August 2003 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

AW: [suse-security] kernel: Neighbour table overflow
by Schoenwaelder Oliver 27 Aug '03

27 Aug '03

Hi, well, it was caused by some infected servers from a office which is connected by ipsec. Due to that I tcpdumped only ethx interfaces I just saw the ESP packets. The servers did a ping to all ip addresses of our class A network which I saw during tcpdump of ipsecx interfaces. Thx to all for your help. Olly > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > Von: John Andersen [mailto:jsa@pen.homeip.net] > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 27. August 2003 09:08 > An: SuSE Security Discussion (suse-security(a)suse.com) > Betreff: Re: [suse-security] kernel: Neighbour table overflow > > > On Tuesday 26 August 2003 02:36, Sven 'Darkman' Michels wrote: > > Schoenwaelder Oliver wrote: > > >>Hi, > > >> > > >>I don't know how to solve the problem on my own: we have a linux > > >>firewall (SuSE 7.3, kernel 2.4.16, iptables 1.2.2-60, FreeS/WAN > > >>1.94_0.9.2-41) which is running for more than a year now. Since > > >>August, 12th with have lots of messages like > > >> > > >>Aug 25 10:52:25 batschkapp-ext kernel: NET: 468 messages > suppressed. > > >>Aug 25 10:52:25 batschkapp-ext kernel: Neighbour table overflow. > > >> > > >>in messages file. What is strange is that arp tables contains > > >>exactly 1023 entries, most of them incomplete with IP > addresses of > > >>our local subnet which are not used and not reachable. Sometimes > > >>arp table is correct with about 70 entries, but only for > a couple of > > >>seconds. > > > > you can 'fix' it by spending more ram for the arp table: > > > > echo 1024 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/neigh/default/gc_thresh1 > > echo 2048 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/neigh/default/gc_thresh2 > > echo 4096 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/neigh/default/gc_thresh3 > > > > Dunno if it's really related to blaster, but we had similar > problems. > > > > Your arp table is loaded by the actions of processes in your > linux box, > usually some interaction with the target IP, either as a > samba server or by > the target trying to send mail etc. > > Nothing in a windows box is going change that unless ALL of > them are infected and ALL of them are trying to send mail > thru the gateway. > > If all these addresses show up as "incomplete" you can be > sure that the action that caused them to be added to the > table originated in or came thru the linux box. > > It looks like port scanning, or pinging every IP on the local > net from the server. > > Someone may have contrived to ping the broadcast > address with, this will fill your arp table in a hurry, but > usually only wity good (working) addresses, not incompletes > > > > -- > _____________________________________ > John Andersen > > -- > Check the headers for your unsubscription address > For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com > Security-related bug reports go to security(a)suse.de, not here >

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kernel: Neighbour table overflow
by Schoenwaelder Oliver 27 Aug '03

27 Aug '03

> Hi, > > I don't know how to solve the problem on my own: we have a linux firewall > (SuSE 7.3, kernel 2.4.16, iptables 1.2.2-60, FreeS/WAN 1.94_0.9.2-41) > which is running for more than a year now. Since August, 12th with have > lots of messages like > > Aug 25 10:52:25 batschkapp-ext kernel: NET: 468 messages suppressed. > Aug 25 10:52:25 batschkapp-ext kernel: Neighbour table overflow. > > in messages file. What is strange is that arp tables contains exactly 1023 > entries, most of them incomplete with IP addresses of our local subnet > which are not used and not reachable. > Sometimes arp table is correct with about 70 entries, but only for a > couple of seconds. > I wonder whether this is linked to Blaster.Worm. Because first entry in > messages files is from August, 12th and next entry with significant > increase of suppressed messages is starting August, 22nd. On August, 13th > I configured our firewall to drop packets addressed to the ports used by > Blaster.Worm. > > Any idea what's going wrong? > > Best regards, > > Olly > >

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mua supporting apop
by mailinglists 27 Aug '03

27 Aug '03

Hi which mua does support apop auth? thanks Philipp

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Re: [suse-security] Winpopups behind SUSEfirewall
by Arndt Faulhaber 27 Aug '03

27 Aug '03

On Tuesday 26. August 2003 21:04, you wrote: > I don't know whether this is related to your problem, but > last thursday someome got past my IPTables firewall, that > was in FULL stealth mode, according to Shields Up firewall > test at www.grc.com Thanks - I test it using nmap myself... > So I put a temporary rule in my firewall to log ALL packets > coming into the input chain, (I already had a rule to log > every packet going through the output chain). Did you find something? Cheers, Arndt -- Arndt Faulhaber mailto:arndt.faulhaber@diagnosdata.com

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Re: [suse-security] Winpopups behind SUSEfirewall
by Arndt Faulhaber 27 Aug '03

27 Aug '03

First thanks for the answer, but > Close this ports used by Netbios > > udp/135 > udp/137 - 139 > udp/445 > tcp/137 - 139 > tcp/445 These ports are _not_ open (scanned using nmap...). No ports are open from the outside... > More information in http://www.hispasec.com/unaaldia/1587 (spanish) hmmm... > > Could test your configuration with > http://www.mynetwatchman.com/winpopuptester.asp Jup, I had done that already... naturally that doesn't get through. I think the technique must be different, don't know how, but maybe the packets are generated from the inside (by some javascript, trojan or whatever...) -- could not put my finger to it yet... Cheers, Arndt -- Arndt Faulhaber mailto:arndt.faulhaber@diagnosdata.com

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FYI: Kritischer Fehler - yast2-users-2.7.20-15
by Carsten Mueller 26 Aug '03

26 Aug '03

FYI: >Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 05:57:13 +0200 >To: security(a)suse.de >From: Carsten Mueller <mueller(a)intertrend.de> >Subject: Kritischer Fehler - yast2-users-2.7.20-15 > >Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, > >wir haben soeben einen weiteren kritischen Fehler in Ihrem Yast2-Usermanager >gefunden. > >Das Problem tritt auf, sobald sich in der /etc/passwd am Ende mindestens eine >Leerzeilen befindet. > >Beim Starten des Usermanagers gibt dieser waehrend des Tasks >"Benutzereinstellungen lesen" folgende Fehlermeldung aus: >"Einstellungen für die Systembenutzer konnten nicht gelesen werden." >Diese Meldung kann nur mit "Ok" bestaetigt werden. Danach wird der >Usermanager scheinbar normal gestartet. >Falls man danach einen neuen User anlegt bzw einen vorhandenen >User modifiziert werden nur noch die "normalen" Nutzer (ueber UID 500) >zurueck in der /etc/passwd geschrieben. Alle Systembenutzer inkl. >root(!) sind nicht mehr vorhanden. Im Gegensatz dazu werden die User >in der /etc/shadow nicht geloescht. > >Wir haben das genannte Problem auf einer SuSE 8.2 und einer SuSE 8.1 >Version getestet. SuSE 8.1 ist davon nicht betroffen, nur SuSE 8.2! > >SuSE 8.1 Pro - yast2-users-2.6.27-10 - fehler tritt nicht auf >SuSE 8.2 Pro - yast2-users-2.7.20-15 - fehler tritt auf > >Wir würden uns freuen von Ihnen zu hören und verbleiben. > > >Mit freundlichen Gruessen / best regards > >Carsten Mueller >intertrend GmbH network & security solutions >Bleichstr. 8a >35390 Giessen >Germany >Tel.: +49 641 984993-0 >Fax: +49 641 984993-5 >email: mailto:mueller@intertrend.de

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SuSE Security Announcement: sendmail (SuSE-SA:2003:035)
by Thomas Biege 26 Aug '03

26 Aug '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: sendmail Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:035 Date: Tuesday, Aug 26th 2003 19:00 MEST Affected products: 8.0, 8.1, 8.2 SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 remote denial-of-service Severity (1-10): 5 SuSE default package: no Cross References: CAN-2003-0688 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: calling free() with arbitrary argument problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: - traceroute(-nanog) - gdm2 - pam_smb - exim 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information The well known and widely used MTA sendmail is vulnerable to a remote denial-of-service attack in version 8.12.8 and earlier (but not before 8.12). The bug exists in the DNS map code. This feature is enabled by specifying FEATURE(`enhdnsbl'). When sendmail receives an invalid DNS response it tries to call free(3) on random data which results in a process crash. After your system was updated you have to restart your sendmail daemon to make the update effective. There is no known workaround for this vulnerability other than using a different MTA. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/sendmail-8.12.7-73.i58… eaf90e49886f496b2779107f1d9a831a patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/sendmail-8.12.7-73.i58… c5999fe4026e05c4308249a7e3dbf8f4 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/src/sendmail-8.12.7-73.src.… 2cda6c535a3be4e26c50373bd078b4c7 SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/sendmail-8.12.6-147.i5… 03d2b6e1083f863dc19a28f44256b071 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/sendmail-8.12.6-147.i5… ee6a3553396432bd3a208d355dacdd33 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/sendmail-8.12.6-147.src… 97417cee623251c6cc3009c13c5b1fbe SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n1/sendmail-8.12.3-76.i386.rpm c7cd791bdbcf0c5ed80cd9aab0ccc965 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n1/sendmail-8.12.3-76.i386.patc… a2d04f73894a09b9134f0f516c385d78 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/sendmail-8.12.3-76.src.rpm 4c059b5714ba2dbe5860654622b65bfb Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/uucp-1.06.1-931.i586.r… 1d5e50aea21f2ce88277fd9113dfb6da patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/i586/uucp-1.06.1-931.i586.p… 402cff9f2e0e4b56b2409082d0adbc0d source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.2/rpm/src/sendmail-8.12.7-73.src.… 2cda6c535a3be4e26c50373bd078b4c7 SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/uucp-1.06.1-931.i586.r… 7de06e8f16800359e25b5d9dcc739af5 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/uucp-1.06.1-931.i586.p… 67c84d8cd4ff132ef0c1a91ed845b5d8 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/sendmail-8.12.6-147.src… 97417cee623251c6cc3009c13c5b1fbe SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n4/uucp-1.06.1-931.i386.rpm b95b64d0c474ee7b37a82e2fc04e72b7 patch rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n4/uucp-1.06.1-931.i386.patch.r… e872341553634848bb19b0d89a1e3a37 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/sendmail-8.12.3-76.src.rpm 4c059b5714ba2dbe5860654622b65bfb ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - traceroute(-nanog) A integer overflow in traceroute can be abused by local attackers to gain access to a raw IP socket. New packages are available on out FTP servers. - gdm2 Due to a bug in GDM it is possible for local users to read any text file on a system by creating a symlink from ~/.xsession-errors. Updated packages will be available on our FTP servers soon. - pam_smb A buffer overflow in the password handling function of pam_smb allows remote root compromise. Fixed packages will be available soon. - exim Two bugs where fixed in exim. One bug allows remote access as user mail/mail and the other one allows local root access for 'Admin Users'. Fixed packages are available on our FTP servers. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. 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Winpopups behind SUSEfirewall
by Arndt Faulhaber 26 Aug '03

26 Aug '03

Hi there, has anyone received some kind of windows messaging services popup spam sitting behind a linux box (got SUSEFirewall2 running...)? I just cannot imagine how these messages should be able to get through, since stateful inspection should take care of that stuff. Any advise? Thanx a lot, cheers, Arndt -- Arndt Faulhaber mailto:arndt.faulhaber@diagnosdata.com

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what about them latest sendmail bug
by Andreas Bittner 26 Aug '03

26 Aug '03

where are the patches? http://www.sendmail.org/dnsmap1.html thanks.

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Re: [suse-security] Re: stopping DrDOS attacks against Apache???
by m3047＠inwa.net 26 Aug '03

26 Aug '03

keith(a)topaz5.worldonline.co.uk wrote: > My idea was to keep a count of ALL packets coming to the > server, and if there is an excessive amount of packets that > are coming from one source IP, in a very short period of > time, then this would probably indicate a SYN flood attack. Apache is opening a tcp connection, yes? I may be mistaken, but I believe that Apache does access control after the connection is open. As SYN packets are part of the connection negotiation, they therefore happen beyond Apache's control. If you're suggesting changing the way Apache handles connections (does its own TCP connection negotiation?), maybe that should be discussed on an Apache-specific list. However I suspect that anything that low-level might not be entirely portable. -- Fred Morris m3047(a)inwa.net

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