November 2002 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

Re: *****SPAM***** Re: [suse-security] suse 7.3 & kernel
by Joerg Henner 20 Nov '02

20 Nov '02

On Die, 19 Nov 2002, wrote: >where do I get the 2.4.19-deflt? ftp://ftp.leo.org/pub/people/mantel/next/RPM/ Please be sure, there is no warranty upon those RPMs ;) Greetings, -- Jörg Henner Fon: +49 (7 11) 48 90 83 - 0 ETES - EDV-Systemhaus GbR Fax: +49 (7 11) 48 90 83 - 50 Libanonstrasse 58 A * D-70184 Stuttgart Web: http://www.etes.de ______________________________________ Inflex - eMail Scanning and Protection Queries to: postmaster(a)etes.de

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Problems creating usernames with dots
by Mario Viana 20 Nov '02

20 Nov '02

Hello, Well, maybe it´s a little off-topic , but does anybody know why SuSE 8.0 don´t accept creating a username with dots, e.g. , while I try creating the user suse.br : # useradd suse.br useradd: invalid user name 'suse.br' I have seen all the configuration files in /etc/sysconfig, Suse DB and Google and I haven´t found anything related to this topic. =(( -- ========================= José Mário Viana Analista de Sistemas SecrelNet Infomática Ltda =========================

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Re: [suse-security] Problems with rules of anti spoofing
by Achim Hoffmann 20 Nov '02

20 Nov '02

On 19 Nov 2002, Fabio Sena wrote: > Nov 19 14:31:10 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-DROP-ANTI-SPOOF IN=ppp0 OUT= MAC= > SRC=10.10.40.251 DST=255.255.255.255 LEN=229 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128 > ID=1185 PROTO=UDP SPT=138 DPT=138 LEN=209 > Nov 19 14:31:10 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-DROP-ANTI-SPOOF IN=ppp0 OUT= MAC= > SRC=10.10.40.251 DST=255.255.255.255 LEN=229 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128 > ID=1185 PROTO=UDP SPT=137 DPT=137 LEN=209 there is nothing special. After you've authentificated successful, the remote server send NetBIOS broadcasts (you know: Network Neighborhood etc.). If you allow that your host will be listed there, allow these ports, otherwise it might be wise to just reject but not log them. Achim

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[OT] Language(s)
by Lars Ellenberg 20 Nov '02

20 Nov '02

I don't know about you, but I found some of the recent postings very difficult to understand, not technically, but language wise. Even though this is, and should remain, an english list, I'd sometimes prefer to have the original native tongue of the respective author in *addition* to that sometimes uneasy english, since I am well able to read a little spanish/portugese/italian/french. Though I'd rather not have to write in those languages :) My feeling is that this might help to understand the details of the repective problems, and clarify possible misunderstandings. Lars

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Problems with rules of anti spoofing
by Fabio Sena 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

People, They know as to decide problems with rules of anti-spoofing in SuSE 8,0 with SuSEfirewall2, I am with a Server VPN PPTP, and when I connect to the VPN SERVER me they appear these messages. Nov 19 14:31:10 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-DROP-ANTI-SPOOF IN=ppp0 OUT= MAC= SRC=10.10.40.251 DST=255.255.255.255 LEN=229 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128 ID=1185 PROTO=UDP SPT=138 DPT=138 LEN=209 Nov 19 14:31:10 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-DROP-ANTI-SPOOF IN=ppp0 OUT= MAC= SRC=10.10.40.251 DST=255.255.255.255 LEN=229 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128 ID=1185 PROTO=UDP SPT=137 DPT=137 LEN=209 this IP was received when I effected logon in the VPN SERVER, exactly loged no obtain to decide names. []'s Fabio Sena Brasil - PE

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Re: [suse-security] SuseFirewall2 DMZ
by Frédéric Poulet 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

I use OS = Suse 8.0 Firewall = SuseFirewall of Suse 8.0 My problem is that i can't use my ftp service from intern network but from internet is Ok. >From internet network my ftp client this messages >WinSock 2.0 >Connecting to 192.168.x.y >Connected to 192.168.x.y Port 21 >220 ProFTPD 1.2.6 Server (ProFTPD Default Installation) >USER [xxxxxx] >331 Password required for [xxxxxx]. >PASS (hidden) >230 User [xxxxxx]logged in. >SYST >215 UNIX Type: L8 >REST 100 >350 Restarting at 100. Send STORE or RETRIEVE to initiate transfer. >REST 0 >350 Restarting at 0. Send STORE or RETRIEVE to initiate transfer. >PWD >257 "/home/[xxxxxx]" is current directory. >TYPE A >200 Type set to A. >PASV >227 Entering Passive Mode (192,168,x,y,129,32). after nothing ! --- Christian Andersson <chrisand(a)cs.lth.se> a écrit : > > On Tuesday 19 November 2002 14:38, you wrote: > > How ? > > Ok, I've lost the thread so I don't know anything about your setup (which I > suppose you have described previously in the list.) > > What is you OS exactly? Version? What firewall? Version? > > -- > Ch > ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com

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Trojan Horse tcpdump and libpcap Distributions
by Linux User 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

CERT® Advisory CA-2002-30 Trojan Horse tcpdump and libpcap Distributions Original issue date: November 13, 2002 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history is at the end of this file. Overview The CERT/CC has received reports that several of the released source code distributions of the libpcap and tcpdump packages were modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse. We strongly encourage sites that use, redistribute, or mirror the libpcap or tcpdump packages to immediately verify the integrity of their distribution. I. Description The CERT/CC has received reports that some copies of the source code for libpcap, a packet acquisition library, and tcpdump, a network sniffer, have been modified by an intruder and contain a Trojan horse. The following distributions were modified to include the malicious code: tcpdump md5sum 3a1c2dd3471486f9c7df87029bf2f1e9 tcpdump-3.6.2.tar.gz md5sum 3c410d8434e63fb3931fe77328e4dd88 tcpdump-3.7.1.tar.gz libpcap md5sum 73ba7af963aff7c9e23fa1308a793dca libpcap-0.7.1.tar.gz These modified distributions began to appear in downloads from the HTTP server www.tcpdump.org on or around Nov 11 2002 10:14:00 GMT. The tcpdump development team disabled download of the distributions containing the Trojan horse on Nov 13 2002 15:05:19 GMT. However, the availability of these distributions from mirror sites is unknown. At this time, it does not appear that related projects such as WinPcap and WinDump contain this Trojan horse. The Trojan horse version of the tcpdump source code distribution contains malicious code that is run when the software is compiled. This code, executed from the tcpdump configure script, will attempt to connect (via wget, lynx, or fetch) to port 80/tcp on a fixed hostname in order to download a shell script named services. In turn, this downloaded shell script is executed to generate a C file (conftes.c), which is subsequently compiled and run. When executed, conftes.c makes an outbound connection to a fixed IP address (corresponding to the fixed hostname used in the configure script) on port 1963/tcp and reads a single byte. Three possible values for this downloaded byte are checked, each causing conftes.c to respond in different ways: 'A' will cause the Trojan horse to exit 'D' will cause the Trojan to fork itself, spawn a shell, and redirect this shell to the connected IP address (Note that communication to and from this shell is obfuscated by XORing all bytes with the constant 0x89.) 'M' will cause the Trojan horse to close the connection and sleep for 3600 seconds To mask the activity of this Trojan horse in tcpdump, libpcap, the underlying packet-capture library of tcpdump, has been modified (gencode.c) to explicitly ignore all traffic on port 1963 (i.e., a BPF expression of "not port 1963"). II. Impact An intruder operating from (or able to impersonate) the remote address specified in the malicious code could gain unauthorized remote access to any host that compiled a version of tcpdump with this Trojan horse. The privilege level under which this malicious code would be executed would be that of the user who compiled the source code. III. Solution We encourage sites using libpcap and tcpdump to verify the authenticity of their distribution, regardless of where it was obtained. Where to get libpcap and tcpdump While the compromise of these distributions is being investigated, the tcpdump and libpcap maintainers recommend using the following distribution sites: http://sourceforge.net/projects/tcpdump/ http://sourceforge.net/projects/libpcap/ Sites that mirror the source code are encouraged to verify the integrity of their sources. We also encourage users to inspect any and all other software that may have been downloaded from the compromised site. Note that it is not sufficient to rely on the timestamps or sizes of the file when trying to determine whether or not you have a copy of the Trojan horse version. Verifying checksums The MD5 hashes of the vendor suggested updates for libpcap and tcpdump are as follows: tcpdump md5sum 03e5eac68c65b7e6ce8da03b0b0b225e tcpdump-3.7.1.tar.gz libpcap md5sum 0597c23e3496a5c108097b2a0f1bd0c7 libpcap-0.7.1.tar.gz As a matter of good security practice, the CERT/CC encourages users to verify, whenever possible, the integrity of downloaded software. For more information, see http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2001-06.html Appendix A. - Vendor Information This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/ CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments. Conectiva We have checked all our released libpcap and tcpdump packages and confirmed that they do not contain the trojan code. Debian Problematic packages are only distributed in Debian/unstable. I have examined both source packages and they did not contain the trojan code the HLUG reported on their web page. Hence, I guess that Debian distributes safe source. MontaVista Software, Inc. We have examined our sources, and our software does not contain this trojan. We are not vulnerable to this advisory. SuSE SuSE Linux products are not vulnerable. Feedback can be directed to the author: Roman Danyliw, Chad Dougherty. This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-30.html CERT/CC Contact Information Email: cert(a)cert.org Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/ To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to majordomo(a)cert.org. Please include in the body of your message subscribe cert-advisory * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University. Revision History November 13, 2002: Initial release

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Re: [suse-security] SuseFirewall2 DMZ
by Frédéric Poulet 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

How ? --- Christian Andersson <chrisand(a)cs.lth.se> a écrit : > > Ok, try Ulriches tip then, opening port 20. > > Greetings /Ch > > On Tuesday 19 November 2002 14:18, you wrote: > > I use "passive mode" > > > > --- Christian Andersson <chrisand(a)cs.lth.se> a écrit : > On Tuesday 19 > > November 2002 13:45, > > > > Frédéric Poulet wrote: > > > > My ftp service is accessible from internet but not from intern network. > > > > In fact for the internet network, the connexion runs but when i use > > > > "ls" command nothing takes place. > > > > > > > > Somebody has an idea ? > > > > > > You have to use "passive FTP" when connecting to the server through a > > > firewall. Otherwise the server will try to open other high filtered ports > > > to the client for data transfers. Most client programs support passive > > > mode. > > > > > > -- > > > Ch > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Check the headers for your unsubscription address > > > For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com > > > Security-related bug reports go to security(a)suse.de, not here > > > > ___________________________________________________________ > > Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! > > Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com > > -- > Ch > ___________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français ! Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com

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suse 7.3 & kernel
by Piet Roorda 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

is there any use in going to kernel 2.4.18 or 2.4.19 with SuSE 7.3? regrads, piet

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AW: [suse-security] SuseFirewall2 DMZ
by Ulrich Roth 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

> My ftp service is accessible from internet but not from > intern network. In fact for the internet > network, the connexion runs but when i use "ls" command > nothing takes place. > > Somebody has an idea ? Maybe you also have to open port 20? -- Ulrich Roth IMPACT Business & Technology Consulting GmbH Im Mediapark 8 / KölnTurm D-50670 Koeln Phone +49-221-93 70 80-29 Fax +49-221-93 70 80-15 E-Mail: roth(a)impact.de

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AW: [suse-security] SuseFirewall2 DMZ
by Ulrich Roth 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

> Proftd running becouse i have the log message of proftpd > > --- Togan Muftuoglu <toganm(a)users.sourceforge.net> a écrit : > > * FrÃ©dÃ©ric Poulet; > <pofrederic(a)yahoo.fr> on 14 Nov, 2002 wrote: > > >when i use ftp service from firewall i have logs: > > >Jan 23 12:40:11 linux kernel: SuSE-FW-REJECT IN=eth2 OUT= > > >MAC=00:40:f4:3d:89:4b:00:e0:18:a6:7d:17:08:00 > SRC=192.168.5.2 DST=192.168.5.1 LEN=60 TOS=0x00 > > >PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=55868 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=32983 DPT=113 > WINDOW=5840 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0 OPT > > >(020405B40402080A0430C8600000000001030300) I think the following happens: You start an ftp request to your server (your web server I think). Before your server answers, it tries to find out who the client machine is, and sends therefore an auth request to the client. But the firewall blocks this auth request. Normally the ftp connection should be established, although the auth request isn't answered. But it may take quite long. Best is to open your firewall for auth requests. The other possibility is to enter your client into the server's /etc/hosts, but in your case I think it may not be possible because of the masquerading, so the ftp requests from different clients all seem to come from the same IP address. Hmm... Simply try entering the IP address 192.168.5.1 in the server's /etc/hosts with some host name you like. Maybe it works. Bye Uli -- Ulrich Roth IMPACT Business & Technology Consulting GmbH Im Mediapark 8 / KölnTurm D-50670 Koeln Phone +49-221-93 70 80-29 Fax +49-221-93 70 80-15 E-Mail: roth(a)impact.de

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Modify Seccheck behaivor
by Linux User 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

Hi guys... I install seccheck on my suse email server.. and it seems that one of it's security test it check for weakness passwords, and send to the users an email with something like: Your password for account "account_name" is insecure. > Please change it as soon as possible. > > Yours, > Password Checking Robot How could I stop that process to send an email to each user ? Thanks !! bye --ed

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Kernel 2.4.19 + e1000 module
by Drew J. Como 19 Nov '02

19 Nov '02

All, On one of my systems, I need to build a custom kernel with some special security modules built in (which I have already completed) and want to build in support for the Intel 1000 Gigabit cards. Has anyone successfully done this? I have downloaded the sources from Intel, but they are not providing any support nor instructions for them. Any help that can be given, I would appreciate. ============================================ Drew J. Como Phone: 631-434-6600 Systems Administrator Fax: 631-434-7800 dcomo(a)bascom.com Web: www.bascom.com Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. -------------------------------------------- "When quality is the goal, winning is guaranteed."

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Masquerading trouble
by Jostein Berntsen 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Hi, I have got some masquerading trouble now when I upgraded from 8.0 to 8.1. I have got a main PC as a name server, and 2 other PC's connected to this. Masquerading worked perfectly with DNS and Bind9 in 8.0, but when I upgraded I get these errors when trying to reach the Internet from the other PC's: 1. Command Dig ; <<>> DiG 8.3 <<>> 195.159.1.208 1 ;; res options: init recurs defnam dnsrch ;; res_nsend to server default -- 192.168.100.1: Connection refused 2. Command SuSEfirewall2 Try `iptables -h' or 'iptables --help' for more information. Bad argument `reject_func' 3. rejec_func is: Chain reject_func (1 references) target prot opt source destination REJECT tcp -- anywhere anywhere reject-with tcp-reset REJECT udp -- anywhere anywhere reject-with icmp-port-unreachable REJECT all -- anywhere anywhere reject-with icmp-proto-unreachable - Ping hangs at 56(84) bytes of data - Bind version is bind9-9.1.3-252 Dial-up Internet works fine from the gateway PC, and all PC's can be pinged internally with both IP and host name. SuSEFirewall2 is activated, and FW_MASQUERADE is set to yes, as is IP_FORWARD to yes in /etc/sysconfig/sysctl. Named.conf, zones, /etc/hosts, and /etc/resolv.conf is configured. Can anyone help with this? Regards, Jostein

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AW: [suse-security] SSH Authentication
by Ulrich Roth 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

> I implemented a ssh conection from the outside to my > intranet. This ssh requires a username and a password. > > In terms of security what is more secure: require > authentication (username and password) or having the public > key of each user that connects to our intranet in the > authorized public key lists (in this case there is no need > for username and password)? > In the second case there is no need of authentication and > only the users wich have the public keys in the list are > allowed to enter in my intranet. That's not true. If someone doesn't have the private key belonging to a certain public key in the list, he is asked for the password. Or is it possible to configure a remote computer in such a way that it doesn't give you a login prompt any more if there exists a public key? > This second solution is a good solution or that brings other > security problems ? The solution with the keys is less secure than the one with passwords, of course. If Computer A connects to computer B via SSH, and there exists a pair of keys so that you don't have to enter the password, then a hacker who logged into computer A has also free access to computer B (crack one, access two). If there's no real need for a pair of keys (e.g. if a cron job copies files from A to B), then you shouldn't use that. Bye Uli

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Re: Fw: [suse-security] Request of servers wins and servers dns, By VPN PPTP
by Fabio Sena 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Gentlemen, Good Night gentlemen, Favours the tips of the gentlemen I obtained, to make a Server VPN in SuSE with PPTP, already I obtain the VPN, only that when I receive the IP from creaks it specified in the VPN server, I do not obtain to make nothing, Therefore my request of ms-dns, ms-wins is DROPs for the FW, for Anti-spoofing, some of the gentlemen knows as I can decide this? In mine opitions.pptp, is with the options of ms-dns and ms-wins, is necessary? or the Client Vpn would assume this automatically? Fabio Sena Brasil-PE My configuration in pptpd.conf debug localip 10.10.40.250 My ip address in eth1(internal lan) remoteip 10.10.40.251-254 listem 200.xxx.xxx.xxx My ip address in eth0(external) My configuration in options.pptp name fwpro.cyberland.com.br lock mtu 1490 mru 1490 proxyarp noauth -chap -chapms +chapms-v2 #chapms-strip-domain ipcp-accept-local ipcp-accept-remote lcp-echo-failure 5 lcp-echo-interval 8 deflate 0 mppe-128 mppe-stateless require-chap #require-mppe #require-mppe-stateless debug -detach proxyarp asyncmap 0 mppe-stateless ms-wins 10.10.30.2 ms-dns 200.249.140.2 netmask 255.255.0.0 When I am Loged in Way pptp in the Vpn server, I am receiving these messages from the SuSEfirewall2, Exactly stopping the SuSEfirewall2, come across myself with these messages. Nov 18 11:01:25 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-UNAUTHORIZED-TARGET IN=ppp0 OUT= MAC= SRC=10.10.40.252 DST=255.255.255.255 LEN=96 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128 ID=1165 PROTO=UDP SPT=137 DPT=137 LEN=76 Nov 18 11:01:28 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-DROP-ANTI-SPOOF IN=ppp0 OUT= MAC= SRC=10.10.40.252 DST=255.255.255.255 LEN=96 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128 ID=1175 PROTO=UDP SPT=137 DPT=137 LEN=76 Nov 18 11:01:30 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-UNAUTHORIZED-TARGET IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:90:27:75:b5:8d:00:10:7b:00:63:94:08:00 SRC=200.249.140.58 DST=200.249.140.20 LEN=129 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=126 ID=1564 PROTO=47 Nov 18 11:01:38 fwpro pppd[10483]: sent [CCP ConfReq id=0x3] Nov 18 11:01:46 fwpro kernel: SuSE-FW-UNAUTHORIZED-TARGET IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:90:27:75:b5:8d:00:10:7b:00:63:94:08:00 SRC=200.249.140.58 DST=200.249.140.20 LEN=129 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=126 ID=1566 PROTO=47 in the SuSEfirewall2 mine config # Common: smtp domain FW_SERVICES_EXT_TCP="110 1723 53 ssh" # Common: domain FW_SERVICES_EXT_UDP="137 53 500" # Common: domain # For VPN/Routing which END at the firewall!! FW_SERVICES_EXT_IP="gre 47" # # Common: smtp domain FW_SERVICES_DMZ_TCP="" # Common: domain FW_SERVICES_DMZ_UDP="" # For VPN/Routing which END at the firewall!! FW_SERVICES_DMZ_IP="" # # Common: ssh smtp domain FW_SERVICES_INT_TCP="53 42 135:139 1723 5800 5900" # Common: domain syslog FW_SERVICES_INT_UDP="42 53 135:139" # For VPN/Routing which END at the firewall!! FW_SERVICES_INT_IP="47 gre" On Mon, 2002-11-18 at 04:35, Fabio Sena wrote: > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Fabio Sena" <skill(a)cyberland.com.br> > To: <suse-security(a)suse.com> > Sent: Thursday, November 14, 2002 6:21 PM > Subject: [suse-security] Request of servers wins and servers dns, By VPN > PPTP > > > > Good Night gentlemen, > > > > Favours the tips of the gentlemen I obtained, to make a > Server > > VPN in SuSE with PPTP, already I obtain the VPN, only that when I receive > > the IP from creaks it specified in the VPN server, I do not obtain to make > > nothing, Therefore my request of ms-dns, ms-wins is DROPs for the FW, for > > Anti-spoofing, some of the gentlemen knows as I can decide this? > > In mine opitions.pptp, is with the options of ms-dns and > > ms-wins, is necessary? or the Client Vpn would assume this automatically? > > > > > > Fabio Sena > > Brasil-PE > > > > > > -- > > Check the headers for your unsubscription address > > For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com > > Security-related bug reports go to security(a)suse.de, not here > > > > > >

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after HARDEN_SUSE Xsession: login for <user> is disabled ??
by Linux User 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Hi guys... I just have test the HARDEN_SUSE and when I try to login on KDE as Oracle user I get the following error: Xsession: login for oracle is disabled Any clue of how to enable it ? Thanks bye --ed

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SSH Authentication
by Joao Reis 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Hi! I implemented a ssh conection from the outside to my intranet. This ssh requires a username and a password. In terms of security what is more secure: require authentication (username and password) or having the public key of each user that connects to our intranet in the authorized public key lists (in this case there is no need for username and password)? In the second case there is no need of authentication and only the users wich have the public keys in the list are allowed to enter in my intranet. This second solution is a good solution or that brings other security problems ? Thanks. -- Farewell. "Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer." "Do or do not. There is no try" - Yoda João Reis -------------------------------------------------------

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RE: [suse-security] allow VPN (pp2p) through firewall
by Patrick Ofner 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Ok, thanks! But I think with kernel 2.2.18 (and so ipchains, not iptables!) there might be a problem with protocoll 47 ?! And do I really not need INPUT and OUTPUT chains (this is with ipchains a little bit different as with iptables)? Bye, Patrick Ofner -----Original Message----- From: Alex Bartl [mailto:alex@bartl.net] Sent: Montag, 18. November 2002 03:28 To: Patrick Ofner; suse-security(a)suse.com Subject: AW: [suse-security] allow VPN (pp2p) through firewall iptables -p 47 -A FORWARD -s 0/0 -d xx.xx.xx.xx -j ACCEPT iptables -p 47 -A FORWARD -s xx.xx.xx.xx -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT iptables -p 6 -A FORWARD -s 0/0 -d xx.xx.xx.xx --destination-port 1723 -j ACCEPT iptables -p 6 -A FORWARD -s xx.xx.xx.xx --source-port 1723 -d 0/0 -j ACCEPT should be fine, whereas xx.xx.xx.xx is the VPN Server, behind your firewall. Make sure, you have no blocking rules which might capture those packages before reaching these rules, or use -I (insert) instead of -A (append). - mfg Alex Bartl Computer ALEX Bartl OEG AB1518-RIPE (whois.ripe.net) AB527363-NICAT (whois.nic.at) AB2092 (whois.networksolutions.com) *********************************** Hamerlingstrasse 2/201 4020 Linz http://www.bartl.net > -----Ursprungliche Nachricht----- > Von: Patrick Ofner [mailto:ofner_pa@koeflach-tv.at] > Gesendet: Samstag, 16. November 2002 14:25 > An: suse-security(a)suse.com > Betreff: [suse-security] allow VPN (pp2p) through firewall > > > Hi, > > I want to connect two windows boxes through a vpn (pp2p), but between > them there is a Linux firewall (kernel 2.2.18 , ipchains). What rules > must i create? >

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AW: [suse-security] which users
by Ulrich Roth 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

> > suse 7.3 > > I got a unfamiliar mail for localhost: > > what is the best way to check which users are logged on? > You can check using the "w" or "who" command. > This only includes shell users (ssh, telnet). Users logged in > via pop3, > imap or web (http auth) can be traced using the appropriate logfiles > (/var/log/messages, /var/log/httpd/access_log) Try also the "last" command. -- Ulrich Roth IMPACT Business & Technology Consulting GmbH Im Mediapark 8 / KölnTurm D-50670 Koeln Phone +49-221-93 70 80-29 Fax +49-221-93 70 80-15 E-Mail: roth(a)impact.de

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SuSE 8.0 compromises WLan security
by Mathias Homann 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Hi, what I have: - Tekram AP104 802.11b base - Elsa AirLancer MC-11 Trouble: I have to set thet access point to broadcast its SSID and accept stations with their own SSID set to unspecified or SuSE can't connect to it... Hints? bye, MH -- Die unaufgeforderte Zusendung einer Werbemail an Privatleute verstößt gegen §1 UWG und §823 I BGB (Beschluß des LG Berlin vom 2.8.1998 Az: 16 O 201/98). Jede kommerzielle Nutzung der übermittelten persönlichen Daten sowie deren Weitergabe an Dritte ist ausdrücklich untersagt!

2 3

which users
by Piet Roorda 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

suse 7.3 I got a unfamiliar mail for localhost: what is the best way to check which users are logged on? piet

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SuSE Security Announcement: SuSE-SA:2002:043 (traceroute-nanog/nkitb)
by Thomas Biege 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: traceroute-nanog/nkitb Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2002:043 Date: Tuesday, Nov 12th 2002 09:30 MEST Affected products: 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.0 SuSE eMail Server 3.1 SuSE eMail Server III SuSE Firewall Adminhost VPN SuSE Linux Admin-CD for Firewall SuSE Firewall on CD 2 - VPN SuSE Firewall on CD 2 SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7 SuSE Linux Office Server Vulnerability Type: local root Severity (1-10): 4 SuSE default package: yes Cross References: none Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: - dropping root after gaining raw socket - a few buffer overflows 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: - ypserv - horde - openssh - wrong MD5 sums in advisory SuSE-SA:2002:041 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information Traceroute is a tool that can be used to track packets in a TCP/IP network to determine it's route or to find out about not working routers. Traceroute-nanog requires root privilege to open a raw socket. It does not relinquish these privileges after doing so. This allows a malicious user to gain root access by exploiting a buffer overflow at a later point. For all products prior to 8.1, the traceroute package contains the NANOG implementation. This package is installed by default. Starting with 8.1, SuSE Linux contains a traceroute program rewritten by Olaf Kirch that does not require root privileges anymore. This version of traceroute is not vulnerable. This is the first update for the traceroute package on the SuSE Linux distributions 7.1 through 8.0. We have changed the version string in the update packages to read "6.x" instead of the former "nanog_6.x" to enable a clean comparison between version numbers. This change is misleading in that it suggests that the package name has been changed. Since only the version string is affected, the name of the package remains the same. As a workaround you can remove the setuid bit or just allow trusted users to execute traceroute-nanog. Become root and add the following line to /etc/permissions.local: "/usr/sbin/traceroute root.trusted 4750" This line will keep the setuid root bit for /usr/sbin/traceroute and just allow users in group trusted to execute the binary. To make the permission change and keep it permanent you have to run chkstat(8): "chkstat -set /etc/permissions.local" Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Missing packages are being built and tested and will be available for download soon. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.i386.rpm afe01bf0b151eca2f42fa5737c99bdc7 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.src.rpm ee35e7cf554daa37a3976f473d4192f1 SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.i386.rpm 0ef0c0153532fcefdf776311503e590b source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.src.rpm 15a9f3dba6339f0a0bb57ce17d2d9894 SuSE-7.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.i386.rpm 3b9acb72a3208e3e4e92c0df8ab8d46f source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.src.rpm a6fd1c7dc3bea4d08ef1efdcbc30fff6 SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/n1/traceroute-6.0-0.i386.rpm 1ac8de3a6e54451bae8e3068f2fbd1e9 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/zq1/traceroute-6.0-0.src.rpm 291036123b377184fdf0231d6878f57d SuSE-7.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/a1/nkitb-2002.11.6-0.i386.rpm b1105bc6916a5fdbd54db63d52ec3d81 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/zq1/nkitb-2002.11.6-0.src.rpm 3061bd5e551995d62c96da133927a612 Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.sparc.rpm 638b868bedab639292d740e60cd0b266 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.src.rpm 10a996ae6a2b4b739bca8f5e9d65e2da AXP Alpha Platform: SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/n1/traceroute-6.0-0.alpha.rpm f2d241cd2331bb3de3382b338fba50b8 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/zq1/traceroute-6.0-0.src.rpm 949737f63fe99b4476b9c325bdc966fc SuSE-7.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/a1/nkitb-2002.11.6-0.alpha.rpm 04a5746b70af2e99f8a31b86e16cb470 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/zq1/nkitb-2002.11.6-0.src.rpm 83abbae6c15ee25adc702047d41a6564 PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.ppc.rpm a00ed346efdc8992b6cf92b890dcc7db source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/traceroute-6.1.1-0.src.rpm 8bfd655104212afc745ea998f0fe6d84 SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/n1/traceroute-6.0-0.ppc.rpm 0dc4fa991f1b6a2260af694b9b73ff1a source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/zq1/traceroute-6.0-0.src.rpm 9e60c951a66e635cab2aa46559f4aa4e SuSE-7.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/a1/nkitb-2002.11.6-0.ppc.rpm eb7d62c5e6ae971a6a96d8a475b8d9fb source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/zq1/nkitb-2002.11.6-0.src.rpm c4b5a31e58a91b5dbd0b6ba497e69046 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - horde There was a cross-site scripting vulnerability in horde. Updated packages have been released for 7.3, 8.0 and 8.1. - openssh When the SSH daemon finds that a user's password has expired, the user is forced to set a new password. While doing so, sshd did not turn off the terminal echo, causing the password to be visible on the screen as it was typed. We are in the process of releasing updated package for 7.0 through 7.3. SuSE Linux 8.0 and 8.1 are not affected. - ypserv Thorsten Kukuk found a memory leak in ypserv that caused it to lose small amounts of memory each time it processes certain malformed requests. This could be used by an attacker to kill ypserv by repeating this exercise until it runs out of memory. We have released updated packages for 7.0 through 8.0. SuSE Linux 8.1 is not affected. - wrong MD5 sums in advisory SuSE-SA:2002:041 Due to a mistake the SuSE Security Announcement SuSE-SA:2002:041 (perl-Mailtools) contains wrong MD5 sums. A new version will be published on our security web sites soon. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de) the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBPdD1JHey5gA9JdPZAQFk9gf9G4vs4m1GH5VdDOBGnS6E/ElvnD+IgMRH Im/TbR7CXisww90x254rs1keMRoZFPyb87loDhSPXe1wl9hCDWYiYRZk8YtkeKYw PucnESkJvtzhIu8WeiJY4eENsRbk8776OKDSnYUbZ4XiWI5Dh4uJnRtZT6XF/tDQ 0cdi5JTMc8pmRSnxlzBSO8LxSF5/gS8MKNb2QPHCxGoLf+xn4Z+VpSxNOCXIRmhy nCyEIUkUvtpuKN159KSyyBzQQbZcHsWXdNqoySWR+NVVzY6fmfWUYtqaGar3F0Nd 3QxiBPckpF5zook4cLIPBe0Hrtwvi11ZCTySwbTDIYaM4NEv2Ha7NQ== =X5pd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Bye, Thomas -- Thomas Biege <thomas(a)suse.de> SuSE Linux AG,Deutschherrnstr. 15-19,90429 Nuernberg Function: Security Support & Auditing "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~thomas/contact/thomas.asc | pgp -fka" Key fingerprint = 51 AD B9 C7 34 FC F2 54 01 4A 1C D4 66 64 09 83 -- Cold silence has a tendency to atrophy any sense of compassion - Maynard James Keenan

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Yast YOU bugs
by Hemsley, Trevor 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Hi SuSE people Is it possible that you could either supply a fixed version of YOU or, alternatively and possibly better, open source it so that some of us can fix the bugs in it. It's now becoming almost impossible to use and practically amounts to a denial of service attack on a SuSE 7.1 machine on which it's run. It contains massive memory leaks and currently, with the number of patch description files available for 7.1 on the SuSE ftp site, it now allocates over 300MB RAM and then blows up if there isn't enough swap space available to handle this. For those of us with 64MB or 128MB machines it takes so long to run YOU that it's getting ridiculous. If you use ftp.suse.com as a source then by the time it's got the patch list downloaded, it's timed the ftp session out and it doesn't have any error recovery from this situation and you have to start all over again... and that's on a machine with 896MB RAM so it doesn't even hit swap at all! I've also used it on 7.3 and it doesn't appear to be much better there either. On 8.0 it isn't quite as bloated so perhaps a backport of the fixes to 7.1/7.3 could be possible? I'd be quite willing to fix the memory leaks if you'd care to make the source available to me. Just 'cos it's called y2bignfat doesn't mean it should be ;-) And, yes, I'm aware of fou4s but I'm of the opinion that if a vendor supplies a tool with which to patch their distributions then it should actually work reliably! This isn't intended to be a flame BTW, just in case it sounds like one! Trevor

4 3

allow VPN (pp2p) through firewall
by Patrick Ofner 18 Nov '02

18 Nov '02

Hi, I want to connect two windows boxes through a vpn (pp2p), but between them there is a Linux firewall (kernel 2.2.18 , ipchains). What rules must i create?

2 1