[uyuni-devel] Special update for CVE-2020-8028 (bsc#1175884)
Dear lists, today we released an unscheduled maintenance update for CVE-2020-8028 (bsc#1175884), which is a security vulnerability of SUSE Manager and Uyuni Servers. The bug has been kept under embargo since it was reported to this day while we prepared a fix and coordinated the release. Only users that have shell access to the Uyuni server can exploit this vulnerability. This is not a common setup, shell access to the server should usually be restricted to the server administrators. In order to install this update please make sure you are on the most recent release (2020.07) and use the following commands on the Uyuni server: zypper addrepo https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/systemsmanagement:/Uyuni:/Stable:... zypper refresh spacewalk-service stop zypper update spacewalk-java-lib spacewalk-java spacewalk-java-config spacewalk-java-postgresql spacewalk-taskomatic spacewalk-admin spacewalk-setup salt-netapi-client spacewalk-service start After services start again, the Salt API endpoint will be authenticated and encrypted. As the fix changes the way the Salt API endpoint is served, it is expected to break any third-party scripts or software that may rely on it. We will take this occasion to remind you that: - the Salt API endpoint configured by Uyuni at installation time is exclusively for internal Uyuni use and by default not exposed to the network. If your custom software depends on using the Salt API directly, you are relying on something not supported by Uyuni. - it is possible to define additional API endpoints, and secure them in a variety of ways, and those are fine for custom scripts. More information about how to configure those are available at: https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/ref/netapi/all/salt.netapi.rest_tornado... If applying the update is not readily feasible, we recommend to restrict shell access to the Uyuni Server to the minimum set of users who really need it - which is a standard, recommended security practice in any case. More information is available at: - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8028 - https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni/pull/2613 -- Julio González Gil Release Engineer, SUSE Manager and Uyuni jgonzalez@suse.com
Hi, After updated those packages now some services not starting . ● taskomatic.service - Taskomatic Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/taskomatic.service; enabled; vendor preset: disabled) Drop-In: /usr/lib/systemd/system/taskomatic.service.d └─override.conf Active: failed (Result: exit-code) since Fri 2020-09-18 09:50:08 EEST; 47min ago Process: 8439 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/taskomatic (code=exited, status=255) Main PID: 8439 (code=exited, status=255) ● spacewalk-wait-for-taskomatic.service - Spacewalk wait for taskomatic Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/spacewalk-wait-for-taskomatic.service; static; vendor preset: disabled) Active: active (exited) since Fri 2020-09-18 09:51:31 EEST; 46min ago Process: 7290 ExecStart=/usr/sbin/spacewalk-startup-helper wait-for-taskomatic (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Main PID: 7290 (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Tasks: 0 CGroup: /system.slice/spacewalk-wait-for-taskomatic.service ● salt-secrets-config.service - Configures secrets between salt-master and other services Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/salt-secrets-config.service; static; vendor preset: disabled) Drop-In: /usr/lib/systemd/system/salt-secrets-config.service.d └─override.conf Active: active (exited) since Fri 2020-09-18 09:49:32 EEST; 48min ago Process: 6781 ExecStart=/usr/bin/salt-secrets-config.py (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Main PID: 6781 (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Tasks: 0 CGroup: /system.slice/salt-secrets-config.service ● mgr-websockify.service - TCP to WebSocket proxy Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/mgr-websockify.service; static; vendor preset: disabled) Active: active (running) since Fri 2020-09-18 09:49:41 EEST; 47min ago Process: 6812 ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/sh -c grep secret_key /etc/rhn/rhn.conf | tr -d ' ' | cut -f2 -d '=' | perl -ne 's/([0-9a-f]{2})/print chr hex $1/gie' > /etc/rhn/websockify.key (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) Main PID: 6832 (websockify) Tasks: 4 CGroup: /system.slice/mgr-websockify.service └─6832 /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/websockify --token-plugin JWTTokenApi --token-source /etc/rhn/websockify.ke…50 ● spacewalk.target - Spacewalk Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/spacewalk.target; enabled; vendor preset: disabled) Active: inactive (dead) ● jabberd.service - Jabber Server Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/jabberd.service; enabled; vendor preset: disabled) Active: inactive (dead) since Fri 2020-09-18 09:49:30 EEST; 48min ago Main PID: 3398 (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) ● osa-dispatcher.service - OSA Dispatcher daemon Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/osa-dispatcher.service; enabled; vendor preset: disabled) Active: inactive (dead) since Fri 2020-09-18 09:49:30 EEST; 48min ago Main PID: 3466 (code=killed, signal=TERM) spacewalk:/var/log # Best Regards, Suhail Siddiqui Service Delivery – Datacenter Services HCL Technologies Ltd. – UPM Partner for IT Services Mob: +91-9717193941 -----Original Message----- From: Julio González Gil <jgonzalez@suse.com> Sent: 16 September 2020 20:15 To: uyuni-announce@opensuse.org; uyuni-devel@opensuse.org; uyuni-users@opensuse.org Subject: [uyuni-announce] Special update for CVE-2020-8028 (bsc#1175884) Dear lists, today we released an unscheduled maintenance update for CVE-2020-8028 (bsc#1175884), which is a security vulnerability of SUSE Manager and Uyuni Servers. The bug has been kept under embargo since it was reported to this day while we prepared a fix and coordinated the release. Only users that have shell access to the Uyuni server can exploit this vulnerability. This is not a common setup, shell access to the server should usually be restricted to the server administrators. In order to install this update please make sure you are on the most recent release (2020.07) and use the following commands on the Uyuni server: zypper addrepo https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/systemsmanagement:/Uyuni:/Stable:... zypper refresh spacewalk-service stop zypper update spacewalk-java-lib spacewalk-java spacewalk-java-config spacewalk-java-postgresql spacewalk-taskomatic spacewalk-admin spacewalk-setup salt-netapi-client spacewalk-service start After services start again, the Salt API endpoint will be authenticated and encrypted. As the fix changes the way the Salt API endpoint is served, it is expected to break any third-party scripts or software that may rely on it. We will take this occasion to remind you that: - the Salt API endpoint configured by Uyuni at installation time is exclusively for internal Uyuni use and by default not exposed to the network. If your custom software depends on using the Salt API directly, you are relying on something not supported by Uyuni. - it is possible to define additional API endpoints, and secure them in a variety of ways, and those are fine for custom scripts. More information about how to configure those are available at: https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/ref/netapi/all/salt.netapi.rest_tornado... If applying the update is not readily feasible, we recommend to restrict shell access to the Uyuni Server to the minimum set of users who really need it - which is a standard, recommended security practice in any case. More information is available at: - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8028 - https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni/pull/2613 -- Julio González Gil Release Engineer, SUSE Manager and Uyuni jgonzalez@suse.com<mailto:jgonzalez@suse.com> ________________________________ Please note. The information contained in this message is confidential and is intended only for the use of the individual named above and others who have been specially authorized to receive it. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. The attachments have been scanned for viruses prior to leaving our E-mail system. UPM-Kymmene Corporation shall not be liable for any consequences of any virus being passed on.
Hi, For those that tried to update and got a problem where the services did not restart, please run the following commands as root on the server:
spacewalk-service status stop
wget https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/systemsmanagement:/Uyuni:/Stable:...
rpm -i --force --replacepkgs salt-netapi-client-0.17.0-1.1.uyuni.noarch.rpm
spacewalk-service status start
The problem happened because the version and the released of the salt-netapi-client package were the same at the Stable reposity and at the Patches repository. The commands above will download the RPM from the Patches repository and will force an installation ignoring the fact that the version installed on the system is the same that is going to be installed. Next time we need to provide such a patch, we will avoid such problem by always providing a new version for all packages (in this case salt-netapi-client got a patch, but not a new version, while all other packages got the source code changed and an new version). Kudos to Torsten Haupt for his help testing the fix for this problem! Best regards. On miércoles, 16 de septiembre de 2020 19:15:22 (CEST) Julio González Gil wrote:
Dear lists,
today we released an unscheduled maintenance update for CVE-2020-8028 (bsc#1175884), which is a security vulnerability of SUSE Manager and Uyuni Servers. The bug has been kept under embargo since it was reported to this day while we prepared a fix and coordinated the release.
Only users that have shell access to the Uyuni server can exploit this vulnerability. This is not a common setup, shell access to the server should usually be restricted to the server administrators.
In order to install this update please make sure you are on the most recent release (2020.07) and use the following commands on the Uyuni server:
zypper addrepo https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/systemsmanagement:/Uyuni:/Stable :/Patches/openSUSE_Leap_15.2/systemsmanagement:Uyuni:Stable:Patches.repo zypper refresh spacewalk-service stop zypper update spacewalk-java-lib spacewalk-java spacewalk-java-config spacewalk-java-postgresql spacewalk-taskomatic spacewalk-admin spacewalk-setup salt-netapi-client spacewalk-service start
After services start again, the Salt API endpoint will be authenticated and encrypted.
As the fix changes the way the Salt API endpoint is served, it is expected to break any third-party scripts or software that may rely on it. We will take this occasion to remind you that:
- the Salt API endpoint configured by Uyuni at installation time is exclusively for internal Uyuni use and by default not exposed to the network. If your custom software depends on using the Salt API directly, you are relying on something not supported by Uyuni. - it is possible to define additional API endpoints, and secure them in a variety of ways, and those are fine for custom scripts. More information about how to configure those are available at: https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/ref/netapi/all/salt.netapi.rest_tornad o.html#module-salt.netapi.rest_tornado
If applying the update is not readily feasible, we recommend to restrict shell access to the Uyuni Server to the minimum set of users who really need it - which is a standard, recommended security practice in any case.
More information is available at: - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8028 - https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni/pull/2613
-- Julio González Gil Release Engineer, SUSE Manager and Uyuni jgonzalez@suse.com
participants (2)
-
Julio González Gil -
Suhail Siddiqui, HCL