November 2002 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

RE: [suse-security] Postfix deferred mail
by mailinglists＠belfin.ch 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Hi, a question for the postfix list, isn't it? try 'postfix flush' to flush all mail or 'postsuper -d ALL' to delete all deferred mails Philipp > Hi list > > Due to a failure in a firewall script, postfix > was unable to reach external mail relays. > > Now the firewall hole to send mail is open > again. > > But how to flush all the mails in > > /var/spool/postfix/deferred > > now with one simple command ? > > Thx in advance > > Michael > > > -- > Check the headers for your unsubscription address > For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com > Security-related bug reports go to security(a)suse.de, not here >

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Re: [suse-security] nfs and authentification
by Frank W.Kooistra 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Hi Dani I think that you forget that the normal user authentication is still there. like on any ([l]Unix) machine. So passwords and file access is the same: an imported file system is not suddenly open when mounted at an other host. of course the exports should go to known hosts as wel. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original Message <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< On 11/11/02, 7:52:25 PM, Daniel121272(a)gmx.de wrote regarding [suse-security] nfs and authentification: > Dear List, > we use nfs to export a file-system of a file-server. But there is no > authentification of the importing computer, so everyone in our subnet > could give > them selves a valid IP and has access to all files. No they have not... do not worry about that regards Frank w Kooistra

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nfs and authentification
by Daniel121272＠gmx.de 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Dear List, we use nfs to export a file-system of a file-server. But there is no authentification of the importing computer, so everyone in our subnet could give themself a valid IP and has acess to all files. I know, there is snfs (nfs via ssh-tunnel), but as far as I know not in SuSE? My question: Is there any version of nfs or a comparable service with a secure authentification in the SuSE-packet? Or are there any other suggestions as alternative? Thank you, Dani. -- +++ GMX - Mail, Messaging & more http://www.gmx.net +++ NEU: Mit GMX ins Internet. Rund um die Uhr für 1 ct/ Min. surfen!

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RE: [suse-security] MS Vpn Server pptp in SuSE 8.0
by mailinglists＠belfin.ch 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

> * studio3arc.com Admin wrote on Sun, Nov 11, 2001 at 16:32 -0800: > > IPTables 1.2.7a does not support protocol 47 which is > required for PPTP. > > What does that mean? I thing, it should be no problem to open > protocol 47 with iptables. > > > In order to make this work you need to run the p-o-m patch > for IPTables > > And apply the pptp_conntrack, and pptp_nat patches. > > Well, but this is only needed to extend the packet filter to > stateful inspection I guess? Is this correct? > > BTW, IPSec should be preferred over PPTP I think. That's right. But crummy isa server is not capable of doing more that pptp. philipp

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SuSE Security Announcement: KDE lanbrowser vulnerability (SuSE-SA:2002:042)
by Olaf Kirch 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: kdenetwork Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2002:042 Date: Tue Nov 12 10:00:00 CET 2002 Affected products: 7.2, 7.3 SuSE eMail Server III, 3.1 SuSE Firewall on CD SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7 SuSE Linux Office Server Vulnerability Type: remote command execution Severity (1-10): 6 SuSE default package: yes Cross References: http://www.kde.org/info/security Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: Remote command execution via the lisa lanbrowser. problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: problem in KDE rlogin:// URL handler 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information During a security review, the SuSE security team has found two vulnerabilities in the KDE lanbrowsing service. LISa is used to identify CIFS and other servers on the local network, and consists of two main modules: "lisa", a network daemon, and "reslisa", a restricted version of the lisa daemon. LISa can be accessed in KDE using the URL type "lan://", and resLISa using the URL type "rlan://". LISA will obtain information on the local network by looking for an existing LISA server on other local hosts, and if there is one, it retrieves the list of servers from it. If there is no other LISA server, it will scan the network itself. SuSE Linux can be configured to run the lisa daemon at system boot time. The daemon is not started by default, however. The first vulnerability found is a buffer overflow in the lisa daemon, and can be exploited by an attacker on the local network to obtain root privilege on a machine running the lisa daemon. It is not exploitable on a default installation of SuSE Linux, because the lisa daemon is not started by default. The second vulnerability is a buffer overflow in the lan:// URL handler. It can possibly be exploited by remote attackers to gain access to the victim user's account, for instance by causing the user to follow a bad lan:// link in a HTML document. This update provides fixes for SuSE Linux 7.2 and 7.3. Previous updates already corrected the vulnerability in SuSE Linux 8.0, and SuSE Linux 8.1 contains the fix already. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/k2de1/kdenetwork-2.2.1-101.i386… 796ee745cea4f743ba4dc7314d0eab47 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/kdenetwork-2.2.1-101.src.rpm bdbcc6e939e4fb2f67d92c4998550ebe SuSE-7.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/k2de1/kdenetwork-2.1.1-154.i386… 52168eb8a1f393d5b070e76a40e12040 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/kdenetwork-2.1.1-154.src.rpm d46367f1c45e557a10854ef9efaa6184 Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/k2de1/kdenetwork-2.2.1-50.spar… 0e7fb9026b8fbf8f023bccb6a1ffe9e3 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/kdenetwork-2.2.1-50.src.rpm c11e3cf176d02bf600d312e527ffa159 PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/k2de1/kdenetwork-2.2.1-88.ppc.rpm 267805b2368f739ec195bec154b7e04c source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/kdenetwork-2.2.1-88.src.rpm 7f52f011e7b7535b0396fe5d00cf04a8 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: In KDE 2.x and KDE 3.x, there is a vulnerability in the handler for rlogin:// URLs, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the victim user. A similar vulnerability exists in KDE 2.x in the handler for telnet:// URLs. The SuSE KDE team is in the process of preparing a kdelibs update for SuSE Linux. In the interim, we recommend the to disable KDE support for rlogin as a workaround. On KDE 3.0, execute the following command as root: rm /opt/kde3/share/services/rlogin.protocol On KDE 2, execute these commands: rm /opt/kde2/share/services/rlogin.protocol rm /opt/kde2/share/services/telnet.protocol ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. 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MS Vpn Server pptp in SuSE 8.0
by Fabio Sena 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Good night, to all. I am wanting to implement a Vpn server with PPTP in the SuSE 8,0 - Kernel 2.4.18, and am having some difficulties in finding documents that explain as it must be configuration. A connection between a Client external MS(modem or lan calling the server vpn). I do not know which parameters I must use in the configuration of pptpd.conf, I am really necessary that I configure ppp, so that the Vpn server functions. I am ordering in the body of the email the 2 scenes as I would like that I functioned Server VPN 1º ex: computer(modem - call vpnserver using native vpnclient default)---------/ISP/----------\INTERNET\---------------/SuSE 8.0/(SuSEfirewall2 + pptpd) This first example I would like to connect the computer to the server vpn, for a computer that is connected by modem the InterNet for its ISP, of later calling my connection VPN using a customer vpn that I create in proper windows 98/nt/2000 2º ex: computer(lan - call vpnserver using native vpnclient default)-----\router\-------\ISP\-------\INTERNET\------------/SuSE 8.0/(SuSEfirewall2 + pptpd) This 2º example I would like to connect a computer to the server vpn, for a computer that is connected by lan internal the InterNet for the EBT(EMBRATEL), of later calling my connection VPN using a customer vpn that I create in proper windows 98/nt/2000 * I would like to know which parameters set for these two configurations, and if these configurations can coexist in pptpd.conf, so that I have a diversification of as to connect to this server VPN. * I am using the SuSEfirewall2, I am configuring to accept in my external interface, port 1723 and protocol 47, and am using masquerade for lan internal. Config-File Firewall ======================== FW_DEV_EXT="eth0" -> I need to place pptpd0 or ppp0 here? FW_DEV_INT="eth1" FW_DEV_DMZ="" FW_ROUTE="yes" FW_MASQUERADE="yes" FW_MASQ_DEV="$FW_DEV_EXT" # e.g. "ippp0" or "$FW_DEV_EXT" FW_MASQ_NETS="0/0" FW_PROTECT_FROM_INTERNAL="no" # "yes" is a good choice FW_AUTOPROTECT_SERVICES="yes" FW_SERVICES_EXT_TCP="22 1723" # Common: smtp domain FW_SERVICES_EXT_UDP="" # Common: domain FW_SERVICES_EXT_IP="47 gre" # For VPN/Routing which END at the firewall!! FW_SERVICES_DMZ_TCP="" # Common: smtp domain FW_SERVICES_DMZ_UDP="" # Common: domain syslog FW_SERVICES_DMZ_IP="" # For VPN/Routing which END at the firewall!! FW_SERVICES_INT_TCP="21 22 53 " # Common: ssh smtp domain FW_SERVICES_INT_UDP="" # Common: domain syslog FW_SERVICES_INT_IP="" # For VPN/Routing which END at the firewall!! FW_ALLOW_INCOMING_HIGHPORTS_TCP="yes" # Common: "ftp-data" FW_ALLOW_INCOMING_HIGHPORTS_UDP="yes" # Common: "DNS" or "domain ntp" Fabio Sena Brasil - PE

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Apache SSL-Attack and now listen on UDP-Port... New or modified worm?
by M. Neubert 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Hi list, I need shortly your advice! I saw today into my logfile and saw a SSL-attack, was somewhat more extensive that than usual. The "daily security report" says me now: OLD: /var/lib/secchk/security-report-daily Sun Nov 10 00:00:08 2002 NEW: /var/lib/secchk/security-report-daily.new Mon Nov 11 00:00:08 2002 * Changes (+: new entries, -: removed entries): + httpd root UDP *:12396 + httpd root UDP *:12397 + httpd root UDP *:12399 + httpd root UDP *:12400 + httpd root UDP *:12405 + httpd root UDP *:12407 + httpd root UDP *:12410 Is that a new or modified worm? Did it have success with me? I use Suse 7.3 with all current updates/patches. Many thanks for your help... Mario Neubert

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Re: [suse-security] use my own firewall script/disable SuSEfirewall2
by Frank W.Kooistra 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Hi Patrick we are all stupid sometimes : But if you fail to get SuSEfirewall2 working, i wonder if you are rellay helped by introducing a strange script. Why do you not send the settings you propose to use and there will be enough people ready here to guide you ? My suggestion is : copy the susefirewall2 script in an editor : and annotate your suggestions : together with smalt description of your setup I have seen home edited iptable scripts ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original Message <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< > hi everybody, > i spend some 3 days and 1 night trying to configure SuSEfirewall2 . Regards Frank

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Re: [suse-security] nfs and authentification
by Frank W.Kooistra 12 Nov '02

12 Nov '02

Hi Dani I think that you forget that the normal user authentication is still there. like on any ([l]Unix) machine. So passwords and file access is the same: an imported file system is not suddenly open when mounted at an other host. of course the exports should go to known hosts as wel. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original Message <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< On 11/11/02, 7:52:25 PM, Daniel121272(a)gmx.de wrote regarding [suse-security] nfs and authentification: > Dear List, > we use nfs to export a file-system of a file-server. But there is no > authentification of the importing computer, so everyone in our subnet > could give > them selves a valid IP and has access to all files. No the have not... regards Frank w Kooistra

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GRUB: passing command line parameters
by Richard Ems 11 Nov '02

11 Nov '02

Hi list! I just installed SuSE 8.1 with the new grub boot loader. With lilo I could block passing command line parameters with the "password" option. After setting this option in lilo.conf, lilo would ask for the saved pasword to accept any parameters appended to the kernel. But grub won't do this: There is a password parameter which will block from editing entries, this will then ask you for a password when trying to switch to the "edit mode" or to the grub command line. There is also a lock parameter which will ask you for the saved password to boot a locked menu entry. But I don't find a possibility to ask the user for a password before appending parameters to a menu entry! So every user can login with root control appending init=/bin/bash !!! This happens only in grub's graphic mode. In text only mode you can't append anything to the menu entries. A security bug in grub? Richard -- Richard Ems ... e-mail: r.ems(a)gmx.net ... Computer Science, University of Hamburg Unix IS user friendly. It's just selective about who its friends are.

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