends on EFI_STUB" in Kconfig. v2: - Moved SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION kernel config to earlier patch. - Add dummy functions to simplify the ifdef check. - Sent to opensuse-kernel(a)opensuse.org for review: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-kernel/2013-08/msg00025.html v1: - Internal review - github: https://github.com/joeyli/linux-s4sign/commits/devel-s4sign Josh Boyer (1): Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Lee, Chun-Yi (15): asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP in rsa asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1 asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with signature check Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification Matthew Garrett (2): Secure boot: Add new capability efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 + Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 121 ++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 9 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 7 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 68 ++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 11 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 16 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 | 19 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c | 152 ++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h | 23 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c | 148 ++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 | 29 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/private_key.h | 29 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 32 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 283 ++++++++++++++++++++++- crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 28 +++ include/crypto/public_key.h | 28 +++ include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h | 6 + include/linux/cred.h | 2 + include/linux/efi.h | 18 ++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +- kernel/cred.c | 17 ++ kernel/power/Kconfig | 77 ++++++- kernel/power/Makefile | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 37 +++ kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c | 329 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/power/main.c | 11 +- kernel/power/power.h | 35 +++ kernel/power/snapshot.c | 345 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/power/swap.c | 22 ++ kernel/power/user.c | 22 ++ 34 files changed, 1925 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/private_key.h create mode 100644 kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

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[opensuse-kernel] Please enable CRYPTO_FIPS
by Marcus Meissner 29 Aug '13

29 Aug '13

Hi folks, please enable CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS Default of fips is still 0 aka "off" afterwards, but you can then actually switch it on via fips=1. Ciao, Marcus -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

2 2

[opensuse-kernel] tcp sysctls for ipv6?
by ar16 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

I'm migrating our LAN stack to IPv6. tcp sysctls for IPv4 are numerous & flexible, and have been of great benefit. for IPv6, there are no apparent tcp tunables sysctl -a | grep ipv6 | grep tcp Is there another method available, or package required, for IPv6 tcp tuning? Or is it simply not implemented? -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

3 3

[opensuse-kernel] Kernel Problem with new Hardware
by Günther J. Niederwimmer 22 Aug '13

22 Aug '13

Hello, I have a new Asus Board P9D WS with the new xeon E3-1275v3 and Chipset Intel C226. Is the kernel for oS 12.3 running with this hardware? I have a big Problem with the intern Graphic and USB Maus / Keyboard Grub have no Problem to find the Mouse / Keyboard, in the oS I have to remove the USB Connector wait and insert the USB Connecter afterward I have a Mouse / Keyboard again. If it is possible to found the correct Graphic (KVM) driver? -- mit freundlichen Grüßen / best Regards, Günther J. Niederwimmer -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

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[opensuse-kernel] [PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
by Lee, Chun-Yi 22 Aug '13

22 Aug '13

Hi experts, This patchset is the implementation for signature verification of hibernate snapshot image. The origin idea is from Jiri Kosina: Let EFI bootloader generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, then pass it to kernel for sign/verify S4 image. Due to there have potential threat from the S4 image hacked, it may causes kernel lost the trust in UEFI secure boot. Hacker attack the S4 snapshot image in swap partition through whatever exploit from another trusted OS, and the exploit may don't need physical access machine. So, this patchset give the ability to kernel for parsing the RSA private key from EFI bootloader, then using the private key to generate the signature of S4 snapshot image. Kernel put the signature to snapshot header, and verify the signature when kernel try to recover snapshot image to memory. ============== How To Enable ============== Set enable the CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION kernel config. And you can also choice which hash algorithm should snapshot be signed with. Then rebuild kernel. Please note this function need UEFI bootloader's support to generate key-pair in UEFI secure boot environment, e.g. shim. Current shim implementation by Gary Lin: Git: https://github.com/lcp/shim/tree/s4-key-upstream RPM: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/home:gary_lin:UEFI/shim Please use the shim from above URL if you want to try. Please remember add the hash of shim to db in UEFI BIOS because it didn't sign by Microsoft or any OSV key. ========= Behavior ========= The RSA key-pair are generated by EFI bootloader(e.g. shim) in UEFI secure boot environment, so this function binding with EFI secure boot enabled. The kernel behavior is: + UEFI Secure Boot ON. Kernel found private key from shim: Kernel will run the signature check when S4. + UEFI Secure Boot ON. Kernel didn't find key from shim: Kernel will lock down S4 function. + UEFI Secure Boot OFF Kernel will disable S4 signature check, and ignore any keys from EFI bootloader. Unconditional allow hibernate launch. On EFI bootloader side, the behavior as following: + First, kernel will check the following 2 EFI variable: S4SignKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 [BootService] S4WakeKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 [Runtime][Volatile] S4SignKey and S4WakeKey is a RSA key-pair: - S4SignKey is a private key that's used to generate signature of S4 snapshot. The blob format of S4SignKey is PKCS#8 uncompressed format, it should packaged a RSA private key that's followed PKCS#1. - S4WakeKey is a public key that's used to verify signature of S4 snapshot. The blob format of S4WakeKey is X.509 format, it should packaged a RSA public key that's followed PKCS#1. + EFI bootloader must generate RSA key-pair when system boot: - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to kernel. + EFI stub kernel will load the S4SignKey blob to RAM before ExitBootServices, then copy to a memory page to maintain by hibernate_key.c. This private key will used to sign snapshot when S4. + When machine resume from hibernate: - EFI bootloader should copy the public key from boottime variable to S4WakeKey EFI variable. - Bootloader need generates a new key-pair for next round S4 usage. It should put new private key to S4SignKey variable. + EFI bootlaoder need check the following EFI runtime variable for regenerate new key-pair: GenS4Key-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 The size of GenS4Key is 1 byte, OS(kernel or userland tool) will set it to "1" for notify efi bootloader regenerate key-pair. ============== Implementation ============== Whole implementation including 3 parts: shim, asymmetric keys and hibernate: + shim: Current solution implemented by Gary Lin: https://github.com/lcp/shim/tree/s4-key-upstream Please use shim from the above URL if you want to try. Please remember add this shim to db because it didn't sign by Microsoft or any OSV key. + Asymmetric keys: This patchset implemented uncompressed PKCS#8 and RSA private key parser, it also implement the signature generation operation of RSASSA-PKCS1-v_5 in PKCS#1 spec. [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2] Set CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_PARSER=y will give kernel the abilities to parsing private key in uncompressed PKCS#8 blob and generate signature. + Hibernate: Set CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION=y will enable the function of snapshot signature generation and verification. I reserved 512 byes size in snapshot header for store the signature that's generated from the digest with SHA algorithms. For adapt S4 signature check to secure boot, I have porting 3 patches from Fedora kernel, authors are Josh Boyer and Matthew Garrett. I also add Cc. to them. Please help review this RFC patchset! Appreciate for any comments! v3: - Load S4 sign key before ExitBootServices in efi stub. - In Makefile, moved hibernate_keys.o before hibernate.o for load S4 sign key before check hibernate image. It makes sure the new sign key will be transfer to resume target kernel. - Set "depends on EFI_STUB" in Kconfig. v2: - Moved SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION kernel config to earlier patch. - Add dummy functions to simplify the ifdef check. - Sent to opensuse-kernel(a)opensuse.org for review: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-kernel/2013-08/msg00025.html v1: - Internal review - github: https://github.com/joeyli/linux-s4sign/commits/devel-s4sign Josh Boyer (1): Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Lee, Chun-Yi (15): asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP in rsa asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1 asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with signature check Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification Matthew Garrett (2): Secure boot: Add new capability efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 + Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 121 ++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 9 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 7 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 68 ++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 11 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 16 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 | 19 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c | 152 ++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h | 23 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c | 148 ++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 | 29 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/private_key.h | 29 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 32 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 283 ++++++++++++++++++++++- crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 28 +++ include/crypto/public_key.h | 28 +++ include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h | 6 + include/linux/cred.h | 2 + include/linux/efi.h | 18 ++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +- kernel/cred.c | 17 ++ kernel/power/Kconfig | 77 ++++++- kernel/power/Makefile | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 37 +++ kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c | 329 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/power/main.c | 11 +- kernel/power/power.h | 35 +++ kernel/power/snapshot.c | 345 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/power/swap.c | 22 ++ kernel/power/user.c | 22 ++ 34 files changed, 1925 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/private_key.h create mode 100644 kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

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[opensuse-kernel] [PATCH] Update armv6 default config
by Guillaume Gardet 13 Aug '13

13 Aug '13

Hi, please find a patch to update armv6 default config to multi-arch armv6. Signed-off-by: Guillaume GARDET <guillaume.gardet(a)opensuse.org> Regards, Guillaume

1 0

[opensuse-kernel] [PATCH] Reenable ARMv6/ARMv7 configs
by Dirk Müller 13 Aug '13

13 Aug '13

Hi, the patch below reenables the ARMv6 / v7 configs that we need for building current Factory images. Please merge to master. TIA, Dirk

2 2

[opensuse-kernel] Kernel:HEAD btrfs + chromium == hard lockup, crash
by Cristian Rodríguez 11 Aug '13

11 Aug '13

Hi: Since moving to 3.11rc2 the following happends Accessing a heavy site like youtube with chromium 30.x ends with > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: Modules linked in: af_packet cachefiles fscache hid_logitech_dj snd_hda_codec_hdmi x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp kvm_int > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 1644 Comm: SimpleCacheWork Tainted: P O 3.11.0-rc2-1.g00cdcf9-desktop #1 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: Hardware name: DELL Inc. Studio XPS 435T/9000/0X501H, BIOS A16 02/04/2010 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: task: ffff8801bd4b2400 ti: ffff88019ff5a000 task.ti: ffff88019ff5a000 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d85bd>] [<ffffffff812d85bd>] memcpy+0xd/0x110 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff88019ff5b9a0 EFLAGS: 00010202 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RAX: ffff880124c74107 RBX: 000000000000065a RCX: 00000000000000cb > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: db73880000000000 RDI: ffff880124c74107 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RBP: ffff8801200ff7b0 R08: 0000000000000761 R09: 0000000000001000 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 6db6db6db6db6db7 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: R13: 0000160000000000 R14: ffff880124c74761 R15: 000000000000065a > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: FS: 00007fd825640700(0000) GS:ffff88023fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: CR2: 00007fd8327d81a3 CR3: 00000001c9b52000 CR4: 00000000000027e0 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: Stack: > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: ffffffffa00cb868 0000000000000000 ffff880219379800 0000000000000000 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: ffff880120022a30 ffff880124c74000 ffff8801200ff6e0 ffff88010e865338 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: ffffffffa00b0aab 0000000000001000 ffff8801318226d0 0000000000000761 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: Call Trace: > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffffa00cb868>] read_extent_buffer+0xc8/0x120 [btrfs] > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffffa00b0aab>] btrfs_get_extent+0x8db/0x980 [btrfs] > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffffa00c8b36>] __extent_read_full_page+0x316/0x7d0 [btrfs] > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffffa00c9f99>] extent_readpages+0x169/0x1c0 [btrfs] > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff81129a43>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x1b3/0x260 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff81129f17>] ondemand_readahead+0x117/0x250 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff8111fb66>] generic_file_aio_read+0x4a6/0x6f0 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff811827f7>] do_sync_read+0x67/0x90 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff81182d94>] vfs_read+0x94/0x160 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff811839e3>] SyS_pread64+0x63/0xa0 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<ffffffff815b6fff>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: [<00007fd85666dbd3>] 0x7fd85666dbd2 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: Code: fc ff ff 48 8b 43 58 48 2b 43 50 88 43 4e eb e9 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 <f3> 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 20 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 4c 8 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RIP [<ffffffff812d85bd>] memcpy+0xd/0x110 > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: RSP <ffff88019ff5b9a0> > Jul 24 21:56:54 xps9000.cristianrodriguez.net kernel: ---[ end trace a4449cb6cdee0f9a ]--- No futher IO can be done, machine locks up, REISUB is the only escape :-| -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe(a)opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner(a)opensuse.org

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