Based on the non-detailed descriptions I've read, although the specific handshake step might be on the client side, it's not likely a client only flaw. It's the whole handshake, which likely means that both AP and client need to be patched. Tony On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:41 AM, Tony Su <tonysu@su-networking.com> wrote:
Regarding stuff like key servers, That's not going to be affected. Servers hold the keys for providing authentication for services, but those keys are not generally used directly in WiFi (or at least not the systems I know about). Normally those keys are used to generate ephemeral (single use) keys which are then used for handshakes.
In the case of Network Security like LDAP/AD, Both the Server and Client have been joined to the Domain beforehand, so each contains a "secret" that is commonly known to the two that doesn't have to be exchanged over the network.
Tony
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:35 AM, Tony Su <tonysu@su-networking.com> wrote:
From the general description (I haven't been able to inspect a detailed demo), it looks like a cousin to the Diffie Hellman flaw described last year.
If so, - All encrypted traffic including SSL/TLS, SSH, VPNs, etc should be protected despite the researchers' suggestion that <might> also be vulnerable. And, all User activity that involves exchanging passwords on websites, Financial/Banking, email and other activity are covered here.
- The other stuff about capturing, replaying and injecting content or even false network settings is a different consideration, but if this is not much different than what has always been possible using aircrack-ng against WEP or WPA1, then there are practical considerations which can make this kind of attack difficult although possible... like...
The attacker might have to capture gigabytes of data to obtain the few packets which contain a WPA handshake. Low activity APs might be more vulnerable than heavily used.
Once captured, the attacker has to crack the keys. Depending on strength and available machine resources plus method of crack (are rainbow tables available and used?), this might take awhile
Once cracked, the keys are usable for only as long as the original User has not yet closed his wireless session. Once the User has disconnected, then a new session and handshake has to be cracked.
So, Unless you're supporting a high security wireless network, I don't think that anyone should be pressing any emergency buttons, and if you were supporting a high security network then I'd be questioning why you even have Wifi or not deploying WiFi that automatically rotates new keys every few minutes.
Tony
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:18 AM, James Knott <james.knott@rogers.com> wrote:
On 10/16/2017 09:43 AM, Richard Brown wrote:
But WPA2 comes in a couple variants. Does anyone know if any of them
are unaffected?
Thanks Greg I don't know, but I do know that SUSE are working on providing us fast updates for SLE (which Leap will get equally fast) and Tumbleweed
Would SUSE being up to date affect this? Or is it an attack on the access point?
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