July 2003 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

how to keep nimda and code red from filling apache logs
by Mathias Homann 25 Sep '03

25 Sep '03

Hi all, here's a bit of a step-by-step description on how to keep nimda and codered from filling your apache logs. Parts used: - SuSE 7.2 Professional - SuSEfirewall2 - iptables 1.2.3 - linux kernel 2.4.13-pre5 steps: 1. install kernel sources for a kernel >> 2.4.9, running 2.4.13- pre5 here, works fine so far 2. get the sources for iptables 1.2.3 from http://netfilter.samba.org 3. unpack sources somewhere 4. export KERNEL_DIR=$(where you put the kernel tree) 5. cd into unpacked iptables sources, there's a subdirectory named patch-o-matic there 6. apply wanted patches by running ./runme $(name.of.patch)patch for this here You'll want the string patch You can also apply other patches, like the irc-conntrack patch 7. now there's a little bug in this patch... here's a diff: --- linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_string.c~ Sun Oct 21 00:16:29 2001 +++ linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_string.c Sun Oct 21 16:54:45 2001 @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ sk = skip[haystack[right_end - i]]; sh = shift[i]; - right_end = max(int, right_end - i + sk, right_end + sh); + right_end = max(right_end - i + sk, right_end + sh); } return NULL; 8. now, make config/menuconfig/xconfig... as usual. You can import your running kernel's config first. 9. enable the experimental stuff 10. go to networking options->netfilter, there's an option there to enable string matching; set that to M 11. compile and install kernel as usual; remember to uncomment the export INSTALL_PATH=/boot in the main makefile. 12. now build a rpm file for the new iptables stuff by installing the source rpm which comes with suse, then edit the spec file, put the iptables source in /usr/src/packages/SOURCE and rebuild. 13. now there are some small changes to the firewall config files. a) uncomment the last line in /etc/rc.config.d/firewall2.rc.config: FW_CUSTOMRULES="/etc/rc.config.d/firewall2-custom.rc.config" b) edit that file, I got the following stuff in mine: for forbidden_string in root.exe cmd.exe .ida; do iptables -I input_ext -p tcp --dport http -m string \ --string $forbidden_string -m state \ --state ESTABLISHED -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset done put that in the last supfunction defined in the custom rc file. c) change the FW_LOG setting in firewall2.rc.config from reading -log-level warning to -log-level kernel.warning 14. last: some small changes to /sbin/SuSEfirewall2 search in the script for the parts where the modules are loaded and unloaded; be sure to add ipt_string (and the other new modules you created by patching the kernel and enabling them in make config) to the modules loading/unloading code there. 15. reboot 16. if you try now to access (from outside, of course) one of the nimda or codered URLS, all you get is a 'connection reset by peer', and the request doesn't show in apache log files. btw, no guarantees, and the usual YMMV :) bye [L]

7 7

FYI: Kritischer Fehler - yast2-users-2.7.20-15
by Carsten Mueller 26 Aug '03

26 Aug '03

FYI: >Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 05:57:13 +0200 >To: security(a)suse.de >From: Carsten Mueller <mueller(a)intertrend.de> >Subject: Kritischer Fehler - yast2-users-2.7.20-15 > >Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, > >wir haben soeben einen weiteren kritischen Fehler in Ihrem Yast2-Usermanager >gefunden. > >Das Problem tritt auf, sobald sich in der /etc/passwd am Ende mindestens eine >Leerzeilen befindet. > >Beim Starten des Usermanagers gibt dieser waehrend des Tasks >"Benutzereinstellungen lesen" folgende Fehlermeldung aus: >"Einstellungen für die Systembenutzer konnten nicht gelesen werden." >Diese Meldung kann nur mit "Ok" bestaetigt werden. Danach wird der >Usermanager scheinbar normal gestartet. >Falls man danach einen neuen User anlegt bzw einen vorhandenen >User modifiziert werden nur noch die "normalen" Nutzer (ueber UID 500) >zurueck in der /etc/passwd geschrieben. Alle Systembenutzer inkl. >root(!) sind nicht mehr vorhanden. Im Gegensatz dazu werden die User >in der /etc/shadow nicht geloescht. > >Wir haben das genannte Problem auf einer SuSE 8.2 und einer SuSE 8.1 >Version getestet. SuSE 8.1 ist davon nicht betroffen, nur SuSE 8.2! > >SuSE 8.1 Pro - yast2-users-2.6.27-10 - fehler tritt nicht auf >SuSE 8.2 Pro - yast2-users-2.7.20-15 - fehler tritt auf > >Wir würden uns freuen von Ihnen zu hören und verbleiben. > > >Mit freundlichen Gruessen / best regards > >Carsten Mueller >intertrend GmbH network & security solutions >Bleichstr. 8a >35390 Giessen >Germany >Tel.: +49 641 984993-0 >Fax: +49 641 984993-5 >email: mailto:mueller@intertrend.de

3 3

RE: Re[2]: [suse-security] SuSEfirewall2 and Active ftp
by Knut Erik Hauslo 15 Aug '03

15 Aug '03

The problem with FTP is, that at some point during the communication, FTP Client and FTP Server "agreee" on using a different port than 21 and 20 TCP. If you use a sniffer you would see that the FTP client sends packets on destination port 21 with source port > 1024. When transfer starts the FTP clients send a port request on which port to use for transfer. In most cases this is source port + 1. With the sniffer, at some point you will see (provided you use normal FTP an not passive) something like this "PORT 12,34,56,78,65,43". This means the client will listen on ip address 12.34.56.78 on Port 16683 for the data channel. (NOTE: the port is the 65,43 pair and is calculated like this: (65x256)+43=16683). Without masquerading, and allowed FTP, I only got this working by additionally open ports 1024-65535. Now, suppose you allow outgoing 20,21 for FTP, you'd also need to open incoming high ports. Unfortunately, this parameter does not seem to work if you do not masquerade, so you need to add a forwarding rule which permits high ports from the outside world. This again leaves those ports always open, not only when FTP sessions needs them. With masquerading, this worked fine: FW_MASQ_NETS="172.19.0.0/16,0/0,tcp,20 172.19.0.0/16,0/0,tcp,21 172.19.0.0/16,0/0,tcp,80" FW_FORWARD_MASQ="0/0,172.19.6.10,tcp,80" FW_TRUSTED_NETS="" FW_ALLOW_INCOMING_HIGHPORTS_TCP="yes" Cheers

5 6

[suse-security] unsubscribe
by njean 09 Aug '03

09 Aug '03

Please remove me from your distribution list. Thanks, Neal Jean

10 10

iptables with transparent squid
by David Blomber 09 Aug '03

09 Aug '03

I was setting up a transparent squid proxy server on a single NIC machine. (got it working to) then I went to a multi-homed machine and no matter how I tweak the firewall rules are killing me and will not allow the nat redirect to take incoming traffic on port 80 and give it to port 3128 iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i $INTERFACE -p tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-port 3128 but even with this rule all normal (browser set up to use proxy works) but nothing on port 80. V ^ | | | | +-------------------------------+ |(trusted NIC) (ext NIC)| | Squid | +-------------------------------+ The iptables rules generated by SuSE 8.2 Pro SuSEFIREWALL2 are quite extensive. Any help would be appreciated.

2 1

Deny IP address's
by Nigel Gaylard 09 Aug '03

09 Aug '03

Hi All I would like to create a list of IP address's that should be denied all access to my server. I have currently 2 or 3 people making a deliberate effort to hack into my SSH port, and so I would like to deny them access to it at firewall level, as well as all other ports. I can't seem to find information in the Suse documentation on firewall2. Many thanks Nigel Gaylard

5 4

FYI: Kritischer Fehler - yast2-users-2.7.20-15
by Carsten Mueller 07 Aug '03

07 Aug '03

FYI: Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 05:05:10 +0200 (CEST) >Subject: Kritischer Fehler - yast2-users-2.7.20-15 >From: "Andreas Mallek" <mallek(a)intertrend.de> >To: security(a)suse.de >Cc: mueller(a)intertrend.de >Reply-To: mallek(a)intertrend.de >Importance: High > >Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, > >mit grossem Entsetzen mussten wir soeben feststellen, dass Sie >einen kritischen Fehler in Ihren Yast2-Usermanager eingebaut haben. > >Das Problem tritt auf, sobald mindestens zwei Benutzer mit derselben >UID auf dem System erzeugt und anschließend mit Hilfe des Yast2 >Usermanager Änderungen an irgendeinem Benutzer vorgenommen werden. > >Beim Beenden des Usermanagers werden dann die auf dem System vorhandenen >Benutzer neu in die /etc/passwd und in die /etc/shadow geschrieben, >wobei nur der erste Benutzer mit jeweils gleichen UIDs >(in alphabetischer Reihenfolge) in die /etc/passwd zurückgeschrieben >wird. Dieses Problem tritt in der /etc/shadow nicht auf. Dort werden >alle Benutzer durch Yast2 eingetragen. > >Auch Benutzer root wird durch Yast2 entfernt, sobald ein Benutzer z.B. >mit dem Usernamen "bert" und der UID 0 angelegt wird und danach die >Yast2 Routine ausgeführt wird. > >Wir haben das genannte Problem auf verschienen SuSE 8.2er Versionen >getestet, und auf einem SuSE 8.1 System. SuSE 8.1 ist davon nicht >betroffen, nur SuSE 8.2! > >Das Problem hängt nach unseren Tests auch nicht mit der Sort-Funktion >des Yast2 Password-Managers zusammen. Ohne die passwd-Sort Funktion ist >das Problem auf unseren Systemen auch aufgetreten. > >SuSE 8.1 Pro - yast2-users-2.6.27-10 - fehler tritt nicht auf >SuSE 8.2 Pro - yast2-users-2.7.20-15 - fehler tritt auf > >Im Normalfall verwenden wir kein Yast, die heutige Ausnahme >hat meine Meinung über solche Tools gestärkt. > >Wir würden uns freuen von Ihnen zu hören und verbleiben > > > mit freundlichem Gruß, best Regards, > TEAM INTERTREND Network & Security > --------------------------------------------- > intertrend Network & Security Solutions GmbH > Andreas Mallek, Chief Software Engineer > Bleichstraße 8a - D-35390 Giessen > Ph. +49 641 984993 Fax +49 641 984993 5 > http://www.intertrend.de - mailto:mallek@intertrend.de > > > >-- >+++ regfish.com - Domains, Web-Mail & more http://www.regfish.com +++ >Und DynDNS gibts zu jeder bestellten Domain natürlich gratis dazu! :)

1 1

How secure is Twofish against brute force
by Bo Jacobsen 06 Aug '03

06 Aug '03

I use Twofish encryption on a loopback device. Does anyone have any information on how "safe" the twofish implemented in SuSE linux is. I know there is no simple answer to this, but any information, or links to relevant sites would be appreciated. Thanks in advance Bo Jacobsen

2 1

Webmin security
by João Reis 01 Aug '03

01 Aug '03

Hi to all! I am interested in creating a way to administer my company systems when iam away. I come across Webmin and i think it is a good way to administer systems when i am not in the company. Does anyone knows if the Webmin permits to do a administration of the systems securely ? Example if i connect from home to my company to administer my systems with webmin is there any secyrity flaws or if it is not advisable ? Thanks to all and sorry about my english. João Reis -------------------------------------------------------

6 8

SuSE Security Announcement: wuftpd (SuSE-SA:2003:032)
by Roman Drahtmueller 31 Jul '03

31 Jul '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: wuftpd Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2003:032 Date: Thursday, July 31st 2003 18:00 MEST Affected products: 7.2, 7.3 SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7 SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Office Server Vulnerability Type: remote buffer overflow Severity (1-10): 7 SuSE default package: no Cross References: CAN-2003-0466 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: wuftpd problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information Janusz Niewiadomski and Wojciech Purczynski of iSEC Security Research have found a single byte buffer overflow in the Washington University ftp daemon (wuftpd), a widely used ftp server for Linux-like systems. It is yet unclear if this bug is (remotely) exploitable. Positive exploitability may result in a remote root compromise of a system running the wuftpd ftp daemon. Notes: * SuSE Linux products do not contain wuftpd any more starting with SuSE Linux 8.0 and SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8. The wuftpd package has been substituted by a different server implementation of the file transfer protocol server. * The affected wuftpd packages in products as stated in the header of this announcement actually ship two different wuftpd ftp daemon versions: The older version 2.4.x that is installed as /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd, the newer version 2.6 is installed as /usr/sbin/wu.ftpd-2.6 . The 2.4.x version does not contain the defective parts of the code and is therefore not vulnerable to the weakness found. * If you are using the wuftpd ftp daemon in version 2.4.x, you might want to update the package anyway in order not to risk an insecure configuration once you switch to the newer version. There exists no workaround that can fix this vulnerability on a temporary basis other than just using the 2.4.x version as mentioned above. The proper fix for the weakness is to update the package using the provided update packages. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n2/wuftpd-2.6.0-403.i386.rpm 9f786439f4efc289dbaee78a8c873b56 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/wuftpd-2.6.0-403.src.rpm 6f748bfc27cc44ade2c2044365fb825a SuSE-7.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n2/wuftpd-2.6.0-403.i386.rpm 077463a6387d8b596cfedb6f80d765aa source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/wuftpd-2.6.0-403.src.rpm 5bd18ea86422a84338fc1827362e8bdc Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n2/wuftpd-2.6.0-260.sparc.rpm 985a2bdcb25ec5283a00784810b28050 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/wuftpd-2.6.0-260.src.rpm 49d647216d0f1b22a5a326887d8ef955 PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n2/wuftpd-2.6.0-328.ppc.rpm f8b1276d87cb5dcb4aca89054015a353 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/wuftpd-2.6.0-328.src.rpm 07ff383965af6b860e5cfda95efa2fce ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - gnats Several security bugs were reported in gnats. The version of gnats that comes with SuSE Linux is not vulnerable to these problems. - kopete Kopete is the KDE instant messenger. A bug in kopete's gpg plugin can be abused to execute commands remotely. A fix will be available as soon as possible. - wget When handling long URLs, a buffer underrun may occur in the wget program. This underrun may be exploitable remotely. The update packages are available now on our ftp servers. - emacs Due to insecure temporary file handling in the semi and wemi library of GNU Emacs it is possible for a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files of the user running emacs. The fix is currently being worked on. - ethereal Several remote exploitable bugs were found in the network analyzing tool ethereal. The update packages are available on our ftp servers. - tomcat Wrong file permission and clear passwords in the tomcat default installation allows local users to gain security relevant data by reading the file /opt/jakarta/tomcat/conf/tomcat-users.xml. Please enable password encryption and revoke the read permissions for 'group' and 'others' by adding the following line to /etc/permissions.local: /opt/jakarta/tomcat/conf/tomcat-users.xml wwwrun.root 0700 and run the following command as root: "chkstat -set /etc/permissions.local" - heartbeat A format string bug in heartbeat's debug code can be exploited by a remote attacker if the debug level is high and the heartbeat daemon in configuered in an unsecure manner. The update packages are being tested right now. - freeradius A buffer overflow in the CHAP implementation of freeradius leads to a remotely exploitable security hole which can be abused to execute arbitrary code on the RADIUS server. The update packages are being tested right now. - traceroute(-nanog) An integer overflow in traceroute-nanog can be abused to gain access to the raw ip socket. We are working on the fix. - kdelibs Due to the fact of verifying the IP address instead of the Common Name (CN) field of the X.509 certificate the SSL implementation of KDE 2.2 and earlier is vulnerable to a MiM attack. Only SuSE Linux 7.3 is affected by this problem. Update packages are available on our FTP servers. - man The mandb program which is part of the man package contains a buffer overflow which allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code as man user. New packages are already availabale on our ftp servers. - several minor bug fixes There are alot more minor security updates in the queue. YOU (Yast Online Update) will inform you when they appear. Alternatively you may want to monitor the following website: http://www.suse.de/de/private/download/updates/index.html or: http://www.suse.de/en/private/download/updates/index.html ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Roman Drahtmüller, SuSE Security. - -- - - | Roman Drahtmüller <draht(a)suse.de> // Nail here | SuSE Linux AG - Security Phone: // for a new | Nürnberg, Germany +49-911-740530 // monitor! --> [x] | - - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (GNU/Linux) iQEVAwUBPylQcHey5gA9JdPZAQGd9wgAnpqABh96vqMISvP2Tp66wjAQm+XPF2nE Iz4tas6XNLWzH+Ypg6P95uwYt5wZTBMbcmtJvZ/10x6AxjkuEvfw45/GgvHFXNNN GLlYMehE1bHzUhG2VGBCyxMt8rMtVd3WdQnLb40OS/EBMui5F6Q9EZRxU5SDhGY6 a8t7e97QD87U8M0WumGd9Or9P11Hx260YLS0+sn8IS4WNrZnANrsxKjASBB3Y+ya 289aDY2sb/nhhaphEW1m25KxDIKvTHcbRoV/5UaBFWcnXF6oNwNyLQWHZSqHMSKH ohO8x4ybd1RfjfthehGuyLd36FPtEpaNvzBzL9t7sSD7dBi+pZeEQQ== =0Krv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0