October 2006 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

SUSE Security Announcement: openssl security problems (SUSE-SA:2006:058)
by Marcus Meissner 15 Mar '07

15 Mar '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ______________________________________________________________________________ SUSE Security Announcement Package: openssl Announcement ID: SUSE-SA:2006:058 Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 18:00:00 +0000 Affected Products: Novell Linux Desktop 9 Novell Linux POS 9 Open Enterprise Server SUSE LINUX 10.1 SUSE LINUX 10.0 SUSE LINUX 9.3 SUSE LINUX 9.2 SuSE Linux Desktop 1.0 SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 SuSE Linux Openexchange Server 4 SUSE LINUX Retail Solution 8 SuSE Linux School Server SuSE Linux Standard Server 8 SUSE SLED 10 SUSE SLES 10 SUSE SLES 9 UnitedLinux 1.0 Vulnerability Type: remote denial of service Severity (1-10): 7 SUSE Default Package: yes Cross-References: CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-2940, CVE-2006-3738 CVE-2006-4343, VU#547300, VU#386964 Content of This Advisory: 1) Security Vulnerability Resolved: several security problems in openssl Problem Description 2) Solution or Work-Around 3) Special Instructions and Notes 4) Package Location and Checksums 5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds: See SUSE Security Summary Report. 6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) Problem Description and Brief Discussion Several security problems were found and fixed in the OpenSSL cryptographic library. CVE-2006-3738/VU#547300: A Google security audit found a buffer overflow condition within the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function which has been fixed. CVE-2006-4343/VU#386964: The above Google security audit also found that the OpenSSL SSLv2 client code fails to properly check for NULL which could lead to a server program using openssl to crash. CVE-2006-2937: Fix mishandling of an error condition in parsing of certain invalid ASN1 structures, which could result in an infinite loop which consumes system memory. CVE-2006-2940: Certain types of public key can take disproportionate amounts of time to process. This could be used by an attacker in a denial of service attack to cause the remote side top spend an excessive amount of time in computation. 2) Solution or Work-Around There is no known workaround, please install the update packages. 3) Special Instructions and Notes None. 4) Package Location and Checksums The preferred method for installing security updates is to use the YaST Online Update (YOU) tool. YOU detects which updates are required and automatically performs the necessary steps to verify and install them. Alternatively, download the update packages for your distribution manually and verify their integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this announcement. Then install the packages using the command rpm -Fhv <file.rpm> to apply the update, replacing <file.rpm> with the filename of the downloaded RPM package. x86 Platform: SUSE LINUX 10.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/i586/openssl-0.9.8a-18.10.i586.… f5d7a08e60a52b7816cae88e9def7762 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/i586/openssl-devel-0.9.8a-18.10… a583491fc985dff2f3f405776fa8554a SUSE LINUX 10.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/i586/openssl-0.9.7g-2.10.i… 13d07a7a3b81fdef9ba68b0f0670f14c ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/i586/openssl-devel-0.9.7g-… 1198085023a60d99ce90207b5498db45 SUSE LINUX 9.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/i586/openssl-0.9.7e-3.6.i58… 51606d0da43bc5c61562bb8d4679ca8b ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/i586/openssl-devel-0.9.7e-3… c6a9122fec64b5a82f433c56b602f2b5 SUSE LINUX 9.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/i586/openssl-0.9.7d-25.6.i5… 96b59a2af5663ae1f780626da0b5756a ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/i586/openssl-devel-0.9.7d-2… e33a86104b85919dda444b4a9901a10b Power PC Platform: SUSE LINUX 10.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/ppc/openssl-0.9.8a-18.10.ppc.rpm 8310266cd6da01baaf964ed8cac841c0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/ppc/openssl-devel-0.9.8a-18.10.… 8ff4b94e685be05d00599ecc6cc939e7 SUSE LINUX 10.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/ppc/openssl-0.9.7g-2.10.pp… 0678839057c3170dc84fab28b3dd202f ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/ppc/openssl-devel-0.9.7g-2… e86965c19538073b15c2131a04c20260 x86-64 Platform: SUSE LINUX 10.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/x86_64/openssl-0.9.8a-18.10.x86… 28dc138c088450b753fdd419c487023e ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/x86_64/openssl-32bit-0.9.8a-18.… 651d62cab3c31d0bc3e18b91a4ba9ac3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-0.9.8a-18.… 2a3e98aca1aa613a58f09b39f12e84a4 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-32bit-0.9.… 81bb446763424df4c18eac760e0ed80e SUSE LINUX 10.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/x86_64/openssl-0.9.7g-2.10… 5a612bd7a6756e2926a3ef59a72fd197 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/x86_64/openssl-32bit-0.9.7… 840e98707317d9cef51837a486541be7 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-0.9.7… 46b1a289d445c5304001aba4417e73a9 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-32bit… a4e2a59c151ff22ed683e115da8fce48 SUSE LINUX 9.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/x86_64/openssl-0.9.7e-3.6.x… 3bf35d8e03848aa87a662b93a8c14fe1 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/x86_64/openssl-32bit-9.3-7.… 35ce818f05f655397c4b1b13ba3a93b3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-0.9.7e… dcfbcadb626de068028ac546f07ba685 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-32bit-… da50170edc9a2596954c2453030494d6 SUSE LINUX 9.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/x86_64/openssl-0.9.7d-25.6.… 32ec53e71eefb0ebe893034ac2e552ac ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/x86_64/openssl-32bit-9.2-20… 0b7706ce568832eb1b2e86bdd7cbe51d ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-0.9.7d… c8671a7a77dcc5a08e2c19f9a6ff056c ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/x86_64/openssl-devel-32bit-… 2bebb0fea9579ca5e659fca63c7beac0 Sources: SUSE LINUX 10.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/update/10.1/rpm/src/openssl-0.9.8a-18.10.src.rpm 2613501ca4ea03f1a79548014b13ff67 SUSE LINUX 10.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/10.0/rpm/src/openssl-0.9.7g-2.10.sr… c5b1ff892ff74af82ddbceaf757c6fb3 SUSE LINUX 9.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.3/rpm/src/openssl-0.9.7e-3.6.src.… f62e34422fc77343fd15a1790e6ef8d8 SUSE LINUX 9.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/9.2/rpm/src/openssl-0.9.7d-25.6.src… 8c451560ea55a3bec1b01f0b36943048 Our maintenance customers are notified individually. The packages are offered for installation from the maintenance web: UnitedLinux 1.0 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SuSE Linux Openexchange Server 4 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… Open Enterprise Server http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… Novell Linux POS 9 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… Novell Linux Desktop 9 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SuSE Linux Standard Server 8 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SuSE Linux School Server http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SUSE LINUX Retail Solution 8 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SuSE Linux Desktop 1.0 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SUSE SLES 10 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SUSE SLED 10 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… SUSE SLES 9 http://support.novell.com/techcenter/psdb/16e2a93b390a1ceb86b0945a88a4d415.… ______________________________________________________________________________ 5) Pending Vulnerabilities, Solutions, and Work-Arounds: See SUSE Security Summary Report. ______________________________________________________________________________ 6) Authenticity Verification and Additional Information - Announcement authenticity verification: SUSE security announcements are published via mailing lists and on Web sites. The authenticity and integrity of a SUSE security announcement is guaranteed by a cryptographic signature in each announcement. All SUSE security announcements are published with a valid signature. To verify the signature of the announcement, save it as text into a file and run the command gpg --verify <file> replacing <file> with the name of the file where you saved the announcement. The output for a valid signature looks like: gpg: Signature made <DATE> using RSA key ID 3D25D3D9 gpg: Good signature from "SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de>" where <DATE> is replaced by the date the document was signed. If the security team's key is not contained in your key ring, you can import it from the first installation CD. To import the key, use the command gpg --import gpg-pubkey-3d25d3d9-36e12d04.asc - Package authenticity verification: SUSE update packages are available on many mirror FTP servers all over the world. While this service is considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, the authenticity and the integrity of a package needs to be verified to ensure that it has not been tampered with. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or RPM package: 1) Using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package 2) MD5 checksums as provided in this announcement 1) The internal rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an RPM package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, replacing <file.rpm> with the filename of the RPM package downloaded. The package is unmodified if it contains a valid signature from build(a)suse.de with the key ID 9C800ACA. This key is automatically imported into the RPM database (on RPMv4-based distributions) and the gpg key ring of 'root' during installation. You can also find it on the first installation CD and at the end of this announcement. 2) If you need an alternative means of verification, use the md5sum command to verify the authenticity of the packages. Execute the command md5sum <filename.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SUSE FTP server or its mirrors. Then compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the SUSE security announcement. Because the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (by security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package if the signature of the announcement is valid. Note that the md5 sums published in the SUSE Security Announcements are valid for the respective packages only. Newer versions of these packages cannot be verified. - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - General Linux and SUSE security discussion. All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an e-mail to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SUSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an e-mail to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (FAQ), send mail to <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com>. ===================================================================== SUSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, the clear text signature should show proof of the authenticity of the text. SUSE Linux Products GmbH provides no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (GNU/Linux) mQENAzbhLQQAAAEIAKAkXHe0lWRBXLpn38hMHy03F0I4Sszmoc8aaKJrhfhyMlOA BqvklPLE2f9UrI4Xc860gH79ZREwAgPt0pi6+SleNFLNcNFAuuHMLQOOsaMFatbz JR9i4m/lf6q929YROu5zB48rBAlcfTm+IBbijaEdnqpwGib45wE/Cfy6FAttBHQh 1Kp+r/jPbf1mYAvljUfHKuvbg8t2EIQz/5yGp+n5trn9pElfQO2cRBq8LFpf1l+U P7EKjFmlOq+Gs/fF98/dP3DfniSd78LQPq5vp8RL8nr/o2i7jkAQ33m4f1wOBWd+ cZovrKXYlXiR+Bf7m2hpZo+/sAzhd7LmAD0l09kABRG0JVN1U0UgU2VjdXJpdHkg VGVhbSA8c2VjdXJpdHlAc3VzZS5kZT6JARUDBRA24S1H5Fiyh7HKPEUBAVcOB/9b yHYji1/+4Xc2GhvXK0FSJN0MGgeXgW47yxDL7gmR4mNgjlIOUHZj0PEpVjWepOJ7 tQS3L9oP6cpj1Fj/XxuLbkp5VCQ61hpt54coQAvYrnT9rtWEGN+xmwejT1WmYmDJ xG+EGBXKr+XP69oIUl1E2JO3rXeklulgjqRKos4cdXKgyjWZ7CP9V9daRXDtje63 Om8gwSdU/nCvhdRIWp/Vwbf7Ia8iZr9OJ5YuQl0DBG4qmGDDrvImgPAFkYFzwlqo choXFQ9y0YVCV41DnR+GYhwl2qBd81T8aXhihEGPIgaw3g8gd8B5o6mPVgl+nJqI BkEYGBusiag2pS6qwznZiQEVAwUQNuEtBHey5gA9JdPZAQFtOAf+KVh939b0J94u v/kpg4xs1LthlhquhbHcKNoVTNspugiC3qMPyvSX4XcBr2PC0cVkS4Z9PY9iCfT+ x9WM96g39dAF+le2CCx7XISk9XXJ4ApEy5g4AuK7NYgAJd39PPbERgWnxjxir9g0 Ix30dS30bW39D+3NPU5Ho9TD/B7UDFvYT5AWHl3MGwo3a1RhTs6sfgL7yQ3U+mvq MkTExZb5mfN1FeaYKMopoI4VpzNVeGxQWIz67VjJHVyUlF20ekOz4kWVgsxkc8G2 saqZd6yv2EwqYTi8BDAduweP33KrQc4KDDommQNDOXxaKOeCoESIdM4p7Esdjq1o L0oixF12CohGBBARAgAGBQI7HmHDAAoJEJ5A4xAACqukTlQAoI4QzP9yjPohY7OU F7J3eKBTzp25AJ42BmtSd3pvm5ldmognWF3Trhp+GYkAlQMFEDe3O8IWkDf+zvyS FQEBAfkD/3GG5UgJj18UhYmh1gfjIlDcPAeqMwSytEHDENmHC+vlZQ/p0mT9tPiW tp34io54mwr+bLPN8l6B5GJNkbGvH6M+mO7R8Lj4nHL6pyAv3PQr83WyLHcaX7It Klj371/4yzKV6qpz43SGRK4MacLo2rNZ/dNej7lwPCtzCcFYwqkiiEYEEBECAAYF AjoaQqQACgkQx1KqMrDf94ArewCfWnTUDG5gNYkmHG4bYL8fQcizyA4An2eVo/n+ 3J2KRWSOhpAMsnMxtPbBmQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCk YS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP +Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0dM+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR 8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcOQliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U 8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrKXBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0S cZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBED3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEh ELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUdG5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtB UVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NMCC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOo AqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoEmyW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1n KFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNrYWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohi BBMRAgAiBQJA2AY+AhsDBQkObd+9BAsHAwIDFQIDAxYCAQIeAQIXgAAKCRCoTtro nIAKypCfAJ9RuZ6ZSV7QW4pTgTIxQ+ABPp0sIwCffG9bCNnrETPlgOn+dGEkAWeg KL+IRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCeQOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lx yoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNeLZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWn B/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3tXXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDV wM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBUD9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVh UzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ30kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF 5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3 D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpWcRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGu zgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BuQINBDnu9JIQCACEkdBN6Mxf5WvqDWkcMRy6wnrd 9DYJ8UUTmIT2iQf07tRUKJJ9v0JXfx2Z4d08IQSMNRaq4VgSe+PdYgIy0fbj23Vi a5/gO7fJEpD2hd2f+pMnOWvH2rOOIbeYfuhzAc6BQjAKtmgR0ERUTafTM9Wb6F13 CNZZNZfDqnFDP6L12w3z3F7FFXkz07Rs3AIto1ZfYZd4sCSpMr/0S5nLrHbIvGLp 271hhQBeRmmoGEKO2JRelGgUJ2CUzOdtwDIKT0LbCpvaP8PVnYF5IFoYJIWRHqlE t5ucTXstZy7vYjL6vTP4l5xs+LIOkNmPhqmfsgLzVo0UaLt80hOwc4NvDCOLAAMG B/9g+9V3ORzw4LvO1pwRYJqfDKUq/EJ0rNMMD4N8RLpZRhKHKJUm9nNHLbksnlZw rbSTM5LpC/U6sheLP+l0bLVoq0lmsCcUSyh+mY6PxWirLIWCn/IAZAGnXb6Zd6Tt IJlGG6pqUN8QxGJYQnonl0uTJKHJENbI9sWHQdcTtBMc34gorHFCo1Bcvpnc1LFL rWn7mfoGx6INQjf3HGQpMXAWuSBQhzkazY6vaWFpa8bBJ+gKbBuySWzNm3rFtT5H RKMWpO+M9bHp4d+puY0L1YwN1OMatcMMpcWnZpiWiR83oi32+xtWUY2U7Ae38mMa g8zFbpeqPQUsDv9V7CAJ1dbriEwEGBECAAwFAkDYBnoFCQ5t3+gACgkQqE7a6JyA CspnpgCfRbYwxT3iq+9l/PgNTUNTZOlof2oAn25y0eGi0371jap9kOV6uq71sUuO =ypVs - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (GNU/Linux) iQEVAwUBRRv66Xey5gA9JdPZAQL7fgf/WskObtJd6xDwy4d+F9TjeGy+K3Mi8iNC Meb8Chs08TaVuuuvp6+UwtUpek+zuMTimdUZdedF4Tc3xBjwQL6GmIvdh5Kr5vdA UZRnHUMWdD9ClKyc3KPKVHXrDGOmgytWVtaQdD4pSmrh6k7j5aE9Gsss1MSrI64u BefsTWYnoJ0OJ/iXFVIIh964A/6wBcFV6f0C9YWKMYjfylXPBTWlSBzhY69g722N kmgboFffBkxD37ILQSKygJrJ3N2fn6acN7pRylCEb+n0XWu5nPMf/xTWVVzH4f/I FS5jdzJc7gfb096tWsNoB48ULkLENIaauHZup1p6NCyt5/R3eLmgcQ== =TSxY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

6 6

Detecting Brute-Force and Dictionary attacks
by Shashi Kanth Boddula 04 Nov '06

04 Nov '06

Hi All, I am looking for a good tool to detect brute-force and dictionary attacks on user accounts on a Linux system . The tool should also have the intelligence to differntiate between user mistakes and actual brute-force/dictionary attacks and reduce the false positives. SLES9/SLES10 included security tools are not helping in this case . The seccheck package functionality also not matching with my requirement. Please , anyone knows any third party security tool or any opensource security tool which solves my problem ? Thanks & Regards, Shashi Kanth,CISSP

12 13

Boot password
by Jithendra 31 Oct '06

31 Oct '06

Hi , I forgot the boot password of my SuSe desktop. Can anyone provide me a workaround to change the boot options or way to disable to boot password prompt. Thank You , Jithendra.

9 14

Mailman Update Snafu
by Barry McLarnon 28 Oct '06

28 Oct '06

The security update to the mailman software yesterday broke the mailing lists on my SUSE 10.0 (x86_64) box. It seems that the update overwrote the /var/lib/mailman/data/virtual-mailman file, setting it to zero length. Fortunately, I had a backup handy. Nasty! Barry -- Barry McLarnon VE3JF Ottawa, ON

1 0

Open port in SuSEfirewall2
by Terje J. Hanssen 27 Oct '06

27 Oct '06

I'm new to SuSEfirewall2 and I'm struggling to get access to my openSUSE 10.1 workstation from remote locations. The purpose is to run NX server/clients and SSH in the first phase. So far port 22 of my network router is directed to the SuSE workstation, and I've tried with YaST to enable the ssh service in the firewall. But the workstation doesn't seem to respond on remote ssh commands. Looking in /etc/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2 the following are set: FW_SERVICES_EXT_TCP="microsoft-ds netbios-ssn ssh" FW_SERVICES_EXT_UDP="netbios-dgm netbios-ns" I'm not sure about use of required zones EXT, INT and/or DMZ? In YaST2 I could neither see a way to set both "ssh 22" as commented in the config.file? Suggestions to how to do this and to what is the preferred way to test the settings, locally and from remote? Thanks, Terje J. Hanssen

9 22

SSL client authentication with AD
by geert.van.muylem＠utimaco.be 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

Hi All, I'm trying to connect to an active directory (Win 2000 server) using ssl (with client authentication) The primary goal is doing that by using python-ldap (on a SuSE 10.1 environment) I get here however a strange situation that it "sometimes" works.. After some hints from the python-ldap mailing list, I tested the ssl connection with openssl, and guess what..the same result.it sometimes works.. SuSE 10.1 Openssl : 0.9.8a-16 I've tried with another version of openssl (0.9.7l) but with same result I've also tried both versions of openssl on windows and fedora core 3 with success! Anyone any idea? Thanks in advance, in the event vieuwer : directory service : ldap interface events -> 5 date: Source: NTDS LDAP Time Category: (16) Type: warning Event ID:1216 The LDAP server closed a socket to a client bacause of an error condition, 87 Here is the output of my openssl commands.. -à If it does not work openssl s_client -connect 192.168.1.5:636 -CAfile /home/gvm/Temp/PYSSL/rootca.pem -cert /home/gvm/Temp/PYSSL/endor-crt.pem -key /home/gvm/Temp/PYSSL/endor-key.pem CONNECTED(00000003) depth=1 /C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=CAS_SK verify return:1 depth=0 /C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=eowyn.doom.be verify return:1 15313:error:140790E5:SSL routines:SSL23_WRITE:ssl handshake failure:s23_lib.c:188: and If it does work: openssl s_client -connect 192.168.1.5:636 -CAfile /home/gvm/Temp/PYSSL/rootca.pem -cert /home/gvm/Temp/PYSSL/endor-crt.pem -key /home/gvm/Temp/PYSSL/endor-key.pem CONNECTED(00000003) depth=1 /C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=CAS_SK verify return:1 depth=0 /C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=eowyn.doom.be verify return:1 --- Certificate chain 0 s:/C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=eowyn.doom.be i:/C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=CAS_SK --- Server certificate -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIICjDCCAfWgAwIBAgIBHDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBUMQswCQYDVQQGEwJCRTEU MBIGA1UEBxMLSG9vZ3N0cmF0ZW4xEDAOBgNVBAoTB0NBVHJ1c3QxDDAKBgNVBAsT A1BLSTEPMA0GA1UEAwwGQ0FTX1NLMB4XDTA2MTAxNzEwNDk1NVoXDTA3MTAxNzEw NDk1NVowWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxFDASBgNVBAcTC0hvb2dzdHJhdGVuMRAwDgYD VQQKEwdDQVRydXN0MQwwCgYDVQQLEwNQS0kxFjAUBgNVBAMTDWVvd3luLmRvb20u YmUwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL6pGS7FO76CcZuDBOtwso5+ H1Sr/9hfDy2Cymp0gLixW1Fga5xdsO+hiV255NDiI2jQHvjP/FloThEp5UzJVwTY lvT50APyGl1f2g/Akv8eqvK12TyOAtGwuj8SXzayyEzsWtzlN2NFnlWEKJc0qh6Q l2UmDo/ggGxJBxxlfBkNAgMBAAGjZzBlMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFDhp/FYUPtJVxyCc 64ksf3y38HKIMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQ/g+qO3W1SDxsEJu86QgEzTrZAVDAOBgNVHQ8B Af8EBAMCBaAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEA ASmsG3ltOTkUJWv5zlTSZ69sr9hSjOeSC+wqiKFI0fqmbbcMkiDdxp+olwZwE3LM RGwg9KXU4MZjQsMbDPoySPqDvHh4LlDOeMx8SVqvfQxQa/SnOYIGtONl3CosVe81 P19ynZeq4z+QzubR4F1Is3dqYqL9zYi0k4z2F0pXixA= -----END CERTIFICATE----- subject=/C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=eowyn.doom.be issuer=/C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=CAS_SK --- Acceptable client certificate CA names /C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=CAS_SK /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority - G2/OU=(c) 1998 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only/OU=VeriSign Trust Network /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 4 Public Primary Certification Authority - G2/OU=(c) 1998 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only/OU=VeriSign Trust Network /C=ZA/ST=Western Cape/L=Cape Town/O=Thawte Consulting/OU=Certification Services Division/CN=Thawte Personal Freemail CA/emailAddress=personal-freemail(a)thawte.com /C=ZA/ST=Western Cape/L=Cape Town/O=Thawte Consulting/OU=Certification Services Division/CN=Thawte Personal Premium CA/emailAddress=personal-premium(a)thawte.com /C=US/O=First Data Digital Certificates Inc./CN=First Data Digital Certificates Inc. Certification Authority /C=ZA/ST=Western Cape/L=Cape Town/O=Thawte Consulting/OU=Certification Services Division/CN=Thawte Personal Basic CA/emailAddress=personal-basic(a)thawte.com /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 1 Public Primary Certification Authority /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G2/OU=(c) 1998 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only/OU=VeriSign Trust Network /C=US/O=GTE Corporation/CN=GTE CyberTrust Root /C=BE/L=Hoogstraten/O=CATrust/OU=PKI/CN=EOWYN CA /C=US/O=GTE Corporation/OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc./CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root /OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp./OU=Microsoft Corporation/CN=Microsoft Root Authority /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=Class 2 Public Primary Certification Authority - G2/OU=(c) 1998 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only/OU=VeriSign Trust Network /C=US/O=GTE Corporation/OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc./CN=GTE CyberTrust Root --- SSL handshake has read 3261 bytes and written 1781 bytes --- New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is RC4-MD5 Server public key is 1024 bit Compression: NONE Expansion: NONE SSL-Session: Protocol : TLSv1 Cipher : RC4-MD5 Session-ID: 830A000079AD969762D5CA1CC27D874EADB5777B7F9AF5A191900602703F0F9B Session-ID-ctx: Master-Key: 2D17CCBF98E9610A5043C5348A5551717846756EFAE04734239A1DBA6D044788D3A34E7074E1 08CD12D1364586B2405E Key-Arg : None Start Time: 1161103751 Timeout : 300 (sec) Verify return code: 0 (ok) --- read:errno=0

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geronimo user added in twice in SLES10
by shashi 18 Oct '06

18 Oct '06

Hi , I did fresh installation of SLES10 with SDK , the user geronimo added twice in /etc/passwd file . The yast users module is not working because of this issue . geronimo:x:103:105:Geronimo:/usr/share/geronimo-1.0:/bin/sh geronimo:x:114:105:Geronimo:/usr/share/geronimo-1.0:/bin/sh I think , it will be a security issue . Thanks Shashi Kanth

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SPAM:
by Bojahra, Uwe 18 Oct '06

18 Oct '06

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Password length
by Miguel ALBUQUERQUE 16 Oct '06

16 Oct '06

Why can't one increase the password length ? I've changed the password length to 15 and encryption method from DES to MD5 due to DES length limitations but when I create an user the password is truncated is still truncadet to 8 chars ! What am i missing here ? Miguel Albuquerque Network Administrator DISCLAIMER - This message is intended for the use of the named person only. The information contained in this E-mail is confidential and any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message does not represent a formal commitment by Codalis SA. Codalis SA is neither liable for the proper and complete transmission of the information contained in this communication nor for any delay in its receipt.

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OT? updates for SLES
by Dörfler Andreas 16 Oct '06

16 Oct '06

hi list, little question: when i get a sles with 1 year subscription it meen i can get updates only for year and buy the a further subscription or does the subscription only effect servicepacks and not security fixes ? i know, sounds like a stupid question but i havent found something about it at forums and lists archive greetings andy ASCII ribbon campaign ( ) - against HTML email X & vCards / \

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Re: [suse-security] Password length
by Boyan Tabakov 16 Oct '06

16 Oct '06

On 16.10.2006 13:59, Miguel ALBUQUERQUE wrote: > Same thing...maybe a bug in YAST ? How can check it manually ? See if your /etc/default/passwd file sais something like: CRYPT_FILES=blowfish BLOWFISH_CRYPT_FILES=10 If passwords are crypted with blowfish, the hash in /etc/shadow should start with the '$2a$10$' magic. SuSE 9.3, 10 and 10.1 use blowfish by default. Why did you modified this anyway? -- Blade hails you... It's not the monsters under your bed It is the Man next door That makes you fear, makes you cry... --Nightwish

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Re: [suse-security] Open port in SuSEfirewall2
by Terje J. Hanssen 16 Oct '06

16 Oct '06

Jürgen Mell wrote: > Next step would be to check whether the SSH daemon is running at all. As > root at the workstation enter > > > rcsshd status # rcsshd status Checking for service sshd running > If a remote ssh > connection does not work, try it from the workstation itself: > > ssh localhost > Does this work or do you get any error messages? ~> ssh localhost The authenticity of host 'localhost (127.0.0.1)' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is 2a:34:............................. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes Warning: Permanently added 'localhost' (RSA) to the list of known hosts. Password: Last login: Mon Oct 16 09:32:33 2006 Have a lot of fun... Looks like ssh is running and working on my Linux box. I have no other Linux boxes internal on LAN to test ssh from, though the telnet as mentioned gave a message. The problem is still to get external response/access throught port 22 forwarding on the separate router. Terje

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SPAM: Matthew Eldridge has just sent you $93.50 USD with PayPal
by service＠paypal.com 10 Oct '06

10 Oct '06

PayPal Protect Your Account Info Make sure you never provide your password to fraudulent websites. To safely and securely access the PayPal website or your account, open a new web browser (e.g. Internet Explorer or Netscape) and type in the PayPal URL (https://www.paypal.com/us/) to be sure you are on the real PayPal site. PayPal will never ask you to enter your password in an email. To learn more about protecting yourself from fraud, visit the Security Center. Click "Security Center" on the bottom of any PayPal page Protect Your Password You should never give your PayPal password to anyone, including PayPal employees. Matthew Eldridge just sent you money with PayPal. Matthew Eldridge is a Verified buyer. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Payment Details Amount: $93.50 USD Transaction ID: 9FW55189WD400453J View the details of this transaction online -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shipping Information Address: Matthew Eldridge 1936 68th Street Windsor Heights, IA 50322 United States Address Status: Confirmed -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thank you for using PayPal! The PayPal Team PayPal Email ID PP274

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PGP key implementation question
by HG 10 Oct '06

10 Oct '06

Hello! Sorry, this is not quite the right place, but as I previously got good answers about the PGP servers from you guys, I thought that maybe somebody could help me again. (Plus I tried to subscribe to the PGP mailing list, but either it's down as nothing happened or completely gone as the website was not found...) Ok, rolling out PGP at a small company. This is what I'm thinking. 1) Master signing key that is used to sign every key - Not uploaded to keyservers, just on the https-page with fingerprints and all - No encryption key - No email - My key added as revokation key Q: should I sign this? Q: if https-page is not available (from our IT), should I then sign this (my key will be uploaded to the key servers)? Q: should the global revokation key be added also 2) Global revokation key (Only use is to revoke other keys) - Signed by the master key Q: Does this need the encryption key, or should I delete it also? Q: If it needs, then it needs a email address also? Q: Should this be uploaded to the key server 3) ADK - Not uploaded to keyservers - Signed by the master key - AFAIK, needs an encryption key and therefore an email address? - Will be split later on (when I learn that stuff) 4) Individual email keys - Global revokation key as the revoking key - ADK added as the ADK key - Signed by the master key - added to the key servers How does this sound? -- HG.

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Re: [suse-security] Deny access to file for all applications with apparmor?
by Boyan Tabakov 08 Oct '06

08 Oct '06

On 8.10.2006 03:56, Crispin Cowan wrote: > AppArmor currently does not have a way to do this, but it is in our road > map. The idea would be a "default profile" that applies to *any* process > started, which does not otherwise have an explicit profile. The problem > with the default profile approach is that this profile has to > simultaneously satisfy 2 requirements: > > 1. Be "tight" enough that a process confined only by the default > profile cannot corrupt AppArmor itself. > 2. Be "loose" enough that administrative processes, such as YaST and > RPM, can still function. I see. Hope you will come up with a solution! > * The security of the default profile will be exceptionally weak if > it is a negative profile. This is for all the usual security > weaknesses of a default allow policy. OK, but how would this 'weakness' be any different than the current state, where there is no profile assigned at all to most of the processes. If the default negative profile is empty, that would mean 'access granted' by default, which won't corrupt anything. > * The usability of the system will be severely compromised if the > default profile is a positive (normal) profile. *Every* process in > the system will be subject to this default profile, and so lots of > "normal" UNIX administrative procedures won't work. A default restrictive profile could render the system completely unusable. Thats why I guess the default profile should be negative only. If it is positive, it would truly need a lot time to develop. > Therefore, using the default profile feature is likely to be appropriate > only for specialized situations where the configuration can be limited > to a specific need, and therefore its administrative needs will be > relatively simple. Exactly! My situation is like this. But having the tools to do this, only gives the administrator more options. It means that the administrator should be paying more attention, too. Good luck with the project! -- Blade hails you... All the same take me away We're dead to the world --Nightwish

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tomcat5 webdav and user dirs
by Wouter 02 Oct '06

02 Oct '06

Hi, I have installed a few days ago tomcat whit the suse rpms. But i want now that i can make user directoy's. Because the world can now write in de webdav dir.... Is there someone who knows how i can make a few user directory's ? Greets

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Encrypted filesystem on loop file
by Carlos E. R. 01 Oct '06

01 Oct '06

Hi, I'm trying to create an encrypted filesystem via Yast partitioner in SuSE 10.1, using a file mounted via the loop device. I have done this before, in fact I have two such things created under 9.3 running; but I can't (couldn't) with 10.1, it is creating a plain non encrypted filesystem instead. Or so it seemed. Looking carefully again, after several runs, I noticed that it was mounting the filesystem as plain non encrypted, but it was in fact creating an encrypted one with the appropriate entry en /etc/cryptotab instead of in /etc/fstab - whereas in 9.3 it created then in /etc/fstab instead, and in 8.x they were created in /etc/cryptotab. This criteria change is very confusing. Perhaps Yast could ask where the user wanted to define it - feature request, perhaps? It's not only a config file difference; an encrypted filesystem defined in /etc/fstab can be mounted with the command mount, but one defined in /etc/cryptotab is mounted via the command "/etc/init.d/boot.crypto start", which is less comfortable for manual mount after boot (and it mounts all devices listed, even if already mounted). /etc/cryptotab sample line: /dev/loop3 /file3 /crypta3 ext3 twofish256 acl,user_xattr /etc/fstab, the equivalent sample line: /file3 /crypta3 ext3 noauto,acl,user_xattr,loop=/dev/loop3,encryption=twofish256 0 0 Both work with the same file, I tried. I'll stay with the second one. But in 9.3 the fstab line was instead (incompatible): /file2 /crypta2 ext3 noauto,acl,user_xattr,loop=/dev/loop2,encryption=twofish256,phash=sha512,itercountk=100 Comments? Also, how would I create the equivalent encrypted filesystem manually; docus, howtos? Tks. -- Cheers, Carlos Robinson

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[suse-security] Deny access to file for all applications with apparmor?
by Boyan Tabakov 01 Oct '06

01 Oct '06

Hi, I was recently going through the manuals of apparmor. As far as I could understand you can create profiles for specific executables. I was wondering, however, is it possible to create a 'generic' profile that should be applied to ANY process started. Or, what I really want to accomplish, how can I deny access to specific file for ALL processes, except, let's say one or two? If I understand the concept right, this can't be done, but let me know if I am wrong, please! -- Blade hails you... Toll no bell for me father But let this suffering pass from me Send me no shepherd to heal my world But the Angel - the dream foretold --Nightwish

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