openSUSE Security May 2003

security@lists.opensuse.org

146 participants
119 discussions

how to keep nimda and code red from filling apache logs
by Mathias Homann 25 Sep '03

25 Sep '03

Hi all, here's a bit of a step-by-step description on how to keep nimda and codered from filling your apache logs. Parts used: - SuSE 7.2 Professional - SuSEfirewall2 - iptables 1.2.3 - linux kernel 2.4.13-pre5 steps: 1. install kernel sources for a kernel >> 2.4.9, running 2.4.13- pre5 here, works fine so far 2. get the sources for iptables 1.2.3 from http://netfilter.samba.org 3. unpack sources somewhere 4. export KERNEL_DIR=$(where you put the kernel tree) 5. cd into unpacked iptables sources, there's a subdirectory named patch-o-matic there 6. apply wanted patches by running ./runme $(name.of.patch)patch for this here You'll want the string patch You can also apply other patches, like the irc-conntrack patch 7. now there's a little bug in this patch... here's a diff: --- linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_string.c~ Sun Oct 21 00:16:29 2001 +++ linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_string.c Sun Oct 21 16:54:45 2001 @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ sk = skip[haystack[right_end - i]]; sh = shift[i]; - right_end = max(int, right_end - i + sk, right_end + sh); + right_end = max(right_end - i + sk, right_end + sh); } return NULL; 8. now, make config/menuconfig/xconfig... as usual. You can import your running kernel's config first. 9. enable the experimental stuff 10. go to networking options->netfilter, there's an option there to enable string matching; set that to M 11. compile and install kernel as usual; remember to uncomment the export INSTALL_PATH=/boot in the main makefile. 12. now build a rpm file for the new iptables stuff by installing the source rpm which comes with suse, then edit the spec file, put the iptables source in /usr/src/packages/SOURCE and rebuild. 13. now there are some small changes to the firewall config files. a) uncomment the last line in /etc/rc.config.d/firewall2.rc.config: FW_CUSTOMRULES="/etc/rc.config.d/firewall2-custom.rc.config" b) edit that file, I got the following stuff in mine: for forbidden_string in root.exe cmd.exe .ida; do iptables -I input_ext -p tcp --dport http -m string \ --string $forbidden_string -m state \ --state ESTABLISHED -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset done put that in the last supfunction defined in the custom rc file. c) change the FW_LOG setting in firewall2.rc.config from reading -log-level warning to -log-level kernel.warning 14. last: some small changes to /sbin/SuSEfirewall2 search in the script for the parts where the modules are loaded and unloaded; be sure to add ipt_string (and the other new modules you created by patching the kernel and enabling them in make config) to the modules loading/unloading code there. 15. reboot 16. if you try now to access (from outside, of course) one of the nimda or codered URLS, all you get is a 'connection reset by peer', and the request doesn't show in apache log files. btw, no guarantees, and the usual YMMV :) bye [L]

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X Listening
by Richard Ibbotson 19 Jun '03

19 Jun '03

Hi Anyone know how to stop X-windows and port 6000 from listening on SuSE 8.2 ? I've already tried changed the line ... :0 local /usr/X11R6/bin/X :0 vt07 to :0 local /usr/X11R6/bin/X :0 vt07 --nolisten tcp but X-windows is still listening on port 6000. What else do I need to change ? Thanks -- Richard

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SSH and CHROOT alternatives...
by Duncan Carter 12 Jun '03

12 Jun '03

Howdoo all, I've been looking at trying to secure SSH sessions so that specified users can only browse their home diretories. I've found a couple of bodges that can be made to do the trick, but none of them seem particulalry ideal. Has anyone got any suggestions on how I could secure SSH in this fashion, whether using CHROOT or something else entirely I don't mind. Cheers. ----~~~~==oOo==~~~~---- Duncan Carter ----~~~~==oOo==~~~~----

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sshd, Is it safe to use "Password authentication Yes"
by Bo Jacobsen 11 Jun '03

11 Jun '03

I think it's much more convinient to use "Password Authentication" then using keys, but how safe is it. Also should I use ChallengeResponseAuthentication" or not. I use SuSE 8.2. Thanks in advance Bo Jacobsen

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SuSE Security Announcement: glibc (SuSE-SA:2003:027)
by Thomas Biege 04 Jun '03

04 Jun '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: glibc Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:027 Date: Monday, May 26th 2003 16:12 MET Affected products: 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.0, 8.1 SuSE Linux Database Server, SuSE eMail Server III, 3.1 SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7, SuSE Linux Firewall on CD/Admin host SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Office Server Vulnerability Type: remote system compromise Severity (1-10): 6 SuSE default package: yes Cross References: CAN-2003-0028 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: integer overflow in XDR code problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: - ethereal - XFree4 - vnc - bitchx - lv 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information Another integer overflow was found in glibc' XDR code. This bug is equal to the one described in advisory SuSE-SA:2002:031. The overflow occurs in the function xdrmem_getbytes() and can be used by external attackers to execute arbitrary code. There is no temporary workaround for this security problem other than disabling all RPC based server and client programs. The permanent solution is to update the glibc packages with the update packages listed below. Notes, Special installation instructions: * PRECAUTIONS The shared libraries package of the glibc is the most sensitive part of a running Linux system, and modifications to it should be handled with special care. During the update of the shlibs/glibc package, runtime-linking the shared libraries is likely to fail for processes that execute a new binary with the execve(2) system call. Therefore, we recommend to bring a system to single user mode ("init S") to perform the package update. If this is not applicable for operational reasons, a system receiving the update should be kept as quiet as possible (no shell scripts of any kind, no cron jobs, no incoming email). * After performing the update, you should run the following command on your system: /sbin/ldconfig ldconfig will rebuild the runtime linker cache. If you use YOU (Yast2 Online Update), the ldconfig command will be executed automatically at the end of the update. The shared libraries that were installed on the system before the update have been removed from the filesystem, but they are still in use by the running applications. Therefore, the disk-space as well as the memory will not be freed until the last process that uses these files exits. We recommend to reboot the system to workaround this problem. Listed below you find the URLs for the update packages for the SuSE Linux products. We only list the packages that are relevant for the security update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i686/glibc-2.2.5-177.i686.r… 1cf549fa52427710c7dc3316fc5df4a6 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i686/glibc-2.2.5-177.i686.p… f87601fd71edf54928104581684dae8f SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/a1/glibc-2.2.5-177.i386.rpm da51402d30c37dd5dc6d5444c37f4dc3 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/a1/glibc-2.2.5-177.i386.patch.r… 0b5ea57d89c31d923cfb56cb1f951bac source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/glibc-2.2.5-177.src.rpm 6fecec2ed42fb792b6e9cb2a5602fe23 SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/a1/glibc-2.2.4-78.i386.rpm 11cc1ceb173b18fc82d8500b1528663e source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/glibc-2.2.4-78.src.rpm 38527e5f75d94c016659c71028c37c52 SuSE-7.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/a1/glibc-2.2.2-68.i386.rpm 82f4c3ee8ba0cf3feef5e0ba7321a230 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/glibc-2.2.2-68.src.rpm 34114134cb51d706989c45306f4fdde3 SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/a1/glibc-2.2-26.i386.rpm ffe7c422727ee98b8191facbbf40b9d7 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/zq1/glibc-2.2-26.src.rpm 1c5b778ff60a82f03e412239b907671b Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/a1/glibc-2.2.4-46.sparc.rpm dc577491e13344411462603b6fe83d3f source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/glibc-2.2.4-46.src.rpm 0a0a5dd6ee76e6b0ef866b500d6537b2 AXP Alpha Platform: SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/a1/glibc-2.2-34.alpha.rpm d250c254668e02b9f23341903f2f3a5e source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/zq1/glibc-2.2-34.src.rpm d89b4a1ff27227a085e516b48ccdb1cf PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/a1/glibc-2.2.4-69.ppc.rpm 5bf4edf432c996b3e38ef085122e1e8 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - ethereal Several one-byte buffer overflows and integer overflows are fixed. These bugs lead to remote denial-of-service or even remote code execution. New packages are available on our FTP servers. - XFree4 A buffer overflow in the Xlib code can be triggered while handling the environment variable XLOCALEDIR. The X version affected is 4.2.0 (SuSE Linux 8.0 and 8.1). New packages are available on our FTP servers. - vnc VNC (Virtual Network Computing) uses a weak cookie generation process which can be exploited by an attacker to bypass authentication. New packages are available on our FTP servers. - bitchx Several buffer overflows got fixed that can be exploited remotely by a malicious IRC servers. New packages are available on our FTP servers. - lv lv reads config files from the current directory without verifying the ownership. If lv is called in world-writeable directories like /tmp it can be tricked into executing commands by putting a malicious config- file there. New packages are available on our FTP servers. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (GNU/Linux) iQEVAwUBPtNwVney5gA9JdPZAQGgRwf+Jb5OmG6zuqPPAE9nf31SVOUXKY1aO+D0 eHqEM/7VbSaCQ2TAx28mYfyek1NaGudwyqDBGxyVYrrlwz0z9jkGRP/GUY4h2mBk vff5xnlzSbvetFCnoHtR/RqXXRPvnDe3GDgeJXoPpZtRYnDb/Rw/4UOKnIyev7QP iw8yupuYGEQt6yDHwMatSJAHOT3QOmYbsqy6N8GcQ2KwttaVWmHw8bm5eoJKrAAM HR0YjLAu371ZO4pfV4r3Vl2HhaQ+r+/tm4VHnySqA5YdDyM1QiX1AEi5RXqD3L0U ERYYwSc/h/jG6aqKcqAurFIdoGUqAvzevJv0quQAYRWNwbik8jzv8g== =BUi3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bye, Thomas -- Thomas Biege <thomas(a)suse.de> SuSE Linux AG,Deutschherrnstr. 15-19,90429 Nuernberg Function: Security Support & Auditing "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~thomas/contact/thomas.asc | gpg --import" Key fingerprint = 7254 B15D B3C4 943F 485E 0BBD 8ECC D7CB C200 A213 -- Das erste Opfer einer Schlacht ist immer der Schlachtplan.

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obsolete (PF_INET,SOCK_PACKET)
by webmaster 02 Jun '03

02 Jun '03

Hi List, Is the err below harmless? And what a way to cure it? SuSe 7.1 box scanlogd uses obsolete (PF_INET,SOCK_PACKET) Thanks Antal Kreorg Oktatóközpont Grid International Magyarország kreorg(a)kreorg.hu +36-1-321-0031

2 1

SuSEfirewall2
by Greg Jamison 01 Jun '03

01 Jun '03

Hello, I am new to the SuSEfirewall, but have quite a bit of experience with iptables. There are a few rules I used in iptables that I can't seem to find equivalents for with the SuSEfirewall. Specifically the following: -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --syn -j DROP (This drops all TCP syn packets received on eth0) -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID,NEW -j DROP (This drops any TCP traffic received on eth0 not generated by my firewall or internal network) Is there any way I can accomplish the same with the SuSEfirewall? Any help is greatly appreciated. Thanks! Greg Jamison

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OT: how to report bugs of AMaViS and samba-vscan
by Rainer Link 31 May '03

31 May '03

Hi, as I received once in a while bug reports/feedback et al wrt AMaViS/samba-vscan from readers of this list (send directly to me), here's a short announcement: * SuSE-related issues (e.g. RPM packaging, YaST/SuSEconfig) should be reported via http://www.suse.com/feedback * general AMaViS issues should be send to the amavis-user mailing list (see http://www.amavis.org); security issues should be directed to security at amavis dot org * general/security issues wrt samba-vscan should be send to rainer at openantivirus dot org Reason: today will be my last day working for SuSE. So, the new RPM maintainer of AMaViS won't be a member of the AMaViS Core Team. Thank you very much for your co-operation. Last but not least I'd like to thank SuSE very much for funding my work for three years. I really enjoyed working for one of the best OSS/Linux company around [1] :-) best regards, Rainer Link R&D, SuSE Labs -- Rainer Link | SuSE Linux AG - The Linux Experts link(a)suse.de | Developer of A Mail Virus Scanner (www.amavis.org) www.suse.de | Founder OpenAntiVirus Project (www.openantivirus.org)

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RE: AW: [suse-security] Log/Audit all user commands
by Jeff Harris 30 May '03

30 May '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Eduard Avetisyan [mailto:dich_ed@yahoo.com] > > Sent: Viernes, 30 de Mayo de 2003 06:34 > > > > Dear friends, > > > > I followed this discussion a little bit, and here's my 2 cents: > > > > bash_history logs only commands one typed in bash. What if he changes to > > tcsh or whatever else? "Whatever else" includes also graphical helpers, > > like konqueror or nautilus that give you a lot of freedom to run or > > modify any files, while you can't log any actions... and tty sniffer > > won't help either. > > > > I agree with the statement that you don't have to let any intruder play > > with your machine, since it may well be that he HAS already installed > > sniffers (tty or network) and stuff like that, so any action you take > > now will be well known to him. So better really unplug the network, shut > > off the machine, boot from CD (if you'd like to trace back changes he > > made to your system), and reinstall... > > > > Good luck, > > Eduard > > > > __________________________________ > > Do you Yahoo!? > > > On Fri, 30 May 2003, Ricardo wrote: > > > It's OK that he plays with the network. I am using two net's and that > > one he's using isn't important. This can help me to see what he is > > trying to do, what a hacker does, etc. and more important how to act and > > correct. So, this is just a "demo" for me. It's real, but I can see that > > as a demo. So, if you want to help and participate (I give you all the > > info he is doing)... Thanks again, > > > > Ricardo > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jeff Harris [mailto:linux@rallycentral.us] > Sent: Friday, May 30, 2003 9:34 AM > > IMO, it's never OK that unauthorized users "play with the network." They > might be setting up a grand DOS that when the FBI tracks down, is > originating with your server, and _you_ may spend time in the pokey. > > It would be much more beneficial to unplug the network and reinstall the > OS and all security updates. If you really want to know how a cracker > works, you might want to try a legally cracking into systems: > http://www.happyhacker.org/wargame/index.shtml > > -- On Fri, 30 May 2003, Sturgis, Grant wrote: > But this situation, from what Ricardo wrote, is more like a honeypot than an > exploit. > If you're operating a Honeypot in the US or where other comparable laws exist, you might still spend some time in the pokey: http://www.securityfocus.com/printable/news/4004 (Apparently, there's some naughty text in this message. I keep getting a "content denied" message from someone.) - -- Registered Linux user #304026. "lynx -source http://www.rallycentral.us/~linux/jharris.asc | gpg --import" or "gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key BD23A31E" Key fingerprint = FB8C 3210 8DE1 78F4 6505 5918 0C34 BE94 BD23 A31E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Made with pgp4pine 1.76 iD8DBQE+15pADDS+lL0jox4RAkLIAJ9VuPdwMlB3CbIt2ANoE+9xUa57MgCdFbBU RQMVT5GArzwmWzGKOReK7Cc= =4YCi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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AW: [suse-security] Log/Audit all user commands
by Ulrich Roth 30 May '03

30 May '03

Hi Ricardo, > Hi, I am having a little problem I need to solve > quickly. I have one intruder (long to explain now) > which edited the passwd file and set his user with 0 > id (as root). I don't want to block him. I want to log > all his actions, moves, commands, etc. How can I do > that? If he didn't disable it or uses another shell, you can have a look at his ~/.bash_history. Bye Uli -- Ulrich Roth IMPACT Business & Technology Consulting GmbH Im Mediapark 8 / KölnTurm D-50670 Koeln Phone +49-221-93 70 80-29 Fax +49-221-93 70 80-15 E-Mail: roth(a)impact.de

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openSUSE Security May 2003