W dniu 29.02.2016 o 11:52, Carlos E. R. pisze:
On 2016-02-29 10:00, Łukasz 'Cyber Killer' Korpalski wrote:
But the checksums are pgp signed (inline pgp signature inside the sha256 ckecksum file), so as long as the user has the pubkey used for this signature and uses it to verify the checksums, everything is fine. The pubkey long fingerprint is noted on the main iso download page, not on the mirrors pages.
But the PGP signatures, to be secure, need a web of trust. A separate and trusted method to download and verify the keys themselves, and this we don't have.
Probably a certified page with all keys used by the project for signing downloads and builds.
Certified by who? Some commercial CA? IMHO these are less trustable than any randomly picked PGP key. There is no running from it - at some point you need to trust someone. At this point I trust the openSUSE Project Signing Key 0x3DBDC284 to be okay. I signed it with my key too, so in the future I'll be able to quickly notice if this is the key I trusted today. That is enough of the web of trust, that I need. -- Łukasz "Cyber Killer" Korpalski mail: firstname.lastname@example.org xmpp: email@example.com site: http://website.cybkil.cu.cc gpgkey: 0x72511999 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net //When replying to my e-mail, kindly please //write your message below the quoted text.