On Fri, 2010-04-16 at 23:02 +0200, Carlos E. R. wrote:
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On 2010-04-16 11:29, Hans Witvliet wrote:
On Fri, 2010-04-16 at 11:21 +0200, Per Jessen wrote:
Hans Witvliet wrote:
To explain the sitiation a bit better: I'm drawing up a list of steps to take for installing a CA. One of the aspects is that i want to be sure that my time is correct. This is, because the certificate defines explicitly an begin/ending date of the validity.
Hmm, you don't need NTP-style accuracy for that. A couple of seconds to one side or the other makes no difference.
No, but if someone manage to shift it a year, makes a crt, shift it again, another crt,....
(perhaps i'm getting paranoid)
Changing the time needs to be root. If the attacker has already root access, it does not matter if you use ntp auth or not >:-)
On the practical side, if your ntp daemon is configured to interrogate, say, a dozen of presumably safe ntp servers, in order to get your server to shift the time they have to hack the majority of your ntp peers.
I fail to see the need of authentication for ntp, but I can easily be misinformed O:-)
How about spoofing the ntp-source and doing a reboot? Logging in as ca-admin and signing a CSR... No need for root privilege... afaics, just the knowledge of the ip of the ntp-server and some iron doing an ntp-impersonation! -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse+unsubscribe@opensuse.org For additional commands, e-mail: opensuse+help@opensuse.org