On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:47, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code. The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial capability set if required.
There was some discussion about this before, right? And I don't think conclusion was it was acceptable...?
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> --- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index ba478fa..7109e65 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND +/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */ + +#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
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