May 2002 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

suse security list - another heaven for spam bots
by PW 23 May '02

23 May '02

Dear all, We are all grinding today under loads of spam. I was not among the amused as I received the first spam directed to my private E-mail address which, until today, was also my subscription address to the SuSE security list (it has not been published anywhere else). Apparently, a grave mistake. This list with all its messages is archived with the complete headers, mirrored and searchable throughout the net. That of course also attracts the dirty spam bots. In my opinion there should be at least one BIG warning in the subscription confirmation message alerting the user that this list is archived and his E-mail address therefore open to the entire public. I was not aware of this fact as I subscribed. Just a hint. Best regards, Philippe Wiede Megapublic [r], Inc. Gemsberg 11, 4051 Basel, Switzerland www.megapublic.com

11 12

iptables against nmap
by Andreas Wahlert 23 May '02

23 May '02

Hi list, i've testet SuSE 8.0 with iptables and squid. When i start many (7) nmap scans, options -sF sX sN sS sU, sychronously from another maschine against the public interface of the Squid and iptables firewall, the scanlogd service crashes and the squid is very slow. The users behind the Firewall don't see any Homepage in their browsers. All sites are unreachable. If the scans are stopped, everything works fine. Any ideas, what could happen? regards Andreas Wahlert

2 1

Re: [suse-security] Securing SuSE Linux 7.3
by Albert Brandl 23 May '02

23 May '02

On Thu, May 23, 2002 at 11:24:23AM +0200, Markus Gaugusch wrote: > There are several open source products for backing up stuff. If you want > to use cdroms, see e.g. http://mondo.soureforge.net. We are using AMANDA ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ this of course should read sourceforge, not sou_re_forge... Sorry, Albert

1 0

SuSE Personal and Firewall2
by Fred A. Miller 22 May '02

22 May '02

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I found it interesting that 2 "outside" scans of this box gave the SAME results with both firewalls. NEITHER put ports in "stealth" or "blocked" mode when services are NOT allowed, which they SHOULD, IMHO. Most are "closed." Fred - -- Fred A. Miller Systems Administrator Cornell Univ. Press Services fm(a)cupserv.org, www.cupserv.org - --- SuSE Linux v8.0 Pro--- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAjzsBscACgkQB9vk4ichYXcN8gCaAyvj8TW7Q8hb+K1wF6COSIh1 u1oAn0QgDzBIM1nTCxF5sc9a/r1t/vyR =e659 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

SuSE Security Announcement: dhcp/dhcp-server (SuSE-SA:2002:019)
by Thomas Biege 22 May '02

22 May '02

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: dhcp/dhcp-server Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2002:019 Date: Wednesday, May 22th 2002 13:30 MEST Affected products: 7.2, 7.3, 8.0 SuSE Linux Database Server SuSE eMail Server III SuSE Linux Enterprise Server for S/390 SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7 Vulnerability Type: remote command execution Severity (1-10): 4 SuSE default package: no Other affected systems: all systems using ISC DHCP server 3.x Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: format string bug in dynamic DNS code problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information The "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol" (DHCP) server from the Internet Software Consortium allows hosts on a TCP/IP network to request and be assigned IP addresses, and also to discover information about the network to which they are attached. A remote exploitable format string vulnerability was found in the logging routines of the dynamic DNS code of dhcpd. This vulnerability allows an attacker, usually within the LAN served by the DHCP server, to get remote root access to the host running dhcpd. The dhcp/dhcp-server package is not installed by default nor is the dynamic DNS feature enabled by default. As temporary workaround the dynamic DNS feature could be disabled via dhcpd's config file with the following lines: ddns-update-style none; ddns-updates off; After updating the package or modifying the config file you have to run: rcdhcpd restart as root to restart all instances of running dhcpd processes. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. i386 Intel Platform: SuSE-8.0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n2/dhcp-server-3.0.1rc6-8.i386.… 754569c059f5f2c4f71397f6c6498f53 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/dhcp-3.0.1rc6-8.src.rpm 82ab4455ae86a932a746778ca0cf06f1 SuSE-7.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n2/dhcp-3.0rc12-47.i386.rpm 58bdf5e4e0622ba280fad0d649a36bdd source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/dhcp-3.0rc12-47.src.rpm 20abdc3bad4810971aa4cc959c133a9e SuSE-7.2 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n2/dhcp-3.0rc4-27.i386.rpm 826ffc2524ad6a6b3b746e3c5e0e5413 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/dhcp-3.0rc4-27.src.rpm 7bfd527698beef5a83e60577e7e02cfb Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n2/dhcp-3.0rc12-22.sparc.rpm 15ec49d27e7f8b61ec22616484e43996 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/dhcp-3.0rc12-22.src.rpm 1e3f0ee6da5684a49b31908f0e6ac9dd PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n2/dhcp-3.0rc12-32.ppc.rpm 76914c072100dff6fdf781ed81f7afeb source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/dhcp-3.0rc12-32.src.rpm 9ac78f35a529c24315f11184555c7f81 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - tcpdump/libpcap Various security and non-security related bugs were found in the code of tcpdump and libpcap. New RPMs are currently being build. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3in Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBPOvMjXey5gA9JdPZAQF70Qf9EovJ5FK0nGSa9uMVcoCiCvhRwdfFSCBe HNx1LgX9Q+bHEo9dPjqYxyNxN4HTGwWMbVyix/lQ2CDUOzxf0gxp+30R1E++RUdC sOCXwiPTkrcuMhOhwq3j7D2YUoxkpXpK17Eq+ZxHB6Z89mJEFPrkVuSriLdl07a4 6xAEH3koek3QFi18IX6JAzaQtG5A8qPfFRdE6mBrNk3a0zWH9mBzUUeYw+a4gaF3 497vfBdu/cffxVqyLBCqZlnUM6gs9YzBpbDNz3T3uNqQ1cjhl91b92x0MFatqiEj Nn3lTXXPklob6S9JoaONvvw3diQ31F2gor+sZNTRv/6q9zNUv3IUdA== =KL4d -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bye, Thomas -- Thomas Biege <thomas(a)suse.de> SuSE Linux AG,Deutschherrnstr. 15-19,90429 Nuernberg Function: Security Support & Auditing "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~thomas/contact/thomas.asc | pgp -fka" Key fingerprint = 51 AD B9 C7 34 FC F2 54 01 4A 1C D4 66 64 09 83 -- Trete durch die Form ein, und trete aus der Form heraus.

1 0

Securing SuSE Linux 7.3
by Thomas Föcking 22 May '02

22 May '02

Hello! It's my duty to set up an internet server with SuSE Linux 7.3. I want to ensure that it is as secure as possible. First thing was of course thinking of not to use SuSE Linux but instead install a little Linux From Scratch system (www.linuxfromscratch.org) with only a few files really needed to run a webserver. But then I am be sure if ColdFusion and some other applications/programs/modules would run correctly. So the decision was SuSE Linux 7.3 for x86. Dual PIII 1,13GHz, 1GB ECC SD-RAM, 2x 17GB SCSI ... First I installed 7.3 minimal (but I took around 200MB space, a lot for a minimal installation I think) + ProFTP, Sendmail, MySQL, Apache, PHP, Perl, SuSE Firewall2, harden_suse. What I did to secure the system: 1. run harden_suse with all options enabled. 2. compiled new kernel 2.4.18 with LIDS (lids.org) support. 3. secured all directories readonly except /dev, /var, /tmp, /proc 4. denied files like /etc/shadow except for su, login, proftp, sshd readonly 5. secured .bash_history, /var/log/firewall, /var/log/messages as append only 6. disabled capabilities like mknod, rawio ... And to keep track of what is going on: 1. weekly mail with all important logfiles 2. lids provides a port scan detector and to send a mail to me, if something is goning wrong in the system. Is this enough to avoid crackers to change my system? I know, that nothing is nearly 100% secure, but I think if no one (root included) can change system files it should be quite secure also if some breaks into the system and gets root privileges. I think If I'll always install the newest SuSE security updates the system would be only a few days unsaved. If then someone would break into, s/he could not damage that much, I hope. Best regards, Thomas

3 3

Re: [suse-security] Securing SuSE Linux 7.3
by Markus Gaugusch 22 May '02

22 May '02

On May 21, Thomas Föcking <thomas(a)foecking.de> wrote: > Once a week this simply script is ran: > (only this script has cap_sys_rawio and write access on /dev/sdb) > dd if=/dev/sda of=/dev/sdb bs=16M You will have two problems with this: Minor: Only data lost during the last week can be restored. If you delete a file, go on holiday for two weeks and want to restore it later, there is no chance. Major: Changes in the filesystem during this "backup" will most likely ruin your copy ... ! > > You also didn't tell us, which services you are offering. Web only? User > > authentication? SMTP/POP/IMAP? ... > > Every service that is used to authenticate users should use encryption > > (SSL/TLS). > World: > ftp, ssh, http, https Anonymous ftp only, hopefully? Markus -- _____________________________ /"\ Markus Gaugusch ICQ 11374583 \ / ASCII Ribbon Campaign markus(a)gaugusch.at X Against HTML Mail / \

3 2

iptables firewall
by Patrik Breitenmoser 22 May '02

22 May '02

Hi all, I need a little help from you guys. Does someone have a dedicatet internetserver and is running a iptables based firewall? regars Patrik Breitenmoser

4 3

Hardensuse and Suse 8.0
by oliver.z 22 May '02

22 May '02

Hey there Has anybody installed hardensuse on suse 8.0? Has anybody seen problems/bugs with that? To the installation of hardensuse: When I unpacked the harden_suse-3.5.tar.gz, there was one file with ending pl. Means that this is a perl script and I have only the do "perl harden-suse-3.5.pl" ? Any other options? thanks in advance Oliver

1 0

Protecting my password in ftp perl module
by Francesc Dantí 21 May '02

21 May '02

Hi all! I've used ftp-module (Net::FTP) in a perl-script that permits me to do a ftp to a remote server automaticly. My idea is that when I starts my linux server, it modifies some remote pages (on other server...) and when I halt my server, it restore the original files on the remote server. (I use rc.d directories) It runs correctly :), but there is a problem: I've to write my login and password in plain text in the script (*as shown below). I know that i can read-protect the script, but i doesn't like to have my password in plain text. Is there any manner to encrypt it, as linux do in passwd files? Or any other module that permits me to do the same with encrypted password? Thanks in advance! p.s. I can't use ssh in the remote server, it only runs ftp! ____________________________________________________ *SOME SCRIPT LINES use Net::FTP $ftp = Net::FTP->new("remote_server", Debug => 0); $ftp->login("LOGIN",'PASSWORD); $ftp-> MY COMMANDS ____________________________________________________

3 2