openSUSE Security November 2003

security@lists.opensuse.org

112 participants
89 discussions

by Sven 'Darkman' Michels

Hi there, afaig (as far as i googled ;) others had reported the problem with 9.0 and nmap already, but noone has a solution right now. On 9.0 no nmap i know does work. I tried multiple boxes with 9.0 with no success. A fresh builded nmap doesn't work, too. The same nmap sourcecode on other distro's and SuSE's works. Ok, nmap doesn't work isn't correctly, it 'works': Doing a nmap localhost as $user isn't a problem, scan completed in < 1 sec. su - and nmap again -> fails: Note: Host seems down. If it is really up, but blocking our ping probes, try -P0 Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (0 hosts up) scanned in 36.408 seconds ok, all will now say: 'do what nmap said..' but that isn't a solution. nmap will run then, but doesn't give any output (it's running a few minutes now). A firewall isn't installed and manual ping localhost as root works. So anyone can say something about it? A solution would be nice cause many ppl on this list may use nmap ;) Regards, Sven

18 years, 6 months

Re: [suse-security] Trace user logins in SAMBA

by J J

My knowledge is somewhat sketchy and from Samba 2.2.1a so forgive me if it's no use. My crude understanding is that a login to a domain from a Windows box isn't quite like a unix log in, what you're doing is logging on to the *Windows* box and Windows is asking the unix (samba) domain server whether the user has permission to log on locally. Later the user will probably start to use shared network resources (shared drives, etc.) from the unix box and these requests will then start a "session" (in SMB terminology) from that user on that Windows box to that share - these "sessions" are the things that are easy to see on the STATUS page of SWAT* or using smbstatus. But I doubt that's what you want to see. After all, a user could log on and never use network shared resources in theory. The samba log files (eek! - not sure where they've gone! used to be in /var/lock/samba/log.nmbd think they are now in /var/log/samba/) will record what the smbd daemon is doing so somewhere in there there should be some unique kind of SMB message received that corresponds to a domain logon request. Unfortunately I'm not an SMB protocol expert so I couldn't tell you the exact call! The loglevel parameter increases the amount of logging. At 3 you get a log of stuff, probably more than enough. Remember you'll probably need to restart the smbd daemon to make it pick up the change to the loglevel in smb.conf (YMMV). Good luck! Carl *SWAT, if you haven't used it before, is an invaluable tool. It usually comes as part of the samba package (in the rpm) and will probably already be installed. You may need to modify inetd.conf to get it to run. Basically it listens to HTTP requests on port 901. The upshot of this is that you can administer your samba server remotely using a web browser, see who's using what shares, change configuration, restart the servers, etc. Plus view lots of help online! >From: João Reis <joao.reis(a)2000comp.pt> >To: suse-linux-e(a)suse.com, suse-security(a)suse.com >Subject: [suse-security] Trace user logins in SAMBA >Date: Tue, 04 Nov 2003 10:32:25 +0000 > >Hi to all > >I have read a lot of documentation but i cannot find a way to track user >logins, from a Windows machine, in Samba. >Does the log parameter in the smb.conf file does the job. I have the log >files of the machines present (log.%m) but >they do not register the time when the users login and logout. > >is there a way to register this information? > >Thanks > >-- > \|/ "Do or do not. There is no try" - Yoda \|/ > |==============================================| > | 2000Comp - Consultoria e Informática, Lda | > | Tel: +351 22 941 99 32 | >\|/ | Fax: +351 22 941 99 34 | \|/ > O | www: http://www.2000comp.pt | O >-|--| |--|- >\| | João Reis | |/ >/ \ |==============================================| / \ >========================================================== > > > >-- >Check the headers for your unsubscription address >For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com >Security-related bug reports go to security(a)suse.de, not here > _________________________________________________________________ Hotmail messages direct to your mobile phone http://www.msn.co.uk/msnmobile

18 years, 6 months

Block diagrams...

by Dominik Sk³adanowski

Hello, please excuse me this mail on this list. I need block diagrams of DES, RC4, MD5 and SHA algorithms. I have googled Net and I have found only visualisation of DES algorithm. It is the last thing I need to finish my final thesis (postgraduade studies). So if you can help... Dominik

18 years, 7 months

suse 8.1 : ptrace exploit still working fine!?

by Olivier M.

A suse 8.1 based server has been cracked, and the "visitor" left all his tools, so I've been able to play with it as well. The server was kept "up to date", but look at that: om@box:~/tmp> uname -a Linux box 2.4.19-4GB #1 Fri Sep 13 13:14:56 UTC 2002 i686 unknown om@box:~/tmp> cat /etc/issue Welcome to SuSE Linux 8.1 (i386) - Kernel \r (\l). om@box:~/tmp> rpm -qa|grep k_ k_deflt-2.4.19-340 om@box:~/tmp> id uid=400(om) gid=500(nofiles) groups=500(nofiles) om@box:~/tmp> ./ptrace [*] PID of Parent: 22768 [*] PID of Child: 22769 [*] Attaching to PID 22770 [*] Got registers! [!] EIP: 0x4000eaed [!] ESP: 0xbffffa48 [!] EBP: 0xffffffda [!] EAX: 0xbffffa8c [!] EBX: 0xbffffc74 [!] ECX: 0xbfffff7c [!] EDX: 0x400130ec [!] EDI: 0x00000000 [!] ESI: 0x400135fc [*] Injecting shellcode (0x4000eaed) [*] Detaching from PID 22770 [*] Voila baby, entering rootshell! sh-2.05b# [*] waiting for SIGCHLD... sh-2.05b# id uid=0(root2) gid=0(root) groups=500(nofiles) sh-2.05b# Well... I thought that ptrace problem has been fixed... ? (in suse 8.2 it's fine, the exploit is not working) Regards, Olivier -- _________________________________________________________________ Olivier Mueller - om(a)8304.ch - PGPkeyID: 0E84D2EA - Switzerland

18 years, 7 months

Re: [suse-security] suse 8.1 : ptrace exploit still working fine!?

by GarUlbricht7＠netscape.net

"Olivier M." <qmail(a)orion.8304.ch> wrote: >On Sun, Nov 30, 2003 at 04:51:54AM -0500, GarUlbricht7(a)netscape.net wrote: > >> However,Oliver,if you really think your box has been cracked because >> of a ptrace exploit, in addition to posting to this list, >> send a copy to: >> >> security(a)suse.de > > Ok, I will later today. > >> (In fact I think they would have preferred you wrote >> to them first, but that's your call.) > > I think just "writing" here is fine: it would be different > If I had attached the exploit binary to my message... > > Before writing to suse, I'd like to make some more checks, > and find another test server with suse 8.1: > but all the other servers runs 8.2 or newer :/ > Oliver, I can understand your desire to run additional checks. However, you didn't say if you have "unplugged" your "cracked" server from the net. Hopefully you have. If not, please do so Immediately if not sooner !!! Also there was a nice check list furnished by Philippe Vogel in a thread last "Sep" entitled: "Apache Gain Remote Shell Access" http://lists.suse.com/archive/suse-security/2003-Sep/0027.html for checking if you think the box has been cracked. Remember, if it truly has beencracked, some if not many of your tools may be giving supirious info. Hope this helps, Gar -- Higdon's Law: (as quoted by Bruce Marshall) "Good judgement comes from experience." "Experience comes from bad judgement." -- __________________________________________________________________ McAfee VirusScan Online from the Netscape Network. Comprehensive protection for your entire computer. Get your free trial today! http://channels.netscape.com/ns/computing/mcafee/index.jsp?promo=393397 Get AOL Instant Messenger 5.1 free of charge. Download Now! http://aim.aol.com/aimnew/Aim/register.adp?promo=380455

18 years, 7 months

Re: [suse-security] suse 8.1 : ptrace exploit still working fine!?

by GarUlbricht7＠netscape.net

Kastus <NOSPAM(a)tprfct.net> wrote: >On Sun, Nov 30, 2003 at 12:48:23AM +0100, Olivier M. wrote: >> >> A suse 8.1 based server has been cracked, and the "visitor" left >> all his tools, so I've been able to play with it as well. >> The server was kept "up to date", but look at that: >> >> om@box:~/tmp> uname -a >> Linux box 2.4.19-4GB #1 Fri Sep 13 13:14:56 UTC 2002 i686 unknown > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > This date looks suspicious. > The kernel from k_deflt-2.4.19-340 has time stamp Mon Aug 4 23:38:42 UTC 2003 > >> om@box:~/tmp> rpm -qa|grep k_ >> k_deflt-2.4.19-340 > > I doubt the kernel you are running belongs to this package. > Did you try to verify k_deflt package? What's the output of > rpm -V k_deflt ? > >Also check your bootloader, what kernel is actually gets booted. > >Regards, -Kastus > >-- Hi Kastus and Olivier, I am running SuSE 8.1 with k-deflt-2.4.19-340 on my box. As Kastus pointed out, when I do uname -a on a Konsole, I get: [gar@box1 gar]$ uname -a Linux gandalf 2.4.19-4GB #1 Mon Aug 4 23:38:42 UTC 2003 i686 unknown [gar@gandalf gar]$ How do you have: Linux box 2.4.19-4GB #1 Fri Sep 13 13:14:56 UTC 2002 i686 unknown ???? However,Oliver,if you really think your box has been cracked because of a ptrace exploit, in addition to posting to this list, send a copy to: security(a)suse.de as I am sure Roman and his Team will want to know. See: http://www.suse.de/de/security/contact/index.html (In fact I think they would have preferred you wrote to them first, but that's your call.) Hope this helps, Gar -- In the Beginning was the Command Line ---Neal Stephenson -- __________________________________________________________________ McAfee VirusScan Online from the Netscape Network. Comprehensive protection for your entire computer. Get your free trial today! http://channels.netscape.com/ns/computing/mcafee/index.jsp?promo=393397 Get AOL Instant Messenger 5.1 free of charge. Download Now! http://aim.aol.com/aimnew/Aim/register.adp?promo=380455

18 years, 7 months

RE: [suse-security] Block diagrams...

by GarUlbricht7＠netscape.net

"Dominik Sk³adanowski" <dominik.skladanowski(a)ch.pw.edu.pl> wrote: > >Hello, > > please excuse me this mail on this list. I need block diagrams of DES, > RC4, MD5 and SHA algorithms. > > I have googled Net and I have found only visualisation >of DES algorithm. > It is the last thing I need to finish my final thesis > (postgraduade studies). > So if you can help... > Hi Dominik, Your question is off-topic for this list, which deals with SuSE security issues... Further, I don't know the rules at your school, so I don't know if what you are asking is "stricly cricket". However, for the fun of it, I did an "advanced google search," on: ... DES + "Block Diagram" RC4 + "Block Diagram" MD5 + "Block Diagram", etc. In each case, I found something labled "Block Diagram." I think you need to google more. Good luck on your thesis. Gar -- In the Beginning was the Command Line ---Neal Stephenson __________________________________________________________________ McAfee VirusScan Online from the Netscape Network. Comprehensive protection for your entire computer. Get your free trial today! http://channels.netscape.com/ns/computing/mcafee/index.jsp?promo=393397 Get AOL Instant Messenger 5.1 free of charge. Download Now! http://aim.aol.com/aimnew/Aim/register.adp?promo=380455

18 years, 7 months

tcpd problem

by Freddy

Hi to all, I'm running a public server with SuSE 8.1 and I've recently discovered some strange log entries (19:32:52 was the first time when this error occured): Nov 28 19:32:52 ***** tcpd[18129]: warning: can't get client address: Socket operation on non-socket Nov 28 19:32:56 ***** last message repeated 3695 times Nov 28 21:17:41 ***** tcpd[21930]: warning: can't get client address: Socket operation on non-socket Nov 28 21:17:43 ***** last message repeated 1445 times Nov 28 21:28:32 ***** tcpd[22733]: warning: can't get client address: Socket operation on non-socket Nov 28 21:28:33 ***** last message repeated 1015 times Therefore I searched the web for this error and found out that this might be symptoms of a rootkit, so I ran chkrootkit but it didn't find any infected files. Now I've got two questions: 1) Is somebody scanning my machine for the mentioned rookit or trying to break in? 2) How can I find out which application invokes tcpd (or vice versa) and causes the error? (inetd definitely does not) Regards Freddy

18 years, 7 months

SUSE Security Announcement: bind8 (SuSE-SA:2003:047)

by Thomas Biege

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SUSE Security Announcement Package: bind8 Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:047 Date: Friday, Nov 28th 2003 15:30 MEST Affected products: 7.3, 8.0, 8.1, 8.2 Vulnerability Type: cache poisoning/denial-of-service Severity (1-10): 5 SUSE default package: yes Cross References: CAN-2003-0914 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: - caching negative answers problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: - ethereal - KDE - mc - apache1/2 - gpg - freeradius - xscreensaver - screen - mod_gzip - gnpan 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information To resolve IP addresses to host and domain names and vice versa the DNS service needs to be consulted. The most popular DNS software is the BIND8 and BIND9 suite. The BIND8 code is vulnerable to a remote denial-of-service attack by poisoning the cache with authoritative negative responses that should not be accepted otherwise. To execute this attack a name-server needs to be under malicious control and the victim's bind8 has to query this name-server. The attacker can set a high TTL value to keep his negative record as long as possible in the cache of the victim. For this time the clients of the attacked site that rely on the bind8 service will not be able to reach the domain specified in the negative record. These records should disappear after the time-interval (TTL) elapsed. There is no temporary workaround for this bug. To make this update effective run "rcnamed restart" as root please. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/bind8-8.3.4-64.i586.rpm 3d44d46f0e8397c69d53e96aba9fbd6d patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/bind8-8.3.4-64.i586.pa… cce1df09a0b6fb5cbbddcc462f055c64 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/src/bind8-8.3.4-64.src.rpm a980a0eca79de02f135fce1cbe84ee22 SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bind8-8.2.4-336.i586.r… 4a46d0560eac1ca5de77c12f8abe4952 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bind8-8.2.4-336.i586.p… c8020302f6f161e9d86a3f1615304a23 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/bind8-8.2.4-336.src.rpm c9ee184cbd1f1722c94de9fd66f11801 SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n2/bind8-8.2.4-334.i386.rpm f739fdb03a7df6685e0aa026f98a0389 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n2/bind8-8.2.4-334.i386.patch.r… a3de26e06b689d29b4b4b08c04fa32f4 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-334.src.rpm 85d8d9fee3c8a029263777a45b4af011 SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-334.i386.rpm 381c2b6f805ca30d0fefc98afaee9ba0 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-334.src.rpm 97a87469cfb573bdd89f8f3a2c02264f Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-128.sparc.rpm c08454b933ed2365d9d2ab1322803af6 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-128.src.rpm 827a7f56273c7a25ac40ffba728e9150 PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-243.ppc.rpm 12f1f205c08449e945c8ad344a8e3b41 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-243.src.rpm 177093e76b3b8d2679089a1ab1c46d0e ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SUSE Distributions and Workarounds: - ethereal A new official version of ethereal, a network traffic analyzer, was released to fix various security-related problems. An update package is currently being tested and will be released as soon as possible. - KDE New KDE packages are currently being tested. These packages fixes several vulnerabilities: + remote root compromise (CAN-2003-0690) + weak cookies (CAN-2003-0692) + SSL man-in-the-middle attack + information leak through HTML-referrer (CAN-2003-0459) + wrong file permissions of config files The packages will be release as soon as testing is finished. - mc By using a special combination of links in archive-files it is possible to execute arbitrary commands while mc tries to open it in its VFS. The packages are currently tested and will be release as soon as possible. - apache1/2 The widely used HTTP server apache has several security vulnerabilities: - locally exploitable buffer overflow in the regular expression code. The attacker must be able to modify .htaccess or httpd.conf. (affects: mod_alias and mod_rewrite) - under some circumstances mod_cgid will output its data to the wrong client (affects: apache2) The new packages are available on our FTP servers. - gpg In GnuPG version 1.0.2 a new code for ElGamal was introduced. This code leads to an attack on users who use ElGamal keys for signing. It is possible to reconstruct the private ElGamal key by analyzing a public ElGamal signature. Please note that the ElGamal algorithm is seldomly used and GnuPG displays several warnings when generating ElGamal signature keys. The default key generation process in GnuPG will create a DSA signature key and an ElGamal subkey for _encryption only_. These keys are not affected by this vulnerability. Anyone using ElGamal signature keys (type 20, check fourth field of "gpg --list-keys --with-colon" output) should revoke them. - freeradius Two vulnerabilities were found in the FreeRADIUS package. The remote denial-of-service attack bug was fixed and new packages will be released as soon as testing was successfully finished. The other bug is a remote buffer overflow in the module rlm_smb. We do not ship this module and will fix it for future releases. - xscreensaver The well known screen-saver for X is vulnerable to several local tmp file attacks as well as a crash when verifying a password. Only SuSE Linux 9.0 products are affected. The new packages are available on our FTP servers. - screen A buffer overflow in screen was reported. Since SuSE Linux 8.0 we do not ship screen with the s-bit anymore. An update package will be released for 7.3 as soon as possible. - mod_gzip The apache module mod_gzip is vulnerable to remote code execution while running in debug-mode. We do not ship this module in debug-mode but future versions will include the fix. - gnpan A remote denial-of-service attack can be run against the GNOME news-reader program gnpan. This bug affects SuSE Linux 8.0, 8.1, 8.2. Update packages are available on our FTP servers. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SUSE security discussion. All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SUSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SUSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (GNU/Linux) iQEVAwUBP8dgT3ey5gA9JdPZAQH5LQf+MA/cLvB14QAZFTXwtqB2tNpcotkmJyF8 oWbsWl7EnsF6hlR7tr3Hjk2bvpzE8yLShtckMvtVAy1Xj29fvWpHjtZM1TEfjWSk XgxeJ4n5HvKMjyOYopNgdbdQCvcr8v4eWjVA9ekK/WXikIXRWsiN9PhT6c0NQxfA tO7zHQYHhGwH4jae8aD6EPWJhc1sLzQMC4XCkFxIFlZouAtVr7rShDNUamKcaV63 5c1uhewBorqfD7o8x85OCXcAA9WEnEs7t/mJnHC0hLgYF259YxX3HtXrj18jnD8/ YvVnzfkQwDxRY3qALRjAfd05QGOGir75fSBCtofP2lDPg8igRFo8UQ== =fX7r -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bye, Thomas -- Thomas Biege <thomas(a)suse.de>, SUSE LINUX AG, Security Support & Auditing "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~thomas/contact/thomas.asc | pgp -fka" Key fingerprint = 51 AD B9 C7 34 FC F2 54 01 4A 1C D4 66 64 09 83 -- ... stay with me, safe and ignorant, go back to sleep... - Maynard James Keenan

18 years, 7 months

postfix - one interface, two different content filter?

by Markus Feilner

Hello List, is it possible to have postfix listen on two network interfaces, but the same port and use two different content filter for mails depending on where they come in? I have the following config: - incoming mail via eth0 is spam-checked and forwarded to exchange server - outgoing mail comes from the exchange server and must not be spam-checked when going out. Actually now I have three Ports open for postfix-SMTP (incoming,spamd,outgoing), and three smtp-instances running via config from master.cf. Now we need to close the port for outgoing mail. (And I don't want to do a redirect with iptables!) Thanks a lot! -- Mit freundlichen Grüßen Markus Feilner -- Linux Solutions, Training, Seminare und Workshops - auch Inhouse Feilner IT Linux & GIS Erlangerstr. 2 93059 Regensburg fon: +49 941 70 65 23 - mobil: +49 170 302 709 2 web: http://feilner-it.net mail: mfeilner(a)feilner-it.net

18 years, 7 months

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openSUSE Security November 2003