July 2022 - openSUSE Bugs - openSUSE Mailing Lists

[Bug 1200811] X shows sometimes artifacts like missing graphics and/or characters
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1200811 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1200811#c11 --- Comment #11 from Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> --- Ok. Thanks for the update! -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1200275] [Build 20220606] virtio: llvmpipe segfault detected
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1200275 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1200275#c15 Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Flags| |needinfo?(dimstar@opensuse. | |org) --- Comment #15 from Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> --- (In reply to Stefan Dirsch from comment #14) > > Monitoring shows this still crashing in 0619: > > > > https://openqa.opensuse.org/tests/2425680 > > > > from the oomath based fail-log: > > Thanks. This is interesting since this might be something we can reproduce > outside of an installation. Could someone provide this test, please? Not sure who would this be. Probably an openQA expert ... -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1200468] [Build 20220610] XFCE does not start up with libX11 1.8.1
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1200468 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1200468#c6 Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assignee|bnc-team-xfce(a)forge.provo.n |maurizio.galli(a)suse.com |ovell.com | --- Comment #6 from Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> --- (In reply to Maurizio Galli from comment #5) > An initial patch was made for xfsettingsd upstream. If it gets merged I will > either backport it or send an update to Factory. Thanks. But please also update this bug. Otherwise I can never update libX11 again ... Reassigning the bug to you ... -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1201091] nvidia, update => no MOK dialog and a black screen
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201091 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201091#c8 --- Comment #8 from Episteme PROMENEUR <epistemepromeneur(a)free.fr> --- (In reply to Stefan Dirsch from comment #7) > So currently the driver is working on TW, right? Yes I suggest to report what > happens with the next nvidia driver or kernel update. A rebuild of the > nvidia kernel modules is to be expected including resigning. And also a MOK > dialog after rebooting. OK -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1201211] VUL-0: CVE-2022-2301: chafa: Buffer Over-read
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1201211 http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1201211#c5 --- Comment #5 from OBSbugzilla Bot <bwiedemann+obsbugzillabot(a)suse.com> --- This is an autogenerated message for OBS integration: This bug (1201211) was mentioned in https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/986833 Backports:SLE-15-SP3 / chafa https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/986834 Backports:SLE-15-SP4 / chafa -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1201091] nvidia, update => no MOK dialog and a black screen
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201091 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201091#c7 --- Comment #7 from Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch(a)suse.com> --- So currently the driver is working on TW, right? I suggest to report what happens with the next nvidia driver or kernel update. A rebuild of the nvidia kernel modules is to be expected including resigning. And also a MOK dialog after rebooting. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1201066] kernel upgrade fails with Failed to enroll new keys
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201066 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201066#c5 --- Comment #5 from Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.com> --- Does it work if Secure Boot is enabled? -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1201219] New: wpa_supplicant hit assert(*bool_p == 0 || *bool_p == 1) when started with -utt and requesting ALL properties via DBus
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1201219 Bug ID: 1201219 Summary: wpa_supplicant hit assert(*bool_p == 0 || *bool_p == 1) when started with -utt and requesting ALL properties via DBus Classification: openSUSE Product: openSUSE Tumbleweed Version: Current Hardware: i686 OS: Other Status: NEW Severity: Normal Priority: P5 - None Component: Network Assignee: screening-team-bugs(a)suse.de Reporter: cfamullaconrad(a)suse.com QA Contact: qa-bugs(a)suse.de Found By: --- Blocker: --- # Summary If I start wpa_supplicant with parameters `-utt` and requesting all properties via DBus, wpa_supplicant is hitting the following error: > bus[19258]: arguments to dbus_message_iter_append_basic() were incorrect, assertion "*bool_p == 0 || *bool_p == 1" failed in file dbus-message.c line 2794. > This is normally a bug in some application using the D-Bus library. #Reproducer Start wpa_supplicant like: > wpa_supplicant -utt Request all properties via DBus: > dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1 /fi/w1/wpa_supplicant1 org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties.GetAll string:fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1 -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1169238] AUDIT-STALE: enlightenment: changes to binaries requiring suid bits
by bugzilla_noreply＠suse.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1169238 https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1169238#c24 Matthias Gerstner <matthias.gerstner(a)suse.com> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|IN_PROGRESS |RESOLVED Resolution|--- |FIXED --- Comment #24 from Matthias Gerstner <matthias.gerstner(a)suse.com> --- All sub-bugs have been addressed, so I'm closing this tracker bug as well. Thanks for working on this. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Bug 1170161] New: AUDIT-FIND: enlightenment: enlightenment_system: _store_mount_verify() follows symlinks in /media/$user
by bugzilla_noreply＠novell.com 05 Jul '22

05 Jul '22

http://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1170161 Bug ID: 1170161 Summary: AUDIT-FIND: enlightenment: enlightenment_system: _store_mount_verify() follows symlinks in /media/$user Classification: openSUSE Product: openSUSE Tumbleweed Version: Current Hardware: Other OS: Other Status: NEW Severity: Normal Priority: P5 - None Component: Security Assignee: simonf.lees(a)suse.com Reporter: matthias.gerstner(a)suse.com QA Contact: qa-bugs(a)suse.de CC: matthias.gerstner(a)suse.com, security-team(a)suse.de Blocks: 1169238 Found By: --- Blocker: --- +++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1169238 This function rejects relative path components in the target mount path, unlike its sibbling function described in b). However, it is unaware of symlinks. Furthermore it makes sure that /media/$user and /media/$user/sub are existing and are owned by the $uid:$gid of the unprivileged user. - by placing a symlink in /media/$user/sub the setuid-root binary can be tricked to create attacker owned directories in arbitrary locations. This can quite likely lead to full root access by creating user owned directories e.g. beneath /etc that are then used by other privileged programs. - if the attacker wins a race condition he can also cause the setuid-root binary to pass ownership of arbitrary existing directories to himself. The `_store_mount_verify()` functions performs a single `stat()` call on the target mount path. Only if it exists and is not owned by the unprivileged user, the execution is aborted. Therefore if the attacker places a suitable symlink in the target path just after this `stat()` is performed by the setuid-root binary, the following `_mkdir()` invocation will `mkdir()` and `chown()` the path components nonetheless. This allows full root system access by gaining ownership of e.g. /etc or /root. To fix this I suggest not to pass ownership of /media/$user or of any sub-directories to the unprivileged user. If /media/$user is user controlled then the mount operation should be rejected. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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