-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: bind8 Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2002:044 Date: Wed Nov 13 17:00:00 CET 2002 Affected products: (7.0), 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.0, 8.1, SuSE Linux Database Server SuSE eMail Server III, 3.1 SuSE Firewall SuSE Linux Enterprise Server for S/390 SuSE Linux Connectivity Server SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 7 SuSE Linux Office Server Vulnerability Type: remote command execution Severity (1-10): 8 SuSE default package: yes Cross References: CVE CAN-2002-1219, CAN-2002-1220, CAN-2002-1221, http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/bind-security.html http://bvlive01.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/alertdetail.jsp?oid=21469 Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: Remote command execution in bind8 name server. problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds: BIND4, reports of trojanized tcpdump/libpcap 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information The security research company ISS (Internet Security Services) has discovered several vulnerabilities in the BIND8 name server, including a remotely exploitable buffer overflow. Circumstancial evidence suggests that the Internet Software Consortium (maintainer of BIND) has been made aware of these issues in mid-October. Distributors of Open Source operating systems, including SuSE, were notified of these vulnerabilities via CERT approximately 12 hours before the release of the advisories by ISS and ISC on Tue, Nov 12. This notification did not include any details that allowed us to identify the vulnerable code, much less prepare a fix. Mails to ISC went unanswered for 36 hours. The SuSE security team regrets that the Internet Software Consortium has withheld vital information from the Internet community for so long, putting the majority of BIND users at risk. We would like to express our concern that the approach chosen by ISC and ISS is likely to erode trust in the security community if it becomes a model for dealing with security issues. We apologize to SuSE customers for not being able to provide timely fixes for this problem. The advisories by ISS and ISC mention the following problems in detail: 1. There is a buffer overflow in the way named handles SIG records. This buffer overflow can be exploited to obtain access to the victim host under the account the named process is running with. In order to exploit this problem, the attacker must control an existing DNS domain, and must be allowed to perform a recursive query. The impact of this vulnerability is serious. In all SuSE products, named is configured to run as user "named" by default, so a potential attacker or virus/worm does not get immediate root access. However, this is merely an additional obstacle the attacker faces. It may be possible for the attacker to exploit other, unpatched local vulnerabilities such as the recently announced traceroute hole to obtain root privilege. It may also be possible for an attacker to obtain increased privilege by manipulating the DNS zones served by the victim BIND server. We recommend to upgrade to the provided packages. If this is not possible, we recommend to restrict recursive requests as a workaround. This can be done by adding a statement such as the following to /etc/named.conf: options { ... existing options ... # Restrict recursive queries to 192.168.1.*, # except 192.168.1.254. # Order does matter. allow-recursion { !192.168.1.254; 192.168.1/24; }; }; Alternatively, you can add "recursion no;" to the options section to turn off recursion completely. 2. There are several Denial Of Service problems in BIND8 that allow remote attackers to terminate the name server process. At least one of these vulnerabilities seems to be exploitable even when the attacker is not allowed to perform recursive queries, so that the workaround suggested above is not effective against this bug. Both vulnerabilities are addressed by this update, using patches originating from ISC. Due to the severity of this issue, we will provide update packages for SuSE Linux 7.0, even though support for this product has officially been discontinued. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. Then, install the packages using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply the update. After updating, make sure to restart the name server process by issuing the following command as root: rcnamed restart Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Intel i386 Platform: SuSE-8.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bind8-8.2.4-260.i586.rpm e1c07d8c1dd74374cc37e7fa692c9de1 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bindutil-8.2.4-260.i586.rpm b41734970bf88aa7b5d3debbf834b78d ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/i586/bind8-devel-8.2.4-260.i586.rpm f7236e5e621725e100dbd204e2692a66 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.1/rpm/src/bind8-8.2.4-260.src.rpm 02154fbdc935a2900d70ce6a16e96543 SuSE-8.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n2/bind8-8.2.4-260.i386.rpm 07bc10c5c348c560084edb3c289459c9 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n1/bindutil-8.2.4-260.i386.rpm 4db27e9ad4ae038d81422a0c5b9a34d0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/n4/bind8-devel-8.2.4-260.i386.rpm a1b3958e0fbaed30ddecbf7753007dbf source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-260.src.rpm 0b66ae2b5c462f041625919fed7ab089 SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-261.i386.rpm fe0654b3de751533874b08a860afea5e ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n1/bindutil-8.2.4-261.i386.rpm 043a8c1c0bb2cc23308a614dc7bdc0fe ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/n2/bind8-devel-8.2.4-261.i386.rpm 59aca78f5aacb3ff7ecbc252eb760956 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-261.src.rpm 355add6397435262c597ad662e3df119 SuSE-7.2: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n2/bind8-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm 1072a9fe708150bc14c70a72ca42dfd3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm 0713d9b200db862110493233bc1d8321 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n2/bind8-devel-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm c681a91b38104cf47de4f4d454136a8a source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-200.src.rpm 8f51737bc0c84b7be08fe3bb1d4012b4 SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/n2/bind8-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm f2c14f81038d7ba952def27981b4599c ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm 961a5403a41e8031c054a081ebf92ba5 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-200.src.rpm 7f3c9b95591fb22f00dc0b22cdd5fcf1 SuSE-7.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/n1/bind8-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm 0a6b9e23cefa5cd9f06660571ebf85ff ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-200.i386.rpm 3a6e0e81c2d8b05ee01a2a0b9c26e9a4 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-200.src.rpm 1c2cb2e531fe2834de84b22ad714de68 Sparc Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-128.sparc.rpm c08454b933ed2365d9d2ab1322803af6 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n1/bindutil-8.2.4-128.sparc.rpm 47e063be85fadfa2e5d0fce1746a34b5 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-devel-8.2.4-128.sparc.rpm 46a97b033cca0a01dcb39ef90275ce46 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-128.src.rpm 827a7f56273c7a25ac40ffba728e9150 AXP Alpha Platform: SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/n2/bind8-8.2.3-139.alpha.rpm 77f39990fabacb545657236a60fecbe0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-139.alpha.rpm 33bf9f28a7c9105c84216906694c7b7c source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-139.src.rpm df347649fc98de695837a88452814ee6 SuSE-7.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/n1/bind8-8.2.3-139.alpha.rpm 23f307cda6a0eefb3d9f1a0439950bdd ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-139.alpha.rpm 0789b49749d93ddd79192506cda00f7a source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-139.src.rpm 356306a7f2c079e2726b3aa8da496e9b PPC Power PC Platform: SuSE-7.3: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-8.2.4-200.ppc.rpm 4cbeb4719625f8735ec03c27e1b27b85 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n1/bindutil-8.2.4-200.ppc.rpm 37fca302d72c819e713f8038d730a527 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/n2/bind8-devel-8.2.4-200.ppc.rpm f0f5cb7b808789606448a4d472c71400 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/bind8-8.2.4-200.src.rpm 5c810e6f144d0f2875bb06d2331f50d8 SuSE-7.1: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/n2/bind8-8.2.3-121.ppc.rpm 47fcc451954f03a915b57b500bd56c57 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-121.ppc.rpm 2c0de3b64d5c3d62cb840a534911ef31 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-121.src.rpm 235e142413ec35bcbdb86168b04b7a78 SuSE-7.0: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/n1/bind8-8.2.3-121.ppc.rpm 44dc01f6b4fae1dfd87874db6d42e8d9 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/n1/bindutil-8.2.3-121.ppc.rpm d46f45bef0f12c3c5b071443ac9e7f13 source rpm(s): ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/zq1/bind8-8.2.3-121.src.rpm 1bac32496ae66d4b0e35bc34d4e500ff ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: BIND4 In addition to the vulnerabilities in BIND8 discussed above, ISS report several vulnerabilities in BIND4. As stated previously, SuSE has discontinued support for BIND4 and recommends that users upgrade to BIND8 as soon as possible. Trojaned libpcap/tcpdump There have been reports that the source packages of tcpdump and libpcap available from several FTP servers have been modified to include a trojan. We have checked our source packages for this and found them to be clean. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security@suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe@suse.com>. suse-security-announce@suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe@suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info@suse.com> or <suse-security-faq@suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security@suse.com> or <security@suse.de>. The <security@suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. 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