July 2001 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

RE: [suse-security] IPSec system design questions (slightly OT)
by christian.burri＠synecta.ch 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

.-. /v\ L I N U X // \\ >Phear the Penguin< /( )\ ^^-^^ Ed <scotte@inthea To: "suse-security(a)suse.com" <suse-security(a)suse.com> irnet.com> cc: Subject: RE: [suse-security] IPSec system design questions (slightly OT) 30.06.2001 06:21 <snip> The system will be immune to DoS attacks. </snip> There's no such thing as a system that is immune to DoS attacks. Even when some links are definatley "fat pipes", and some ISPs "just add another T1" if you experience a flood... Someone will have *far more* bandwidth available than you or your ISP can ever dream of. Imagine someone roots eight sites, each connected at 622Mbps. This makes up 4976mbps of total bandwidth available, for the attacker. I think this amount of bandwidth exceeds the total bandwidth available for some entire countries. And that is not a worst-case scenario, since a DDoS attack with 8 sites would be considered a minor attack, and could probably even be filtered by some rather large top tier ISPs (if no spoofing is involved). Large attacks can involve hunderds, even thousands of traffic sources, whereas it is impossible to block them all, even for top tier ISPs. And blocking is only feasible, if the blocking party can cope with the amount of traffic being sent to it. Example: if my ISP has a total bandwidth of 34mbps available, but some attacker constantly sends traffic at a rate of 100mbps, then my ISP will not be able to withstand the attack and it will be taken offline, because it's links will be saturated after about 1/3 of a second. And as said, if the attacker chooses to spoof the source addresses of theyr traffic, blocking would be impossible at all .The only thing the ISP can do then is, remove your route from the internet. And that's just the same as being DoSed, if you think about it. Cheers & Correct me if Im wrong Chr. Burri

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setting up firewall in 7.1
by twowitchesinthelight＠btinternet.com 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

Hi All, Another newbie question. I edited my inetd.conf and commented out ftp, telnet, shell, login, pop3, finger and swat and rebooted. Everything seems to work ok. nmap -sT -v my ip shows these 22 ssh 37 time 111 sunrpc 515 printer 1024 kdm 6000 X11 nmap -sU my ip shows these 37 time 111 sunrpc 517 talk 518 ntalk Questions are these. First, is what I commented out ok? secondly, is it safe to comment out talk, ntalk, and time in inetd.conf as well? Secondly...how about ssh,sunrpc,printer and X11? Is it safe and where do I shut them down at? If you could just give me a site that would explain this to me I would be very grateful. As I said, I am new and just don't want to make any mistakes configuring or to take an unsecured machine out on the net. Thanks in advance, Dallam

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AW: [suse-security] Ipsec + firewall
by Schulz, Wolfgang 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

Hi! The problem with the firewall + IPsec is still not solved. To split the setup problems I have tried to configure different test environment: a) Only 2 IPsec gateways b) 2 IPsec gateways with the firewall script - no masquerading c) 2 IPsec gateways with the firewall script with maquerading Setup a) is working but with setup b) I have already problems: The tunnel is established but I still cannot ping to the net on the other side. I checked the firewall.log for denied packets but couldn't find any entry. Also another strange phenomenon: If I boot the machine with the firewall script and stop afterwards the firewall script by hand the ipsec connection doesn't work too. What could be the problem with my setup. Thanks for your help Wolfgang > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > Von: Tobias Gewinner [mailto:crt@tmt.de] > Gesendet: Dienstag, 19. Juni 2001 23:32 > An: suse-security(a)suse.com > Betreff: Re: [suse-security] Ipsec + firewall > > > On Tue, Jun 19, 2001 at 05:55:09PM +0200, Schulz, Wolfgang wrote: > > Hi list! > > > > As soon as we start the firewall script (Version 4.1) ipsec > doesn't work > > anymore. > > I remember having the same problem in the past. AFAIK the > firewalls must > accept incoming requests from the outside on port 500/UDP. Also the > firewall doesn't know the net behind his partner, so any input from > these IPs to the internal net is denied. > > I remember that I set the following ipchains rules (or something like > that) manually on both machines: > > On firewall A this (may have) looked like > > ipchains -I forward -b -s [local net B] -d [local net A] -j ACCEPT > ipchains -I input -b -s [local net B] -d [local net A] -j ACCEPT > ipchains -I output -b -s [local net B] -d [local net A] -j ACCEPT > > and on firewall B you must swap the networks, of course ;-) > > After that it worked fine for me. I think you can set these rules > in /etc/rc.config.de/firewall-custom.rc.config > > Greetings! > -- > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > Tobias Gewinner <gewinner(a)tmt.de> > Fachinformatiker i.A. TMT InterNETworks GmbH > Phone: +49921560716-0 Maxstrasse 4 > Fax: +49921560716-18 D-95444 Bayreuth > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > To unsubscribe, e-mail: suse-security-unsubscribe(a)suse.com > For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help(a)suse.com >

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SuSE Security Announcement: scotty (SuSE-SA:2001:023)
by Thomas Biege 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: scotty Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2001:023 Date: Monday, Jul 2nd 2001 15:30 MEST Affected SuSE versions: (6.0, 6.1, 6.2,) 6.3, 6.4, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2 Vulnerability Type: local privilege escalation Severity (1-10): 5 SuSE default package: no Other affected systems: yes Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: scotty/ntping problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information Tkined's Scotty is a Tcl extension to build network management applications. Ntping, a ping/traceroute program, is part of the Scotty package. It's failure is to read a hostname as commandline option without checking the size. This leads to a bufferoverrun, that could be used to gain root privileges, because ntping is installed setuid root and is executeable by everyone. As a temporary workaround you could remove the setuid bit: /bin/chmod u-s /usr/bin/ntping or just allow trusted users the access the binary: /bin/chown root.trusted /usr/bin/ntping /bin/chmod 4750 /usr/bin/ntping Also add these permission changes to /etc/permissions.local. i386 Intel Platform: SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-315.i386.rpm ba862494c240b607b156612bcfcd99da source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-315.src.rpm a06e490783eaabfe1db79ff03028153c SuSE-6.4 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.4/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-314.i386.rpm b303c3b6f6b53bbfb05804387f6abafa source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.4/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-314.src.rpm 1714012d8b68ca8191d5ccec67992e9e SuSE-6.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.3/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-314.i386.rpm 2506a6ceefdfc547869417df190e6257 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.3/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-314.src.rpm 9196abccc0b17ed26844cf3300d3cc60 Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.0/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-268.sparc.r… 98db75ae951400f6486150c041a97c95 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.0/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-268.src.rpm b8bb4e526b79d5e6173b160f9ceb10e9 AXP Alpha Platform: SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-273.alpha.rpm 4e688975e393d3d42f2898cc17869b92 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-273.src.rpm 6bd09c52c30d7ac92057bf5d28786c9d SuSE-6.4 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.4/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-272.alpha.rpm 7014099ef97cef800fe2669dc410030b source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.4/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-272.src.rpm 018cf855b56b6fc9de9be496744590cd SuSE-6.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.3/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-274.alpha.rpm 6002583f730762da88884c2754c9a68b source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.3/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-274.src.rpm 7257c5fcad741201da69f2551569ab22 PPC PowerPC Platform: SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/tcl2/scotty-2.1.10-274.ppc.rpm 40a150f560053e4a90e8fc36e4fb9190 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-274.src.rpm b6dea15ed3e2f9a1d4032e4723afee55 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/6.4/zq1/scotty-2.1.10-274.src.rpm 75755249a092c61626b12f3b9cda35ea ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - dqs dex(a)raza-mexicana.org has found an exploitable buffer overflow bug in the dsh program from the dqs package on SuSE Linux distributions. To workaround the problem, do "chmod -s /usr/bin/dsh" and change the files /etc/permissions* to reflect the change. If you do not need the dqs package, then deinstall it (rpm -e dqs). Packages for most of the supported SuSE Linux distributions are available at the usual location ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/<arch>/<dist> for download and installation/update. Do not forget to change the files /etc/permissions* to remove the suid-bit from the dsh program. Please note that we will not issue a dedicated security announcement for this specific bug. - pcp Paul Starzetz discovered a security weakness in the setuid root program /usr/share/pcp/bin/pmpost. The common library in pcp trusts the environment that has been supplied by the user, regardless of privileged execution or not. By consequence, a user can specify the configuration file and therefore write to files owned by root. The problem is not based on insecurely following symlinks as stated by Paul Starzetz. The pcp package is not installed by default in SuSE Linux distributions. We have provided update packages for the SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and 7.2 that remove the setuid bit from the pmpost binary. Versions before SuSE-7.1 were not affected because the setuid bit was not set. We thank Keith Owens and Mark Goodwin from Silicon Graphics for responding quickly and for publishing a new version of the pcp package which will be included in future releases of the SuSE Linux distribution. For more information see the /usr/share/doc/packages/pcp directory of your SuSE Linux installation after installing the update package, or go to obtained from http://oss.sgi.com/projects/pcp/download . Please note that there will not be a dedicated security announcement for this specific bug. - fetchmail (fetchml) New fetchmail packages are available on the ftp server. The packages cure a buffer overflow that can be exploited by sending a victim a specially designed email, waiting for the victim's fetchmail program to pick up the email. We are preparing a security announcement for this problem. - openssh update packages for the openssh package after (and including) SuSE-6.4 are available on our ftp servers ftp.suse.de (for < 7.1) or ftp.suse.com (for >= 7.1). We are currently checking for a non-security related irregularity in sshd's behaviour under faulty setup conditions. - exim SuSE Linux distributions do not contain the exim Mail Transport Agent (See http://www.exim.org/ for details) and are therefore not susceptible to the recently found security-related bugs. - webmin SuSE Linux distributions do not contain the webmin administration web frontend (See http://www.webmin.org/ for details) and are therefore not vulnerable to the recently found security-related problems in the software. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. =================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com>. The <security(a)suse.com> public key is listed below. =================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. 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Re: [suse-security] Sendmail/TLS
by Markus Gaugusch 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

> > I installed on my server and my home PC sendmail-tls (SuSE 7.1). But how > > can I make them use the secure connection? > http://www.sendmail.org/m4/cf-readme.txt so, this is the 'hardcore' way, but is there a SuSE way, too? I found lots of TLS commands in /etc/sendmail.cf, but no TLS related documentation in /usr/share/doc/packages/sendmail :( regards Markus -- _____________________________ /"\ Markus Gaugusch ICQ 11374583 \ / ASCII Ribbon Campaign markus(a)gaugusch.dhs.org X Against HTML Mail / \

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SuSEfirewall2 v1.2 update information
by marc＠suse.de 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

Hi folks, I updated v1.2 to fix some things: v1.2 01.07.01 GAMMA * Fixed 5 small bugs in logging functions (which resulted in "unknown option --syn" messages in special occasions) * Added the new option FW_IGNORE_FW_BROADCAST in addition to FW_ALLOW_FW_BROADCAST if broadcasts should not be allowed but ignored to prevent the annoying log entries v1.1 23.06.01 GAMMA * Fixed a small bug in FW_TRUSTED_NETS * People with german/french etc. language sets for root could not run this script because the output of ifconfig etc. is different. I hope I could fix this. * Fixed the backup function of /etc/ip-up in INSTALL * Added a mss iptables rule which seems to be needed for adsl * Support for weird lsof binaries :-) * Fixed some minor things in ip-up take especially note of the language fix. people who change their language for root to something else then english will break several scripts in the long run ... SuSEfirewall 1 + 2 does a language reset for itself now, but most other tools dont. this will bite you, bet on it. also a fix for ADSL users is in. As usual: if anyone encounters bugs (not misconfigurations on your side!) please contact me directly. Also: seccheck 2.0 is out. update is recommended for everyone Greets, Marc -- E@mail: marc(a)suse.de Function: Security Research and Advisory PGP: "lynx -source http://www.suse.de/~marc/marc.pgp | pgp -fka" Key fingerprint = B5 07 B6 4E 9C EF 27 EE 16 D9 70 D4 87 B5 63 6C Private: http://www.suse.de/~marc SuSE: http://www.suse.de/security

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Freeswan and SuSE 7.2 and Kernel 2.4.4 problem
by Severin Wiedemann 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

Hi everyone, is there anyone who successfully runs Freeswan 1.9 on Suse 7.2 (standard installation of freeswan and SuSE) It seems that the tunnel comes up but I am unable to send data through it. The same configuration is working with 2 other SuSE Linux <7.2. If I try SuSE 7.2 and SuSE < 7.2 it is possible to send data in one direction but not back to 7.2 (see message of debug output below). I think there is a bug in KLIPS on SuSE 7.2 Kernel 2.4.4-4GB because I always get strange debug output on both machines like: "Jul 2 09:51:34 gate kernel: klips_debug:ipsec_rcv: Why the hell is someone passing me a non-ipsec packet? -- dropped." I compiled a new 2.4.4 Kernel with Freeswan 1.91 and now it works fine. Maybe there will be a patch from SuSE for the Kernel on SuSE 7.2 to solve this bug (if so) ?!? Regards Severin Wiedemann -- Wiedemann EDV Systeme GmbH Landsbergerstr. 77 80339 München Tel.: 089/5108599-0 Fax.: 089/5108599-99

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Sendmail/TLS
by Markus Gaugusch 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

I installed on my server and my home PC sendmail-tls (SuSE 7.1). But how can I make them use the secure connection? thank you Markus Gaugusch -- _____________________________ /"\ Markus Gaugusch ICQ 11374583 \ / ASCII Ribbon Campaign markus(a)gaugusch.dhs.org X Against HTML Mail / \

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[suse-security] Kernel Question
by Wilhelm Tesnaar 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

Hi everyone. I know this is not quite pertaining to the Security Group, but it looks like the only one that is really alive ! I have been having some serious crap with the 2.4.2 kernel and 2.4.5 kernel. I am wanting to use IPTables and Netfilter and for that I need 2.4.x I am trying to patch it so that it has support for Reiserfs and I have had NO Luck so far whatsoever. I follow everything as per instruction from the namesys website. When I run make menuconfig, and I look under Filesystems, reiserfs is not listed however if I go and browse under the "fs" directory, It all looks 100%. Am I being stupid ? Regards Willie Tesnaar Change your way of thinking, it might ease the process of self discovery ! (Willie Tesnaar 06/06/2001)

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Re: [suse-security] iptables and squid
by Stefan_Walther＠gehag-dsk.de 01 Jul '01

01 Jul '01

DIRK WROTE: Helo Stefan, helo folks, I tried that one but it`s the same thing. Realy curious is, when the firewall script starts I get an error message with reference to "Bad argument squid" even I had declared in /etc/services. The same one, when I use the port nummer."Bad argument 3128" Any idea??? Thanks and regards Dirk Hello Dirk, hello folks, I don't know if it works but you can try this, maybe you can send me your log and the full error listed at you monitor: #SQUID internal lan iptables -A INPUT -i $IF_LAN -p tcp --dport 3128 -j ACCEPT iptables -A OUTPUT -i $IF_LAN -p tcp --sport 3128 -j ACCEPT #HTTP iptables -A INPUT -i $IF_WAN -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT iptables -A OUTPUT -i $IF_WAN -p tcp --sport 80 -j ACCEPT #DNS iptables -A INPUT -i $IF_WAN -p udp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -j ACCEPT iptables -A OUTPUT -o $IF_WAN -p udp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT iptables -A INPUT -i $IF_WAN -p tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 53 -j ACCEPT iptables -A OUTPUT -o $IF_WAN -p tcp --dport 53 --sport 1024:65535 -j ACCEPT just try this (use the portnumbers not names in /etc/services). if this doesn't work, you should try to install proxy and firewall at to different machines. MfG. Stefan Walther stefan_walther(a)gehag-dsk.de dienst.: +4930/89786448 Funk: +49172/3943961

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