Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the first step of signature generation operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). This patch is temporary set emLen to pks->k, and temporary set EM to pks->S for debugging. We will replace the above values to real signature after implement RSASP1. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/crypto/public_key.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c index 95aab83..6996ff7 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> #include "public_key.h" #include "private_key.h" @@ -152,6 +153,125 @@ static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X) } /* + * EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] + * @M: message to be signed, and octet string + * @emLen: intended length in octets of the encoded message + * @hash_algo: hash function (option) + * @hash: true means hash M, otherwise M is digest + * @EM: encoded message, an octet string of length emLen + */ +static int EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_ENCODE(const u8 *M, size_t emLen, + enum pkey_hash_algo hash_algo, const bool hash, + u8 **_EM, struct public_key_signature *pks) +{ + u8 *digest; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t digest_size, desc_size; + size_t tLen; + u8 *T, *PS, *EM; + int i, ret; + + pr_info("EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_ENCODE start\n"); + + if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data) + ret = -ENOTSUPP; + else + pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash_algo; + + /* 1) Apply the hash function to the message M to produce a hash value H */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash_algo], 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) + goto error_digest; + pks->digest = digest; + pks->digest_size = digest_size; + + if (hash) { + desc = (void *) digest + digest_size; + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_shash; + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, M, sizeof(M), pks->digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_shash; + } else { + memcpy(pks->digest, M, pks->digest_size); + pks->digest_size = digest_size; + } + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + + /* 2) Encode the algorithm ID for the hash function and the hash value into + * an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo with the DER. Let T be the DER encoding of + * the DigestInfo value and let tLen be the length in octets of T. + */ + tLen = RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size + pks->digest_size; + T = kmalloc(tLen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!T) + goto error_T; + + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size); + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size); + + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */ + if (emLen < tLen + 11) { + ret = EINVAL; + goto error_emLen; + } + + /* 4) Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - tLen - 3 octets with 0xff. */ + PS = kmalloc(emLen - tLen - 3, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!PS) + goto error_P; + + for (i = 0; i < (emLen - tLen - 3); i++) + PS[i] = 0xff; + + /* 5) Concatenate PS, the DER encoding T, and other padding to form the encoded + * message EM as EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T + */ + EM = kmalloc(3 + emLen - tLen - 3 + tLen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!EM) + goto error_EM; + + EM[0] = 0x00; + EM[1] = 0x01; + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3); + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00; + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen); + + *_EM = EM; + + kfree(PS); + kfree(T); + + return 0; + +error_EM: + kfree(PS); +error_P: +error_emLen: + kfree(T); +error_T: +error_shash: + kfree(digest); +error_digest: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} + +/* * Perform the RSA signature verification. * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata * @EM: The computed signature value @@ -275,9 +395,43 @@ static struct public_key_signature *RSA_generate_signature( const struct private_key *key, u8 *M, enum pkey_hash_algo hash_algo, const bool hash) { - pr_info("RSA_generate_signature start"); + struct public_key_signature *pks; + u8 *EM = NULL; + size_t emLen; + int ret; - return 0; + pr_info("RSA_generate_signature start\n"); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + pks = kzalloc(sizeof(*pks), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pks) + goto error_no_pks; + + /* 1): EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: */ + /* Use the private key modulus size to be EM length */ + emLen = mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n); + emLen = (emLen + 7) / 8; + + ret = EMSA_PKCS1_v1_5_ENCODE(M, emLen, hash_algo, hash, &EM, pks); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_v1_5_encode; + + /* TODO 2): m = OS2IP (EM) */ + + /* TODO 3): s = RSASP1 (K, m) */ + + /* TODO 4): S = I2OSP (s, k) */ + + /* TODO: signature S to a u8* S or set to sig->rsa.s? */ + pks->S = EM; /* TODO: temporary set S to EM */ + + return pks; + +error_v1_5_encode: + kfree(pks); +error_no_pks: + pr_info("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = { diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index d44b29f..1cdf457 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload); struct public_key_signature { u8 *digest; u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */ + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */ + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */ u8 nr_mpi; /* Occupancy of mpi[] */ enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; union { -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

Implement Octet String to Integer conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.2] in rsa.c. It's the second step of signature generation operation. This patch is temporary set non-RSASP1 message to pks->S for debugging. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c index c26ae77..0862018 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c @@ -168,6 +168,20 @@ static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X) } /* + * Octet String to Integer conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.2] + */ +static int RSA_OS2IP(u8 *X, size_t XLen, MPI *_x) +{ + MPI x; + + x = mpi_alloc((XLen + BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB); + mpi_set_buffer(x, X, XLen, 0); + + *_x = x; + return 0; +} + +/* * EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] * @M: message to be signed, and octet string * @emLen: intended length in octets of the encoded message @@ -412,6 +426,9 @@ static struct public_key_signature *RSA_generate_signature( { struct public_key_signature *pks; u8 *EM = NULL; + MPI m = NULL; + MPI s = NULL; + unsigned X_size; size_t emLen; int ret; @@ -431,14 +448,16 @@ static struct public_key_signature *RSA_generate_signature( if (ret < 0) goto error_v1_5_encode; - /* TODO 2): m = OS2IP (EM) */ + /* 2): m = OS2IP (EM) */ + ret = RSA_OS2IP(EM, emLen, &m); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_v1_5_encode; /* TODO 3): s = RSASP1 (K, m) */ + s = m; - /* TODO 4): S = I2OSP (s, k) */ - - /* TODO: signature S to a u8* S or set to sig->rsa.s? */ - pks->S = EM; /* TODO: temporary set S to EM */ + /* 4): S = I2OSP (s, k) */ + _RSA_I2OSP(s, &X_size, &pks->S); return pks; -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

Add ASN.1 files and parser to support parsing PKCS #8 noncompressed private key information. It's better than direct parsing pure private key because PKCS #8 has a privateKeyAlgorithm to indicate the algorithm of private key, e.g. RSA from PKCS #1 Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 11 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 16 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 | 19 ++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h | 23 ++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 | 29 ++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 1 + include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 400 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 6d2c2ea..c0ebd57 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -35,4 +35,15 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a public key packet found inside the certificate. +config PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_PARSER + tristate "PKCS #8 private key info parser" + depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select ASN1 + select OID_REGISTRY + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + help + This option provides support for parsing PKCS #8 RSA private key info + format blobs for key data and provides the ability to instantiate a + crypto key from a private key packet. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 0727204..65fbc45 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -23,5 +23,21 @@ $(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h $(obj)/x509-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.c $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h +# +# PKCS8 Private Key handling +# +obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_PARSER) += pkcs8_key_parser.o +pkcs8_key_parser-y := \ + pkcs8-asn1.o \ + pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.o \ + pkcs8_info_parser.o \ + pkcs8_private_key.o + +$(obj)/pkcs8_info_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs8-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.h +$(obj)/pkcs8-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs8-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs8-asn1.h +$(obj)/pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.h + clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h +clean-files += pkcs8-asn1.c pkcs8-asn1.h +clean-files += pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.c pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.h diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89e845d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +-- +-- Representation of RSA PKCS#8 private key information. +-- + +PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version Version, + privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + privateKey OCTET STRING ({ pkcs8_extract_key_data }) + -- Does not support attributes + -- attributes [ 0 ] Attributes OPTIONAL + } + +-- Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) } +Version ::= INTEGER + +AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs8_note_OID }), + parameters ANY OPTIONAL + } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2da19b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_info_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +/* X.509 certificate parser + * + * Copyright (C) 2013 SUSE Linux Products GmbH. All rights reserved. + * Written by Lee, Chun-Yi (jlee@suse.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS8: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include "public_key.h" +#include "pkcs8_parser.h" +#include "pkcs8-asn1.h" +#include "pkcs8_rsakey-asn1.h" + +struct pkcs8_parse_context { + struct pkcs8_info *info; /* Certificate being constructed */ + unsigned long data; /* Start of data */ + const void *key; /* Key data */ + size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */ + enum OID algo_oid; /* Algorithm OID */ + unsigned char nr_mpi; /* Number of MPIs stored */ +}; + +/* + * Free an PKCS #8 private key info + */ +void pkcs8_free_info(struct pkcs8_info *info) +{ + if (info) { + public_key_destroy(info->priv); + kfree(info); + } +} + +/* + * Parse an PKCS #8 Private Key Info + */ +struct pkcs8_info *pkcs8_info_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct pkcs8_info *info; + struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx; + long ret; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + info = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs8_info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) + goto error_no_info; + info->priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct private_key), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info->priv) + goto error_no_ctx; + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs8_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + goto error_no_ctx; + + ctx->info = info; + ctx->data = (unsigned long)data; + + /* Attempt to decode the private key info */ + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs8_decoder, ctx, data, datalen); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_decode; + + /* Decode the private key */ + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs8_rsakey_decoder, ctx, + ctx->key, ctx->key_size); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_decode; + + kfree(ctx); + return info; + +error_decode: + kfree(ctx); +error_no_ctx: + pkcs8_free_info(info); +error_no_info: + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +/* + * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how + * to interpret it. + */ +int pkcs8_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->algo_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + if (ctx->algo_oid == OID__NR) { + char buffer[50]; + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n", + (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Extract the data for the private key algorithm + */ +int pkcs8_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx = context; + + if (ctx->algo_oid != OID_rsaEncryption) + return -ENOPKG; + + ctx->info->privkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + ctx->key = value; + ctx->key_size = vlen; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Extract a RSA private key value + */ +int rsa_priv_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs8_parse_context *ctx = context; + MPI mpi; + + if (ctx->nr_mpi >= ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->info->priv->mpi)) { + /* does not grab exponent1, exponent2 and coefficient */ + if (ctx->nr_mpi > 8) { + pr_err("Too many public key MPIs in pkcs1 private key\n"); + return -EBADMSG; + } else { + ctx->nr_mpi++; + return 0; + } + } + + mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen); + if (!mpi) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx->info->priv->mpi[ctx->nr_mpi++] = mpi; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f5d801 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_parser.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* PKCS #8 parser internal definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2013 SUSE Linux Products GmbH. All rights reserved. + * Written by Lee, Chun-Yi (jlee@suse.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <crypto/public_key.h> + +struct pkcs8_info { + enum pkey_algo privkey_algo:8; /* Private key algorithm */ + struct private_key *priv; /* Private key */ +}; + +/* + * pkcs8_parser.c + */ +extern void pkcs8_free_info(struct pkcs8_info *info); +extern struct pkcs8_info *pkcs8_info_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf2545b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_private_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* Instantiate a private key crypto key + * + * Copyright (C) 2013 SUSE Linux Products GmbH. All rights reserved. + * Written by Chun-Yi Lee (jlee@suse.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS8: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include "private_key.h" +#include "pkcs8-asn1.h" +#include "pkcs8_parser.h" + +#define KEY_PREFIX "Private Key: " +#define FINGERPRINT_HASH "sha256" + +static const +struct private_key_algorithm *pkcs8_private_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { + [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = NULL, +#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \ + defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE) + [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_private_key_algorithm, +#endif +}; + +/* + * Attempt to parse a data blob for a private key. + */ +static int pkcs8_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct pkcs8_info *info; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + u8 *digest; + size_t digest_size, desc_size; + char *fingerprint, *description; + int i, ret; + + pr_info("pkcs8_key_preparse start\n"); + + info = pkcs8_info_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen); + if (IS_ERR(info)) + return PTR_ERR(info); + + info->priv->algo = pkcs8_private_key_algorithms[info->privkey_algo]; + info->priv->id_type = PKEY_ID_PKCS8; + + /* Hash the pkcs #8 blob to generate fingerprint */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(FINGERPRINT_HASH, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(tfm); + goto error_shash; + } + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) + goto error_digest; + desc = (void *) digest + digest_size; + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_shash_init; + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, prep->data, prep->datalen, digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_shash_finup; + + fingerprint = kzalloc(digest_size * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!fingerprint) + goto error_fingerprint; + for (i = 0; i < digest_size; i++) + sprintf(fingerprint + i * 2, "%02x", digest[i]); + + /* Propose a description */ + description = kzalloc(strlen(KEY_PREFIX) + strlen(fingerprint) + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!description) + goto error_description; + sprintf(description, "%s", KEY_PREFIX); + memcpy(description + strlen(KEY_PREFIX), fingerprint, strlen(fingerprint)); + + /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ + __module_get(private_key_subtype.owner); + prep->type_data[0] = &private_key_subtype; + prep->type_data[1] = fingerprint; + prep->payload = info->priv; + prep->description = description; + + /* size of 4096 bits private key file is 2.3K */ + prep->quotalen = 700; + + pr_info("pkcs8_key_preparse done\n"); + + /* We've finished with the information */ + kfree(digest); + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + info->priv = NULL; + pkcs8_free_info(info); + + return 0; + +error_description: + kfree(fingerprint); +error_fingerprint: +error_shash_finup: +error_shash_init: + kfree(digest); +error_digest: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); +error_shash: + info->priv = NULL; + pkcs8_free_info(info); + return ret; +} + +static struct asymmetric_key_parser pkcs8_private_key_parser = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .name = "pkcs8", + .parse = pkcs8_key_preparse, +}; + +/* + * Module stuff + */ +static int __init pkcs8_private_key_init(void) +{ + return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&pkcs8_private_key_parser); +} + +static void __exit pkcs8_private_key_exit(void) +{ + unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&pkcs8_private_key_parser); +} + +module_init(pkcs8_private_key_init); +module_exit(pkcs8_private_key_exit); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d997c5e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs8_rsakey.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +-- +-- Representation of RSA private key with information. +-- + +RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + version Version, + modulus INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- n + publicExponent INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- e + privateExponent INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- d + prime1 INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- p + prime2 INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- q + exponent1 INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- d mod (p-1) + exponent2 INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }), -- d mod (q-1) + coefficient INTEGER ({ rsa_priv_extract_mpi }) -- (inverse of q) mod p + -- Doesn't support multi-prime + -- otherPrimeInfos [ 0 ] OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + } + +-- Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) } +Version ::= INTEGER + +-- OtherPrimeInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF OtherPrimeInfo +OtherPrimeInfos ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherPrimeInfo + +OtherPrimeInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + prime INTEGER, -- ri + exponent INTEGER, -- di + coefficient INTEGER -- ti +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 97ff932..1636c4c 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_hash_algo); const char *const pkey_id_type[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = { [PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP", [PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509", + [PKEY_ID_PKCS8] = "PKCS8", }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type); diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index 1cdf457..e51f294 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern const char *const pkey_hash_algo[PKEY_HASH__LAST]; enum pkey_id_type { PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ + PKEY_ID_PKCS8, /* PKCS #8 Private Key */ PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST }; -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's scope, neither RSA_verify() nor mpi_get_buffer() didn't take care the leading byte. To avoid the risk, that's better we explicitly add the leading zero byte to EM for pass to RSA_verify(). This patch allocate a _EM buffer to capture the result from RSA_I2OSP(), then set the first byte to zero in EM and copy the remaining bytes from _EM. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c index e60defe..1fadc7f 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c @@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */ const u8 *H = sig->digest; u8 *EM = NULL; + u8 *_EM = NULL; MPI m = NULL; size_t k; @@ -435,14 +436,19 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message * (EM) of length k octets. * - * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a - * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()! + * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we add it + * back to EM before input to RSA_verify()! */ - ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM); + ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &_EM); if (ret < 0) goto error; - ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size, + EM = kmalloc(k, GFP_KERNEL); + memset(EM, 0, 1); + memcpy(EM + 1, _EM, k-1); + kfree(_EM); + + ret = RSA_verify(H, EM, k, sig->digest_size, RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size); -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code. The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial capability set if required. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index ba478fa..7109e65 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data { #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND +/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */ + +#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> This forcibly drops CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL from both cap_permitted and cap_bset in the init_cred struct, which everything else inherits from. This works on any machine and can be used to develop even if the box doesn't have UEFI. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++++++ kernel/cred.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 15356ac..6ad8292 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2784,6 +2784,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads. + secureboot_enable= + [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This + locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the + CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things + like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can + be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes. + security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot. If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first security module asking for security registration will be diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void) 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); } +void __init secureboot_enable() +{ + pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n"); + cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); + cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL); +} + +/* Dummy Secure Boot enable option to fake out UEFI SB=1 */ +static int __init secureboot_enable_opt(char *str) +{ + int sb_enable = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); + if (sb_enable) + secureboot_enable(); + return 1; +} +__setup("secureboot_enable=", secureboot_enable_opt); + /** * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself down. We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ include/linux/efi.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt index 199f453..ff651d3 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning 1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below) 1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer (below) +1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled +1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Kernel should enable secure boot lockdowns 1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders 290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures 2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index d606463..9baee3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -861,6 +861,36 @@ fail: return status; } +static int get_secure_boot(efi_system_table_t *_table) +{ + u8 sb, setup; + unsigned long datasize = sizeof(sb); + efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return 0; + + if (sb == 0) + return 0; + + + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + L"SetupMode", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, + &setup); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return 0; + + if (setup == 1) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /* * Because the x86 boot code expects to be passed a boot_params we * need to create one ourselves (usually the bootloader would create @@ -1169,6 +1199,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table, if (sys_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE) goto fail; + boot_params->secure_boot = get_secure_boot(sys_table); + setup_graphics(boot_params); setup_efi_pci(boot_params); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h index 653668d..69a6c08 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h @@ -38,9 +38,13 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params) memset(&boot_params->olpc_ofw_header, 0, (char *)&boot_params->efi_info - (char *)&boot_params->olpc_ofw_header); - memset(&boot_params->kbd_status, 0, + memset(&boot_params->kbd_status, 0, sizeof(boot_params->kbd_status)); + /* don't clear boot_params->secure_boot. we set that ourselves + * earlier. + */ + memset(&boot_params->_pad5[0], 0, (char *)&boot_params->hdr - - (char *)&boot_params->kbd_status); + (char *)&boot_params->_pad5[0]); memset(&boot_params->_pad7[0], 0, (char *)&boot_params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer[0] - (char *)&boot_params->_pad7[0]); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index c15ddaf..85d7685 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ struct boot_params { __u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */ __u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */ __u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */ - __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */ + __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */ /* * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S. * diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index f8ec578..2a8168a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -1129,6 +1129,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) io_delay_init(); + if (boot_params.secure_boot) { +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI + set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &x86_efi_facility); +#endif + secureboot_enable(); + } + /* * Parse the ACPI tables for possible boot-time SMP configuration. */ diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 04421e8..9e69542 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *); extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *); extern void __init cred_init(void); +extern void secureboot_enable(void); + /* * check for validity of credentials */ diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 5f8f176..febce85 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -634,6 +634,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *); #define EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES 3 /* Can we use runtime services? */ #define EFI_MEMMAP 4 /* Can we use EFI memory map? */ #define EFI_64BIT 5 /* Is the firmware 64-bit? */ +#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT 6 /* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI # ifdef CONFIG_X86 -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

Introduced a hibernate_key.c file to query the key pair from EFI variables and maintain key pair for check signature of S4 snapshot image. We loaded the private key when snapshot image stored success. This patch introduced 2 EFI variables for store the key to sign S4 image and verify signature when S4 wake up. The names and GUID are: S4SignKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 S4WakeKey-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21 S4SignKey is used by EFI bootloader to pass the RSA private key that packaged by PKCS#8 format, kernel will read and parser it when system boot and reload it when S4 resume. EFI bootloader need gnerate a new private key when every time system boot. S4WakeKey is used to pass the RSA public key that packaged by X.509 certificate, kernel will read and parser it for check the signature of S4 snapshot image when S4 resume. The follow-up patch will remove S4SignKey and S4WakeKey after load them to kernel for avoid anyone can access it through efivarfs. v3: - Load S4 sign key before ExitBootServices. Load private key before ExitBootServices() then bootloader doesn't need generate key-pair for each booting: + Add setup_s4_keys() to eboot.c to load S4 sign key before ExitBootServices. + Reserve the memory block of sign key data blob in efi.c - In Makefile, moved hibernate_keys.o before hibernate.o for load S4 sign key before check hibernate image. It makes sure the new sign key will be transfer to resume target kernel. - Set "depends on EFI_STUB" in Kconfig v2: Add CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION for build of hibernate_keys.c depend on Kconfig. Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c | 89 ++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 9 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 68 ++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 17 ++ kernel/power/Kconfig | 16 ++- kernel/power/Makefile | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 + kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c | 290 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/power/power.h | 27 +++ 10 files changed, 519 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index 9baee3e..855bda4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -368,6 +368,91 @@ free_handle: return status; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +static efi_status_t setup_s4_keys(struct boot_params *params) +{ + struct setup_data *data; + unsigned long datasize; + u32 attr; + struct efi_s4_key *s4key; + efi_status_t status; + + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)params->hdr.setup_data; + + while (data && data->next) + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)data->next; + + status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool, + EFI_LOADER_DATA, sizeof(*s4key), &s4key); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + efi_printk("Failed to alloc memory for efi_s4_key\n"); + goto error_setup; + } + + s4key->data.type = SETUP_S4_KEY; + s4key->data.len = sizeof(struct efi_s4_key) - + sizeof(struct setup_data); + s4key->data.next = 0; + s4key->skey_dsize = 0; + s4key->err_status = 0; + + if (data) + data->next = (unsigned long)s4key; + else + params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long)s4key; + + /* obtain the size of key data */ + datasize = 0; + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + EFI_S4_SIGN_KEY_NAME, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID, + NULL, &datasize, NULL); + if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + efi_printk("Couldn't get S4 key data size\n"); + goto error_size; + } + if (datasize > PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(datasize)) { + efi_printk("The size of S4 sign key is too large\n"); + status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto error_size; + } + + s4key->skey_dsize = datasize; + status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool, + EFI_LOADER_DATA, s4key->skey_dsize, + &s4key->skey_data_addr); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + efi_printk("Failed to alloc page for S4 key data\n"); + goto error_s4key; + } + + attr = 0; + memset((void *)s4key->skey_data_addr, 0, s4key->skey_dsize); + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable, + EFI_S4_SIGN_KEY_NAME, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID, &attr, + &(s4key->skey_dsize), s4key->skey_data_addr); + if (status) { + efi_printk("Couldn't get S4 key data\n"); + goto error_gets4key; + } + if (attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) { + efi_printk("S4 sign key can not be a runtime variable\n"); + memset((void *)s4key->skey_data_addr, 0, s4key->skey_dsize); + status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + goto error_gets4key; + } + + return 0; + +error_gets4key: + efi_call_phys1(sys_table->boottime->free_pool, s4key->skey_data_addr); +error_s4key: +error_size: + s4key->err_status = status; +error_setup: + return status; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ + /* * See if we have Graphics Output Protocol */ @@ -1205,6 +1290,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *_table, setup_efi_pci(boot_params); +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + setup_s4_keys(boot_params); +#endif + status = efi_call_phys3(sys_table->boottime->allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, sizeof(*gdt), (void **)&gdt); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h index 0062a01..56ececa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ extern void efi_call_phys_epilog(void); extern void efi_unmap_memmap(void); extern void efi_memory_uc(u64 addr, unsigned long size); +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +struct efi_s4_key { + struct setup_data data; + unsigned long err_status; + unsigned long skey_dsize; + void *skey_data_addr; +}; +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static inline bool efi_is_native(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index 85d7685..79398ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #define SETUP_E820_EXT 1 #define SETUP_DTB 2 #define SETUP_PCI 3 +#define SETUP_S4_KEY 4 /* ram_size flags */ #define RAMDISK_IMAGE_START_MASK 0x07FF diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 90f6ed1..c8a4fca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -704,6 +704,69 @@ static int __init efi_memmap_init(void) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +static unsigned long skey_dsize; +static u64 skey_data_addr; +static unsigned long skey_err_status; + +bool efi_s4_key_available(void) +{ + return skey_dsize && skey_data_addr && !skey_err_status; +} + +unsigned long __init efi_copy_skey_data(void *page_addr) +{ + void *key_addr; + + if (efi_s4_key_available()) { + key_addr = early_ioremap(skey_data_addr, skey_dsize); + memcpy(page_addr, key_addr, skey_dsize); + early_iounmap(key_addr, skey_dsize); + } + + return skey_dsize; +} + +void __init efi_erase_s4_skey_data(void) +{ + void *key_addr; + + key_addr = early_ioremap(skey_data_addr, skey_dsize); + memset(key_addr, 0, skey_dsize); + early_iounmap(key_addr, skey_dsize); + memblock_free(skey_data_addr, skey_dsize); + skey_data_addr = 0; + skey_dsize = 0; +} + +static void __init efi_reserve_s4_skey_data(void) +{ + u64 pa_data; + struct setup_data *data; + struct efi_s4_key *s4key; + + skey_err_status = 0; + pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data; + while (pa_data) { + data = early_ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*s4key)); + if (data->type == SETUP_S4_KEY) { + s4key = (struct efi_s4_key *)data; + if (!s4key->err_status) { + skey_dsize = s4key->skey_dsize; + skey_data_addr = (u64) s4key->skey_data_addr; + memblock_reserve(skey_data_addr, skey_dsize); + } else { + skey_err_status = s4key->err_status; + pr_err("Get S4 sign key from EFI fail: 0x%lx\n", + skey_err_status); + } + } + pa_data = data->next; + early_iounmap(data, sizeof(*s4key)); + } +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ + void __init efi_init(void) { efi_char16_t *c16; @@ -729,6 +792,11 @@ void __init efi_init(void) set_bit(EFI_SYSTEM_TABLES, &x86_efi_facility); +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + /* keep s4 key from setup_data */ + efi_reserve_s4_skey_data(); +#endif + /* * Show what we know for posterity */ diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index febce85..55f80be 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -389,6 +389,18 @@ typedef efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store_t(u32 attributes, unsigned long si #define EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_GUID \ EFI_GUID( 0x964e5b22, 0x6459, 0x11d2, 0x8e, 0x39, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b ) +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +#define EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xfe141863, 0xc070, 0x478e, 0xb8, 0xa3, 0x87, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0xc9, 0xef, 0x21) +/* + * The UEFI variable names of the key-pair to verify S4 snapshot image: + * S4SignKey-EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID: The private key is used to sign snapshot + * S4WakeKey-EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID: The public key is used to verify snapshot + */ +#define EFI_S4_SIGN_KEY_NAME ((efi_char16_t [10]) { 'S', '4', 'S', 'i', 'g', 'n', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 }) +#define EFI_S4_WAKE_KEY_NAME ((efi_char16_t [10]) { 'S', '4', 'W', 'a', 'k', 'e', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 }) +#endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ + typedef struct { efi_guid_t guid; u64 table; @@ -577,6 +589,11 @@ extern void efi_enter_virtual_mode (void); /* switch EFI to virtual mode, if pos extern void efi_late_init(void); extern void efi_free_boot_services(void); extern efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store(u32 attributes, unsigned long size); +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +extern bool efi_s4_key_available(void); +extern unsigned long efi_copy_skey_data(void *page_addr); +extern void efi_erase_s4_skey_data(void); +#endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ #else static inline void efi_late_init(void) {} static inline void efi_free_boot_services(void) {} diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig index d444c4e..b592d88 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -66,8 +66,17 @@ config HIBERNATION For more information take a look at <file:Documentation/power/swsusp.txt>. -config ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS - bool +config SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + bool "Hibernate snapshot verification" + depends on HIBERNATION + depends on EFI_STUB + depends on X86 + select PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_PARSER + help + This option provides support for generate anad verify the signautre by + RSA key-pair against hibernate snapshot image. Current mechanism + dependent on UEFI environment. EFI bootloader should generate the + key-pair. config PM_STD_PARTITION string "Default resume partition" @@ -91,6 +100,9 @@ config PM_STD_PARTITION suspended image to. It will simply pick the first available swap device. +config ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS + bool + config PM_SLEEP def_bool y depends on SUSPEND || HIBERNATE_CALLBACKS diff --git a/kernel/power/Makefile b/kernel/power/Makefile index 29472bf..46b6422 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Makefile +++ b/kernel/power/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_VT_CONSOLE_SLEEP) += console.o obj-$(CONFIG_FREEZER) += process.o obj-$(CONFIG_SUSPEND) += suspend.o obj-$(CONFIG_PM_TEST_SUSPEND) += suspend_test.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION) += hibernate_keys.o obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION) += hibernate.o snapshot.o swap.o user.o \ block_io.o obj-$(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP) += autosleep.o diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index b26f5f1..c545b15 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/genhd.h> +#include <linux/key.h> #include "power.h" @@ -631,6 +632,7 @@ static void power_down(void) int hibernate(void) { int error; + int skey_error; lock_system_sleep(); /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */ @@ -680,6 +682,7 @@ int hibernate(void) pm_restore_gfp_mask(); } else { pr_debug("PM: Image restored successfully.\n"); + restore_sign_key_data(); } Thaw: diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c b/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1bc5976 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,290 @@ +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/mpi.h> +#include <linux/asn1.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + +#include "power.h" + +static void *skey_data; +static void *skey_data_buf; +static unsigned long skey_dsize; + +static int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status) +{ + int err; + + switch (status) { + case EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER: + err = -EINVAL; + break; + case EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES: + err = -ENOSPC; + break; + case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR: + err = -EIO; + break; + case EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED: + err = -EROFS; + break; + case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: + err = -EACCES; + break; + case EFI_NOT_FOUND: + err = -ENODATA; + break; + default: + err = -EINVAL; + } + + return err; +} + +bool swsusp_page_is_sign_key(struct page *page) +{ + unsigned long skey_data_pfn; + bool ret; + + if (!skey_data || IS_ERR(skey_data)) + return false; + + skey_data_pfn = page_to_pfn(virt_to_page(skey_data)); + ret = (page_to_pfn(page) == skey_data_pfn) ? true : false; + if (ret) + pr_info("PM: Avoid snapshot the page of S4 sign key.\n"); + + return ret; +} + +unsigned long get_skey_data_buf_pfn(void) +{ + if (!skey_data_buf || IS_ERR(skey_data_buf)) + return 0; + + return page_to_pfn(virt_to_page(skey_data_buf)); +} + +void clone_skey_data(void *page) +{ + if (!page) + return; + + if (skey_data && !IS_ERR(skey_data)) { + memcpy(page, &skey_dsize, sizeof(skey_dsize)); + memcpy(page + sizeof(skey_dsize), skey_data, PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(skey_dsize)); + } +} + +void restore_sign_key_data(void) +{ + memset(skey_data, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + if (skey_data_buf && !IS_ERR(skey_data_buf)) { + /* restore sign key size and data from buffer */ + memcpy(&skey_dsize, skey_data_buf, sizeof(skey_dsize)); + memcpy(skey_data, skey_data_buf + sizeof(skey_dsize), + PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(skey_dsize)); + /* reset skey page buffer */ + memset(skey_data_buf, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + pr_info("PM: Restore S4 sign key from buffer\n"); + } else + pr_err("PM: Restore S4 sign key fail\n"); +} + +bool skey_data_available(void) +{ + static unsigned char const_seq = (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)); + bool ret = false; + + /* Sign key is PKCS#8 format that must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */ + ret = skey_data && !IS_ERR(skey_data) && + (skey_dsize != 0) && + ((unsigned char *)skey_data)[0] == const_seq; + + return ret; +} + +struct key *get_sign_key(void) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + struct key *skey; + int err; + + if (!skey_data || IS_ERR(skey_data)) + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + + skey = key_alloc(&key_type_asymmetric, "s4_sign_key", + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, + cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + if (IS_ERR(skey)) { + pr_err("PM: Allocate s4 sign key error: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(skey)); + goto error_keyalloc; + } + + err = key_instantiate_and_link(skey, skey_data, skey_dsize, NULL, NULL); + if (err < 0) { + pr_err("PM: S4 sign key instantiate error: %d\n", err); + if (skey) + key_put(skey); + skey = ERR_PTR(err); + goto error_keyinit; + } + + return skey; + +error_keyinit: +error_keyalloc: + return skey; +} + +void erase_skey_data(void) +{ + if (!skey_data || IS_ERR(skey_data)) + return; + + memset(skey_data, 0, PAGE_SIZE); +} + +void destroy_sign_key(struct key *skey) +{ + erase_skey_data(); + if (skey) + key_put(skey); +} + +static void *load_wake_key_data(unsigned long *datasize) +{ + u32 attr; + void *wkey_data; + efi_status_t status; + + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES)) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + + /* obtain the size */ + *datasize = 0; + status = efi.get_variable(EFI_S4_WAKE_KEY_NAME, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID, + NULL, datasize, NULL); + if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + wkey_data = ERR_PTR(efi_status_to_err(status)); + pr_err("PM: Couldn't get wake key data size: 0x%lx\n", status); + goto error; + } + + /* check attributes */ + wkey_data = kzalloc(*datasize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!wkey_data) { + wkey_data = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + goto error; + } + + status = efi.get_variable(EFI_S4_WAKE_KEY_NAME, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID, + &attr, datasize, wkey_data); + if (status) { + kfree(wkey_data); + *datasize = 0; + wkey_data = ERR_PTR(efi_status_to_err(status)); + pr_err("PM: Get wake key data error: 0x%lx\n", status); + goto error; + } + if (attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) { + memset(wkey_data, 0, *datasize); + kfree(wkey_data); + *datasize = 0; + wkey_data = ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + pr_err("PM: Wake key has wrong attributes: 0x%x\n", attr); + goto error; + } + +error: + return wkey_data; +} + +bool wkey_data_available(void) +{ + static int ret = 1; + unsigned long datasize; + void *wkey_data; + + if (ret > 0) { + wkey_data = load_wake_key_data(&datasize); + if (wkey_data && IS_ERR(wkey_data)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(wkey_data); + goto error; + } else { + if (wkey_data) { + memset(wkey_data, 0, datasize); + kfree(wkey_data); + } + ret = 0; + } + } + +error: + return !ret; +} + +struct key *get_wake_key(void) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + void *wkey_data; + unsigned long datasize = 0; + struct key *wkey; + int err; + + wkey_data = load_wake_key_data(&datasize); + if (IS_ERR(wkey_data)) { + wkey = (struct key *)wkey_data; + goto error_data; + } + + wkey = key_alloc(&key_type_asymmetric, "s4_wake_key", + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, + cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + if (IS_ERR(wkey)) { + pr_err("PM: Allocate s4 wake key error: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(wkey)); + goto error_keyalloc; + } + err = key_instantiate_and_link(wkey, wkey_data, datasize, NULL, NULL); + if (err < 0) { + pr_err("PM: S4 wake key instantiate error: %d\n", err); + if (wkey) + key_put(wkey); + wkey = ERR_PTR(err); + } + +error_keyalloc: + if (wkey_data && !IS_ERR(wkey_data)) + kfree(wkey_data); +error_data: + return wkey; +} + +size_t get_key_length(const struct key *key) +{ + const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data; + size_t len; + + /* TODO: better check the RSA type */ + + len = mpi_get_nbits(pk->rsa.n); + len = (len + 7) / 8; + + return len; +} + +static int __init init_sign_key_data(void) +{ + skey_data = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + skey_data_buf = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + + if (skey_data && efi_s4_key_available()) { + skey_dsize = efi_copy_skey_data(skey_data); + efi_erase_s4_skey_data(); + pr_info("PM: Load s4 sign key from EFI\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +late_initcall(init_sign_key_data); diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h index 7d4b7ff..69a81d8 100644 --- a/kernel/power/power.h +++ b/kernel/power/power.h @@ -160,6 +160,33 @@ extern void swsusp_close(fmode_t); extern int swsusp_unmark(void); #endif +/* kernel/power/hibernate_key.c */ +extern bool skey_data_available(void); +extern struct key *get_sign_key(void); +extern void erase_skey_data(void); +extern void snapshot_fill_s4_skey(void); +extern void destroy_sign_key(struct key *key); +extern bool wkey_data_available(void); +extern struct key *get_wake_key(void); +extern size_t get_key_length(const struct key *key); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +extern void restore_sign_key_data(void); +extern bool swsusp_page_is_sign_key(struct page *page); +extern unsigned long get_skey_data_buf_pfn(void); +extern void clone_skey_data(void *page_addr); +#else /* !CONFIG_SUSPEND */ +static inline void restore_sign_key_data(void) {} +static inline bool swsusp_page_is_sign_key(struct page *page) +{ + return false; +} +static inline unsigned long get_skey_data_buf_pfn(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ + /* kernel/power/block_io.c */ extern struct block_device *hib_resume_bdev; -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index 72e2911..9e4c94b 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn) BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page)); + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page)) + return NULL; + if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) || PageReserved(page)) return NULL; @@ -922,6 +925,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn) BUG_ON(PageHighMem(page)); + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page)) + return NULL; + if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page)) return NULL; -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

In current solution, the snapshot signature check used the RSA key-pair that are generated by bootloader(e.g. shim) and pass the key-pair to kernel through EFI variables. I choice to binding the snapshot signature check mechanism with UEFI secure boot for provide stronger protection of hibernate. Current behavior is following: + UEFI Secure Boot ON, Kernel found key-pair from shim: Will do the S4 signature check. + UEFI Secure Boot ON, Kernel didn't find key-pair from shim: Will lock down S4 function. + UEFI Secure Boot OFF Will NOT do the S4 signature check. Ignore any keys from bootloader. v2: Replace sign_key_data_loaded() by skey_data_available() to check sign key data is available for hibernate. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- kernel/power/hibernate.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++- kernel/power/main.c | 11 +++++- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- kernel/power/swap.c | 4 +- kernel/power/user.c | 11 +++++ 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index c545b15..0f19f3d 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> #include "power.h" @@ -632,7 +633,14 @@ static void power_down(void) int hibernate(void) { int error; - int skey_error; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !skey_data_available()) { +#else + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { +#endif + return -EPERM; + } lock_system_sleep(); /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */ @@ -799,6 +807,15 @@ static int software_resume(void) if (error) goto Unlock; +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !wkey_data_available()) { +#else + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { +#endif + mutex_unlock(&pm_mutex); + return -EPERM; + } + /* The snapshot device should not be opened while we're running */ if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { error = -EBUSY; @@ -892,6 +909,15 @@ static ssize_t disk_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, int i; char *start = buf; +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT) && !skey_data_available()) { +#else + if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) { +#endif + buf += sprintf(buf, "[%s]\n", "disabled"); + return buf-start; + } + for (i = HIBERNATION_FIRST; i <= HIBERNATION_MAX; i++) { if (!hibernation_modes[i]) continue; @@ -926,6 +952,14 @@ static ssize_t disk_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *p; int mode = HIBERNATION_INVALID; +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !skey_data_available()) { +#else + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { +#endif + return -EPERM; + } + p = memchr(buf, '\n', n); len = p ? p - buf : n; diff --git a/kernel/power/main.c b/kernel/power/main.c index 1d1bf63..47bf300 100644 --- a/kernel/power/main.c +++ b/kernel/power/main.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/efi.h> #include "power.h" @@ -301,7 +302,15 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION - s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) { + s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + } else if (skey_data_available()) { + s += sprintf(s, "%s\n", "disk"); +#endif + } else { + s += sprintf(s, "\n"); + } #else if (s != buf) /* convert the last space to a newline */ diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index cf3d69c..36c7157 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -860,7 +860,8 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn) BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page)); - if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page)) + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && + swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page)) return NULL; if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) || @@ -925,7 +926,8 @@ static struct page *saveable_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn) BUG_ON(PageHighMem(page)); - if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page)) + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && + swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page)) return NULL; if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page)) @@ -1056,35 +1058,37 @@ copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm) #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION struct page *d_page; void *hash_buffer = NULL; - struct crypto_shash *tfm; - struct shash_desc *desc; - u8 *digest; + struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL; + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; + u8 *digest = NULL; size_t digest_size, desc_size; struct key *s4_sign_key; struct public_key_signature *pks; int ret; ret = -ENOMEM; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { - pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm)); - return PTR_ERR(tfm); - } + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } - desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); - digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); - digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!digest) { - pr_err("digest allocate fail"); - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error_digest; + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) { + pr_err("digest allocate fail"); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_digest; + } + desc = (void *) digest + digest_size; + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_shash; } - desc = (void *) digest + digest_size; - desc->tfm = tfm; - desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; - ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_shash; #endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ for_each_populated_zone(zone) { @@ -1106,24 +1110,29 @@ copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm) copy_data_page(dst_pfn, pfn); #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION - /* Generate digest */ - d_page = pfn_to_page(dst_pfn); - if (PageHighMem(d_page)) { - void *kaddr; - kaddr = kmap_atomic(d_page); - copy_page(buffer, kaddr); - kunmap_atomic(kaddr); - hash_buffer = buffer; - } else { - hash_buffer = page_address(d_page); + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { + /* Generate digest */ + d_page = pfn_to_page(dst_pfn); + if (PageHighMem(d_page)) { + void *kaddr; + kaddr = kmap_atomic(d_page); + copy_page(buffer, kaddr); + kunmap_atomic(kaddr); + hash_buffer = buffer; + } else { + hash_buffer = page_address(d_page); + } + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, hash_buffer, PAGE_SIZE); + if (ret) + goto error_shash; } - ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, hash_buffer, PAGE_SIZE); - if (ret) - goto error_shash; #endif } #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + goto skip_sign; + crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); if (ret) goto error_shash; @@ -1153,6 +1162,8 @@ copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm) kfree(pks); kfree(digest); crypto_free_shash(tfm); + +skip_sign: #endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */ return 0; @@ -2382,9 +2393,11 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle) /* Allocate void * array to keep buffer point for generate hash, * h_buf will freed in snapshot_image_verify(). */ - h_buf = kmalloc(sizeof(void *) * nr_copy_pages, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!h_buf) - pr_err("Allocate hash buffer fail!"); + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { + h_buf = kmalloc(sizeof(void *) * nr_copy_pages, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!h_buf) + pr_err("Allocate hash buffer fail!"); + } #endif error = memory_bm_create(©_bm, GFP_ATOMIC, PG_ANY); @@ -2414,7 +2427,7 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle) if (IS_ERR(handle->buffer)) return PTR_ERR(handle->buffer); #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION - if (h_buf) + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && h_buf) *h_buf = handle->buffer; #endif } @@ -2428,7 +2441,7 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle) if (handle->buffer != buffer) handle->sync_read = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION - if (h_buf) + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && h_buf) *(h_buf + (handle->cur - nr_meta_pages - 1)) = handle->buffer; /* Keep the buffer of sign key in snapshot */ if (pfn == skey_data_buf_pfn) diff --git a/kernel/power/swap.c b/kernel/power/swap.c index b5f8ce1..40225d7 100644 --- a/kernel/power/swap.c +++ b/kernel/power/swap.c @@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static int load_image(struct swap_map_handle *handle, if (!snapshot_image_loaded(snapshot)) ret = -ENODATA; #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION - else { + else if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { ret = snapshot_image_verify(); if (ret) pr_info("PM: snapshot signature check FAIL: %d\n", ret); @@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ out_finish: } } #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION - if (!ret) { + if (!ret && !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { ret = snapshot_image_verify(); if (ret) pr_info("PM: snapshot signature check FAIL: %d\n", ret); diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c index 27b21ee..690f148 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.c +++ b/kernel/power/user.c @@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) struct snapshot_data *data; int error; +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) && !wkey_data_available()) { +#else + if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { +#endif + return -EPERM; + } + lock_system_sleep(); if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) { @@ -255,6 +263,8 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, break; } #ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + if (capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) + goto skip_verify; if (!snapshot_image_verify()) { pr_info("PM: snapshot signature check SUCCESS!\n"); snapshot_fill_s4_skey(); @@ -263,6 +273,7 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = -EPERM; break; } +skip_verify: #endif error = hibernation_restore(data->platform_support); break; -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org

This patch introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for user to select which hash algorithm will be used during signature generation of snapshot. v2: Add define check of oCONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION in snapshot.c before declare pkey_hash(). Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- kernel/power/Kconfig | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/power/snapshot.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig index b592d88..79b34fa 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -78,6 +78,52 @@ config SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION dependent on UEFI environment. EFI bootloader should generate the key-pair. +choice + prompt "Which hash algorithm should snapshot be signed with?" + depends on SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + help + This determines which sort of hashing algorithm will be used during + signature generation of snapshot. This algorithm _must_ be built into + the kernel directly so that signature verification can take place. + It is not possible to load a signed snapshot containing the algorithm + to check the signature on that module. + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA1 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-1" + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA224 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-224" + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA256 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-256" + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA384 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-384" + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + select CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA512 + bool "Sign modules with SHA-512" + select CRYPTO_SHA512 + select CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3 if X86_64 + +endchoice + +config SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH + string + depends on SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION + default "sha1" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA1 + default "sha224" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA224 + default "sha256" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA256 + default "sha384" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA384 + default "sha512" if SNAPSHOT_SIG_SHA512 + config PM_STD_PARTITION string "Default resume partition" depends on HIBERNATION diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c index b9c6a8a..f02e351 100644 --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c @@ -1042,12 +1042,29 @@ static inline void copy_data_page(unsigned long dst_pfn, unsigned long src_pfn) } #endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */ -#define SNAPSHOT_HASH "sha256" +#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION +static const char *snapshot_hash = CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH; + +static int pkey_hash(void) +{ + int i, ret; + + ret = -1; + for (i = 0; i < PKEY_HASH__LAST; i++) { + if (!strcmp(pkey_hash_algo[i], snapshot_hash)) { + ret = i; + break; + } + } + + return ret; +} /* * Signature of snapshot for check. */ static u8 signature[SIG_LENG]; +#endif static int copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm) @@ -1068,7 +1085,7 @@ copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm) ret = -ENOMEM; if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)) { - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(snapshot_hash, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm)); return PTR_ERR(tfm); @@ -1145,7 +1162,7 @@ copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm) goto error_key; } - pks = generate_signature(s4_sign_key, digest, PKEY_HASH_SHA256, false); + pks = generate_signature(s4_sign_key, digest, pkey_hash(), false); if (IS_ERR(pks)) { pr_err("Generate signature fail: %lx", PTR_ERR(pks)); ret = PTR_ERR(pks); @@ -2499,7 +2516,7 @@ int snapshot_verify_signature(u8 *digest, size_t digest_size) pr_err("PM: Allocate public key signature fail!"); return -ENOMEM; } - pks->pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256; + pks->pkey_hash_algo = pkey_hash(); pks->digest = digest; pks->digest_size = digest_size; @@ -2547,7 +2564,7 @@ int snapshot_image_verify(void) if (!h_buf) return 0; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(snapshot_hash, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm)); return PTR_ERR(tfm); -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-kernel+owner@opensuse.org