commit polkit for openSUSE:Factory
Hello community, here is the log from the commit of package polkit for openSUSE:Factory checked in at Wed Apr 27 11:16:39 CEST 2011. -------- --- polkit/polkit.changes 2010-11-10 16:04:42.000000000 +0100 +++ /mounts/work_src_done/STABLE/polkit/polkit.changes 2011-04-26 21:20:59.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,0 +2,22 @@ +Tue Apr 26 21:19:32 CEST 2011 - kay.sievers@novell.com + +- use LGPLv2.1+ in spec file + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Apr 26 18:24:01 CEST 2011 - kay.sievers@novell.com + +- stat race condition (CVE-2011-1485) (bnc#688788) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Apr 6 15:40:51 UTC 2011 - fcrozat@novell.com + +- Remove PolkitAgent-1.0.typelib from main package, it is in + library package. + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Mar 9 13:54:11 UTC 2011 - coolo@novell.com + +- update to 0.101: + * tons of bug fixes, see NEWS + +------------------------------------------------------------------- calling whatdependson for head-i586 Old: ---- polkit-0.99.tar.bz2 New: ---- _service _service:recompress:download_url:polkit-0.101.tar.bz2 polkit-0.101.tar.bz2 polkit-CVE-2011-1485-1.patch polkit-CVE-2011-1485-2.patch polkit-CVE-2011-1485-3.patch polkit-CVE-2011-1485-4.patch ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ polkit.spec ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.WlIaey/_old 2011-04-27 11:15:52.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.WlIaey/_new 2011-04-27 11:15:52.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # -# spec file for package polkit (Version 0.99) +# spec file for package polkit # -# Copyright (c) 2010 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany. +# Copyright (c) 2011 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany. # # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed @@ -19,16 +19,16 @@ Name: polkit Summary: PolicyKit Authorization Framework -Version: 0.99 -Release: 2 -License: LGPLv2+ +Version: 0.101 +Release: 1 +License: LGPLv2.1+ Url: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/PolicyKit BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build Group: System/Libraries Source0: http://hal.freedesktop.org/releases/%{name}-%{version}.tar.bz2 Source99: baselibs.conf -BuildRequires: glib2-devel -BuildRequires: gobject-introspection-devel +BuildRequires: glib2-devel >= 2.25.12 +BuildRequires: gobject-introspection-devel >= 0.6.2 BuildRequires: gtk-doc BuildRequires: intltool BuildRequires: libexpat-devel @@ -37,13 +37,23 @@ Requires: dbus-1 Requires: libpolkit0 = %{version}-%{release} +Patch10: polkit-CVE-2011-1485-1.patch +Patch11: polkit-CVE-2011-1485-2.patch +Patch12: polkit-CVE-2011-1485-3.patch +Patch13: polkit-CVE-2011-1485-4.patch + +# Upstream First - Policy: +# Never add any patches to this package without the upstream commit id +# in the patch. Any patches added here without a very good reason to make +# an exception will be silently removed with the next version update. + %description PolicyKit is a toolkit for defining and handling authorizations. It is used for allowing unprivileged processes to speak to privileged processes. %package devel -License: LGPLv2+ +License: LGPLv2.1+ Summary: Development files for PolicyKit Group: Development/Libraries/C and C++ Requires: %name = %{version}-%{release} @@ -54,7 +64,7 @@ Development files for PolicyKit Authorization Framework. %package doc -License: LGPLv2+ +License: LGPLv2.1+ Summary: Development documentation for PolicyKit Group: Development/Libraries/C and C++ %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1120 @@ -65,7 +75,7 @@ Development documentation for PolicyKit Authorization Framework. %package -n libpolkit0 -License: LGPLv2+ +License: LGPLv2.1+ Summary: Libraries required for polkit Group: System/Libraries Requires: %{name} = %{version} @@ -79,6 +89,10 @@ %prep %setup -q +%patch10 -p1 +%patch11 -p1 +%patch12 -p1 +%patch13 -p1 %build export V=1 @@ -118,6 +132,7 @@ %defattr(-,root,root,-) %{_libdir}/lib*.so.* %{_libdir}/girepository-1.0/Polkit-1.0.typelib +%{_libdir}/girepository-1.0/PolkitAgent-1.0.typelib %files -f polkit-1.lang %defattr(-,root,root,-) @@ -164,6 +179,7 @@ %files doc %defattr(-,root,root,-) +%doc NEWS %{_datadir}/gtk-doc/html/* %changelog ++++++ _service ++++++ <services> <service name="download_url"> <param name="protocol">http</param> <param name="host">hal.freedesktop.org</param> <param name="path">/releases/polkit-0.101.tar.gz</param> </service> <service name="verify_file"> <param name="file">_service:download_url:polkit-0.101.tar.gz</param> <param name="verifier">sha256</param> <param name="checksum">927f65760e4fce23d7cdeae90245c22986eb0a39335a344915302158f73f9f1b</param> </service> <service name="recompress"> <param name="file">*.tar.gz</param> <param name="compression">bz2</param> </service> </services> ++++++ polkit-0.99.tar.bz2 -> polkit-0.101.tar.bz2 ++++++ ++++ 31897 lines of diff (skipped) ++++++ polkit-CVE-2011-1485-1.patch ++++++
On Linux, also switch to parsing /proc/<pid>/status instead of relying on the st_uid returned by stat(2) to be the uid we want. This was pointed out by Neel Mehta <nmehta@google.com>. Thanks! Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com> --- diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c index d95a1d4..876da69 100644 --- a/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c +++ b/src/polkit/polkitunixprocess.c @@ -24,9 +24,7 @@ #endif #include <sys/types.h> -#ifndef HAVE_FREEBSD -#include <sys/stat.h> -#else +#ifdef HAVE_FREEBSD #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/sysctl.h> #include <sys/user.h> @@ -34,6 +32,7 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> #include "polkitunixprocess.h" #include "polkitsubject.h" @@ -208,6 +207,8 @@ polkit_unix_process_get_pid (PolkitUnixProcess *process) * * Gets the uid of the owner of @process. * + * Note that this returns the real user-id (not the effective user-id) of @process. + * * Returns: The UNIX user id of the owner for @process or 0 if @error is set. **/ gint @@ -215,17 +216,21 @@ polkit_unix_process_get_owner (PolkitUnixProcess *process, GError **error) { gint result; + gchar *contents; + gchar **lines; #ifdef HAVE_FREEBSD struct kinfo_proc p; #else - struct stat statbuf; - char procbuf[32]; + gchar filename[64]; + guint n; #endif g_return_val_if_fail (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_PROCESS (process), 0); g_return_val_if_fail (error == NULL || *error == NULL, 0); result = 0; + lines = NULL; + contents = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_FREEBSD if (get_kinfo_proc (process->pid, &p) == 0) @@ -241,23 +246,52 @@ polkit_unix_process_get_owner (PolkitUnixProcess *process, result = p.ki_uid; #else - g_snprintf (procbuf, sizeof procbuf, "/proc/%d", process->pid); - if (stat (procbuf, &statbuf) != 0) + + /* see 'man proc' for layout of the status file + * + * Uid, Gid: Real, effective, saved set, and file system UIDs (GIDs). + */ + g_snprintf (filename, sizeof filename, "/proc/%d/status", process->pid); + if (!g_file_get_contents (filename, + &contents, + NULL, + error)) { - g_set_error (error, - POLKIT_ERROR, - POLKIT_ERROR_FAILED, - "stat() failed for /proc/%d: %s", - process->pid, - g_strerror (errno)); goto out; } + lines = g_strsplit (contents, "\n", -1); + for (n = 0; lines != NULL && lines[n] != NULL; n++) + { + gint real_uid, effective_uid; + if (!g_str_has_prefix (lines[n], "Uid:")) + continue; + if (sscanf (lines[n] + 4, "%d %d", &real_uid, &effective_uid) != 2) + { + g_set_error (error, + POLKIT_ERROR, + POLKIT_ERROR_FAILED, + "Unexpected line `%s' in file %s", + lines[n], + filename); + goto out; + } + else + { + result = real_uid; + goto out; + } + } - result = statbuf.st_uid; + g_set_error (error, + POLKIT_ERROR, + POLKIT_ERROR_FAILED, + "Didn't find any line starting with `Uid:' in file %s", + filename); #endif - out: - +out: + g_strfreev (lines); + g_free (contents); return result; } -- cgit v0.8.3-6-g21f6 ++++++ polkit-CVE-2011-1485-2.patch ++++++ ++++ 615 lines (skipped) ++++++ polkit-CVE-2011-1485-3.patch ++++++
This avoids a TOCTTOU problem. Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com> --- diff --git a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c index 495f752..9c331b6 100644 --- a/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c +++ b/src/polkitbackend/polkitbackendsessionmonitor.c @@ -293,14 +293,15 @@ polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor if (POLKIT_IS_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) { - local_error = NULL; - uid = polkit_unix_process_get_owner (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject), &local_error); - if (local_error != NULL) + uid = polkit_unix_process_get_uid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)); + if ((gint) uid == -1) { - g_propagate_prefixed_error (error, local_error, "Error getting user for process: "); + g_set_error (error, + POLKIT_ERROR, + POLKIT_ERROR_FAILED, + "Unix process subject does not have uid set"); goto out; } - ret = polkit_unix_user_new (uid); } else if (POLKIT_IS_SYSTEM_BUS_NAME (subject)) -- cgit v0.8.3-6-g21f6 ++++++ polkit-CVE-2011-1485-4.patch ++++++
In a nutshell, the parent process may change its uid (either real- or effective uid) after launching pkexec. It can do this by exec()'ing e.g. a setuid root program. To avoid this problem, just use the uid the parent process had when it executed pkexec. This happens to be the same uid of the pkexec process itself. Additionally, remove some dubious code that allowed pkexec to continue when the parent process died as there is no reason to support something like that. Also ensure that the pkexec process is killed if the parent process dies. This problem was pointed out by Neel Mehta <nmehta@google.com>. Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen <davidz@redhat.com> --- diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c index 9217954..3e656be 100644 --- a/src/programs/pkexec.c +++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ #include <pwd.h> #include <errno.h> +#ifdef __linux__ +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#endif + #include <glib/gi18n.h> #ifdef POLKIT_AUTHFW_PAM @@ -423,7 +427,6 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) GPtrArray *saved_env; gchar *opt_user; pid_t pid_of_caller; - uid_t uid_of_caller; gpointer local_agent_handle; ret = 127; @@ -598,40 +601,49 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) */ g_type_init (); - /* now check if the program that invoked us is authorized */ + /* make sure we are nuked if the parent process dies */ +#ifdef __linux__ + if (prctl (PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) != 0) + { + g_printerr ("prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) failed: %s\n", g_strerror (errno)); + goto out; + } +#else +#warning "Please add OS specific code to catch when the parent dies" +#endif + + /* Figure out the parent process */ pid_of_caller = getppid (); if (pid_of_caller == 1) { /* getppid() can return 1 if the parent died (meaning that we are reaped - * by /sbin/init); get process group leader instead - for example, this - * happens when launching via gnome-panel (alt+f2, then 'pkexec gedit'). + * by /sbin/init); In that case we simpy bail. */ - pid_of_caller = getpgrp (); - } - - subject = polkit_unix_process_new (pid_of_caller); - if (subject == NULL) - { - g_printerr ("No such process for pid %d: %s\n", (gint) pid_of_caller, error->message); - g_error_free (error); + g_printerr ("Refusing to render service to dead parents.\n"); goto out; } - /* paranoia: check that the uid of pid_of_caller matches getuid() */ - error = NULL; - uid_of_caller = polkit_unix_process_get_owner (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject), - &error); - if (error != NULL) - { - g_printerr ("Error determing pid of caller (pid %d): %s\n", (gint) pid_of_caller, error->message); - g_error_free (error); - goto out; - } - if (uid_of_caller != getuid ()) - { - g_printerr ("User of caller (%d) does not match our uid (%d)\n", uid_of_caller, getuid ()); - goto out; - } + /* This process we want to check an authorization for is the process + * that launched us - our parent process. + * + * At the time the parent process fork()'ed and exec()'ed us, the + * process had the same real-uid that we have now. So we use this + * real-uid instead of of looking it up to avoid TOCTTOU issues + * (consider the parent process exec()'ing a setuid helper). + * + * On the other hand, the monotonic process start-time is guaranteed + * to never change so it's safe to look that up given only the PID + * since we are guaranteed to be nuked if the parent goes away + * (cf. the prctl(2) call above). + */ + subject = polkit_unix_process_new_for_owner (pid_of_caller, + 0, /* 0 means "look up start-time in /proc" */ + getuid ()); + /* really double-check the invariants guaranteed by the PolkitUnixProcess class */ + g_assert (subject != NULL); + g_assert (polkit_unix_process_get_pid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) == pid_of_caller); + g_assert (polkit_unix_process_get_uid (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) >= 0); + g_assert (polkit_unix_process_get_start_time (POLKIT_UNIX_PROCESS (subject)) > 0); error = NULL; authority = polkit_authority_get_sync (NULL /* GCancellable* */, &error); -- cgit v0.8.3-6-g21f6 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Remember to have fun... -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-commit+unsubscribe@opensuse.org For additional commands, e-mail: opensuse-commit+help@opensuse.org
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root@hilbert.suse.de