March 2003 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

How to handle usernames?
by lars 28 Mar '03

28 Mar '03

Hi there, I´ve got a strange behaviour which I want to get rid off ... though it may not be the right group here: on a suse linux 8.1 box, doing useradd -s /bin/false -d /... and-so-on ... b.richards to add a mailuseraccount, I always got the reply: invalid username The same with useradd -s /bin/false -d /... and-so-on b\.richards OK, then I´m typing ³useradd brichards², editing the /etc/passwd as well as /etc/shadow (e.g. setting in the dot manually), then typing in the password, but then ... the client sometimes gets an errormessage from postfix - sometimes it works fine. I found out that in case of unvalid usernames always almost a ³!² is shown in the second field in /etc/shadow-uservalue-lines (where there have to be the shadowed password). everything works fine with usernames without a dot. I tried hard to find some informations about this, but the only restriction valid for all shels seemed to be avoiding ³:² and ³/² in usernames. Anyone a suggestion? would be helpfull... thanx a lot! greetings Btw: how can I change the length of a password to a value higher than 8? Possible at all on a bash or tcsh?

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AW: [suse-security] How to handle usernames?
by Manfred Pausch 28 Mar '03

28 Mar '03

hi radu, hi others, please don't send mails with "High-Important-Flag". some mails are not important... for me... thanx manfred -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Radu Voicu [mailto:suse@ploiesti.rdsnet.ro] Gesendet: Freitag, 28. März 2003 14:53 An: lars; suse-security(a)suse.com Betreff: Re: [suse-security] How to handle usernames? Wichtigkeit: Hoch Hi! I don't know about the osers, but about password length: Yast - security and users - custom - on the second screen you have the password length screen Regards, Radu ----- Original Message ----- From: "lars" <lars(a)brainlift.de> To: <suse-security(a)suse.com> Sent: Friday, March 28, 2003 3:33 PM Subject: [suse-security] How to handle usernames? Hi there, I´ve got a strange behaviour which I want to get rid off ... though it may not be the right group here: on a suse linux 8.1 box, doing useradd -s /bin/false -d /... and-so-on ... b.richards to add a mailuseraccount, I always got the reply: invalid username The same with useradd -s /bin/false -d /... and-so-on b\.richards OK, then I´m typing ³useradd brichards², editing the /etc/passwd as well as /etc/shadow (e.g. setting in the dot manually), then typing in the password, but then ... the client sometimes gets an errormessage from postfix - sometimes it works fine. I found out that in case of unvalid usernames always almost a ³!² is shown in the second field in /etc/shadow-uservalue-lines (where there have to be the shadowed password). everything works fine with usernames without a dot. I tried hard to find some informations about this, but the only restriction valid for all shels seemed to be avoiding ³:² and ³/² in usernames. Anyone a suggestion? would be helpfull... thanx a lot! greetings Btw: how can I change the length of a password to a value higher than 8? Possible at all on a bash or tcsh? -- Check the headers for your unsubscription address For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com Security-related bug reports go to security(a)suse.de, not here

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RE: [suse-security] How to handle usernames?
by Ronny Martin 28 Mar '03

28 Mar '03

Can't help you on the usernames, but for the password length: enable md5 passes > -----Original Message----- > From: lars [mailto:lars@brainlift.de] > Sent: Friday, March 28, 2003 2:33 PM > To: suse-security(a)suse.com > Subject: [suse-security] How to handle usernames? > > > Hi there, > > I´ve got a strange behaviour which I want to get rid off ... > though it may > not be the right group here: > > on a suse linux 8.1 box, doing > > useradd -s /bin/false -d /... and-so-on ... b.richards > > to add a mailuseraccount, I always got the reply: > > invalid username > > The same with > > useradd -s /bin/false -d /... and-so-on b\.richards > > OK, then I´m typing ³useradd brichards², editing the > /etc/passwd as well as > /etc/shadow (e.g. setting in the dot manually), then typing > in the password, > but then ... the client sometimes gets an errormessage from postfix - > sometimes it works fine. > I found out that in case of unvalid usernames always almost a > ³!² is shown > in the second field in /etc/shadow-uservalue-lines (where > there have to be > the shadowed password). > > everything works fine with usernames without a dot. > > I tried hard to find some informations about this, but the > only restriction > valid for all shels seemed to be avoiding ³:² and ³/² in usernames. > > Anyone a suggestion? would be helpfull... thanx a lot! > > greetings > > Btw: how can I change the length of a password to a value > higher than 8? > Possible at all on a bash or tcsh? > >

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New kernel and netstat 'problem'
by Sven 'Darkman' Michels 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

lo, anyone can confirm that netstat -p isn't working correctly on the new kernel? at least on 7.3. with 2.4.18 it doesn't work correctly: before: tcp 0 0 217.69.160.53:25 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 27721/master after: tcp 0 0 217.69.160.53:25 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 5877/ as you can see, the name of the process isn't displayed (but the pid, which is correct...) Regards, Sven

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ptrace + kernel 2.2.19
by Volker Kuhlmann 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

The exploit sinuspl.net/ptrace/isec-ptrace-kmod-exploit.c works on the last version of 2.2.19 released by SuSE. The reason I am still running this kernel on one machine (with SuSE 8.0) is that it contains a biggy SiS chipset for which 2.4.19 has a workaround, but that workaround was removed again from all 2.4 kernels up to at least 2.4.16. For the record, the kernel update installed without a hitch on 3 different 8.1 machines by a simple rpm -Uvh. Even mk_initrd was completely automagic. People who use binary-only kernel drivers must expect these to break with each kernel change. The SuSE-supplied vmware modules crash vmware 2.0.4 (sorry but vmware went beyond anything acceptable for upgrade prices), but the latest patches to the module source and a recompile of that fixed that. Now vmware panics again on power-up, guess I just have to recompile the modules again (come to think of it, the kernel update will have overwitten the ones I compiled). Volker -- Volker Kuhlmann is possibly list0570 with the domain in header http://volker.dnsalias.net/ Please do not CC list postings to me.

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Exchange/postfix working together
by Philippe Vogel 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

Hi! Is there anybody having experience using exchange and postfix? Due to chost reason I want to use postfix as external MTA. In our DMZ we have an Exchange-Server with OWA. Our users want to have Webaccess for External use. If there comes the question why I don't use imp/horde or something like that - I gave it a try but it wasn't accepted. My config is, that postfix gets mail and redirects it to amavis and then transmitts virus free mails to the exchange-server via the .forward. This way is secure and is scanned. The users then may send mails to external servers with the exchange-server and the recipient may return mail to this account. Is it possible to rewrite headers of the exchange-server's outgoing mails, that all mails are from the linux-server? Or is there any other way? This would minimize my problem. Philippe

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RE: [suse-security] Problems when updating to new 2.4.18 kernel o n SuSE 7.3
by Reckhard, Tobias 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

Hi > Some ppl reported problems updating to the new kernel on SuSE 7.3. Well, my problems occured on 8.0, but the reasons could well be similar, if not identical. Anyway, I received a private email from someone who'd experienced the same problem and managed to solve it with the help of some SuSE people. Here's my translation to English: <Begin quote> Known problem: 8.0's implementation of mk_initrd pivot_root is unnecessary as well as completely broken with new kernels. Simply comment out the line [ "$rootfstype" = ext3 ] && use_pivot_root=1 then it should work again. <End quote> I haven't tried it myself yet, but it worked for the person who forwarded this information to me. Cheers, Tobias

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SuSE Security Announcement: kernel (SuSE-SA:2003:021)
by Roman Drahtmueller 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: kernel Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:021 Date: Tuesday, Mar 25 2003 18:00 MET Affected products: 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.0, 8.1 SuSE Linux Database Server, SuSE eMail Server III, 3.1 SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, SuSE Linux Firewall on CD/Admin host SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Office Server Vulnerability Type: local privilege escalation Severity (1-10): 6 SuSE default package: yes Cross References: CAN-2003-0127 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: kernel problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: - none in this security announcement 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information The Linux kernel has a security flaw in all versions used on SuSE products excluding the upcoming SuSE Linux 8.2 distribution. The flaw is known as ptrace/modprobe bug: The local attacker can use ptrace and attach to a modprobe process that is spawned if the user triggers the loading of a kernel module using the kmod kernel module subsystem. This can be done by asking for network protocols that are supplied by kernel modules which are not loaded (yet). The vulnerability allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands as root. There exists a temporary workaround against this flaw: It is possible to temporaryly disable the kmod kernel module loading subsystem in the kernel after all necessary kernel modules have been loaded (Note: SuSE systems do not unload kernel modules in regular intervals.). If the temporary workaround is chosen, it should be made sure that no additional kernel modules need to be loaded afterwards (such as ISDN drivers, scsi subsystem drivers or filesystem drivers such as the iso9660 filesystem for cdroms and the language codepages). To disable the kmod kernel module loading subsystem, use the following command as root: echo /no/such_file > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe If this command is inserted into a boot script that runs after all services in a runlevel have been launched, it is an efficient permanent solution. This workaround can be reverted by writing the original content ("/sbin/modprobe") back to the /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file. Please note that it is still possible for the root user to manually load kernel modules. As a permanent remedy for the problem we offer kernel update packages for download from our ftp server. Please follow the guidelines that are given in the extensive installation intructions below. The update should be performed with special care in order to make sure that the system will properly boot after the package update. Note: Managing the necessary patches, building and mostly testing kernel update packages is an extremely worksome and therefore also time-consuming process. SuSE wishes to provide the same quality and reliability in update packages as customers are used to from the shipped original products. Even though our kernel updates are thoroughly tested, the numerous possible hardware configurations for the x86 platform give a certain probability for a functional failure of parts of the kernel after the update has been performed. Some of the possible failures cannot be handled by SuSE by definition. These include (and are not limited to) possible problems with NVIDIA chipset graphics boards that make use of hardware 3D acceleration. SuSE cannot deliver the binary only driver for the NVIDIA graphics boards in the kernel RPM. The kernel of a Linux system is the most critical component with respect to stability, reliability and security. By consequence, an update of that component requires some care and full attention to succeed. If you do not run a system where multiple users have access to, you may want to consinder to not perform this update since the security risk imposed by this bug is very small on a system with only one user. SPECIAL INSTALL INSTRUCTIONS: ============================== The following paragraphs will guide you through the installation process in a step-by-step fashion. The character sequence "****" marks the beginning of a new paragraph. In some cases, you decide if the paragraph is needed for you or not. Please read through all of the steps down to the end. All of the commands that need to be executed are required to be run as the superuser (root). Each step relies on the steps before to complete successfully. **** Step 1: Determine the needed kernel type Please use the following command to find the kernel type that is installed on your system: rpm -qf /boot/vmlinuz The following options are possible (disregarding the version and build number following the name, seperated by the "-" character): k_deflt # default kernel, good for most systems. k_i386 # kernel for older processors and chipsets k_athlon # kernel made specifically for AMD Athlon family processors k_orig # kernel built with unmodified sources k_psmp # kernel for Pentium-I dual processor systems k_smp # kernel for SMP systems (Pentium-II and above) **** Step 2: Download the package for your system Please download the kernel RPM package for your distribution with the name starting as indicated by Step 1. The list of all kernel rpm packages is appended below. Note: The kernel-source package does not contain any binary kernel in bootable form. Instead, it contains the sources that the binary kernel rpm packages are made from. It can be used by administrators who have decided to build their own kernel. Since the kernel-source.rpm is an installable (compiled) package that contains sources for the linux kernel, it is not the source RPM for the kernel RPM binary packages. After downloading the kernel RPM package for your system, you should verify the authenticity of the kernel rpm package using the methods as listed in section 3) of each SuSE Security Announcement. **** Step 3: Installing your kernel rpm package Install the rpm package that you have downloaded in Steps 3 or 4 with the command rpm -Uhv --nodeps --force <K_FILE.RPM> where <K_FILE.RPM> is the name of the rpm package that you downloaded. Warning: After performing this step, your system will likely not be able to boot if the following steps have not been fully applied. **** Step 4: configuring and creating the initrd The initrd is a ramdisk that is being loaded into the memory of your system together with the kernel boot image by the bootloader. The kernel uses the content of this ramdisk to execute commands that must be run before the kernel can mount its actual root filesystem. It is usually used to initialize scsi drivers or NIC drivers for diskless operation. The variable INITRD_MODULES (set in the files /etc/rc.config up to 7.3) or /etc/sysconfig/kernel (after and including 8.0)) determines which kernel modules will be loaded in the initrd before the kernel has mounted its actual root filesystem. The variable should contain your scsi adapter (if any) or filesystem driver modules. With the installation of the new kernel, the initrd has to be re-packed with the update kernel modules. Please run the command mk_initrd as root to create a new init rmadisk (initrd) for your system. **** Step 5: bootloader If you have a 7.x system, you must now run the command lilo as root to initialize the lilo bootloader for your system. Then proceed to the next step. If you run a SuSE Linux 8.x or a SLES8 system, there are two options: Depending on your software configuration, you have the lilo bootloader or the grub bootloader installed and initialized on your system. The grub bootloader does not require any further actions to be performed after the new kernel images have been moved in place by the rpm Update command. If you have a lilo bootloader installed and initialized, then the lilo program must be run as root. Use the command grep LOADER_TYPE /etc/sysconfig/bootloader to find out which boot loader is configured. If it is lilo, then you must run the lilo command as root. If grub is listed, then your system does not require any bootloader initialization. Warning: An improperly installed bootloader may render your system unbootable. **** Step 6: reboot If all of the steps above have been successfully applied to your system, then the new kernel including the kernel modules and the initrd should be ready to boot. The system needs to be rebooted for the changes to become active. Please make sure that all steps are complete, then reboot using the command shutdown -r now or init 6 Your system should now shut down and reboot with the new kernel. Download sources for all kernel RPM packages: Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/kernel/2.4.19-20030324/kernel-s… 96860a64953bcac4d95d8308b5df39f7 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/kernel/2.4.19-20030324/k_smp-2.… d1b85a6922ff0cd7dac9387c566b5c37 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/kernel/2.4.19-20030324/k_psmp-2… 74756e9aa9e9d7fa855c01f0c8740627 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/kernel/2.4.19-20030324/k_deflt-… 0e54e7a10fc3c6f0ec803811d0431bc3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/kernel/2.4.19-20030324/k_debug-… 6dddb64d890a1d6dcc7364c460dc197c ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/kernel/2.4.19-20030324/k_athlon… 89e4522f63e1c8a002d1c5220ebdc354 SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/kernel-s… 43682b1dd033c5d2954b71cf5410c0d4 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_smp-2.… c43197a11c12d159720455e4c0d6e8d6 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_psmp-2… 936d0dafeafc657e4b61bf2c9ae4b819 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_orig-2… ad2ae6f8802ca99daa7f5aa6a6246329 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_i386-2… c400f303c12e81cd206ee107322bcf18 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_deflt-… b880932645c424b7931d92ae4af609c7 SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/kernel-s… ef49e97fee6f72ad842e54dcca878f03 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_smp-2.… c8896427d3d9e693086cac022970afb8 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_psmp-2… 28980fc3f164783eaaa98f5a32d46813 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_i386-2… a7a9a9a993ba33542ddc23483ed9a0da ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_deflt-… 364d714d3806208841bb24c6914fca89 SuSE-7.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/kernel-s… ef49e97fee6f72ad842e54dcca878f03 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_smp-2.… c8896427d3d9e693086cac022970afb8 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_psmp-2… 28980fc3f164783eaaa98f5a32d46813 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_i386-2… a7a9a9a993ba33542ddc23483ed9a0da ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_deflt-… 364d714d3806208841bb24c6914fca89 SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/kernel-s… ef49e97fee6f72ad842e54dcca878f03 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_smp-2.… c8896427d3d9e693086cac022970afb8 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_psmp-2… 28980fc3f164783eaaa98f5a32d46813 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_i386-2… a7a9a9a993ba33542ddc23483ed9a0da ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/kernel/2.4.18-20030324/k_deflt-… 364d714d3806208841bb24c6914fca89 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - there are no items listed in this security announcements. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Roman Drahtmüller, SuSE Security. - -- - - | Roman Drahtmüller <draht(a)suse.de> // "You don't need eyes to see, | SuSE Linux AG - Security Phone: // you need vision!" | Nürnberg, Germany +49-911-740530 // Maxi Jazz, Faithless | - - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3in Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBPoCQ1Hey5gA9JdPZAQFRkwf+JBCEutJFr4opI8K3twezAcbwQ/NampqH MBZ5fOM8kCnzPwzwH16wYnDYcfWXz1lT+d7i7NaJIawklOxPOA5SCWfT+eWFYDgj hSOn2Hw/70lguDrQS3ZMDeE4mfq+YIjNObkMFix2NWcaO/Nzi1D1iXkZ8m/5jl3k 9AjeY54EWA4ONQfPhGhq8GWPtr0a6XwqVZMq1ZlhpnqR4KF0nXqYntS7z/Js9VRm 87d834wLZeUgaeowBcFnbeHiuUnOAHZcZrgf1s/fGU6GLEw/kV2Wn3K2fs96KHVK JC4xTd8iGEmvgNon0rpFPUy6kAOWR5Wve4jDCrYl/WT4xoOEQhT0uQ== =MsRt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Ptrace Exploit Patch for Stock 2.4.20 Kernel and CK4 Patched Kernel
by Charles Philip Chan 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I have a Ptrace exploit patch on my system for the stock 2.4.20 kernel. This patch also applies cleanly to kernels that have been patched with the Con Kolivas (http://members.optusnet.com.au/ckolivas/kernel/) patch set. It might work with other patch sets too, YMMV. Please email me if you are interested. Charles -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQE+gqVp3epPyyKbwPYRAtlDAJwMaCWp1bTCzZYQ105l/AO7K7YDdwCbB3cf 03uJ3CLzNHx6oI59gHHdKnk= =u9DW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

ptrace exploit still works after kernel update
by Andreas Tetzl 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

Hi, I installed the kernel update k_deflt-2.4.19-274 from SuSE-SA:2003:021 on my SuSE 8.1 system. The system rebooted normal after install. The exploit from http://sinuspl.net/ptrace/isec-ptrace-kmod-exploit.c still works and gives me a root shell under the new kernel! rpm -qf /boot/vmlinuz shows k_deflt-2.4.19-274 The boot manager is grub. Does the kernel update not fix this bug correctly? -- Andreas Tetzl <andreas(a)tetzl.de>

7 9