March 2003 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

Re: [suse-security] ptrace exploit still works after kernel update
by Eduard Avetisyan 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

Hi ;-) --- David Huecking <d.huecking(a)gmx.net> wrote: > For me it only works for SuSE Kernel 2.4.16-4GB delivered for > SuSE 7.3. > 2.4.18-4GB of 8.0 and 2.4.19-4GB of 8.1 seem to be "safe" > against THIS > particular exploit. (All the "old" unpatched versions...) > Does anybody have an exploit for these kernels? I've seen it (the km3.c) work on at least two machines with 8.1, probably the k_deflt kernel... Cheers Eduard __________________________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Platinum - Watch CBS' NCAA March Madness, live on your desktop! http://platinum.yahoo.com

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TUN/TAP device driver (bad state)
by Markus Roth 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

hello all i'm trying to build my own secure tunnel (i know that there are already a lot of them out there. it's for educational purpose only). i like to use the virtual tunX/tapX interfaces/devices. this is no problem with the "old" ethertab module, but the doc from /usr/src/linux/Documentation/networking/ethertap.txt says that: "Ethertap is now an obsolete facility". it points to /usr/src/linux/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt where the new tun/tap device driver is explained. i played the hole day around with this driver but didn't succeed to bring up a virtual tunX/tapX device. i always get a "File descriptor in bad state" error message. i'm using SuSE 8.0 with the default kernel 2.4.18-4GB. i did everything which gets pointed out in the manuals and from the FAQ. the important parts look like this diavolo:/dev/net # grep tun /etc/modules.conf alias char-major-10-200 tun diavolo:/dev/net # ls -ltra tun crw------- 1 root root 10, 200 Dec 20 2001 tun if i try to access the device i get diavolo:/dev/net # cat tun cat: tun: File descriptor in bad state the module gets loaded (if it wasn't already) and a message gets logged to /var/log/messages Mar 26 19:59:35 diavolo kernel: Universal TUN/TAP device driver 1.4 (C)1999-2001 Maxim Krasnyansky diavolo:/ # lsmod | grep tun tun 3488 0 (autoclean) the docs says: TUN/TAP driver will be automatically loaded when application access /dev/tunX, /dev/tapX or /dev/net/tun if i access /dev/tab0 the module netlink_dev is used instead of the tun module. diavolo:/home/mroth/download/networking/tap/tun-1.1 # lsmod | head -3 Module Size Used by Tainted: P tun 3488 0 (unused) netlink_dev 1728 1 (autoclean) i can also bring up a interface diavolo:/home/mroth/download/networking/tap/tun-1.1 # ifconfig tap0 up diavolo:/home/mroth/download/networking/tap/tun-1.1 # ifconfig tap0 tap0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr FE:FD:00:00:00:00 inet6 addr: fe80::fcfd:ff:fe00:0/10 Scope:Link UP BROADCAST RUNNING NOARP MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1 RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 TX packets:3 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:216 (216.0 b) Interrupt:5 but the ethertap module will be used diavolo:/home/mroth/download/networking/tap/tun-1.1 # lsmod | head -4 Module Size Used by Tainted: P ethertap 2496 1 (autoclean) tun 3488 0 (unused) netlink_dev 1728 1 (autoclean) does somebody know if with the new driver the netlink_dev driver will still be used and if the devices /dev/tapX can be accessed as before (if it would work)? i wrote the following small test program to use the driver as explained in the manual. most of the source taken from included examples. #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <netinet/if_ether.h> #include <linux/if.h> #include <linux/if_tun.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct ifreq ifr; int fd, err; if( (fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) < 0 ) { printf("Could not open device\n"); exit(1); } memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr)); ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP | IFF_NO_PI; if( (err = ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, (void *) &ifr)) < 0 ){ printf("Cannot allocate TAP device\n"); close(fd); exit(1); } printf("Allocated device %s\n", ifr.ifr_name); close(fd); return 0; } the result is the following diavolo:/home/mroth/tmp # ./tun Cannot allocate TAP device the problem seams to be at the ioctl call diavolo:/home/mroth/tmp # strace ./tun 2>&1 | grep -A 1 -B 1 ioctl open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR) = 3 ioctl(3, TUNSETIFF, 0xbffff62c) = -1 EBADFD (File descriptor in bad state) fstat64(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 it would be rally great if someone could tell me what i am doing wrong or what i have to do that this works. thank you very much (also for reading so much!) markus

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Re: [suse-security] SuSE Security Announcement: kernel (SuSE-SA:2003:021)
by Michael Salmon 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

--On 2003-03-25 19.16.02 +0100 "=?windows-1252?Q?Dominik_Sk=3Fadanowski?=" <dominik.skladanowski(a)ch.pw.edu.pl> wrote: > Hello list. > > Many post about new kernel update was not positive. Somebody installed > this update without any problems? > > I have a server WWW (Pentium 2) working on SuSE 8.1 Pro, without any X11. > There is only packets I need: Apache, PHP, PostgreSQL 7.3.2 (compiled > from source) and some more. Still I'm afraid to install this update to > kernel. -- I have just installed the patches for 8.1 (Duron) and 8.0 (C3) and I have not had any problems so far, except that downloading the source is taking an eternity, this is the first time I have really used kget and I have to recommend it. /Michael -- This space intentionally left non-blank.

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Re: [suse-security] Persisting problems when updating to new 2.4.18 kernel on SuSE 7.3
by Vaclav Brunnhofer 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

Jan Kiszka <kiszka(a)rts.uni-hannover.de> : same findings, system boots, but ext3 does not seem to be active. lsmod reports no ext3, jbd 42736 0 (unused) Also kjournald is not running. Vaclav Brunnhofer ___________________________________ NOCC, http://nocc.sourceforge.net

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Persisting problems when updating to new 2.4.18 kernel on SuSE 7.3
by Jan Kiszka 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

Hi, yesterday I also spent some hours on that kernel issue. Now I tried the workaround swapping the ext3/jdb order in INITRD_MODULES. After reenabling ext3 for the root filesystem, my system actually boots again. It also reports that / is mounted as ext3 (according to the "mount" output). But there is still a warning during startup, because / acually seems to be still ext2. And after intentionally hard-resetting the system it did not replay the journal, it just ran the lengthy fsck... Any (further) ideas? Thanks, Jan

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Re: [suse-security] ping through SuSEfirewall2
by Dirk Borchers 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

>> I set up a router with SuSEfirewall2 and allowed only certain ports >> for masquerading. To allow ping through the firewall I added the line >> 0/0,0/0,icmp in FW_MASQ_NETS. But the pings do not reach the external >> computers. What is missing? >> >> Dirk >> maybe u need also to add a rule to let the ping request be forwareded >> to the outside?! the forwarding rules are only for routing from the internet to the intranet (so the documents say), so these rules do not apply. i also set FW_ALLOW_PING_EXT="yes"; but this has only the effect that the pings do not appear in the log-files - i get no error message. but the ping does not reach the destination.

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Problems when updating to new 2.4.18 kernel on SuSE 7.3
by Sven 'Darkman' Michels 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

Hello, Some ppl reported problems updating to the new kernel on SuSE 7.3. Today i did the same update on one of my boxes and run into the same trouble: After updating the kernel, the box doesn't boot anymore cause of a kernel panic due to problems with the root fs. All settings where correct, mk_initrd was done sucessfully and even lilo reported no problems. After a while i downgraded, with the same settings back to 2.4.16 and it worked without any problems. With a lot of help from the SuSE ppl, we found out what the problem is/was: the order of the modules loaded by initrd. The "default" was: INITRD_MODULES="jbd ext3" but if you change it to: INITRD_MODULES="ext3 jbd" and do the mk_initrd && lilo again, it works without problems. Actually it's unknown _why_ the order does matter in that case. On 8.1. with INITRD_MODULES="jbd ext3 ide-scsi" the update worked without such problems. Hope that helps Regards, Sven

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kernel updates
by Roman Drahtmueller 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

Hi, long awaited, it's there now: The kernel updates for 7.1-8.1 are on their way to the mirrors. 8.2 already has the fix when it hits the stores. You'll find directories named kernel/2.4.18-20030324/ in each of the update directories of the 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.0, 8.1 distributions. The changelogs are not fully consistent, but the packages are ok and fix the known problems. 8.1 has a 2.4.19 kernel, 8.0 and below have 2.4.18. Basically, the 2.4.19 kernel from 8.1 should run with the older distributions as well, but your mileage may vary. We have had some problems when we tested the kernel packages, mostly because the first suggested fixes were incorrect. This is why it took us so long. The announcement will follow later tonight. It will be copied to the update/*/kernel/2.4.1?-20030324 directories as soon as it is published. It will contain detailed information about the commands necessary to install the updates. In short: rpm -qf /boot/vmlinuz download the package for your system. rpm -Uhv your_package mk_initrd . /etc/sysconfig/bootloader case "$LOADER_TYPE" in *lilo*) lilo ;; *) ;; esac Roman.

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SuSE Security Announcement: apcupsd (SuSE-SA:2003:022)
by Thomas Biege 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: apcupsd Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:022 Date: Wednesday, Mar 26th 2003 14:00 MET Affected products: 7.3, 8.0, 8.1 Vulnerability Type: remote system compromise Severity (1-10): 3 SuSE default package: no Cross References: CAN-2003-0098 CAN-2003-0099 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: - several buffer overflows - several format bugs problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: - glibc - rxvt - vnc - openssl 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information The controlling and management daemon apcupsd for APC's Unbreakable Power Supplies is vulnerable to several buffer overflows and format bugs. These bugs can be exploited remotely by an attacker to gain root access to the machine apcupsd is running on. There is no temporary fix known. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/apcupsd-3.8.6-17.i586.… 4a6e718edf75219769dcbc8d42d78586 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/apcupsd-3.8.6-17.i586.… 1e7a3656b82dd626add69b9473b87e1c source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/apcupsd-3.8.6-17.src.rpm 7dd06d1bcefa78bd25eaa512bcbaa67e SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/ap4/apcupsd-3.8.6-16.i386.rpm 6ed48e7150f88da8dea856a96ed66cd9 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/ap4/apcupsd-3.8.6-16.i386.patch… 186dc6bc26808bb0d71d697c5b2152ec source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/apcupsd-3.8.6-16.src.rpm d0671be38f7fe29a2c7bfd3950673af3 SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/ap2/apcupsd-3.8.2-70.i386.rpm 4e19d2e227716a5dbd56eeda5bbe3e3f source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/apcupsd-3.8.2-70.src.rpm 9d80af6c213025944aecf5d08449c552 Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/ap2/apcupsd-3.8.2-30.sparc.rpm e76823753f5ae5446be78362d9d0ad47 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/apcupsd-3.8.2-30.src.rpm 9e1295c038d72e96ae3c68a4755f46e8 PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/ap2/apcupsd-3.8.2-56.ppc.rpm c692b7d1fbf221a1f6f714789f32bada source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/apcupsd-3.8.2-56.src.rpm 65d0a076d147b91133bc1a820711147b ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - glibc SuSE Security is working on glibc updates for the RPC XDR integer overflow security problem in glibc. The central function of the glibc package in a Linux system requires extensive testing of the update packages. The update packages will be provided for download at the usual location and publically announced as soon as the testing is completed successfully. - rxvt A new version of the rxvt packages was put on our FTP servers. This version fix' the handling of dangerous escape-sequences. - vnc VNC (Virtual Network Computing) uses a weak cookie generation process which can be exploited by an attacker to bypass authentication. New packages are currently being tested and will be available on our FTP servers soon. - openssl A paper regarding remote timing attacks against OpenSSL has been published by researchers of the Stanford University. It is possible to extract the private RSA key used by services using OpenSSL by observing their timing behavior. Fixed packages will be available on our FTP servers soon. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBPoGpcney5gA9JdPZAQHr5gf+LuhcT2e8/9iFWbIhmuz3R4trje5Xnc+A whJgfviqVGpDHc9DbcM55oNBtWJOF1xbG0ZQO99BAQ7f8gR4zln+pU34s0yoCiPm wVSUg59Ji1EdRm/uVW6iBppdEVg6hVUvduwVPuz4N1MfWOmByhrt50i2tO7mChvW QLxuf3KmTYIqFmYYRRhe7wM/9yUoKo4cjMekl0tXvmn+aHvp7keC4fKndP7Uwi9T fZSCUr2BXGWC0rcOdeOeWhm+D75CzFhXw0JZpMWaTE68vwjxYOvcgnzTT4LViLB5 YjPjEzS5gEEyCZSgK44RRQu1ze5UA0Ua6i5qdSbp1NCrZEuDmMi3jQ== =qgtY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bye, Thomas -- Thomas Biege <thomas(a)suse.de> SuSE Linux AG,Deutschherrnstr. 15-19,90429 Nuernberg Function: Security Support & Auditing "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~thomas/contact/thomas.asc | gpg --import" Key fingerprint = 7254 B15D B3C4 943F 485E 0BBD 8ECC D7CB C200 A213

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Kernel Exploit --- Another temporary solution
by Thomas Seliger 26 Mar '03

26 Mar '03

Hi, i found the following kernel module working well under Debian Woody: http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5SP082K5GK.html It allows ptrace only for the root user. Any problems to expect when using it on a SuSE System? peace, Tom

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