December 2024 - openSUSE Bugs - openSUSE Mailing Lists

[Bug 1234567] New: VUL-0: CVE-2024-45337: gitsign: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234567 Bug ID: 1234567 Summary: VUL-0: CVE-2024-45337: gitsign: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto Classification: openSUSE Product: openSUSE Distribution Version: Leap 15.5 Hardware: Other URL: https://smash.suse.de/issue/432234/ OS: Other Status: NEW Whiteboard: CVSSv3.1:SUSE:CVE-2024-45337:8.1:(AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/ S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Severity: Normal Priority: P5 - None Component: Security Assignee: opensuse_buildservice(a)ojkastl.de Reporter: andrea.mattiazzo(a)suse.com QA Contact: security-team(a)suse.de Blocks: 1234482 Target Milestone: --- Found By: --- Blocker: --- Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance. References: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-45337 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-45337 https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fb… https://go.dev/cl/635315 https://go.dev/issue/70779 https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/-nPEi39gI4Q/m/cGVPJCqdAQAJ https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3321 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/12/11/2 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2331720 https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main//cves/2024/45xxx/CVE-2024… -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1234566] New: VUL-0: CVE-2024-45337: gh: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234566 Bug ID: 1234566 Summary: VUL-0: CVE-2024-45337: gh: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto Classification: openSUSE Product: openSUSE Distribution Version: Leap 15.5 Hardware: Other URL: https://smash.suse.de/issue/432234/ OS: Other Status: NEW Whiteboard: CVSSv3.1:SUSE:CVE-2024-45337:8.1:(AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/ S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Severity: Normal Priority: P5 - None Component: Security Assignee: pdostal(a)suse.com Reporter: andrea.mattiazzo(a)suse.com QA Contact: security-team(a)suse.de Blocks: 1234482 Target Milestone: --- Found By: --- Blocker: --- Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance. References: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-45337 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-45337 https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fb… https://go.dev/cl/635315 https://go.dev/issue/70779 https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/-nPEi39gI4Q/m/cGVPJCqdAQAJ https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3321 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/12/11/2 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2331720 https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main//cves/2024/45xxx/CVE-2024… -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1234568] New: VUL-0: CVE-2024-45337: flux2-cli: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234568 Bug ID: 1234568 Summary: VUL-0: CVE-2024-45337: flux2-cli: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto Classification: openSUSE Product: openSUSE Distribution Version: Leap 15.5 Hardware: Other URL: https://smash.suse.de/issue/432234/ OS: Other Status: NEW Whiteboard: CVSSv3.1:SUSE:CVE-2024-45337:8.1:(AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/ S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) Severity: Normal Priority: P5 - None Component: Security Assignee: opensuse_buildservice(a)ojkastl.de Reporter: andrea.mattiazzo(a)suse.com QA Contact: security-team(a)suse.de Blocks: 1234482 Target Milestone: --- Found By: --- Blocker: --- Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance. References: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-45337 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-45337 https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fb… https://go.dev/cl/635315 https://go.dev/issue/70779 https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/-nPEi39gI4Q/m/cGVPJCqdAQAJ https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3321 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/12/11/2 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2331720 https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main//cves/2024/45xxx/CVE-2024… -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1228946] Xorg segfaults in Nouveau on inactivity, with Prime display offload
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1228946 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1228946#c5 Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Resolution|--- |WONTFIX Status|IN_PROGRESS |RESOLVED --- Comment #5 from Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> --- (In reply to Linus Kardell from comment #3) > Didn't see this issue with "modesetting", though that instead suffers from > severe tearing, including diagonal tearing. So now I'm using the proprietary > driver, which doesn't suffer from either issue, and also doesn't experience > https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1214987. Ok With nouveau driver involved I suggest to close this as WONTFIX. And it seems you're now happy with the proprietary driver. BTW, this blog might be interesting for you. https://negativo17.org/prime-optimus-laptops-and-multi-gpu-systems/ -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1224773] NVIDIA KMP: initrd not regenerated on transactional systems using systemd-boot like Aeon >= RC2
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224773 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224773#c96 Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Flags|needinfo?(iforster(a)suse.com | |) | --- Comment #96 from Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> --- Thanks a lot, Alberto. This fix will be included in the next driver update early next year. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1234055] Unable to reach dual monitor resolution with 2x 4k UHD side by side to 7680x2160
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234055 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234055#c27 Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |patrik.jakobsson(a)suse.com, | |tzimmermann(a)suse.com --- Comment #27 from Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.com> --- Thanks! It's still lengthy but it's really what the driver tries, as it seems. I'll be off from tomorrow, so I leave this to our graphics people. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1234605] New: Userspace crashes on parallels VM
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234605 Bug ID: 1234605 Summary: Userspace crashes on parallels VM Classification: openSUSE Product: openSUSE Distribution Version: Leap 16.0 Hardware: aarch64 OS: Other Status: NEW Severity: Normal Priority: P5 - None Component: Kernel Assignee: kernel-bugs(a)opensuse.org Reporter: guillaume.gardet(a)arm.com QA Contact: qa-bugs(a)suse.de CC: afaerber(a)suse.com Target Milestone: --- Found By: --- Blocker: --- On parallels VM, random userspace crashes when fork happens. It's due to TLB invalidations not going through properly. The fix is merged in 6.13-rc2, but should be backported to kernel 6.4 for Leap 16.0 (and likely Leap 15.6): https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --- arm64: Ensure bits ASID[15:8] are masked out when the kernel uses 8-bit ASIDs Linux currently sets the TCR_EL1.AS bit unconditionally during CPU bring-up. On an 8-bit ASID CPU, this is RES0 and ignored, otherwise 16-bit ASIDs are enabled. However, if running in a VM and the hypervisor reports 8-bit ASIDs (ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.ASIDBits == 0) on a 16-bit ASIDs CPU, Linux uses bits 8 to 63 as a generation number for tracking old process ASIDs. The bottom 8 bits of this generation end up being written to TTBR1_EL1 and also used for the ASID-based TLBI operations as the upper 8 bits of the ASID. Following an ASID roll-over event we can have threads of the same application with the same 8-bit ASID but different generation numbers running on separate CPUs. Both TLB caching and the TLBI operations will end up using different actual 16-bit ASIDs for the same process. A similar scenario can happen in a big.LITTLE configuration if the boot CPU only uses 8-bit ASIDs while secondary CPUs have 16-bit ASIDs. Ensure that the ASID generation is only tracked by bits 16 and up, leaving bits 15:8 as 0 if the kernel uses 8-bit ASIDs. Note that clearing TCR_EL1.AS is not sufficient since the architecture requires that the top 8 bits of the ASID passed to TLBI instructions are 0 rather than ignored in such configuration. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse(a)arm.com> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241203151941.353796-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Diffstat --- -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1234405] devel:microos/libeconf: Bug libeconf 0.7.5 causes systemd/sddm/pam/libc crash and prevents login
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234405 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234405#c10 --- Comment #10 from pallas wept <pallaswept(a)proton.me> --- Thanks for the advice and the quick fix, nice one :) -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1224773] NVIDIA KMP: initrd not regenerated on transactional systems using systemd-boot like Aeon >= RC2
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224773 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224773#c95 Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Flags|needinfo?(aplanas(a)suse.com) | --- Comment #95 from Alberto Planas Dominguez <aplanas(a)suse.com> --- (In reply to Stefan Dirsch from comment #94) > Hmm. How can I detect if I am on such a system where apparently lsinitrd is > not supposed to work? A variation of this should always work: eval $(pbl --default-settings) lsinitrd "$initd" -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1234405] devel:microos/libeconf: Bug libeconf 0.7.5 causes systemd/sddm/pam/libc crash and prevents login
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 13 Dec '24

13 Dec '24

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234405 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1234405#c9 Stefan Schubert <schubi(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Resolution|--- |FIXED Status|NEW |RESOLVED --- Comment #9 from Stefan Schubert <schubi(a)suse.com> --- > > Should I try moving that to /etc/environment.d, now, or just remove it and > wait for an update? It depends :-) If this file is part of the package then keep it in /usr/etc. /etc is used for changes by the administrator only and will not be changed by a package update. I have fixed it. New release is on the way (0.7.6) Thanks for the report !!!!! -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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