commit tigervnc.4091 for openSUSE:13.2:Update

Hello community, here is the log from the commit of package tigervnc.4091 for openSUSE:13.2:Update checked in at 2015-10-23 13:16:48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:13.2:Update/tigervnc.4091 (Old) and /work/SRC/openSUSE:13.2:Update/.tigervnc.4091.new (New) ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Package is "tigervnc.4091" Changes: -------- New Changes file: --- /dev/null 2015-10-14 00:04:03.524025256 +0200 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:13.2:Update/.tigervnc.4091.new/tigervnc.changes 2015-10-23 13:16:54.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,333 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Oct 14 10:42:29 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- u_tigervnc-prioritize-anon-ecdh.patch + * Prefer ANON-ECDH over ANON-DH cipher to avoid java bug. + (bnc#950147) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu Oct 1 23:19:24 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- u_tigervnc-vncserver-clean-pid-files.patch + * vncserver: Clean pid files of dead processes. (bnc#948392) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Aug 25 15:12:02 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- Remove commented out DefaultDepth 16 from 10-libvnc.conf file. + Using 16 bit depth can cause troubles and does not have any + positives anymore, so lets not suggest it to users. (bnc#942982) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue May 5 12:35:17 UTC 2015 - privacy@not.given + +- compile with -fPIC - fixes build for armv7l. (bnc#929685) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Apr 1 12:12:36 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- u_terminate_instead_of_ignoring_restart.patch + * Terminate instead of ignoring restart. (bnc#920969) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu Feb 12 12:28:17 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- U_xkb-check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch + * Check string lenghts in XkbSetGeometry request. + (bnc#915810, CVE-2015-0255) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Feb 2 13:10:47 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- n_tigervnc_Revert_Attempt_to_handle_Ctrl-key.patch + * Revert bugged upstream commit. (bnc#915782) + +- Rebuild against fltk backported patches for cursor and clipboard + handling. (bnc#908738) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Jan 13 12:57:09 UTC 2015 - msrb@suse.com + +- Update to tigervnc 1.4.1 and X server 1.16.1. (bnc#911577) + +- Synchronize patches from xorg-x11-server that are relevant for Xvnc: + * U_BellProc-Send-bell-event-on-core-protocol-bell-when-requested.patch + * U_Xi_unvalidated_lengths_in_Xinput_extension.patch + * U_Xv_unvalidated_lengths_in_XVideo_extension_swapped_procs.patch + * U_dbe_Call_to_DDX_SwapBuffers_requires_address_of_int_not_unsigned_int.patch + * U_dbe_unvalidated_lengths_in_DbeSwapBuffers_calls.patch + * U_dix_GetHosts_bounds_check_using_wrong_pointer_value.patch + * U_dix_Missing_parens_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE_macro.patch + * U_dix_integer_overflow_in_GetHosts.patch + * U_dix_integer_overflow_in_ProcPutImage.patch + * U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch + * U_dix_integer_overflow_in_RegionSizeof.patch + * U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.patch + * U_dri3_unvalidated_lengths_in_DRI3_extension_swapped_procs.patch + * U_fb-Fix-invalid-bpp-for-24bit-depth-window.patch + * U_fb_Fix_Bresenham_algorithms_for_commonly_used_small_segments.patch + * U_glx_Add_safe__add_mul_pad.patch + * U_glx_Additional_paranoia_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer___GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER.patch + * U_glx_Be_more_paranoid_about_variable_length_requests.patch + * U_glx_Be_more_strict_about_rejecting_invalid_image_sizes.patch + * U_glx_Fix_image_size_computation_for_EXT_texture_integer.patch + * U_glx_Fix_mask_truncation_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer.patch + * U_glx_Integer_overflow_protection_for_non_generated_render_requests.patch + * U_glx_Length_checking_for_GLXRender_requests.patch + * U_glx_Length_checking_for_RenderLarge_requests.patch + * U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_single_request.patch + * U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_vendor_private_requests.patch + * U_glx_Pass_remaining_request_length_into_varsize.patch + * U_glx_Request_length_checks_for_SetClientInfoARB.patch + * U_glx_Top_level_length_checking_for_swapped_VendorPrivate_requests.patch + * U_present_unvalidated_lengths_in_Present_extension_procs.patch + * U_randr_unvalidated_lengths_in_RandR_extension_swapped_procs.patch + * U_render_check_request_size_before_reading_it.patch + * U_render_unvalidated_lengths_in_Render_extn_swapped_procs.patch + * U_unchecked_malloc_may_allow_unauthed_client_to_crash_Xserver.patch + * U_xcmisc_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXCMiscGetXIDList.patch + * U_xfixes_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput.patch + * u_render-Cast-color-masks-to-unsigned-long-before-shifting-them.patch + * u_xorg-server-xdmcp.patch + +- Drop upstreamed/obsolete patches: + * tigervnc-1.2.80-fix-int-to-pointer.patch + * tigervnc-sf3492352.diff + * u_aarch64-support.patch + * u_arch-Fix-image-and-bitmap-byte-order-for-ppc64le.patch + * u_tigervnc-1.3.0-fix-use-after-free.patch + * u_tigervnc-check-shm-harder.patch + + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri Dec 5 14:09:06 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- U_tigervnc-Allow-SSecurity-to-specify-AccessRights-for-SConnect.patch, + U_tigervnc-vncpasswd-Ask-for-read-only-password.patch, + U_tigervnc-VncAuth-Read-and-use-readonly-password.patch, + U_tigervnc-Add-AccessSetDesktopSize-right.patch, + U_tigervnc-Use-new-API-for-getVncAuthPasswd.patch, + U_tigervnc-Limit-access-to-non-shared-mode.patch, + U_tigervnc-Make-sure-attributes-propagate-through-security-wrap.patch + * Add support for view only passwords. (bnc#901752) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Nov 25 15:26:45 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- Add u_tigervnc-send-special-keys-directly.patch, + fix u_tigervnc-dont-send-ascii-control-characters.patch + * Send correctly keys that don't type any characters, such as + CTRL+Space. (bnc#906922) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Oct 13 11:51:03 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- u_tigervnc-use_preferred_mode.patch + * Mark user chosen resolution as preferred. (bnc#896540) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Aug 18 13:58:30 UTC 2014 - sndirsch@suse.com + +- use update-alternatives only on openSUSE > 13.1 + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Aug 18 11:07:09 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- u_tigervnc-check-shm-harder.patch + * Check if SHM really works before deciding to use it. + (bnc#890580) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Aug 4 10:37:08 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- U_include-vencrypt-only-if-any-subtype-present.patch + * Do not automatically offer VeNCrypt security if none of it's + subtypes is selected. (bnc#889781) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Jun 4 11:39:54 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- Fix some errors reported by rpmlint. + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu May 29 03:37:30 UTC 2014 - crrodriguez@opensuse.org + +- n_tigervnc-date-time.patch package republishes everyday + and gets on my nerves, this is because the binaries contain + hardcoded timestamps, avoid that. +- export CXXFLAGS and CFLAGS before building ttigervnc otherwise + it gets built without optimization. +- Make build verbose so it rpmlint catches errors like the above ones. + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed May 28 14:54:02 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- Use update-alternatives. + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue May 20 13:55:30 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- u_tigervnc-ignore-epipe-on-write.patch + * Do not display error message because of EPIPE on write. + (bnc#864676) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri May 16 13:52:19 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- Update to version 1.3.1 + * Security release (CVE-2014-0011). + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Apr 28 01:00:39 UTC 2014 - sndirsch@suse.com + +- added missing pkgconfig(xorg-macros) >= 1.14 + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Sat Apr 26 12:04:30 UTC 2014 - sndirsch@suse.com + +- xorg-x11-Xvnc: require xkeyboard-config (bnc#875329) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri Apr 25 11:55:11 UTC 2014 - msrb@suse.com + +- vnc.xinetd + * Do not use 16 bpp by default anymore. The network trafic gain + of 16 bpp together with Tight encoding is arguable. 16 bpp + causes graphical issues and is known to not work properly + in Mesa. (bnc#871965) ++++ 136 more lines (skipped) ++++ between /dev/null ++++ and /work/SRC/openSUSE:13.2:Update/.tigervnc.4091.new/tigervnc.changes New: ---- 10-libvnc.conf N_xorg-server-xdmcp.patch U_BellProc-Send-bell-event-on-core-protocol-bell-when-requested.patch U_Xi_unvalidated_lengths_in_Xinput_extension.patch U_Xv_unvalidated_lengths_in_XVideo_extension_swapped_procs.patch U_dbe_Call_to_DDX_SwapBuffers_requires_address_of_int_not_unsigned_int.patch U_dbe_unvalidated_lengths_in_DbeSwapBuffers_calls.patch U_dix_GetHosts_bounds_check_using_wrong_pointer_value.patch U_dix_Missing_parens_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE_macro.patch U_dix_integer_overflow_in_GetHosts.patch U_dix_integer_overflow_in_ProcPutImage.patch U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch U_dix_integer_overflow_in_RegionSizeof.patch U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.patch U_dri3_unvalidated_lengths_in_DRI3_extension_swapped_procs.patch U_fb-Fix-invalid-bpp-for-24bit-depth-window.patch U_fb_Fix_Bresenham_algorithms_for_commonly_used_small_segments.patch U_glx_Add_safe__add_mul_pad.patch U_glx_Additional_paranoia_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer___GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER.patch U_glx_Be_more_paranoid_about_variable_length_requests.patch U_glx_Be_more_strict_about_rejecting_invalid_image_sizes.patch U_glx_Fix_image_size_computation_for_EXT_texture_integer.patch U_glx_Fix_mask_truncation_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer.patch U_glx_Integer_overflow_protection_for_non_generated_render_requests.patch U_glx_Length_checking_for_GLXRender_requests.patch U_glx_Length_checking_for_RenderLarge_requests.patch U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_single_request.patch U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_vendor_private_requests.patch U_glx_Pass_remaining_request_length_into_varsize.patch U_glx_Request_length_checks_for_SetClientInfoARB.patch U_glx_Top_level_length_checking_for_swapped_VendorPrivate_requests.patch U_include-vencrypt-only-if-any-subtype-present.patch U_present_unvalidated_lengths_in_Present_extension_procs.patch U_randr_unvalidated_lengths_in_RandR_extension_swapped_procs.patch U_render_check_request_size_before_reading_it.patch U_render_unvalidated_lengths_in_Render_extn_swapped_procs.patch U_tigervnc-Add-AccessSetDesktopSize-right.patch U_tigervnc-Allow-SSecurity-to-specify-AccessRights-for-SConnect.patch U_tigervnc-Limit-access-to-non-shared-mode.patch U_tigervnc-Make-sure-attributes-propagate-through-security-wrap.patch U_tigervnc-Use-new-API-for-getVncAuthPasswd.patch U_tigervnc-VncAuth-Read-and-use-readonly-password.patch U_tigervnc-vncpasswd-Ask-for-read-only-password.patch U_unchecked_malloc_may_allow_unauthed_client_to_crash_Xserver.patch U_xcmisc_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXCMiscGetXIDList.patch U_xfixes_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput.patch U_xkb-check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch index.vnc n_tigervnc-date-time.patch n_tigervnc-dont-build-gtf.patch n_tigervnc_Revert_Attempt_to_handle_Ctrl-key.patch tigervnc-1.4.1.tar.gz tigervnc-clean-pressed-key-on-exit.patch tigervnc-newfbsize.patch tigervnc-sf3495623.patch tigervnc.changes tigervnc.spec u_render-Cast-color-masks-to-unsigned-long-before-shifting-them.patch u_terminate_instead_of_ignoring_restart.patch u_tigervnc-dont-send-ascii-control-characters.patch u_tigervnc-ignore-epipe-on-write.patch u_tigervnc-prioritize-anon-ecdh.patch u_tigervnc-send-special-keys-directly.patch u_tigervnc-use_preferred_mode.patch u_tigervnc-vncserver-clean-pid-files.patch u_xorg-server-xdmcp.patch vnc-httpd.firewall vnc-server.firewall vnc.reg vnc.xinetd vnc_inetd_httpd vncpasswd.arg xorg-server-1.16.1.tar.bz2 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ tigervnc.spec ++++++ # # spec file for package tigervnc # # Copyright (c) 2015 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany. # # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed # upon. The license for this file, and modifications and additions to the # file, is the same license as for the pristine package itself (unless the # license for the pristine package is not an Open Source License, in which # case the license is the MIT License). An "Open Source License" is a # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9) # published by the Open Source Initiative. # Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/ # Name: tigervnc Version: 1.4.1 Release: 0 Provides: tightvnc = 1.3.9 Obsoletes: tightvnc < 1.3.9 Provides: vnc BuildRequires: Mesa-devel BuildRequires: autoconf BuildRequires: automake BuildRequires: cmake BuildRequires: fltk-devel BuildRequires: gcc-c++ BuildRequires: gcc-c++ BuildRequires: java-devel BuildRequires: jpackage-utils BuildRequires: libjpeg-devel BuildRequires: libopenssl-devel BuildRequires: libtool BuildRequires: nasm BuildRequires: xorg-x11-server-sdk BuildRequires: pkgconfig(x11) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xext) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xproto) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtst) # Because of keytool to build java client BuildRequires: libgcrypt-devel BuildRequires: libgpg-error-devel BuildRequires: mozilla-nss BuildRequires: pam-devel BuildRequires: pkg-config BuildRequires: xmlto BuildRequires: xorg-x11-libICE-devel BuildRequires: xorg-x11-libSM-devel BuildRequires: pkgconfig(bigreqsproto) >= 1.1.0 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(compositeproto) >= 0.4 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(damageproto) >= 1.1 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dri) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fixesproto) >= 4.1 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontsproto) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontutil) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(gl) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(glproto) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(gnutls) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(inputproto) >= 1.9.99.902 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(kbproto) >= 1.0.3 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libtasn1) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(openssl) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(pciaccess) >= 0.8.0 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(pixman-1) >= 0.15.20 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(randrproto) >= 1.2.99.3 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(recordproto) >= 1.13.99.1 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(renderproto) >= 0.11 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(resourceproto) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(scrnsaverproto) >= 1.1 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(videoproto) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xau) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xcmiscproto) >= 1.2.0 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xdmcp) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xextproto) >= 7.0.99.3 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xfont) >= 1.4.2 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xineramaproto) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xkbfile) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xorg-macros) >= 1.14 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xproto) >= 7.0.17 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xtrans) >= 1.2.2 %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1315 Requires(post): update-alternatives Requires(postun): update-alternatives %endif Url: http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/tigervnc/ BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build Summary: A high-performance, platform-neutral implementation of VNC License: GPL-2.0 and MIT Group: System/X11/Servers/XF86_4 Source1: tigervnc-1.4.1.tar.gz Source2: xorg-server-1.16.1.tar.bz2 Source3: vnc.xinetd Source4: 10-libvnc.conf Source5: vnc-server.firewall Source6: vnc-httpd.firewall Source7: vnc_inetd_httpd Source8: vnc.reg Source9: vncpasswd.arg Source10: index.vnc # Tiger vnc patches Patch1: tigervnc-newfbsize.patch Patch2: tigervnc-clean-pressed-key-on-exit.patch Patch3: tigervnc-sf3495623.patch Patch4: u_tigervnc-dont-send-ascii-control-characters.patch Patch5: u_tigervnc-ignore-epipe-on-write.patch Patch6: n_tigervnc-date-time.patch Patch7: U_include-vencrypt-only-if-any-subtype-present.patch Patch8: u_tigervnc-use_preferred_mode.patch Patch9: u_tigervnc-send-special-keys-directly.patch Patch10: U_tigervnc-Allow-SSecurity-to-specify-AccessRights-for-SConnect.patch Patch11: U_tigervnc-vncpasswd-Ask-for-read-only-password.patch Patch12: U_tigervnc-VncAuth-Read-and-use-readonly-password.patch Patch13: U_tigervnc-Add-AccessSetDesktopSize-right.patch Patch14: U_tigervnc-Use-new-API-for-getVncAuthPasswd.patch Patch15: U_tigervnc-Limit-access-to-non-shared-mode.patch Patch16: U_tigervnc-Make-sure-attributes-propagate-through-security-wrap.patch Patch17: n_tigervnc_Revert_Attempt_to_handle_Ctrl-key.patch Patch18: u_terminate_instead_of_ignoring_restart.patch Patch19: u_tigervnc-vncserver-clean-pid-files.patch Patch20: u_tigervnc-prioritize-anon-ecdh.patch # Xserver patches Patch100: u_xorg-server-xdmcp.patch Patch101: u_render-Cast-color-masks-to-unsigned-long-before-shifting-them.patch Patch102: U_BellProc-Send-bell-event-on-core-protocol-bell-when-requested.patch Patch103: U_fb-Fix-invalid-bpp-for-24bit-depth-window.patch Patch104: U_unchecked_malloc_may_allow_unauthed_client_to_crash_Xserver.patch Patch105: U_dix_integer_overflow_in_ProcPutImage.patch Patch106: U_dix_integer_overflow_in_GetHosts.patch Patch107: U_dix_integer_overflow_in_RegionSizeof.patch Patch108: U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch Patch109: U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.patch Patch110: U_dbe_unvalidated_lengths_in_DbeSwapBuffers_calls.patch Patch111: U_Xi_unvalidated_lengths_in_Xinput_extension.patch Patch112: U_xcmisc_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXCMiscGetXIDList.patch Patch113: U_Xv_unvalidated_lengths_in_XVideo_extension_swapped_procs.patch Patch114: U_dri3_unvalidated_lengths_in_DRI3_extension_swapped_procs.patch Patch115: U_present_unvalidated_lengths_in_Present_extension_procs.patch Patch116: U_randr_unvalidated_lengths_in_RandR_extension_swapped_procs.patch Patch117: U_render_check_request_size_before_reading_it.patch Patch118: U_render_unvalidated_lengths_in_Render_extn_swapped_procs.patch Patch119: U_xfixes_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput.patch Patch120: U_glx_Be_more_paranoid_about_variable_length_requests.patch Patch121: U_glx_Be_more_strict_about_rejecting_invalid_image_sizes.patch Patch122: U_glx_Additional_paranoia_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer___GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER.patch Patch123: U_glx_Fix_image_size_computation_for_EXT_texture_integer.patch Patch124: U_glx_Add_safe__add_mul_pad.patch Patch125: U_glx_Length_checking_for_GLXRender_requests.patch Patch126: U_glx_Integer_overflow_protection_for_non_generated_render_requests.patch Patch127: U_glx_Length_checking_for_RenderLarge_requests.patch Patch128: U_glx_Top_level_length_checking_for_swapped_VendorPrivate_requests.patch Patch129: U_glx_Request_length_checks_for_SetClientInfoARB.patch Patch130: U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_vendor_private_requests.patch Patch131: U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_single_request.patch Patch132: U_glx_Pass_remaining_request_length_into_varsize.patch Patch133: U_glx_Fix_mask_truncation_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer.patch Patch134: U_dix_GetHosts_bounds_check_using_wrong_pointer_value.patch Patch135: U_dix_Missing_parens_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE_macro.patch Patch136: U_dbe_Call_to_DDX_SwapBuffers_requires_address_of_int_not_unsigned_int.patch Patch137: U_fb_Fix_Bresenham_algorithms_for_commonly_used_small_segments.patch Patch138: U_xkb-check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch %description TigerVNC is a high-performance, platform-neutral implementation of VNC (Virtual Network Computing), a client/server application that allows users to launch and interact with graphical applications on remote machines. TigerVNC provides the levels of performance necessary to run 3D and video applications; it attempts to maintain a common look and feel and re-use components, where possible, across the various platforms that it supports. TigerVNC also provides extensions for advanced authentication methods and TLS encryption. %package -n xorg-x11-Xvnc Requires: xinetd Requires: xkeyboard-config Summary: TigerVNC implementation of Xvnc Group: System/X11/Servers/XF86_4 %description -n xorg-x11-Xvnc This is the TigerVNC implementation of Xvnc. %prep %setup -T -b1 -b2 cp -r ../xorg-server-*/* unix/xserver/ if [ -e unix/xserver/hw/xfree86/modes/xf86gtf.c -o -e unix/xserver/hw/xfree86/utils/gtf/gtf.c ]; then echo "Files hw/xfree86/modes/xf86gtf hw/xfree86/utils/gtf/gtf.c have to be excluded from the xserver source tar ball (bnc#85566)." exit 1 fi %patch1 -p1 %patch2 -p1 %patch3 -p1 %patch4 -p0 %patch5 -p0 %patch6 -p1 %patch7 -p0 %patch8 -p0 %patch9 -p1 %patch10 -p1 %patch11 -p1 %patch12 -p1 %patch13 -p1 %patch14 -p1 %patch15 -p1 %patch16 -p1 %patch17 -p1 %patch18 -p1 %patch19 -p1 %patch20 -p1 pushd unix/xserver patch -p1 < ../xserver116.patch %patch100 -p1 %patch101 -p1 %patch102 -p1 %patch103 -p1 %patch104 -p1 %patch105 -p1 %patch106 -p1 %patch107 -p1 %patch108 -p1 %patch109 -p1 %patch110 -p1 %patch111 -p1 %patch112 -p1 %patch113 -p1 %patch114 -p1 %patch115 -p1 %patch116 -p1 %patch117 -p1 %patch118 -p1 %patch119 -p1 %patch120 -p1 %patch121 -p1 %patch122 -p1 %patch123 -p1 %patch124 -p1 %patch125 -p1 %patch126 -p1 %patch127 -p1 %patch128 -p1 %patch129 -p1 %patch130 -p1 %patch131 -p1 %patch132 -p1 %patch133 -p1 %patch134 -p1 %patch135 -p1 %patch136 -p1 %patch137 -p1 %patch138 -p1 popd %build export CXXFLAGS="%optflags -fPIC" export CFLAGS="%optflags -fPIC" # Build all tigervnc cmake -DCMAKE_VERBOSE_MAKEFILE=ON -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX:PATH=%{_prefix} -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo make %{?_smp_mflags} # Build Xvnc server pushd unix/xserver autoreconf -fi %configure \ --disable-xorg --disable-xnest --disable-xvfb --disable-dmx \ --disable-xwin --disable-xephyr --disable-kdrive --with-pic \ --disable-static --disable-xinerama \ --with-xkb-path="/usr/share/X11/xkb" \ --with-xkb-output="/var/lib/xkb/compiled" \ --enable-glx --enable-dri --enable-dri2 \ --disable-config-dbus \ --disable-config-hal \ --disable-config-udev \ --without-dtrace \ --disable-unit-tests \ --disable-devel-docs \ --with-fontrootdir=/usr/share/fonts \ --disable-selective-werror make %{?_smp_mflags} V=1 popd # Build java client pushd java cmake -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX:PATH=%{_prefix} make %{?_smp_mflags} popd %install %make_install mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/bin/vncviewer $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/bin/vncviewer-tigervnc mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man1/vncviewer.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/man/man1/vncviewer-tigervnc.1 pushd unix/xserver %make_install popd pushd java mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/vnc/classes install -m755 VncViewer.jar $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/vnc/classes popd install -D -m 644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/xinetd.d/vnc %ifnarch s390x install -D -m 644 %{SOURCE4} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/X11/xorg.conf.d/10-libvnc.conf %endif install -D -m 644 %{SOURCE5} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d/services/vnc-server install -D -m 644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d/services/vnc-httpd install -D -m 755 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/vnc_inetd_httpd install -D -m 644 %{SOURCE8} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/slp.reg.d/vnc.reg install -D -m 755 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/vncpasswd.arg install -D -m 644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/vnc/classes %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1315 ln -s -f %{_sysconfdir}/alternatives/vncviewer $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/vncviewer ln -s -f %{_sysconfdir}/alternatives/vncviewer.1.gz $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/vncviewer.1.gz %endif %find_lang '%{name}' %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1315 %post %_sbindir/update-alternatives \ --install %{_bindir}/vncviewer vncviewer %{_bindir}/vncviewer-tigervnc 20 \ --slave %{_mandir}/man1/vncviewer.1.gz vncviewer.1.gz %{_mandir}/man1/vncviewer-tigervnc.1.gz %postun if [ "$1" = 0 ] ; then "%_sbindir/update-alternatives" --remove vncviewer /usr/bin/vncviewer-tigervnc fi %endif %files -f %{name}.lang %defattr(-,root,root,-) %ghost %{_bindir}/vncviewer %{_bindir}/vncviewer-tigervnc %exclude /usr/share/doc/tigervnc-1.4.1 %doc LICENCE.TXT %doc README.txt %ghost %_mandir/man1/vncviewer.1.gz %doc %_mandir/man1/vncviewer-tigervnc.1.gz %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1315 %ghost %_sysconfdir/alternatives/vncviewer %ghost %_sysconfdir/alternatives/vncviewer.1.gz %endif %files -n xorg-x11-Xvnc %defattr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/Xvnc %{_bindir}/vncconfig %{_bindir}/vncpasswd %{_bindir}/vncpasswd.arg %{_bindir}/vncserver %{_bindir}/x0vncserver %{_bindir}/vnc_inetd_httpd %exclude %{_mandir}/man1/Xserver.1* %{_mandir}/man1/Xvnc.1* %{_mandir}/man1/vncconfig.1* %{_mandir}/man1/vncpasswd.1* %{_mandir}/man1/vncserver.1* %{_mandir}/man1/x0vncserver.1* %exclude /usr/%{_lib}/xorg/protocol.txt %exclude /usr/%{_lib}/xorg/modules/extensions/libvnc.la %ifnarch s390x %{_libdir}/xorg/modules/extensions/libvnc.so %else %exclude %{_libdir}/xorg/modules %exclude %{_libdir}/xorg/modules/extensions %exclude %{_libdir}/xorg/modules/extensions/libvnc.so %endif %exclude /var/lib/xkb/compiled/README.compiled %config %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d/services/vnc-server %config %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d/services/vnc-httpd %ifnarch s390x %config(noreplace) /etc/X11/xorg.conf.d/10-libvnc.conf %else %exclude /etc/X11/xorg.conf.d %endif %config(noreplace) /etc/xinetd.d/vnc %dir /etc/slp.reg.d %config(noreplace) /etc/slp.reg.d/vnc.reg %exclude /usr/lib/debug/* %exclude /usr/lib/debug/.* %exclude /usr/src/debug %doc java/com/tigervnc/vncviewer/README %{_datadir}/vnc %changelog ++++++ 10-libvnc.conf ++++++ # This file contains configuration of libvnc.so module # # To get libvnc.so module working, do this: # 1. run "vncpasswd" as root user # 2. uncomment configuration lines below # # Please note you can specify any option which Xvnc accepts. # Refer to `Xvnc -help` output for detailed list of options. #Section "Module" # Load "vnc" #EndSection #Section "Screen" # Identifier "Screen0 # Option "SecurityTypes" "VncAuth" # Option "PasswordFile" "/root/.vnc/passwd" #EndSection ++++++ N_xorg-server-xdmcp.patch ++++++ Index: xorg-server-1.12.1/os/access.c =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.12.1.orig/os/access.c +++ xorg-server-1.12.1/os/access.c @@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ DefineSelf(int fd) /* * ignore 'localhost' entries as they're not useful - * on the other end of the wire + * on the other end of the wire and because on hosts + * with shared home dirs they'll result in conflicting + * entries in ~/.Xauthority */ if (ifr->ifa_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) continue; @@ -735,6 +737,14 @@ DefineSelf(int fd) else if (family == FamilyInternet6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK((struct in6_addr *) addr)) continue; + + /* Ignore IPv6 link local addresses (fe80::/10), because + * they need a scope identifier, which we have no way + * of telling to the other end. + */ + if (family == FamilyInternet6 && + IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL((struct in6_addr *)addr)) + continue; #endif XdmcpRegisterConnection(family, (char *) addr, len); #if defined(IPv6) && defined(AF_INET6) ++++++ U_BellProc-Send-bell-event-on-core-protocol-bell-when-requested.patch ++++++ From: Egbert Eich Date: Mon Aug 4 19:16:30 2014 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] BellProc: Send bell event on core protocol bell when requested Patch-mainline: Upstream Git-commit: e6c8c7e46c79b2837a7d0b12079a47734eff1eb7 Git-repo: git://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/xorg/xserver References: bnc#890323 Signed-off-by: Egbert Eich XKB allows to override the BellProc() ringing the 'keyboard bell': instead an event is sent to an X client which can perform an appropriate action. In most cases this effectively prevents the core protocol bell from ringing: if no BellProc() is set for the device, no attempt is made to ring a bell. This patch ensures that an XKB bell event is sent also when the core protocol bell is rung end thus an appropriate action can be taken by a client. Signed-off-by: Egbert Eich Acked-by: Peter Hutterer Signed-off-by: Keith Packard --- dix/devices.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c index 7f079ff..5d26fae 100644 --- a/dix/devices.c +++ b/dix/devices.c @@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ ProcBell(ClientPtr client) for (dev = inputInfo.devices; dev; dev = dev->next) { if ((dev == keybd || (!IsMaster(dev) && GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD) == keybd)) && - dev->kbdfeed && dev->kbdfeed->BellProc) { + ((dev->kbdfeed && dev->kbdfeed->BellProc) || dev->xkb_interest)) { rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, dev, DixBellAccess); if (rc != Success) ++++++ U_Xi_unvalidated_lengths_in_Xinput_extension.patch ++++++ Subject: Xi: unvalidated lengths in Xinput extension References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8095 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Multiple functions in the Xinput extension handling of requests from clients failed to check that the length of the request sent by the client was large enough to perform all the required operations and thus could read or write to memory outside the bounds of the request buffer. This commit includes the creation of a new REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE macro in include/dix.h for the common case of needing to ensure a request is large enough to include both the request itself and a minimum amount of extra data following the request header. Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- Xi/chgdctl.c | 8 ++++++-- Xi/chgfctl.c | 2 ++ Xi/sendexev.c | 3 +++ Xi/xiallowev.c | 2 ++ Xi/xichangecursor.c | 2 +- Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- Xi/xigetclientpointer.c | 1 + Xi/xigrabdev.c | 9 ++++++++- Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 12 ++++++++++-- Xi/xiproperty.c | 14 ++++++-------- Xi/xiquerydevice.c | 1 + Xi/xiquerypointer.c | 2 ++ Xi/xiselectev.c | 8 ++++++++ Xi/xisetclientpointer.c | 3 ++- Xi/xisetdevfocus.c | 4 ++++ Xi/xiwarppointer.c | 2 ++ include/dix.h | 4 ++++ 17 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/Xi/chgdctl.c b/Xi/chgdctl.c index d078aa2..b3ee867 100644 --- a/Xi/chgdctl.c +++ b/Xi/chgdctl.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ SProcXChangeDeviceControl(ClientPtr client) REQUEST(xChangeDeviceControlReq); swaps(&stuff->length); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq, sizeof(xDeviceCtl)); swaps(&stuff->control); ctl = (xDeviceCtl *) &stuff[1]; swaps(&ctl->control); @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceControl(ClientPtr client) xDeviceEnableCtl *e; REQUEST(xChangeDeviceControlReq); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE(xChangeDeviceControlReq, sizeof(xDeviceCtl)); len = stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xChangeDeviceControlReq)); ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixManageAccess); @@ -192,6 +192,10 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceControl(ClientPtr client) break; case DEVICE_ENABLE: e = (xDeviceEnableCtl *) &stuff[1]; + if ((len != bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xDeviceEnableCtl)))) { + ret = BadLength; + goto out; + } if (IsXTestDevice(dev, NULL)) status = !Success; diff --git a/Xi/chgfctl.c b/Xi/chgfctl.c index 6dcf60c..224c2ba 100644 --- a/Xi/chgfctl.c +++ b/Xi/chgfctl.c @@ -467,6 +467,8 @@ ProcXChangeFeedbackControl(ClientPtr client) xStringFeedbackCtl *f = ((xStringFeedbackCtl *) &stuff[1]); if (client->swapped) { + if (len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xStringFeedbackCtl))) + return BadLength; swaps(&f->num_keysyms); } if (len != diff --git a/Xi/sendexev.c b/Xi/sendexev.c index 3c21386..183f88d 100644 --- a/Xi/sendexev.c +++ b/Xi/sendexev.c @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ ProcXSendExtensionEvent(ClientPtr client) if (ret != Success) return ret; + if (stuff->num_events == 0) + return ret; + /* The client's event type must be one defined by an extension. */ first = ((xEvent *) &stuff[1]); diff --git a/Xi/xiallowev.c b/Xi/xiallowev.c index ebef233..ca263ef 100644 --- a/Xi/xiallowev.c +++ b/Xi/xiallowev.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int SProcXIAllowEvents(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIAllowEventsReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIAllowEventsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); @@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ SProcXIAllowEvents(ClientPtr client) if (stuff->length > 3) { xXI2_2AllowEventsReq *req_xi22 = (xXI2_2AllowEventsReq *) stuff; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXI2_2AllowEventsReq); swapl(&req_xi22->touchid); swapl(&req_xi22->grab_window); } diff --git a/Xi/xichangecursor.c b/Xi/xichangecursor.c index 7a1bb7a..8e6255b 100644 --- a/Xi/xichangecursor.c +++ b/Xi/xichangecursor.c @@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ int SProcXIChangeCursor(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIChangeCursorReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIChangeCursorReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->win); swapl(&stuff->cursor); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIChangeCursorReq); return (ProcXIChangeCursor(client)); } diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c index 9e36354..2732445 100644 --- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c +++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) { xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any; - int required_len = sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); + size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */ int rc = Success; int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 }; @@ -421,21 +421,46 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) if (!stuff->num_changes) return rc; + if (stuff->length > (INT_MAX >> 2)) + return BadAlloc; + len = (stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo); + any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1]; while (stuff->num_changes--) { + if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) { + rc = BadLength; + goto unwind; + } + SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type)); SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length)); - required_len += any->length; - if ((stuff->length * 4) < required_len) + if ((any->length > (INT_MAX >> 2)) || (len < (any->length << 2))) return BadLength; +#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \ + do { \ + if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \ + rc = BadLength; \ + goto unwind; \ + } \ + } while(0) + switch (any->type) { case XIAddMaster: { xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any; + /* Variable length, due to appended name string */ + if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) { + rc = BadLength; + goto unwind; + } SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len)); + if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) { + rc = BadLength; + goto unwind; + } rc = add_master(client, c, flags); if (rc != Success) @@ -446,6 +471,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) { xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any; + CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo); rc = remove_master(client, r, flags); if (rc != Success) goto unwind; @@ -455,6 +481,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) { xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any; + CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo); rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags); if (rc != Success) goto unwind; @@ -464,6 +491,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) { xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any; + CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo); rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags); if (rc != Success) goto unwind; @@ -471,6 +499,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) break; } + len -= any->length * 4; any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4); } diff --git a/Xi/xigetclientpointer.c b/Xi/xigetclientpointer.c index 3c90d58..306dd39 100644 --- a/Xi/xigetclientpointer.c +++ b/Xi/xigetclientpointer.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int SProcXIGetClientPointer(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIGetClientPointerReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetClientPointerReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->win); diff --git a/Xi/xigrabdev.c b/Xi/xigrabdev.c index 63d95bc..e2a2ae3 100644 --- a/Xi/xigrabdev.c +++ b/Xi/xigrabdev.c @@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ int SProcXIGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIGrabDeviceReq); + /* + * Check here for at least the length of the struct we swap, then + * let ProcXIGrabDevice check the full size after we swap mask_len. + */ + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIGrabDeviceReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); @@ -71,7 +76,7 @@ ProcXIGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) unsigned int pointer_mode; REQUEST(xXIGrabDeviceReq); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIGrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIGrabDeviceReq, ((size_t) stuff->mask_len) * 4); ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixGrabAccess); if (ret != Success) @@ -131,6 +136,7 @@ int SProcXIUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIUngrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIUngrabDeviceReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); @@ -148,6 +154,7 @@ ProcXIUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) TimeStamp time; REQUEST(xXIUngrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIUngrabDeviceReq); ret = dixLookupDevice(&dev, stuff->deviceid, client, DixGetAttrAccess); if (ret != Success) diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c index 700622d..9241ffd 100644 --- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c +++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ SProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) uint32_t *mods; REQUEST(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); @@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ SProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) swaps(&stuff->mask_len); swaps(&stuff->num_modifiers); + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq, + ((uint32_t) stuff->mask_len + stuff->num_modifiers) *4); mods = (uint32_t *) &stuff[1] + stuff->mask_len; for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_modifiers; i++, mods++) { @@ -92,7 +95,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client) int mask_len; REQUEST(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq, + ((uint32_t) stuff->mask_len + stuff->num_modifiers) * 4); if (stuff->deviceid == XIAllDevices) dev = inputInfo.all_devices; @@ -252,6 +256,7 @@ SProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) uint32_t *modifiers; REQUEST(xXIPassiveUngrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIPassiveUngrabDeviceReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->grab_window); @@ -259,6 +264,8 @@ SProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) swapl(&stuff->detail); swaps(&stuff->num_modifiers); + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveUngrabDeviceReq, + ((uint32_t) stuff->num_modifiers) << 2); modifiers = (uint32_t *) &stuff[1]; for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_modifiers; i++, modifiers++) @@ -277,7 +284,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client) int i, rc; REQUEST(xXIPassiveUngrabDeviceReq); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIPassiveUngrabDeviceReq); + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveUngrabDeviceReq, + ((uint32_t) stuff->num_modifiers) << 2); if (stuff->deviceid == XIAllDevices) dev = inputInfo.all_devices; diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c index 463607d..8e8e4b0 100644 --- a/Xi/xiproperty.c +++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c @@ -1013,10 +1013,9 @@ int SProcXListDeviceProperties(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xListDevicePropertiesReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xListDevicePropertiesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); - - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xListDevicePropertiesReq); return (ProcXListDeviceProperties(client)); } @@ -1037,10 +1036,10 @@ int SProcXDeleteDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDeleteDevicePropertyReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDeleteDevicePropertyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->property); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDeleteDevicePropertyReq); return (ProcXDeleteDeviceProperty(client)); } @@ -1048,13 +1047,13 @@ int SProcXGetDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xGetDevicePropertyReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGetDevicePropertyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->property); swapl(&stuff->type); swapl(&stuff->longOffset); swapl(&stuff->longLength); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGetDevicePropertyReq); return (ProcXGetDeviceProperty(client)); } @@ -1253,11 +1252,10 @@ int SProcXIListProperties(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIListPropertiesReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIListPropertiesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); - - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIListPropertiesReq); return (ProcXIListProperties(client)); } @@ -1279,11 +1277,11 @@ int SProcXIDeleteProperty(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIDeletePropertyReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDeletePropertyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); swapl(&stuff->property); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDeletePropertyReq); return (ProcXIDeleteProperty(client)); } @@ -1291,6 +1289,7 @@ int SProcXIGetProperty(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIGetPropertyReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetPropertyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); @@ -1298,7 +1297,6 @@ SProcXIGetProperty(ClientPtr client) swapl(&stuff->type); swapl(&stuff->offset); swapl(&stuff->len); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetPropertyReq); return (ProcXIGetProperty(client)); } diff --git a/Xi/xiquerydevice.c b/Xi/xiquerydevice.c index 4e544f0..67a9a4f 100644 --- a/Xi/xiquerydevice.c +++ b/Xi/xiquerydevice.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int SProcXIQueryDevice(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIQueryDeviceReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIQueryDeviceReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); diff --git a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c index e9bdd42..7ec0c85 100644 --- a/Xi/xiquerypointer.c +++ b/Xi/xiquerypointer.c @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ int SProcXIQueryPointer(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIQueryPointerReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIQueryPointerReq); + swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); swapl(&stuff->win); diff --git a/Xi/xiselectev.c b/Xi/xiselectev.c index 45a996e..168579f 100644 --- a/Xi/xiselectev.c +++ b/Xi/xiselectev.c @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int SProcXISelectEvents(ClientPtr client) { int i; + int len; xXIEventMask *evmask; REQUEST(xXISelectEventsReq); @@ -122,10 +123,17 @@ SProcXISelectEvents(ClientPtr client) swapl(&stuff->win); swaps(&stuff->num_masks); + len = stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xXISelectEventsReq)); evmask = (xXIEventMask *) &stuff[1]; for (i = 0; i < stuff->num_masks; i++) { + if (len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xXIEventMask))) + return BadLength; + len -= bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xXIEventMask)); swaps(&evmask->deviceid); swaps(&evmask->mask_len); + if (len < evmask->mask_len) + return BadLength; + len -= evmask->mask_len; evmask = (xXIEventMask *) (((char *) &evmask[1]) + evmask->mask_len * 4); } diff --git a/Xi/xisetclientpointer.c b/Xi/xisetclientpointer.c index 38ff51e..24d4a53 100644 --- a/Xi/xisetclientpointer.c +++ b/Xi/xisetclientpointer.c @@ -51,10 +51,11 @@ int SProcXISetClientPointer(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXISetClientPointerReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXISetClientPointerReq); + swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->win); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXISetClientPointerReq); return (ProcXISetClientPointer(client)); } diff --git a/Xi/xisetdevfocus.c b/Xi/xisetdevfocus.c index 372ec24..96a9a16 100644 --- a/Xi/xisetdevfocus.c +++ b/Xi/xisetdevfocus.c @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ int SProcXISetFocus(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXISetFocusReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXISetFocusReq); + swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); swapl(&stuff->focus); @@ -56,6 +58,8 @@ int SProcXIGetFocus(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIGetFocusReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIGetFocusReq); + swaps(&stuff->length); swaps(&stuff->deviceid); diff --git a/Xi/xiwarppointer.c b/Xi/xiwarppointer.c index 3f051f7..780758a 100644 --- a/Xi/xiwarppointer.c +++ b/Xi/xiwarppointer.c @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ int SProcXIWarpPointer(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXIWarpPointerReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIWarpPointerReq); + swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->src_win); swapl(&stuff->dst_win); diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h index e0c6ed8..21176a8 100644 --- a/include/dix.h +++ b/include/dix.h @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ SOFTWARE. if ((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len )\ return(BadLength) +#define REQUEST_AT_LEAST_EXTRA_SIZE(req, extra) \ + if (((sizeof(req) + ((uint64_t) extra)) >> 2) > client->req_len ) \ + return(BadLength) + #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_Xv_unvalidated_lengths_in_XVideo_extension_swapped_procs.patch ++++++ Subject: Xv: unvalidated lengths in XVideo extension swapped procs References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8099 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- Xext/xvdisp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/Xext/xvdisp.c b/Xext/xvdisp.c index 86f982a..c2d0fc9 100644 --- a/Xext/xvdisp.c +++ b/Xext/xvdisp.c @@ -1121,6 +1121,7 @@ static int SProcXvQueryExtension(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvQueryExtensionReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryExtensionReq); swaps(&stuff->length); return XvProcVector[xv_QueryExtension] (client); } @@ -1129,6 +1130,7 @@ static int SProcXvQueryAdaptors(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvQueryAdaptorsReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryAdaptorsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); return XvProcVector[xv_QueryAdaptors] (client); @@ -1138,6 +1140,7 @@ static int SProcXvQueryEncodings(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvQueryEncodingsReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryEncodingsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); return XvProcVector[xv_QueryEncodings] (client); @@ -1147,6 +1150,7 @@ static int SProcXvGrabPort(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvGrabPortReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGrabPortReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->time); @@ -1157,6 +1161,7 @@ static int SProcXvUngrabPort(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvUngrabPortReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvUngrabPortReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->time); @@ -1167,6 +1172,7 @@ static int SProcXvPutVideo(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvPutVideoReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvPutVideoReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1186,6 +1192,7 @@ static int SProcXvPutStill(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvPutStillReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvPutStillReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1205,6 +1212,7 @@ static int SProcXvGetVideo(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvGetVideoReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGetVideoReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1224,6 +1232,7 @@ static int SProcXvGetStill(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvGetStillReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGetStillReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1243,6 +1252,7 @@ static int SProcXvPutImage(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvPutImageReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xvPutImageReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1266,6 +1276,7 @@ static int SProcXvShmPutImage(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvShmPutImageReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvShmPutImageReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1293,6 +1304,7 @@ static int SProcXvSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->drawable); return XvProcVector[xv_SelectVideoNotify] (client); @@ -1302,6 +1314,7 @@ static int SProcXvSelectPortNotify(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvSelectPortNotifyReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSelectPortNotifyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); return XvProcVector[xv_SelectPortNotify] (client); @@ -1311,6 +1324,7 @@ static int SProcXvStopVideo(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvStopVideoReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvStopVideoReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -1321,6 +1335,7 @@ static int SProcXvSetPortAttribute(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvSetPortAttributeReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSetPortAttributeReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->attribute); @@ -1332,6 +1347,7 @@ static int SProcXvGetPortAttribute(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvGetPortAttributeReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvGetPortAttributeReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->attribute); @@ -1342,6 +1358,7 @@ static int SProcXvQueryBestSize(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvQueryBestSizeReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryBestSizeReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swaps(&stuff->vid_w); @@ -1355,6 +1372,7 @@ static int SProcXvQueryPortAttributes(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvQueryPortAttributesReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryPortAttributesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); return XvProcVector[xv_QueryPortAttributes] (client); @@ -1364,6 +1382,7 @@ static int SProcXvQueryImageAttributes(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvQueryImageAttributesReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvQueryImageAttributesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); swapl(&stuff->id); @@ -1376,6 +1395,7 @@ static int SProcXvListImageFormats(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xvListImageFormatsReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvListImageFormatsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->port); return XvProcVector[xv_ListImageFormats] (client); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_dbe_Call_to_DDX_SwapBuffers_requires_address_of_int_not_unsigned_int.patch ++++++ Subject: dbe: Call to DDX SwapBuffers requires address of int, not unsigned int References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8097 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb When the local types used to walk the DBE request were changed, this changed the type of the parameter passed to the DDX SwapBuffers API, but there wasn't a matching change in the API definition. At this point, with the API frozen, I just stuck a new variable in with the correct type. Because we've already bounds-checked nStuff to be smaller than UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec), we know it will fit in a signed int without overflow. Signed-off-by: Keith Packard Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- dbe/dbe.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/dbe/dbe.c b/dbe/dbe.c index df2ad5c..e5d928d 100644 --- a/dbe/dbe.c +++ b/dbe/dbe.c @@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(ClientPtr client) int error; unsigned int i, j; unsigned int nStuff; + int nStuff_i; /* DDX API requires int for nStuff */ REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); nStuff = stuff->n; /* use local variable for performance. */ @@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(ClientPtr client) * could deal with cross-screen synchronization. */ - while (nStuff > 0) { + nStuff_i = nStuff; + while (nStuff_i > 0) { pDbeScreenPriv = DBE_SCREEN_PRIV_FROM_WINDOW(swapInfo[0].pWindow); - error = (*pDbeScreenPriv->SwapBuffers) (client, &nStuff, swapInfo); + error = (*pDbeScreenPriv->SwapBuffers) (client, &nStuff_i, swapInfo); if (error != Success) { free(swapInfo); return error; -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_dbe_unvalidated_lengths_in_DbeSwapBuffers_calls.patch ++++++ Subject: dbe: unvalidated lengths in DbeSwapBuffers calls References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8097 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb ProcDbeSwapBuffers() has a 32bit (n) length value that it uses to read from a buffer. The length is never validated, which can lead to out of bound reads, and possibly returning the data read from out of bounds to the misbehaving client via an X Error packet. SProcDbeSwapBuffers() swaps data (for correct endianness) before handing it off to the real proc. While doing the swapping, the length field is not validated, which can cause memory corruption. v2: reorder checks to avoid compilers optimizing out checks for overflow that happen after we'd already have done the overflowing multiplications. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- dbe/dbe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/dbe/dbe.c b/dbe/dbe.c index 527588c..df2ad5c 100644 --- a/dbe/dbe.c +++ b/dbe/dbe.c @@ -450,18 +450,20 @@ ProcDbeSwapBuffers(ClientPtr client) DbeSwapInfoPtr swapInfo; xDbeSwapInfo *dbeSwapInfo; int error; - register int i, j; - int nStuff; + unsigned int i, j; + unsigned int nStuff; REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); nStuff = stuff->n; /* use local variable for performance. */ if (nStuff == 0) { + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); return Success; } if (nStuff > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec)) return BadAlloc; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq, nStuff * sizeof(xDbeSwapInfo)); /* Get to the swap info appended to the end of the request. */ dbeSwapInfo = (xDbeSwapInfo *) &stuff[1]; @@ -914,13 +916,16 @@ static int SProcDbeSwapBuffers(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); - register int i; + unsigned int i; xDbeSwapInfo *pSwapInfo; swaps(&stuff->length); REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq); swapl(&stuff->n); + if (stuff->n > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DbeSwapInfoRec)) + return BadAlloc; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDbeSwapBuffersReq, stuff->n * sizeof(xDbeSwapInfo)); if (stuff->n != 0) { pSwapInfo = (xDbeSwapInfo *) stuff + 1; -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_dix_GetHosts_bounds_check_using_wrong_pointer_value.patch ++++++ Subject: dix: GetHosts bounds check using wrong pointer value References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb GetHosts saves the pointer to allocated memory in *data, and then wants to bounds-check writes to that region, but was mistakenly using a bare 'data' instead of '*data'. Also, data is declared as void **, so we need a cast to turn it into a byte pointer so we can actually do pointer comparisons. Signed-off-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- os/access.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/os/access.c b/os/access.c index f393c8d..28f2d32 100644 --- a/os/access.c +++ b/os/access.c @@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ GetHosts(void **data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled) } for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { len = host->len; - if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n)) + if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > ((unsigned char *) *data + n)) break; ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family; ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len; -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_dix_Missing_parens_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE_macro.patch ++++++ Subject: Missing parens in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE macro References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb The 'n' parameter must be surrounded by parens in both places to prevent precedence from mis-computing things. Signed-off-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- include/dix.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h index 21176a8..921156b 100644 --- a/include/dix.h +++ b/include/dix.h @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ SOFTWARE. #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ - ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ + (((n) >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \ return(BadLength) -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_dix_integer_overflow_in_GetHosts.patch ++++++ Subject: dix: integer overflow in GetHosts() References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb GetHosts() iterates over all the hosts it has in memory, and copies them to a buffer. The buffer length is calculated by iterating over all the hosts and adding up all of their combined length. There is a potential integer overflow, if there are lots and lots of hosts (with a combined length of > ~4 gig). This should be possible by repeatedly calling ProcChangeHosts() on 64bit machines with enough memory. This patch caps the list at 1mb, because multi-megabyte hostname lists for X access control are insane. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- os/access.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/os/access.c b/os/access.c index 5c510de..f393c8d 100644 --- a/os/access.c +++ b/os/access.c @@ -1296,6 +1296,10 @@ GetHosts(void **data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled) for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { nHosts++; n += pad_to_int32(host->len) + sizeof(xHostEntry); + /* Could check for INT_MAX, but in reality having more than 1mb of + hostnames in the access list is ridiculous */ + if (n >= 1048576) + break; } if (n) { *data = ptr = malloc(n); @@ -1304,6 +1308,8 @@ GetHosts(void **data, int *pnHosts, int *pLen, BOOL * pEnabled) } for (host = validhosts; host; host = host->next) { len = host->len; + if ((ptr + sizeof(xHostEntry) + len) > (data + n)) + break; ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->family = host->family; ((xHostEntry *) ptr)->length = len; ptr += sizeof(xHostEntry); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_dix_integer_overflow_in_ProcPutImage.patch ++++++ Subject: dix: integer overflow in ProcPutImage() References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb ProcPutImage() calculates a length field from a width, left pad and depth specified by the client (if the specified format is XYPixmap). The calculations for the total amount of memory the server needs for the pixmap can overflow a 32-bit number, causing out-of-bounds memory writes on 32-bit systems (since the length is stored in a long int variable). Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- dix/dispatch.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c index d844a09..55b978d 100644 --- a/dix/dispatch.c +++ b/dix/dispatch.c @@ -2000,6 +2000,9 @@ ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client) tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1]; lengthProto = length; + if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height)) + return BadLength; + if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) + bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len) return BadLength; -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_dix_integer_overflow_in_REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE.patch ++++++ Subject: dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE() References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during checks. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- include/dix.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h index 991a3ce..e0c6ed8 100644 --- a/include/dix.h +++ b/include/dix.h @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE. #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\ if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \ - (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \ + ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \ + ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \ return(BadLength) #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\ -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_dix_integer_overflow_in_RegionSizeof.patch ++++++ Subject: dix: integer overflow in RegionSizeof() References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8092 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb RegionSizeof contains several integer overflows if a large length value is passed in. Once we fix it to return 0 on overflow, we also have to fix the callers to handle this error condition v2: Fixed limit calculation in RegionSizeof as pointed out by jcristau. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau --- dix/region.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- include/regionstr.h | 10 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) Index: xorg-server-1.15.2/dix/region.c =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.15.2.orig/dix/region.c +++ xorg-server-1.15.2/dix/region.c @@ -169,7 +169,6 @@ Equipment Corporation. ((r1)->y1 <= (r2)->y1) && \ ((r1)->y2 >= (r2)->y2) ) -#define xallocData(n) malloc(RegionSizeof(n)) #define xfreeData(reg) if ((reg)->data && (reg)->data->size) free((reg)->data) #define RECTALLOC_BAIL(pReg,n,bail) \ @@ -205,8 +204,9 @@ if (!(pReg)->data || (((pReg)->data->num #define DOWNSIZE(reg,numRects) \ if (((numRects) < ((reg)->data->size >> 1)) && ((reg)->data->size > 50)) \ { \ - RegDataPtr NewData; \ - NewData = (RegDataPtr)realloc((reg)->data, RegionSizeof(numRects)); \ + size_t NewSize = RegionSizeof(numRects); \ + RegDataPtr NewData = \ + (NewSize > 0) ? realloc((reg)->data, NewSize) : NULL ; \ if (NewData) \ { \ NewData->size = (numRects); \ @@ -345,17 +345,20 @@ Bool RegionRectAlloc(RegionPtr pRgn, int n) { RegDataPtr data; + size_t rgnSize; if (!pRgn->data) { n++; - pRgn->data = xallocData(n); + rgnSize = RegionSizeof(n); + pRgn->data = (rgnSize > 0) ? malloc(rgnSize) : NULL; if (!pRgn->data) return RegionBreak(pRgn); pRgn->data->numRects = 1; *RegionBoxptr(pRgn) = pRgn->extents; } else if (!pRgn->data->size) { - pRgn->data = xallocData(n); + rgnSize = RegionSizeof(n); + pRgn->data = (rgnSize > 0) ? malloc(rgnSize) : NULL; if (!pRgn->data) return RegionBreak(pRgn); pRgn->data->numRects = 0; @@ -367,7 +370,8 @@ RegionRectAlloc(RegionPtr pRgn, int n) n = 250; } n += pRgn->data->numRects; - data = (RegDataPtr) realloc(pRgn->data, RegionSizeof(n)); + rgnSize = RegionSizeof(n); + data = (rgnSize > 0) ? realloc(pRgn->data, rgnSize) : NULL; if (!data) return RegionBreak(pRgn); pRgn->data = data; @@ -1312,6 +1316,7 @@ RegionFromRects(int nrects, xRectangle * { RegionPtr pRgn; + size_t rgnSize; RegDataPtr pData; BoxPtr pBox; int i; @@ -1338,7 +1343,8 @@ RegionFromRects(int nrects, xRectangle * } return pRgn; } - pData = xallocData(nrects); + rgnSize = RegionSizeof(nrects); + pData = (rgnSize > 0) ? malloc(rgnSize) : NULL; if (!pData) { RegionBreak(pRgn); return pRgn; Index: xorg-server-1.15.2/include/regionstr.h =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.15.2.orig/include/regionstr.h +++ xorg-server-1.15.2/include/regionstr.h @@ -127,7 +127,10 @@ RegionEnd(RegionPtr reg) static inline size_t RegionSizeof(int n) { - return (sizeof(RegDataRec) + ((n) * sizeof(BoxRec))); + if (n < ((INT_MAX - sizeof(RegDataRec)) / sizeof(BoxRec))) + return (sizeof(RegDataRec) + ((n) * sizeof(BoxRec))); + else + return 0; } static inline void @@ -138,9 +141,10 @@ RegionInit(RegionPtr _pReg, BoxPtr _rect (_pReg)->data = (RegDataPtr) NULL; } else { + size_t rgnSize; (_pReg)->extents = RegionEmptyBox; - if (((_size) > 1) && ((_pReg)->data = - (RegDataPtr) malloc(RegionSizeof(_size)))) { + if (((_size) > 1) && ((rgnSize = RegionSizeof(_size)) > 0) && + (((_pReg)->data = malloc(rgnSize)) != NULL)) { (_pReg)->data->size = (_size); (_pReg)->data->numRects = 0; } ++++++ U_dri2_integer_overflow_in_ProcDRI2GetBuffers.patch ++++++ Subject: dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers() References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8094 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count). There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause out of bound reads and memory corruption later on. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau --- hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c index ffd66fa..221ec53 100644 --- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c +++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c @@ -270,6 +270,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client) unsigned int *attachments; REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4); + if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4)) + return BadLength; + if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess, &pDrawable, &status)) return status; -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_dri3_unvalidated_lengths_in_DRI3_extension_swapped_procs.patch ++++++ Subject: dri3: unvalidated lengths in DRI3 extension swapped procs References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8103 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- dri3/dri3_request.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/dri3/dri3_request.c b/dri3/dri3_request.c index fe45620..2d75588 100644 --- a/dri3/dri3_request.c +++ b/dri3/dri3_request.c @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static int sproc_dri3_query_version(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDRI3QueryVersionReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDRI3QueryVersionReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->majorVersion); @@ -332,6 +333,7 @@ static int sproc_dri3_open(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDRI3OpenReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDRI3OpenReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -343,6 +345,7 @@ static int sproc_dri3_pixmap_from_buffer(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDRI3PixmapFromBufferReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDRI3PixmapFromBufferReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->pixmap); @@ -358,6 +361,7 @@ static int sproc_dri3_buffer_from_pixmap(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDRI3BufferFromPixmapReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDRI3BufferFromPixmapReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->pixmap); @@ -368,6 +372,7 @@ static int sproc_dri3_fence_from_fd(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDRI3FenceFromFDReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDRI3FenceFromFDReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -379,6 +384,7 @@ static int sproc_dri3_fd_from_fence(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xDRI3FDFromFenceReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xDRI3FDFromFenceReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->drawable); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_fb-Fix-invalid-bpp-for-24bit-depth-window.patch ++++++

From fe5018e0564118a7a8198fa286186fdb9ed818c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 15:57:22 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] fb: Fix invalid bpp for 24bit depth window

We have a hack in fb layer for a 24bpp screen to use 32bpp images, and fbCreateWindow() replaces its drawable.bitsPerPixel field appropriately. But, the problem is that it always replaces when 32bpp is passed. If the depth is 32, this results in bpp < depth, which is actually invalid. Meanwhile, fbCreatePixmap() has a more check and it creates with 24bpp only when the passed depth <= 24 for avoiding such a problem. This oneliner patch just adds the similar check in fbCreateWindow(). This (hopefully) fixes the long-standing broken graphics mess of cirrus KMS with 24bpp. Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Reviewed-by: Keith Packard --- fb/fbwindow.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fb/fbwindow.c b/fb/fbwindow.c index 368c4b883b31..c90175faa078 100644 --- a/fb/fbwindow.c +++ b/fb/fbwindow.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ fbCreateWindow(WindowPtr pWin) { dixSetPrivate(&pWin->devPrivates, fbGetWinPrivateKey(pWin), fbGetScreenPixmap(pWin->drawable.pScreen)); - if (pWin->drawable.bitsPerPixel == 32) + if (pWin->drawable.bitsPerPixel == 32 && pWin->drawable.depth <= 24) pWin->drawable.bitsPerPixel = fbGetScreenPrivate(pWin->drawable.pScreen)->win32bpp; return TRUE; -- 2.0.4 ++++++ U_fb_Fix_Bresenham_algorithms_for_commonly_used_small_segments.patch ++++++ Subject: fb: Fix Bresenham algorithms for commonly used small segments. Git-commit: 1b94fd77792310c80b0a2bcf4bf6d4e4c4c23bca Author: Alex Orange Patch-Mainline: Upstream References: bnc#908258, bnc#856931, fdo#54168 Fixes: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=54168 Fix errors introducted in 863d528a9f76d0e8f122aebf19f8564a4c67a938. Said patch does indeed remove the problematic writes to bad memory, however it also introduces errors in the algoritm. This patch has the effect of reverting said patch and adding an if in the proper location to catch the out of bounds memory write without causing problems to the overall algorithm. Signed-off-by: Alex Orange Reviewed-by: Peter Harris Tested-by: Peter Harris Signed-off-by: Keith Packard --- fb/fbseg.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fb/fbseg.c b/fb/fbseg.c index 36b17e3..c3c196a 100644 --- a/fb/fbseg.c +++ b/fb/fbseg.c @@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ fbBresSolid(DrawablePtr pDrawable, if (axis == X_AXIS) { bits = 0; while (len--) { - if (e >= 0) { - WRITE(dst, FbDoMaskRRop (READ(dst), and, xor, bits)); - bits = 0; - dst += dstStride; - e += e3; - } bits |= mask; mask = fbBresShiftMask(mask, signdx, dstBpp); if (!mask) { @@ -80,12 +74,23 @@ fbBresSolid(DrawablePtr pDrawable, mask = mask0; } e += e1; + if (e >= 0) { + if (bits) { + WRITE(dst, FbDoMaskRRop (READ(dst), and, xor, bits)); + bits = 0; + } + dst += dstStride; + e += e3; + } } if (bits) WRITE(dst, FbDoMaskRRop(READ(dst), and, xor, bits)); } else { while (len--) { + WRITE(dst, FbDoMaskRRop(READ(dst), and, xor, mask)); + dst += dstStride; + e += e1; if (e >= 0) { e += e3; mask = fbBresShiftMask(mask, signdx, dstBpp); @@ -94,9 +99,6 @@ fbBresSolid(DrawablePtr pDrawable, mask = mask0; } } - WRITE(dst, FbDoMaskRRop(READ(dst), and, xor, mask)); - dst += dstStride; - e += e1; } } -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_glx_Add_safe__add_mul_pad.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Add safe_{add,mul,pad} (v3) References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8093 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb These are paranoid about integer overflow, and will return -1 if their operation would overflow a (signed) integer or if either argument is negative. Note that RenderLarge requests are sized with a uint32_t so in principle this could be sketchy there, but dix limits bigreqs to 128M so you shouldn't ever notice, and honestly if you're sending more than 2G of rendering commands you're already doing something very wrong. v2: Use INT_MAX for consistency with the rest of the server (jcristau) v3: Reject negative arguments (anholt) Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/glxserver.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/glx/glxserver.h b/glx/glxserver.h index a324b29..9482601 100644 --- a/glx/glxserver.h +++ b/glx/glxserver.h @@ -228,6 +228,47 @@ extern void glxSwapQueryServerStringReply(ClientPtr client, * Routines for computing the size of variably-sized rendering commands. */ +static _X_INLINE int +safe_add(int a, int b) +{ + if (a < 0 || b < 0) + return -1; + + if (INT_MAX - a < b) + return -1; + + return a + b; +} + +static _X_INLINE int +safe_mul(int a, int b) +{ + if (a < 0 || b < 0) + return -1; + + if (a == 0 || b == 0) + return 0; + + if (a > INT_MAX / b) + return -1; + + return a * b; +} + +static _X_INLINE int +safe_pad(int a) +{ + int ret; + + if (a < 0) + return -1; + + if ((ret = safe_add(a, 3)) < 0) + return -1; + + return ret & (GLuint)~3; +} + extern int __glXTypeSize(GLenum enm); extern int __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, GLsizei w, GLsizei h, GLsizei d, -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Additional_paranoia_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer___GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Additional paranoia in __glXGetAnswerBuffer / __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER (v2) References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8093 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb If the computed reply size is negative, something went wrong, treat it as an error. v2: Be more careful about size_t being unsigned (Matthieu Herrb) v3: SIZE_MAX not SIZE_T_MAX (Alan Coopersmith) Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/indirect_util.c | 7 ++++++- glx/unpack.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/indirect_util.c b/glx/indirect_util.c index 926e57c..de81491 100644 --- a/glx/indirect_util.c +++ b/glx/indirect_util.c @@ -76,9 +76,14 @@ __glXGetAnswerBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, size_t required_size, const unsigned mask = alignment - 1; if (local_size < required_size) { - const size_t worst_case_size = required_size + alignment; + size_t worst_case_size; intptr_t temp_buf; + if (required_size < SIZE_MAX - alignment) + worst_case_size = required_size + alignment; + else + return NULL; + if (cl->returnBufSize < worst_case_size) { void *temp = realloc(cl->returnBuf, worst_case_size); diff --git a/glx/unpack.h b/glx/unpack.h index 52fba74..2b1ebcf 100644 --- a/glx/unpack.h +++ b/glx/unpack.h @@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ extern xGLXSingleReply __glXReply; ** pointer. */ #define __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(res,cl,size,align) \ - if ((size) > sizeof(answerBuffer)) { \ + if (size < 0) return BadLength; \ + else if ((size) > sizeof(answerBuffer)) { \ int bump; \ if ((cl)->returnBufSize < (size)+(align)) { \ (cl)->returnBuf = (GLbyte*)realloc((cl)->returnBuf, \ -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Be_more_paranoid_about_variable_length_requests.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Be more paranoid about variable-length requests References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8093 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb If the size computation routine returns -1 we should just reject the request outright. Clamping it to zero could give an attacker the opportunity to also mangle cmdlen in such a way that the subsequent length check passes, and the request would get executed, thus passing data we wanted to reject to the renderer. Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/glxcmds.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c index 8d3fa9f..0521b58 100644 --- a/glx/glxcmds.c +++ b/glx/glxcmds.c @@ -2060,7 +2060,7 @@ __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) extra = (*entry.varsize) (pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, client->swapped); if (extra < 0) { - extra = 0; + return BadLength; } if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + extra)) { return BadLength; @@ -2177,7 +2177,7 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) extra = (*entry.varsize) (pc + __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE, client->swapped); if (extra < 0) { - extra = 0; + return BadLength; } /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + 4 + extra)) { -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Be_more_strict_about_rejecting_invalid_image_sizes.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Be more strict about rejecting invalid image sizes References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8093 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Before this we'd just clamp the image size to 0, which was just hideously stupid; if the parameters were such that they'd overflow an integer, you'd allocate a small buffer, then pass huge values into (say) ReadPixels, and now you're scribbling over arbitrary server memory. Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/singlepix.c | 16 ++++++++-------- glx/singlepixswap.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/singlepix.c b/glx/singlepix.c index 506fdaa..8b6c261 100644 --- a/glx/singlepix.c +++ b/glx/singlepix.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ __glXDisp_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) lsbFirst = *(GLboolean *) (pc + 25); compsize = __glReadPixels_size(format, type, width, height); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_LSB_FIRST, lsbFirst); @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ __glXDisp_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, level, format, type, width, height, depth); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -218,9 +218,9 @@ GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, height, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; if (compsize2 < 0) - compsize2 = 0; + return BadLength; compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) */ compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, height, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ GetHistogram(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) */ compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ GetMinmax(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, 2, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ GetColorTable(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) */ compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); diff --git a/glx/singlepixswap.c b/glx/singlepixswap.c index 8469101..8dc304f 100644 --- a/glx/singlepixswap.c +++ b/glx/singlepixswap.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ __glXDispSwap_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) lsbFirst = *(GLboolean *) (pc + 25); compsize = __glReadPixels_size(format, type, width, height); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_LSB_FIRST, lsbFirst); @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ __glXDispSwap_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, level, format, type, width, height, depth); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -252,9 +252,9 @@ GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, height, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; if (compsize2 < 0) - compsize2 = 0; + return BadLength; compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) */ compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, height, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ GetHistogram(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) */ compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ GetMinmax(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, 2, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ GetColorTable(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) */ compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, 1, 1); if (compsize < 0) - compsize = 0; + return BadLength; glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize, 1); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Fix_image_size_computation_for_EXT_texture_integer.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Fix image size computation for EXT_texture_integer References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Without this we'd reject the request with BadLength. Note that some old versions of Mesa had a bug in the same place, and would _send_ zero bytes of image data; these will now be rejected, correctly. Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/rensize.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/glx/rensize.c b/glx/rensize.c index ba22d10..9ff73c7 100644 --- a/glx/rensize.c +++ b/glx/rensize.c @@ -224,6 +224,11 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, case GL_ALPHA: case GL_LUMINANCE: case GL_INTENSITY: + case GL_RED_INTEGER_EXT: + case GL_GREEN_INTEGER_EXT: + case GL_BLUE_INTEGER_EXT: + case GL_ALPHA_INTEGER_EXT: + case GL_LUMINANCE_INTEGER_EXT: elementsPerGroup = 1; break; case GL_422_EXT: @@ -234,14 +239,19 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, case GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_MESA: case GL_YCBCR_MESA: case GL_LUMINANCE_ALPHA: + case GL_LUMINANCE_ALPHA_INTEGER_EXT: elementsPerGroup = 2; break; case GL_RGB: case GL_BGR: + case GL_RGB_INTEGER_EXT: + case GL_BGR_INTEGER_EXT: elementsPerGroup = 3; break; case GL_RGBA: case GL_BGRA: + case GL_RGBA_INTEGER_EXT: + case GL_BGRA_INTEGER_EXT: case GL_ABGR_EXT: elementsPerGroup = 4; break; -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Fix_mask_truncation_in___glXGetAnswerBuffer.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Fix mask truncation in __glXGetAnswerBuffer References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8093 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb On a system where sizeof(unsigned) != sizeof(intptr_t), the unary bitwise not operation will result in a mask that clears all high bits from temp_buf in the expression: temp_buf = (temp_buf + mask) & ~mask; Signed-off-by: Robert Morell Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/indirect_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/glx/indirect_util.c b/glx/indirect_util.c index de81491..9ba2815 100644 --- a/glx/indirect_util.c +++ b/glx/indirect_util.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ __glXGetAnswerBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, size_t required_size, void *local_buffer, size_t local_size, unsigned alignment) { void *buffer = local_buffer; - const unsigned mask = alignment - 1; + const intptr_t mask = alignment - 1; if (local_size < required_size) { size_t worst_case_size; -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Integer_overflow_protection_for_non_generated_render_requests.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Integer overflow protection for non-generated render requests (v3) References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8093 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb v2: Fix constants in __glXMap2fReqSize (Michal Srb) Validate w/h/d for proxy targets too (Keith Packard) v3: Fix Map[12]Size to correctly reject order == 0 (Julien Cristau) Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/rensize.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/rensize.c b/glx/rensize.c index 9ff73c7..d46334a 100644 --- a/glx/rensize.c +++ b/glx/rensize.c @@ -43,19 +43,11 @@ (((a & 0xff000000U)>>24) | ((a & 0xff0000U)>>8) | \ ((a & 0xff00U)<<8) | ((a & 0xffU)<<24)) -static int -Map1Size(GLint k, GLint order) -{ - if (order <= 0 || k < 0) - return -1; - return k * order; -} - int __glXMap1dReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) { GLenum target; - GLint order, k; + GLint order; target = *(GLenum *) (pc + 16); order = *(GLint *) (pc + 20); @@ -63,15 +55,16 @@ __glXMap1dReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) target = SWAPL(target); order = SWAPL(order); } - k = __glMap1d_size(target); - return 8 * Map1Size(k, order); + if (order < 1) + return -1; + return safe_mul(8, safe_mul(__glMap1d_size(target), order)); } int __glXMap1fReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) { GLenum target; - GLint order, k; + GLint order; target = *(GLenum *) (pc + 0); order = *(GLint *) (pc + 12); @@ -79,23 +72,24 @@ __glXMap1fReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) target = SWAPL(target); order = SWAPL(order); } - k = __glMap1f_size(target); - return 4 * Map1Size(k, order); + if (order < 1) + return -1; + return safe_mul(4, safe_mul(__glMap1f_size(target), order)); } static int Map2Size(int k, int majorOrder, int minorOrder) { - if (majorOrder <= 0 || minorOrder <= 0 || k < 0) + if (majorOrder < 1 || minorOrder < 1) return -1; - return k * majorOrder * minorOrder; + return safe_mul(k, safe_mul(majorOrder, minorOrder)); } int __glXMap2dReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) { GLenum target; - GLint uorder, vorder, k; + GLint uorder, vorder; target = *(GLenum *) (pc + 32); uorder = *(GLint *) (pc + 36); @@ -105,15 +99,14 @@ __glXMap2dReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) uorder = SWAPL(uorder); vorder = SWAPL(vorder); } - k = __glMap2d_size(target); - return 8 * Map2Size(k, uorder, vorder); + return safe_mul(8, Map2Size(__glMap2d_size(target), uorder, vorder)); } int __glXMap2fReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) { GLenum target; - GLint uorder, vorder, k; + GLint uorder, vorder; target = *(GLenum *) (pc + 0); uorder = *(GLint *) (pc + 12); @@ -123,8 +116,7 @@ __glXMap2fReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) uorder = SWAPL(uorder); vorder = SWAPL(vorder); } - k = __glMap2f_size(target); - return 4 * Map2Size(k, uorder, vorder); + return safe_mul(4, Map2Size(__glMap2f_size(target), uorder, vorder)); } /** @@ -175,14 +167,16 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, GLint bytesPerElement, elementsPerGroup, groupsPerRow; GLint groupSize, rowSize, padding, imageSize; + if (w == 0 || h == 0 || d == 0) + return 0; + if (w < 0 || h < 0 || d < 0 || (type == GL_BITMAP && (format != GL_COLOR_INDEX && format != GL_STENCIL_INDEX))) { return -1; } - if (w == 0 || h == 0 || d == 0) - return 0; + /* proxy targets have no data */ switch (target) { case GL_PROXY_TEXTURE_1D: case GL_PROXY_TEXTURE_2D: @@ -199,6 +193,12 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, return 0; } + /* real data has to have real sizes */ + if (imageHeight < 0 || rowLength < 0 || skipImages < 0 || skipRows < 0) + return -1; + if (alignment != 1 && alignment != 2 && alignment != 4 && alignment != 8) + return -1; + if (type == GL_BITMAP) { if (rowLength > 0) { groupsPerRow = rowLength; @@ -207,11 +207,14 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, groupsPerRow = w; } rowSize = bits_to_bytes(groupsPerRow); + if (rowSize < 0) + return -1; padding = (rowSize % alignment); if (padding) { rowSize += alignment - padding; } - return ((h + skipRows) * rowSize); + + return safe_mul(safe_add(h, skipRows), rowSize); } else { switch (format) { @@ -303,6 +306,7 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, default: return -1; } + /* known safe by the switches above, not checked */ groupSize = bytesPerElement * elementsPerGroup; if (rowLength > 0) { groupsPerRow = rowLength; @@ -310,18 +314,21 @@ __glXImageSize(GLenum format, GLenum type, GLenum target, else { groupsPerRow = w; } - rowSize = groupsPerRow * groupSize; + + if ((rowSize = safe_mul(groupsPerRow, groupSize)) < 0) + return -1; padding = (rowSize % alignment); if (padding) { rowSize += alignment - padding; } - if (imageHeight > 0) { - imageSize = (imageHeight + skipRows) * rowSize; - } - else { - imageSize = (h + skipRows) * rowSize; - } - return ((d + skipImages) * imageSize); + + if (imageHeight > 0) + h = imageHeight; + h = safe_add(h, skipRows); + + imageSize = safe_mul(h, rowSize); + + return safe_mul(safe_add(d, skipImages), imageSize); } } @@ -445,9 +452,7 @@ __glXSeparableFilter2DReqSize(const GLbyte * pc, Bool swap) /* XXX Should rowLength be used for either or both image? */ image1size = __glXImageSize(format, type, 0, w, 1, 1, 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment); - image1size = __GLX_PAD(image1size); image2size = __glXImageSize(format, type, 0, h, 1, 1, 0, rowLength, 0, 0, alignment); - return image1size + image2size; - + return safe_add(safe_pad(image1size), image2size); } -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Length_checking_for_GLXRender_requests.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Length checking for GLXRender requests (v2) References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb v2: Remove can't-happen comparison for cmdlen < 0 (Michal Srb) Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/glxcmds.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c index 0521b58..4c2e616 100644 --- a/glx/glxcmds.c +++ b/glx/glxcmds.c @@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderReq; while (left > 0) { __GLXrenderSizeData entry; - int extra; + int extra = 0; __GLXdispatchRenderProcPtr proc; int err; @@ -2042,6 +2042,9 @@ __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) cmdlen = hdr->length; opcode = hdr->opcode; + if (left < cmdlen) + return BadLength; + /* ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data. */ @@ -2055,6 +2058,10 @@ __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) return __glXError(GLXBadRenderRequest); } + if (cmdlen < entry.bytes) { + return BadLength; + } + if (entry.varsize) { /* variable size command */ extra = (*entry.varsize) (pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE, @@ -2062,17 +2069,9 @@ __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) if (extra < 0) { return BadLength; } - if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + extra)) { - return BadLength; - } } - else { - /* constant size command */ - if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes)) { - return BadLength; - } - } - if (left < cmdlen) { + + if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry.bytes, extra))) { return BadLength; } -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Length_checking_for_RenderLarge_requests.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Length checking for RenderLarge requests (v2) References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb This is a half-measure until we start passing request length into the varsize function, but it's better than the nothing we had before. v2: Verify that there's at least a large render header's worth of dataBytes (Julien Cristau) Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/glxcmds.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/glxcmds.c b/glx/glxcmds.c index 4c2e616..0e7efcc 100644 --- a/glx/glxcmds.c +++ b/glx/glxcmds.c @@ -2107,6 +2107,8 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXRenderLargeReq); + req = (xGLXRenderLargeReq *) pc; if (client->swapped) { __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); @@ -2122,12 +2124,14 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); return error; } + if (safe_pad(req->dataBytes) < 0) + return BadLength; dataBytes = req->dataBytes; /* ** Check the request length. */ - if ((req->length << 2) != __GLX_PAD(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { + if ((req->length << 2) != safe_pad(dataBytes) + sz_xGLXRenderLargeReq) { client->errorValue = req->length; /* Reset in case this isn't 1st request. */ __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); @@ -2137,7 +2141,7 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) if (cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar == 0) { __GLXrenderSizeData entry; - int extra; + int extra = 0; size_t cmdlen; int err; @@ -2150,13 +2154,17 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) return __glXError(GLXBadLargeRequest); } + if (dataBytes < __GLX_RENDER_LARGE_HDR_SIZE) + return BadLength; + hdr = (__GLXrenderLargeHeader *) pc; if (client->swapped) { __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->length); __GLX_SWAP_INT(&hdr->opcode); } - cmdlen = hdr->length; opcode = hdr->opcode; + if ((cmdlen = safe_pad(hdr->length)) < 0) + return BadLength; /* ** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data. @@ -2178,17 +2186,13 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) if (extra < 0) { return BadLength; } - /* large command's header is 4 bytes longer, so add 4 */ - if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + 4 + extra)) { - return BadLength; - } } - else { - /* constant size command */ - if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + 4)) { - return BadLength; - } + + /* the +4 is safe because we know entry.bytes is small */ + if (cmdlen != safe_pad(safe_add(entry.bytes + 4, extra))) { + return BadLength; } + /* ** Make enough space in the buffer, then copy the entire request. */ @@ -2215,6 +2219,7 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) ** We are receiving subsequent (i.e. not the first) requests of a ** multi request command. */ + int bytesSoFar; /* including this packet */ /* ** Check the request number and the total request count. @@ -2233,11 +2238,18 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) /* ** Check that we didn't get too much data. */ - if ((cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar + dataBytes) > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { + if ((bytesSoFar = safe_add(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, dataBytes)) < 0) { + client->errorValue = dataBytes; + __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); + return __glXError(GLXBadLargeRequest); + } + + if (bytesSoFar > cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { client->errorValue = dataBytes; __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); return __glXError(GLXBadLargeRequest); } + memcpy(cl->largeCmdBuf + cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar, pc, dataBytes); cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar += dataBytes; cl->largeCmdRequestsSoFar++; @@ -2241,17 +2253,16 @@ __glXDisp_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * ** This is the last request; it must have enough bytes to complete ** the command. */ - /* NOTE: the two pad macros have been added below; they are needed - ** because the client library pads the total byte count, but not - ** the per-request byte counts. The Protocol Encoding says the - ** total byte count should not be padded, so a proposal will be - ** made to the ARB to relax the padding constraint on the total - ** byte count, thus preserving backward compatibility. Meanwhile, - ** the padding done below fixes a bug that did not allow - ** large commands of odd sizes to be accepted by the server. + /* NOTE: the pad macro below is needed because the client library + ** pads the total byte count, but not the per-request byte counts. + ** The Protocol Encoding says the total byte count should not be + ** padded, so a proposal will be made to the ARB to relax the + ** padding constraint on the total byte count, thus preserving + ** backward compatibility. Meanwhile, the padding done below + ** fixes a bug that did not allow large commands of odd sizes to + ** be accepted by the server. */ - if (__GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != - __GLX_PAD(cl->largeCmdBytesTotal)) { + if (safe_pad(cl->largeCmdBytesSoFar) != cl->largeCmdBytesTotal) { client->errorValue = dataBytes; __glXResetLargeCommandStatus(cl); return __glXError(GLXBadLargeRequest); ++++++ U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_single_request.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Length checking for non-generated single requests (v2) References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb v2: Fix single versus vendor-private length checking for ARB_imaging subset extensions. (Julien Cristau) v3: Fix single versus vendor-private length checking for ARB_imaging subset extensions. (Julien Cristau) Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/indirect_texture_compression.c | 4 ++++ glx/single2.c | 23 +++++++++++++++---- glx/single2swap.c | 19 ++++++++++++---- glx/singlepix.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ glx/singlepixswap.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 5 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/indirect_texture_compression.c b/glx/indirect_texture_compression.c index cda7656..1ebf7f3 100644 --- a/glx/indirect_texture_compression.c +++ b/glx/indirect_texture_compression.c @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ __glXDisp_GetCompressedTexImage(struct __GLXclientStateRec *cl, GLbyte * pc) __GLXcontext *const cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error); ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 8); + pc += __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE; if (cx != NULL) { const GLenum target = *(GLenum *) (pc + 0); @@ -87,6 +89,8 @@ __glXDispSwap_GetCompressedTexImage(struct __GLXclientStateRec *cl, GLbyte * pc) __glXForceCurrent(cl, bswap_32(req->contextTag), &error); ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 8); + pc += __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE; if (cx != NULL) { const GLenum target = (GLenum) bswap_32(*(int *) (pc + 0)); diff --git a/glx/single2.c b/glx/single2.c index 53b661d..a6ea614 100644 --- a/glx/single2.c +++ b/glx/single2.c @@ -45,11 +45,14 @@ int __glXDisp_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; GLsizei size; GLenum type; __GLXcontext *cx; int error; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 8); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -76,10 +79,13 @@ __glXDisp_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDisp_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; GLsizei size; int error; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -104,7 +110,7 @@ __glXDisp_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { - ClientPtr client; + ClientPtr client = cl->client; xGLXRenderModeReply reply; __GLXcontext *cx; GLint nitems = 0, retBytes = 0, retval, newModeCheck; @@ -112,6 +118,8 @@ __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) GLenum newMode; int error; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -188,7 +196,6 @@ __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) ** selection array, as per the API for glRenderMode itself. */ noChangeAllowed:; - client = cl->client; reply = (xGLXRenderModeReply) { .type = X_Reply, .sequenceNumber = client->sequence, @@ -207,9 +214,12 @@ __glXDisp_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDisp_Flush(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; int error; + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -223,10 +233,12 @@ __glXDisp_Flush(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDisp_Finish(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; - ClientPtr client; int error; + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -317,7 +329,7 @@ __glXcombine_strings(const char *cext_string, const char *sext_string) int DoGetString(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLboolean need_swap) { - ClientPtr client; + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; GLenum name; const char *string; @@ -327,6 +339,8 @@ DoGetString(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLboolean need_swap) char *buf = NULL, *buf1 = NULL; GLint length = 0; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + /* If the client has the opposite byte order, swap the contextTag and * the name. */ @@ -343,7 +357,6 @@ DoGetString(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLboolean need_swap) pc += __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE; name = *(GLenum *) (pc + 0); string = (const char *) glGetString(name); - client = cl->client; if (string == NULL) string = ""; diff --git a/glx/single2swap.c b/glx/single2swap.c index 764501f..5349069 100644 --- a/glx/single2swap.c +++ b/glx/single2swap.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int __glXDispSwap_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; GLsizei size; GLenum type; @@ -48,6 +49,8 @@ __glXDispSwap_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) __GLXcontext *cx; int error; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 8); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -77,12 +80,15 @@ __glXDispSwap_FeedbackBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; GLsizei size; __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; int error; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -109,7 +115,7 @@ __glXDispSwap_SelectBuffer(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { - ClientPtr client; + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; xGLXRenderModeReply reply; GLint nitems = 0, retBytes = 0, retval, newModeCheck; @@ -120,6 +126,8 @@ __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_ARRAY_VARIABLES; int error; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -200,7 +208,6 @@ __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) ** selection array, as per the API for glRenderMode itself. */ noChangeAllowed:; - client = cl->client; reply = (xGLXRenderModeReply) { .type = X_Reply, .sequenceNumber = client->sequence, @@ -224,11 +231,14 @@ __glXDispSwap_RenderMode(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_Flush(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; int error; __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -243,12 +253,14 @@ __glXDispSwap_Flush(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_Finish(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; __GLXcontext *cx; - ClientPtr client; int error; __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXSingleReq); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -260,7 +272,6 @@ __glXDispSwap_Finish(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) cx->hasUnflushedCommands = GL_FALSE; /* Send empty reply packet to indicate finish is finished */ - client = cl->client; __GLX_BEGIN_REPLY(0); __GLX_PUT_RETVAL(0); __GLX_SWAP_REPLY_HEADER(); diff --git a/glx/singlepix.c b/glx/singlepix.c index 8b6c261..54ed7fd 100644 --- a/glx/singlepix.c +++ b/glx/singlepix.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ __glXDisp_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int error; char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 28); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -100,6 +102,8 @@ __glXDisp_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; GLint width = 0, height = 0, depth = 1; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 20); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -157,6 +161,8 @@ __glXDisp_GetPolygonStipple(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) GLubyte answerBuffer[200]; char *answer; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { return error; @@ -217,15 +223,13 @@ GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, 1, 1); compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, height, 1, 1); - if (compsize < 0) + if ((compsize = safe_pad(compsize)) < 0) return BadLength; - if (compsize2 < 0) + if ((compsize2 = safe_pad(compsize2)) < 0) return BadLength; - compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); - compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, swapBytes); - __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize + compsize2, 1); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, safe_add(compsize, compsize2), 1); __glXClearErrorOccured(); glGetSeparableFilter(*(GLenum *) (pc + 0), *(GLenum *) (pc + 4), *(GLenum *) (pc + 8), answer, answer + compsize, NULL); @@ -249,7 +253,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetSeparableFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -257,7 +262,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetSeparableFilterEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetSeparableFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -323,7 +329,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetConvolutionFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -331,7 +338,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetConvolutionFilterEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetConvolutionFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -390,7 +398,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetHistogram(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetHistogram(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -398,7 +407,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetHistogramEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetHistogram(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -450,7 +460,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetMinmax(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetMinmax(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -458,7 +469,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetMinmaxEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetMinmax(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -517,7 +529,8 @@ int __glXDisp_GetColorTable(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetColorTable(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -525,6 +538,7 @@ int __glXDisp_GetColorTableSGI(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); - + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetColorTable(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } diff --git a/glx/singlepixswap.c b/glx/singlepixswap.c index 8dc304f..9eff592 100644 --- a/glx/singlepixswap.c +++ b/glx/singlepixswap.c @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ __glXDispSwap_ReadPixels(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int error; char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 28); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -114,6 +116,8 @@ __glXDispSwap_GetTexImage(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) char *answer, answerBuffer[200]; GLint width = 0, height = 0, depth = 1; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 20); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -184,6 +188,8 @@ __glXDispSwap_GetPolygonStipple(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 4); + __GLX_SWAP_INT(&((xGLXSingleReq *) pc)->contextTag); cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc), &error); if (!cx) { @@ -251,15 +257,13 @@ GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, GLXContextTag tag) compsize = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, width, 1, 1); compsize2 = __glGetTexImage_size(target, 1, format, type, height, 1, 1); - if (compsize < 0) + if ((compsize = safe_pad(compsize)) < 0) return BadLength; - if (compsize2 < 0) + if ((compsize2 = safe_pad(compsize2)) < 0) return BadLength; - compsize = __GLX_PAD(compsize); - compsize2 = __GLX_PAD(compsize2); glPixelStorei(GL_PACK_SWAP_BYTES, !swapBytes); - __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, compsize + compsize2, 1); + __GLX_GET_ANSWER_BUFFER(answer, cl, safe_add(compsize, compsize2), 1); __glXClearErrorOccured(); glGetSeparableFilter(*(GLenum *) (pc + 0), *(GLenum *) (pc + 4), *(GLenum *) (pc + 8), answer, answer + compsize, NULL); @@ -285,7 +289,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetSeparableFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetSeparableFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -293,7 +299,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetSeparableFilterEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetSeparableFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -367,7 +375,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetConvolutionFilter(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetConvolutionFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -375,7 +385,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetConvolutionFilterEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetConvolutionFilter(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -441,7 +453,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetHistogram(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetHistogram(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -449,7 +463,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetHistogramEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetHistogram(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -507,7 +523,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetMinmax(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetMinmax(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -515,7 +533,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetMinmaxEXT(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetMinmax(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -581,7 +601,9 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetColorTable(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_SINGLE_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXSingleReq, 16); return GetColorTable(cl, pc + __GLX_SINGLE_HDR_SIZE, tag); } @@ -589,6 +611,8 @@ int __glXDispSwap_GetColorTableSGI(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { const GLXContextTag tag = __GLX_GET_VENDPRIV_CONTEXT_TAG(pc); + ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 16); return GetColorTable(cl, pc + __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE, tag); } -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Length_checking_for_non_generated_vendor_private_requests.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Length-checking for non-generated vendor private requests References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/indirect_program.c | 2 ++ glx/swap_interval.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/glx/indirect_program.c b/glx/indirect_program.c index cda139e..5caee7b 100644 --- a/glx/indirect_program.c +++ b/glx/indirect_program.c @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ DoGetProgramString(struct __GLXclientStateRec *cl, GLbyte * pc, __GLXcontext *const cx = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error); ClientPtr client = cl->client; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq, 8); + pc += __GLX_VENDPRIV_HDR_SIZE; if (cx != NULL) { GLenum target; diff --git a/glx/swap_interval.c b/glx/swap_interval.c index 17bc992..2320550 100644 --- a/glx/swap_interval.c +++ b/glx/swap_interval.c @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ DoSwapInterval(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc, int do_swap) __GLXcontext *cx; GLint interval; + REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq, 4); + cx = __glXLookupContextByTag(cl, tag); if ((cx == NULL) || (cx->pGlxScreen == NULL)) { -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Pass_remaining_request_length_into_varsize.patch ++++++ ++++ 915 lines (skipped) ++++++ U_glx_Request_length_checks_for_SetClientInfoARB.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Request length checks for SetClientInfoARB References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/clientinfo.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/glx/clientinfo.c b/glx/clientinfo.c index 4aaa4c9..c5fef30 100644 --- a/glx/clientinfo.c +++ b/glx/clientinfo.c @@ -33,18 +33,21 @@ static int set_client_info(__GLXclientState * cl, xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq * req, unsigned bytes_per_version) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; char *gl_extensions; char *glx_extensions; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq); + /* Verify that the size of the packet matches the size inferred from the * sizes specified for the various fields. */ - const unsigned expected_size = sz_xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq - + (req->numVersions * bytes_per_version) - + __GLX_PAD(req->numGLExtensionBytes) - + __GLX_PAD(req->numGLXExtensionBytes); + int size = sz_xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq; + size = safe_add(size, safe_mul(req->numVersions, bytes_per_version)); + size = safe_add(size, safe_pad(req->numGLExtensionBytes)); + size = safe_add(size, safe_pad(req->numGLXExtensionBytes)); - if (req->length != (expected_size / 4)) + if (size < 0 || req->length != (size / 4)) return BadLength; /* Verify that the actual length of the GL extension string matches what's @@ -80,8 +83,11 @@ __glXDisp_SetClientInfoARB(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_SetClientInfoARB(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq *req = (xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq *) pc; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq); + req->length = bswap_16(req->length); req->numVersions = bswap_32(req->numVersions); req->numGLExtensionBytes = bswap_32(req->numGLExtensionBytes); @@ -99,8 +105,11 @@ __glXDisp_SetClientInfo2ARB(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_SetClientInfo2ARB(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq *req = (xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq *) pc; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXSetClientInfoARBReq); + req->length = bswap_16(req->length); req->numVersions = bswap_32(req->numVersions); req->numGLExtensionBytes = bswap_32(req->numGLExtensionBytes); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_glx_Top_level_length_checking_for_swapped_VendorPrivate_requests.patch ++++++ Subject: glx: Top-level length checking for swapped VendorPrivate requests References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8098 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Keith Packard Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Michal Srb Reviewed-by: Andy Ritger Signed-off-by: Adam Jackson Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- glx/glxcmdsswap.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/glx/glxcmdsswap.c b/glx/glxcmdsswap.c index 5d179f3..9ec1222 100644 --- a/glx/glxcmdsswap.c +++ b/glx/glxcmdsswap.c @@ -958,11 +958,13 @@ __glXDispSwap_RenderLarge(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_VendorPrivate(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; xGLXVendorPrivateReq *req; GLint vendorcode; __GLXdispatchVendorPrivProcPtr proc; __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateReq); req = (xGLXVendorPrivateReq *) pc; __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); @@ -985,11 +987,13 @@ __glXDispSwap_VendorPrivate(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) int __glXDispSwap_VendorPrivateWithReply(__GLXclientState * cl, GLbyte * pc) { + ClientPtr client = cl->client; xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq *req; GLint vendorcode; __GLXdispatchVendorPrivProcPtr proc; __GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES; + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq); req = (xGLXVendorPrivateWithReplyReq *) pc; __GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_include-vencrypt-only-if-any-subtype-present.patch ++++++ Index: common/rfb/Security.cxx =================================================================== --- common/rfb/Security.cxx (revision 5186) +++ common/rfb/Security.cxx (working copy) @@ -71,10 +71,15 @@ listrdr::U8 result; list<U32>::iterator i; - result.push_back(secTypeVeNCrypt); + bool VeNCryptPresent = false; for (i = enabledSecTypes.begin(); i != enabledSecTypes.end(); i++) - if (*i < 0x100) + if (*i < 0x100) { result.push_back(*i); + } else { + if(!VeNCryptPresent) + result.push_back(secTypeVeNCrypt); + VeNCryptPresent = true; + } return result; } ++++++ U_present_unvalidated_lengths_in_Present_extension_procs.patch ++++++ Subject: present: unvalidated lengths in Present extension procs References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8103 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau --- present/present_request.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/present/present_request.c b/present/present_request.c index 835890d..7c53e72 100644 --- a/present/present_request.c +++ b/present/present_request.c @@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ proc_present_query_capabilities (ClientPtr client) RRCrtcPtr crtc = NULL; int r; + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPresentQueryCapabilitiesReq); r = dixLookupWindow(&window, stuff->target, client, DixGetAttrAccess); switch (r) { case Success: @@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ static int sproc_present_query_version(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xPresentQueryVersionReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPresentQueryVersionReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->majorVersion); @@ -265,6 +267,7 @@ static int sproc_present_pixmap(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xPresentPixmapReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xPresentPixmapReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); @@ -284,6 +287,7 @@ static int sproc_present_notify_msc(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xPresentNotifyMSCReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPresentNotifyMSCReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); @@ -297,6 +301,7 @@ static int sproc_present_select_input (ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xPresentSelectInputReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPresentSelectInputReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); @@ -308,6 +313,7 @@ static int sproc_present_query_capabilities (ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xPresentQueryCapabilitiesReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPresentQueryCapabilitiesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->target); return (*proc_present_vector[stuff->presentReqType]) (client); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_randr_unvalidated_lengths_in_RandR_extension_swapped_procs.patch ++++++ Subject: randr: unvalidated lengths in RandR extension swapped procs References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8101 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- randr/rrsdispatch.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/randr/rrsdispatch.c b/randr/rrsdispatch.c index 08c3b6a..47558cf 100644 --- a/randr/rrsdispatch.c +++ b/randr/rrsdispatch.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SProcRRQueryVersion(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRRQueryVersionReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRRQueryVersionReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->majorVersion); swapl(&stuff->minorVersion); @@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ SProcRRGetScreenInfo(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRRGetScreenInfoReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRRGetScreenInfoReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); return (*ProcRandrVector[stuff->randrReqType]) (client); @@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ SProcRRSelectInput(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRRSelectInputReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRRSelectInputReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); swaps(&stuff->enable); @@ -152,6 +155,7 @@ SProcRRConfigureOutputProperty(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRRConfigureOutputPropertyReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRRConfigureOutputPropertyReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->output); swapl(&stuff->property); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_render_check_request_size_before_reading_it.patch ++++++ Subject: render: check request size before reading it References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8100 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Otherwise we may be reading outside of the client request. Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith --- render/render.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c index e3031da..200e0c8 100644 --- a/render/render.c +++ b/render/render.c @@ -276,11 +276,11 @@ ProcRenderQueryVersion(ClientPtr client) REQUEST(xRenderQueryVersionReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq); + pRenderClient->major_version = stuff->majorVersion; pRenderClient->minor_version = stuff->minorVersion; - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq); - if ((stuff->majorVersion * 1000 + stuff->minorVersion) < (SERVER_RENDER_MAJOR_VERSION * 1000 + SERVER_RENDER_MINOR_VERSION)) { rep.majorVersion = stuff->majorVersion; -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_render_unvalidated_lengths_in_Render_extn_swapped_procs.patch ++++++ Subject: render: unvalidated lengths in Render extn. swapped procs References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8100 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- render/render.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c index 200e0c8..723f380 100644 --- a/render/render.c +++ b/render/render.c @@ -1995,7 +1995,7 @@ static int SProcRenderQueryVersion(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderQueryVersionReq); - + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->majorVersion); swapl(&stuff->minorVersion); @@ -2006,6 +2006,7 @@ static int SProcRenderQueryPictFormats(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderQueryPictFormatsReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryPictFormatsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); } @@ -2014,6 +2015,7 @@ static int SProcRenderQueryPictIndexValues(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderQueryPictIndexValuesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->format); return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); @@ -2029,6 +2031,7 @@ static int SProcRenderCreatePicture(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderCreatePictureReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreatePictureReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->pid); swapl(&stuff->drawable); @@ -2042,6 +2045,7 @@ static int SProcRenderChangePicture(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderChangePictureReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderChangePictureReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->picture); swapl(&stuff->mask); @@ -2053,6 +2057,7 @@ static int SProcRenderSetPictureClipRectangles(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderSetPictureClipRectanglesReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderSetPictureClipRectanglesReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->picture); swaps(&stuff->xOrigin); @@ -2065,6 +2070,7 @@ static int SProcRenderFreePicture(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderFreePictureReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreePictureReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->picture); return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); @@ -2074,6 +2080,7 @@ static int SProcRenderComposite(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderCompositeReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCompositeReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->src); swapl(&stuff->mask); @@ -2093,6 +2100,7 @@ static int SProcRenderScale(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderScaleReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderScaleReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->src); swapl(&stuff->dst); @@ -2193,6 +2201,7 @@ static int SProcRenderCreateGlyphSet(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->gsid); swapl(&stuff->format); @@ -2203,6 +2212,7 @@ static int SProcRenderReferenceGlyphSet(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderReferenceGlyphSetReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->gsid); swapl(&stuff->existing); @@ -2213,6 +2223,7 @@ static int SProcRenderFreeGlyphSet(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->glyphset); return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client); @@ -2227,6 +2238,7 @@ SProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client) xGlyphInfo *gi; REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderAddGlyphsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->glyphset); swapl(&stuff->nglyphs); @@ -2261,6 +2273,7 @@ static int SProcRenderFreeGlyphs(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xRenderFreeGlyphsReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderFreeGlyphsReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->glyphset); SwapRestL(stuff); @@ -2278,6 +2291,7 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client) int size; REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq); + REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq); switch (stuff->renderReqType) { default: -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_tigervnc-Add-AccessSetDesktopSize-right.patch ++++++ Subject: Add AccessSetDesktopSize right. Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: b318b8f978a6f6b99578ec39a5dbd9b7dc860505 References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb So clients with limited access rights can not affect it. --- common/rfb/SConnection.cxx | 15 ++++++++------- common/rfb/SConnection.h | 15 ++++++++------- common/rfb/ServerCore.cxx | 4 ++++ common/rfb/ServerCore.h | 1 + common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx b/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx index 4bf0f93..20182a0 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx @@ -37,13 +37,14 @@ using namespace rfb; static LogWriter vlog("SConnection"); // AccessRights values -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessView = 0x0001; -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessKeyEvents = 0x0002; -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessPtrEvents = 0x0004; -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessCutText = 0x0008; -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessDefault = 0x03ff; -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessNoQuery = 0x0400; -const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessFull = 0xffff; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessView = 0x0001; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessKeyEvents = 0x0002; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessPtrEvents = 0x0004; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessCutText = 0x0008; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessSetDesktopSize = 0x0010; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessDefault = 0x03ff; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessNoQuery = 0x0400; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessFull = 0xffff; SConnection::SConnection(bool reverseConnection_) diff --git a/common/rfb/SConnection.h b/common/rfb/SConnection.h index f712417..0379b17 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SConnection.h +++ b/common/rfb/SConnection.h @@ -122,13 +122,14 @@ namespace rfb { // is up to the derived class. typedef rdr::U16 AccessRights; - static const AccessRights AccessView; // View display contents - static const AccessRights AccessKeyEvents; // Send key events - static const AccessRights AccessPtrEvents; // Send pointer events - static const AccessRights AccessCutText; // Send/receive clipboard events - static const AccessRights AccessDefault; // The default rights, INCLUDING FUTURE ONES - static const AccessRights AccessNoQuery; // Connect without local user accepting - static const AccessRights AccessFull; // All of the available AND FUTURE rights + static const AccessRights AccessView; // View display contents + static const AccessRights AccessKeyEvents; // Send key events + static const AccessRights AccessPtrEvents; // Send pointer events + static const AccessRights AccessCutText; // Send/receive clipboard events + static const AccessRights AccessSetDesktopSize; // Change desktop size + static const AccessRights AccessDefault; // The default rights, INCLUDING FUTURE ONES + static const AccessRights AccessNoQuery; // Connect without local user accepting + static const AccessRights AccessFull; // All of the available AND FUTURE rights virtual void setAccessRights(AccessRights ar) = 0; // Other methods diff --git a/common/rfb/ServerCore.cxx b/common/rfb/ServerCore.cxx index ae2fd24..b11a352 100644 --- a/common/rfb/ServerCore.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/ServerCore.cxx @@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ rfb::BoolParameter rfb::Server::sendCutText ("SendCutText", "Send clipboard changes to clients.", true); +rfb::BoolParameter rfb::Server::acceptSetDesktopSize +("AcceptSetDesktopSize", + "Accept set desktop size events from clients.", + true); rfb::BoolParameter rfb::Server::queryConnect ("QueryConnect", "Prompt the local user to accept or reject incoming connections.", diff --git a/common/rfb/ServerCore.h b/common/rfb/ServerCore.h index e12a8bc..5fc996f 100644 --- a/common/rfb/ServerCore.h +++ b/common/rfb/ServerCore.h @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ namespace rfb { static BoolParameter acceptPointerEvents; static BoolParameter acceptCutText; static BoolParameter sendCutText; + static BoolParameter acceptSetDesktopSize; static BoolParameter queryConnect; }; diff --git a/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx b/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx index 618048a..274c496 100644 --- a/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx @@ -584,6 +584,9 @@ void VNCSConnectionST::setDesktopSize(int fb_width, int fb_height, { unsigned int result; + if (!(accessRights & AccessSetDesktopSize)) return; + if (!rfb::Server::acceptSetDesktopSize) return; + // Don't bother the desktop with an invalid configuration if (!layout.validate(fb_width, fb_height)) { writer()->writeExtendedDesktopSize(reasonClient, resultInvalid, -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_tigervnc-Allow-SSecurity-to-specify-AccessRights-for-SConnect.patch ++++++ Subject: Allow SSecurity to specify AccessRights for SConnection. Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: 8d1ee00bea125fa5f3e6ad7cf816e80890fb17d3 References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb SConnection has AccessRights property that specifies what connected client can do. Set this property to value given by SSecurity after successful authentication. This way individual SSecurity subclasses can accept clients but restrict their access. --- common/rfb/SConnection.cxx | 2 ++ common/rfb/SConnection.h | 1 - common/rfb/SSecurity.h | 5 +++-- common/rfb/Security.h | 1 - common/rfb/SecurityServer.h | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -223,6 +224,7 @@ void SConnection::processSecurityMsg() if (done) { state_ = RFBSTATE_QUERYING; queryConnection(ssecurity->getUserName()); + setAccessRights(ssecurity->getAccessRights()); } } catch (AuthFailureException& e) { vlog.error("AuthFailureException: %s", e.str()); Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SConnection.h =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/SConnection.h +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SConnection.h @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include namespace rfb { Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SSecurity.h =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/SSecurity.h +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SSecurity.h @@ -44,13 +44,12 @@ #define __RFB_SSECURITY_H__ #include +#include #include #include <list> namespace rfb { - class SConnection; - class SSecurity { public: virtual ~SSecurity() {} @@ -63,6 +62,8 @@ namespace rfb { // necessary. Null may be returned to indicate that there is no user name // for this security type. virtual const char* getUserName() const = 0; + + virtual SConnection::AccessRights getAccessRights() const { return SConnection::AccessDefault; } }; } Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/Security.h =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/Security.h +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/Security.h @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include <list> Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SecurityServer.h =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/SecurityServer.h +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SecurityServer.h @@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ #include #include -#include namespace rfb { + + class SSecurity; class SecurityServer : public Security { public: ++++++ U_tigervnc-Limit-access-to-non-shared-mode.patch ++++++ Subject: Limit access to non-shared mode Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: e7be49b57353e66fcbe8702edbeeed393e254ff9 References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb A read-only client should not be allowed to kick out other clients. It will be forced into shared mode, or refused the connection, depending on the neverShared parameter. --- common/rfb/SConnection.cxx | 1 + common/rfb/SConnection.h | 1 + common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx b/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx index 20182a0..99a4850 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/SConnection.cxx @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessKeyEvents = 0x0002; const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessPtrEvents = 0x0004; const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessCutText = 0x0008; const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessSetDesktopSize = 0x0010; +const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessNonShared = 0x0020; const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessDefault = 0x03ff; const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessNoQuery = 0x0400; const SConnection::AccessRights SConnection::AccessFull = 0xffff; diff --git a/common/rfb/SConnection.h b/common/rfb/SConnection.h index 0379b17..005a7a8 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SConnection.h +++ b/common/rfb/SConnection.h @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ namespace rfb { static const AccessRights AccessPtrEvents; // Send pointer events static const AccessRights AccessCutText; // Send/receive clipboard events static const AccessRights AccessSetDesktopSize; // Change desktop size + static const AccessRights AccessNonShared; // Exclusive access to the server static const AccessRights AccessDefault; // The default rights, INCLUDING FUTURE ONES static const AccessRights AccessNoQuery; // Connect without local user accepting static const AccessRights AccessFull; // All of the available AND FUTURE rights diff --git a/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx b/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx index 274c496..e30b4f4 100644 --- a/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/VNCSConnectionST.cxx @@ -445,9 +445,10 @@ void VNCSConnectionST::clientInit(bool shared) { lastEventTime = time(0); if (rfb::Server::alwaysShared || reverseConnection) shared = true; + if (!(accessRights & AccessNonShared)) shared = true; if (rfb::Server::neverShared) shared = false; if (!shared) { - if (rfb::Server::disconnectClients) { + if (rfb::Server::disconnectClients && (accessRights & AccessNonShared)) { // - Close all the other connected clients vlog.debug("non-shared connection - closing clients"); server->closeClients("Non-shared connection requested", getSock()); -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_tigervnc-Make-sure-attributes-propagate-through-security-wrap.patch ++++++ Subject: Make sure attributes propagate through security wrappers Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: 555815a4e3e14c67ac00130f7affa0138ff47d20 References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb Both SSecurityVeNCrypt and SSecurityStack are wrappers around other security objects, so they need to delegate the properties of those sub-objects properly. --- common/rfb/SSecurityStack.cxx | 17 +++++++++++++++++ common/rfb/SSecurityStack.h | 1 + common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.cxx | 13 +++++++++++++ common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.h | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.cxx index 9ddc9f2..478ce4f 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.cxx @@ -65,3 +65,20 @@ const char* SSecurityStack::getUserName() const return c; } + +SConnection::AccessRights SSecurityStack::getAccessRights() const +{ + SConnection::AccessRights accessRights; + + if (!state0 && !state1) + return SSecurity::getAccessRights(); + + accessRights = SConnection::AccessFull; + + if (state0) + accessRights &= state0->getAccessRights(); + if (state1) + accessRights &= state1->getAccessRights(); + + return accessRights; +} diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.h b/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.h index c80a3b9..dd743d2 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.h +++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityStack.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ namespace rfb { virtual bool processMsg(SConnection* cc); virtual int getType() const { return type; }; virtual const char* getUserName() const; + virtual SConnection::AccessRights getAccessRights() const; protected: short state; SSecurity* state0; diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.cxx index 39647f6..7c13749 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.cxx @@ -171,3 +171,16 @@ bool SSecurityVeNCrypt::processMsg(SConnection* sc) return ssecurity->processMsg(sc); } +const char* SSecurityVeNCrypt::getUserName() const +{ + if (ssecurity == NULL) + return NULL; + return ssecurity->getUserName(); +} + +SConnection::AccessRights SSecurityVeNCrypt::getAccessRights() const +{ + if (ssecurity == NULL) + return SSecurity::getAccessRights(); + return ssecurity->getAccessRights(); +} diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.h b/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.h index 849a702..f9c753f 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.h +++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityVeNCrypt.h @@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ namespace rfb { SSecurityVeNCrypt(SecurityServer *sec); ~SSecurityVeNCrypt(); virtual bool processMsg(SConnection* sc);// { return true; } - virtual int getType() const { return secTypeVeNCrypt; } - virtual const char* getUserName() const { return NULL; } + virtual int getType() const { return chosenType; } + virtual const char* getUserName() const; + virtual SConnection::AccessRights getAccessRights() const; protected: SSecurity *ssecurity; -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_tigervnc-Use-new-API-for-getVncAuthPasswd.patch ++++++ Subject: Use new API for getVncAuthPasswd() Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: e84db6535eb624f5b4c81eefa1703267acf16cc2 References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb --- win/vncconfig/Authentication.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/win/vncconfig/Authentication.h b/win/vncconfig/Authentication.h index 534646c..c2aba91 100644 --- a/win/vncconfig/Authentication.h +++ b/win/vncconfig/Authentication.h @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ namespace rfb { static bool haveVncPassword() { - PlainPasswd password(SSecurityVncAuth::vncAuthPasswd.getVncAuthPasswd()); + PlainPasswd password, passwordReadOnly; + SSecurityVncAuth::vncAuthPasswd.getVncAuthPasswd(&password, &passwordReadOnly); return password.buf && strlen(password.buf) != 0; } -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_tigervnc-VncAuth-Read-and-use-readonly-password.patch ++++++ Subject: VncAuth: Read and use readonly password. Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: 270a31cf172a5ea15061ae4bffdad5780e4014ad References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb Try to read second password (for read only access) from rfbauth file. If client sent second password instead of first one, allow him read only access. --- common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.cxx | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.h | 8 ++++-- 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.cxx index ca81bf3..05488f6 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.cxx +++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.cxx @@ -49,10 +49,27 @@ VncAuthPasswdParameter SSecurityVncAuth::vncAuthPasswd "access the server", &SSecurityVncAuth::vncAuthPasswdFile); SSecurityVncAuth::SSecurityVncAuth(void) - : sentChallenge(false), responsePos(0), pg(&vncAuthPasswd) + : sentChallenge(false), responsePos(0), pg(&vncAuthPasswd), accessRights(0) { } +bool SSecurityVncAuth::verifyResponse(const PlainPasswd &password) +{ + rdr::U8 expectedResponse[vncAuthChallengeSize]; + + // Calculate the expected response + rdr::U8 key[8]; + int pwdLen = strlen(password.buf); + for (int i=0; i<8; i++) + key[i] = igetInStream(); @@ -72,25 +89,23 @@ bool SSecurityVncAuth::processMsg(SConnection* sc) if (responsePos < vncAuthChallengeSize) return false; - PlainPasswd passwd(pg->getVncAuthPasswd()); + PlainPasswd passwd, passwdReadOnly; + pg->getVncAuthPasswd(&passwd, &passwdReadOnly); if (!passwd.buf) throw AuthFailureException("No password configured for VNC Auth"); - // Calculate the expected response - rdr::U8 key[8]; - int pwdLen = strlen(passwd.buf); - for (int i=0; i<8; i++) - key[i] = igetData()); if (!fname.buf[0]) { vlog.info("neither %s nor %s params set", getName(), passwdFile->getName()); - return 0; + return; } FILE* fp = fopen(fname.buf, "r"); if (!fp) { vlog.error("opening password file '%s' failed",fname.buf); - return 0; + return; } vlog.debug("reading password file"); - obfuscated.buf = new char[128]; - obfuscated.length = fread(obfuscated.buf, 1, 128, fp); + obfuscated.buf = new char[8]; + obfuscated.length = fread(obfuscated.buf, 1, 8, fp); + obfuscatedReadOnly.buf = new char[8]; + obfuscatedReadOnly.length = fread(obfuscatedReadOnly.buf, 1, 8, fp); fclose(fp); } else { vlog.info("%s parameter not set", getName()); @@ -127,10 +144,11 @@ char* VncAuthPasswdParameter::getVncAuthPasswd() { } try { - PlainPasswd password(obfuscated); - return password.takeBuf(); + PlainPasswd plainPassword(obfuscated); + password->replaceBuf(plainPassword.takeBuf()); + PlainPasswd plainPasswordReadOnly(obfuscatedReadOnly); + readOnlyPassword->replaceBuf(plainPasswordReadOnly.takeBuf()); } catch (...) { - return 0; } } diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.h b/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.h index 8a2d0f6..1aa3a27 100644 --- a/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.h +++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityVncAuth.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #define __RFB_SSECURITYVNCAUTH_H__ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -35,13 +36,13 @@ namespace rfb { public: // getPasswd() returns a string or null if unsuccessful. The // SSecurityVncAuth object delete[]s the string when done. - virtual char* getVncAuthPasswd()=0; + virtual void getVncAuthPasswd(PlainPasswd *password, PlainPasswd *readOnlyPassword)=0; }; class VncAuthPasswdParameter : public VncAuthPasswdGetter, BinaryParameter { public: VncAuthPasswdParameter(const char* name, const char* desc, StringParameter* passwdFile_); - virtual char* getVncAuthPasswd(); + virtual void getVncAuthPasswd(PlainPasswd *password, PlainPasswd *readOnlyPassword); protected: StringParameter* passwdFile; }; @@ -52,15 +53,18 @@ namespace rfb { virtual bool processMsg(SConnection* sc); virtual int getType() const {return secTypeVncAuth;} virtual const char* getUserName() const {return 0;} + virtual SConnection::AccessRights getAccessRights() const { return accessRights; } static StringParameter vncAuthPasswdFile; static VncAuthPasswdParameter vncAuthPasswd; private: + bool verifyResponse(const PlainPasswd &password); enum {vncAuthChallengeSize = 16}; rdr::U8 challenge[vncAuthChallengeSize]; rdr::U8 response[vncAuthChallengeSize]; bool sentChallenge; int responsePos; VncAuthPasswdGetter* pg; + SConnection::AccessRights accessRights; }; } #endif -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_tigervnc-vncpasswd-Ask-for-read-only-password.patch ++++++ Subject: vncpasswd: Ask for read only password. Patch-Mainline: Upstream Git-commit: dbf6355cbb69e588a4162debadb5337dd8b14ac0 References: bnc#901752 Singed-off-by: Michal Srb Ask for optional second password that is used for read only access. Save it after the main password. This is same format as tightvnc uses. --- unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx b/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx index 7ba0b22..16c925e 100644 --- a/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx +++ b/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx @@ -81,6 +81,36 @@ static int encrypt_pipe() { else return 1; } +static ObfuscatedPasswd* readpassword() { + while (true) { + PlainPasswd passwd(getpassword("Password:")); + if (!passwd.buf) { + perror("getpassword error"); + exit(1); + } + if (strlen(passwd.buf) < 6) { + if (strlen(passwd.buf) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr,"Password not changed\n"); + exit(1); + } + fprintf(stderr,"Password must be at least 6 characters - try again\n"); + continue; + } + + PlainPasswd passwd2(getpassword("Verify:")); + if (!passwd2.buf) { + perror("getpass error"); + exit(1); + } + if (strcmp(passwd.buf, passwd2.buf) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr,"Passwords don't match - try again\n"); + continue; + } + + return new ObfuscatedPasswd(passwd); + } +} + int main(int argc, char** argv) { prog = argv[0]; @@ -113,28 +143,13 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) } while (true) { - PlainPasswd passwd(getpassword("Password:")); - if (!passwd.buf) { - perror("getpassword error"); - exit(1); - } - if (strlen(passwd.buf) < 6) { - if (strlen(passwd.buf) == 0) { - fprintf(stderr,"Password not changed\n"); - exit(1); - } - fprintf(stderr,"Password must be at least 6 characters - try again\n"); - continue; - } + ObfuscatedPasswd* obfuscated = readpassword(); + ObfuscatedPasswd* obfuscatedReadOnly = 0; - PlainPasswd passwd2(getpassword("Verify:")); - if (!passwd2.buf) { - perror("getpass error"); - exit(1); - } - if (strcmp(passwd.buf, passwd2.buf) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr,"Passwords don't match - try again\n"); - continue; + fprintf(stderr, "Would you like to enter a view-only password (y/n)? "); + char yesno[3]; + if (fgets(yesno, 3, stdin) != NULL && (yesno[0] == 'y' || yesno[0] == 'Y')) { + obfuscatedReadOnly = readpassword(); } FILE* fp = fopen(fname,"w"); @@ -144,13 +159,18 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) } chmod(fname, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); - ObfuscatedPasswd obfuscated(passwd); - - if (fwrite(obfuscated.buf, obfuscated.length, 1, fp) != 1) { + if (fwrite(obfuscated->buf, obfuscated->length, 1, fp) != 1) { fprintf(stderr,"Writing to %s failed\n",fname); exit(1); } + if (obfuscatedReadOnly) { + if (fwrite(obfuscatedReadOnly->buf, obfuscatedReadOnly->length, 1, fp) != 1) { + fprintf(stderr,"Writing to %s failed\n",fname); + exit(1); + } + } + fclose(fp); return 0; -- 1.8.4.5 ++++++ U_unchecked_malloc_may_allow_unauthed_client_to_crash_Xserver.patch ++++++ Subject: unchecked malloc may allow unauthed client to crash Xserver References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8091 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb authdes_ezdecode() calls malloc() using a length provided by the connection handshake sent by a newly connected client in order to authenticate to the server, so should be treated as untrusted. It didn't check if malloc() failed before writing to the newly allocated buffer, so could lead to a server crash if the server fails to allocate memory (up to UINT16_MAX bytes, since the len field is a CARD16 in the X protocol). Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- os/rpcauth.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/os/rpcauth.c b/os/rpcauth.c index d60ea35..413cc61 100644 --- a/os/rpcauth.c +++ b/os/rpcauth.c @@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ authdes_ezdecode(const char *inmsg, int len) SVCXPRT xprt; temp_inmsg = malloc(len); + if (temp_inmsg == NULL) { + why = AUTH_FAILED; /* generic error, since there is no AUTH_BADALLOC */ + return NULL; + } memmove(temp_inmsg, inmsg, len); memset((char *) &msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_xcmisc_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXCMiscGetXIDList.patch ++++++ Subject: xcmisc: unvalidated length in SProcXCMiscGetXIDList() References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8096 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- Xext/xcmisc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/Xext/xcmisc.c b/Xext/xcmisc.c index 034bfb6..1e91010 100644 --- a/Xext/xcmisc.c +++ b/Xext/xcmisc.c @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ static int SProcXCMiscGetXIDList(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXCMiscGetXIDListReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXCMiscGetXIDListReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->count); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_xfixes_unvalidated_length_in_SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput.patch ++++++ Subject: xfixes: unvalidated length in SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput References: bnc#907268, CVE-2014-8102 Patch-Mainline: Upstream Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer --- xfixes/select.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/xfixes/select.c b/xfixes/select.c index c088ed3..e964d58 100644 --- a/xfixes/select.c +++ b/xfixes/select.c @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ SProcXFixesSelectSelectionInput(ClientPtr client) { REQUEST(xXFixesSelectSelectionInputReq); + REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesSelectSelectionInputReq); swaps(&stuff->length); swapl(&stuff->window); swapl(&stuff->selection); -- 1.7.9.2 ++++++ U_xkb-check-strings-length-against-request-size.patch ++++++ Git-commit: cc830bd3a5b44796f1e8721f336dca4f565a8130 Author: Olivier Fourdan Subject: xkb: Check strings length against request size References: bnc#915810, CVE-2015-0255 Signed-off-by: Michal Srb Ensure that the given strings length in an XkbSetGeometry request remain within the limits of the size of the request. Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan --- xkb/xkb.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) Index: xorg-server-1.15.2/xkb/xkb.c =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.15.2.orig/xkb/xkb.c +++ xorg-server-1.15.2/xkb/xkb.c @@ -4957,26 +4957,29 @@ ProcXkbGetGeometry(ClientPtr client) /***====================================================================***/ -static char * -_GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, Bool swap) +static Status +_GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str) { - char *wire, *str; - CARD16 len, *plen; + char *wire, *next; + CARD16 len; wire = *wire_inout; - plen = (CARD16 *) wire; - if (swap) { - swaps(plen); - } - len = *plen; - str = malloc(len + 1); - if (str) { - memcpy(str, &wire[2], len); - str[len] = '\0'; + len = *(CARD16 *) wire; + if (client->swapped) { + swaps(&len); } - wire += XkbPaddedSize(len + 2); - *wire_inout = wire; - return str; + next = wire + XkbPaddedSize(len + 2); + /* Check we're still within the size of the request */ + if (client->req_len < + bytes_to_int32(next - (char *) client->requestBuffer)) + return BadValue; + *str = malloc(len + 1); + if (!*str) + return BadAlloc; + memcpy(*str, &wire[2], len); + *(*str + len) = '\0'; + *wire_inout = next; + return Success; } static Status @@ -4986,6 +4989,7 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, char *wire; xkbDoodadWireDesc *dWire; XkbDoodadPtr doodad; + Status status; dWire = (xkbDoodadWireDesc *) (*wire_inout); wire = (char *) &dWire[1]; @@ -5033,8 +5037,14 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, doodad->text.width = dWire->text.width; doodad->text.height = dWire->text.height; doodad->text.color_ndx = dWire->text.colorNdx; - doodad->text.text = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); - doodad->text.font = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &doodad->text.text); + if (status != Success) + return status; + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &doodad->text.font); + if (status != Success) { + free (doodad->text.text); + return status; + } break; case XkbIndicatorDoodad: if (dWire->indicator.onColorNdx >= geom->num_colors) { @@ -5069,7 +5079,9 @@ _CheckSetDoodad(char **wire_inout, } doodad->logo.color_ndx = dWire->logo.colorNdx; doodad->logo.shape_ndx = dWire->logo.shapeNdx; - doodad->logo.logo_name = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &doodad->logo.logo_name); + if (status != Success) + return status; break; default: client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x4F, dWire->any.type); @@ -5301,18 +5313,20 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSe char *wire; wire = (char *) &req[1]; - geom->label_font = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &geom->label_font); + if (status != Success) + return status; for (i = 0; i < req->nProperties; i++) { char *name, *val; - name = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); - if (!name) - return BadAlloc; - val = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); - if (!val) { + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &name); + if (status != Success) + return status; + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &val); + if (status != Success) { free(name); - return BadAlloc; + return status; } if (XkbAddGeomProperty(geom, name, val) == NULL) { free(name); @@ -5346,9 +5360,9 @@ _CheckSetGeom(XkbGeometryPtr geom, xkbSe for (i = 0; i < req->nColors; i++) { char *name; - name = _GetCountedString(&wire, client->swapped); - if (!name) - return BadAlloc; + status = _GetCountedString(&wire, client, &name); + if (status != Success) + return status; if (!XkbAddGeomColor(geom, name, geom->num_colors)) { free(name); return BadAlloc; ++++++ index.vnc ++++++ <!-- index.vnc - default HTML page for TigerVNC Java viewer applet, to be used with Xvnc. On any file ending in .vnc, the HTTP server embedded in Xvnc will substitute the following variables when preceded by a dollar: USER, DESKTOP, DISPLAY, APPLETWIDTH, APPLETHEIGHT, WIDTH, HEIGHT, PORT, Use two dollar signs ($$) to get a dollar sign in the generated HTML page. --> <HTML> <TITLE> $USER's $DESKTOP desktop ($DISPLAY) </TITLE> <APPLET CODE="com.tigervnc.vncviewer.VncViewer" ARCHIVE="VncViewer.jar" WIDTH="$APPLETWIDTH" HEIGHT="$APPLETHEIGHT"> <PARAM NAME="Port" VALUE="$PORT"> <PARAM NAME="Embed" VALUE="true"> <PARAM NAME="AlwaysShowServerDialog" VALUE="false"> </APPLET> <BR> <A href="http://www.tigervnc.org/">TigerVNC site</A> </HTML> ++++++ n_tigervnc-date-time.patch ++++++ Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/buildtime.c =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/buildtime.c +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/buildtime.c @@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, * USA. */ -char buildtime[] = __DATE__ " " __TIME__; +char buildtime[] = "??? ?? ???? ??:??:??"; Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/unix/vncconfig/buildtime.c =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/unix/vncconfig/buildtime.c +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/unix/vncconfig/buildtime.c @@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, * USA. */ -char buildtime[] = __DATE__ " " __TIME__; +char buildtime[] = "??? ?? ???? ??:??:??"; Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/unix/x0vncserver/buildtime.c =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/unix/x0vncserver/buildtime.c +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/unix/x0vncserver/buildtime.c @@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, * USA. */ -char buildtime[] = __DATE__ " " __TIME__; +char buildtime[] = "??? ?? ???? ??:??:??"; Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/win/winvnc/buildTime.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/win/winvnc/buildTime.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/win/winvnc/buildTime.cxx @@ -15,4 +15,4 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, * USA. */ -const char* buildTime = "Built on " __DATE__ " at " __TIME__; +const char* buildTime = "Built on ??? ?? ???? at ??:??:??"; Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/CMakeLists.txt =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/CMakeLists.txt +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/CMakeLists.txt @@ -39,8 +39,7 @@ if(MSVC) message(FATAL_ERROR "TigerVNC cannot be built with Visual Studio. Please use MinGW") endif() -set(BUILD_TIMESTAMP "") -execute_process(COMMAND "date" "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M" OUTPUT_VARIABLE BUILD_TIMESTAMP) +set(BUILD_TIMESTAMP "??-??-?? ??:??") if(NOT BUILD_TIMESTAMP) set(BUILD_TIMESTAMP "") ++++++ n_tigervnc-dont-build-gtf.patch ++++++ diff -ur xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/configure.ac xorg-server-1.13.0/configure.ac --- xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/configure.ac 2012-09-06 00:45:08.000000000 +0300 +++ xorg-server-1.13.0/configure.ac 2013-12-16 13:50:39.880775219 +0200 @@ -2268,7 +2268,6 @@ hw/xfree86/utils/Makefile hw/xfree86/utils/man/Makefile hw/xfree86/utils/cvt/Makefile -hw/xfree86/utils/gtf/Makefile hw/dmx/config/Makefile hw/dmx/config/man/Makefile hw/dmx/doc/Makefile diff -ur xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/hw/xfree86/modes/Makefile.am xorg-server-1.13.0/hw/xfree86/modes/Makefile.am --- xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/hw/xfree86/modes/Makefile.am 2012-09-06 00:45:08.000000000 +0300 +++ xorg-server-1.13.0/hw/xfree86/modes/Makefile.am 2013-12-16 13:46:37.130679730 +0200 @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ xf86Crtc.h \ xf86Cursors.c \ xf86cvt.c \ - xf86gtf.c \ xf86DisplayIDModes.c \ xf86EdidModes.c \ xf86Modes.c \ Only in xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/hw/xfree86/modes: xf86gtf.c Only in xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/hw/xfree86/utils: gtf diff -ur xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/hw/xfree86/utils/Makefile.am xorg-server-1.13.0/hw/xfree86/utils/Makefile.am --- xorg-server-1.13.0.orig/hw/xfree86/utils/Makefile.am 2012-09-06 00:45:08.000000000 +0300 +++ xorg-server-1.13.0/hw/xfree86/utils/Makefile.am 2013-12-16 13:46:24.175393782 +0200 @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ SUBDIRS = \ - gtf \ cvt \ man ++++++ n_tigervnc_Revert_Attempt_to_handle_Ctrl-key.patch ++++++

From 5e6450db2c0ecdf458b09a53e9fbcce7f4ab408f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Srb Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 09:12:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Attempt to handle Ctrl+key"

This reverts commit 13a809a6baca9572ab4a9cb992121fbc4e4ffba6. --- vncviewer/Viewport.cxx | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ // FLTK can pull in the X11 headers on some systems #ifndef XK_VoidSymbol -#define XK_LATIN1 #define XK_MISCELLANY #define XK_XKB_KEYS #include @@ -1010,25 +1009,10 @@ rdr::U32 Viewport::translateKeyEvent(voi } // Unknown special key? - if (keyTextLen == 0) { + if (keyText[0] == '\0') { return keyCode; } - // Control character? - if ((keyTextLen == 1) && ((keyText[0] < 0x20) | (keyText[0] == 0x7f))) { - if (keyText[0] == 0x00) - return XK_2; - else if (keyText[0] < 0x1b) { - if (!!Fl::event_state(FL_SHIFT) != !!Fl::event_state(FL_CAPS_LOCK)) - return keyText[0] + XK_A - 0x01; - else - return keyText[0] + XK_a - 0x01; - } else if (keyText[0] < 0x20) - return keyText[0] + XK_3 - 0x1b; - else - return XK_8; - } - // Look up the symbol the key produces and translate that from Unicode // to a X11 keysym. if (fl_utf_nb_char((const unsigned char*)keyText, strlen(keyText)) != 1) { ++++++ tigervnc-clean-pressed-key-on-exit.patch ++++++ Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/DesktopWindow.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/vncviewer/DesktopWindow.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/DesktopWindow.cxx @@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ DesktopWindow::~DesktopWindow() OptionsDialog::removeCallback(handleOptions); + delete viewport; + // FLTK automatically deletes all child widgets, so we shouldn't touch // them ourselves here } Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx @@ -144,6 +144,11 @@ Viewport::Viewport(int w, int h, const r Viewport::~Viewport() { + // Send release for every pressed key + for(DownMap::iterator iter = downKeySym.begin(); iter != downKeySym.end(); ++iter) { + cc->writer()->keyEvent(iter->second, false); + } + // Unregister all timeouts in case they get a change tro trigger // again later when this object is already gone. Fl::remove_timeout(handlePointerTimeout, this); Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/vncviewer.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/vncviewer/vncviewer.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/vncviewer.cxx @@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ char vncServerName[VNCSERVERNAMELEN] = { static bool exitMainloop = false; static const char *exitError = NULL; +static CConn *cc; + void exit_vncviewer(const char *error) { // Prioritise the first error we get as that is probably the most @@ -114,6 +116,16 @@ static void CleanupSignalHandler(int sig // CleanupSignalHandler allows C++ object cleanup to happen because it calls // exit() rather than the default which is to abort. vlog.info(_("CleanupSignalHandler called")); + delete cc; + exit(1); +} + +static int CleanupXIOErrorHandler(Display *dpy) +{ + // CleanupSignalHandler allows C++ object cleanup to happen because it calls + // exit() rather than the default which is to abort. + vlog.info("XErrorHandler called"); + delete cc; exit(1); } @@ -392,11 +404,19 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) init_fltk(); + fl_open_display(); + + XSetIOErrorHandler(CleanupXIOErrorHandler); + #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__) fl_open_display(); XkbSetDetectableAutoRepeat(fl_display, True, NULL); #endif + fl_open_display(); + + XSetIOErrorHandler(CleanupXIOErrorHandler); + Configuration::enableViewerParams(); /* Load the default parameter settings */ @@ -497,7 +517,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) #endif } - CConn *cc = new CConn(vncServerName, sock); + cc = new CConn(vncServerName, sock); while (!exitMainloop) { int next_timer; ++++++ tigervnc-newfbsize.patch ++++++ Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/CConn.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/vncviewer/CConn.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/CConn.cxx @@ -424,6 +424,8 @@ void CConn::dataRect(const Rect& r, int if (encoding != encodingCopyRect) lastServerEncoding = encoding; + if (encoding == pseudoEncodingDesktopSize) + setDesktopSize( r.width(), r.height() ); if (!Decoder::supported(encoding)) { vlog.error(_("Unknown rect encoding %d"), encoding); ++++++ tigervnc-sf3495623.patch ++++++ diff -ur tigervnc-1.3.0.orig/common/network/TcpSocket.cxx tigervnc-1.3.0/common/network/TcpSocket.cxx --- tigervnc-1.3.0.orig/common/network/TcpSocket.cxx 2014-02-07 16:35:24.644388330 +0200 +++ tigervnc-1.3.0/common/network/TcpSocket.cxx 2014-02-07 16:39:50.608078320 +0200 @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -450,7 +451,10 @@ } void TcpListener::getMyAddresses(std::list* result) { - const hostent* addrs = gethostbyname(0); + char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX]; + if (gethostname(hostname, HOST_NAME_MAX) < 0) + throw rdr::SystemException("gethostname", errorNumber); + const hostent* addrs = gethostbyname(hostname); if (addrs == 0) throw rdr::SystemException("gethostbyname", errorNumber); if (addrs->h_addrtype != AF_INET) ++++++ u_render-Cast-color-masks-to-unsigned-long-before-shifting-them.patch ++++++ From: Egbert Eich Date: Fri May 30 19:08:00 2014 -0400 Subject: [PATCH]render: Cast color masks to unsigned long before shifting them Patch-mainline: to be upstreamed Git-commit: 6ec9a78f9b79668239c3a1519d715cbecf186cef Git-repo: References: bnc#876757 Signed-off-by: Egbert Eich The color masks in DirectFormatRec are CARD16. Shifting them may lead to unexpected results. Cast them to unsigned long to make sure the shifted value will still fit into that type. Signed-off-by: Egbert Eich --- render/picture.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/render/picture.c b/render/picture.c index 2908b76..74369de 100644 --- a/render/picture.c +++ b/render/picture.c @@ -548,12 +548,12 @@ PictureMatchVisual(ScreenPtr pScreen, int depth, VisualPtr pVisual) return format; } else { - if (format->direct.redMask << format->direct.red == - pVisual->redMask && - format->direct.greenMask << format->direct.green == - pVisual->greenMask && - format->direct.blueMask << format->direct.blue == - pVisual->blueMask) { + if (((unsigned long)format->direct.redMask) << + format->direct.red == pVisual->redMask && + ((unsigned long)format->direct.greenMask) << + format->direct.green == pVisual->greenMask && + ((unsigned long)format->direct.blueMask) << + format->direct.blue == pVisual->blueMask) { return format; } } ++++++ u_terminate_instead_of_ignoring_restart.patch ++++++ Author: Michal Srb Subject: Terminate instead of ignoring reset Patch-Mainline: To be upstreamed References: bnc#920969 Index: tigervnc-1.3.0/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.cc =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.3.0.orig/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.cc +++ tigervnc-1.3.0/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.cc @@ -1607,7 +1607,12 @@ vfbScreenInit(ScreenPtr pScreen, int arg static void vfbClientStateChange(CallbackListPtr*, void *, void *) { - dispatchException &= ~DE_RESET; + if (dispatchException & DE_RESET) { + ErrorF("Warning: VNC extension does not support -reset, terminating instead. Use -noreset to prevent termination.\n"); + + dispatchException |= DE_TERMINATE; + dispatchException &= ~DE_RESET; + } } #if XORG >= 113 ++++++ u_tigervnc-dont-send-ascii-control-characters.patch ++++++ Author: Michal Srb Subject: Do not send ascii control characters for CTRL+[A-Z] combinations. Patch-Mainline: To be upstreamed References: bnc#864666 Index: vncviewer/Viewport.cxx =================================================================== --- vncviewer/Viewport.cxx.orig +++ vncviewer/Viewport.cxx @@ -1044,7 +1044,13 @@ rdr::U32 Viewport::translateKeyEvent(voi return NoSymbol; } - ucs = fl_utf8decode(keyText, NULL, NULL); + if (keyCode >= 'a' && keyCode <= 'z' && keyText[0] < 0x20) { + // Do not send ascii control characters - send the original key combination that caused them. + ucs = keyCode; + } else { + ucs = fl_utf8decode(keyText, NULL, NULL); + } + return ucs2keysym(ucs); } ++++++ u_tigervnc-ignore-epipe-on-write.patch ++++++ Author: Michal Srb Subject: Ignore EPIPE on write. Patch-Mainline: To be upstreamed References: bnc#864676 If the VNC server closes connection after our last read and before this write, we will report error message about EPIPE. This situation is no error, however, we should quit normally same as when we find out that connection was closed during read. Index: common/rdr/FdOutStream.cxx =================================================================== --- common/rdr/FdOutStream.cxx (revision 5178) +++ common/rdr/FdOutStream.cxx (working copy) @@ -225,7 +225,12 @@ // network connections. Should in fact never ever happen... } while (n < 0 && (errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); - if (n < 0) throw SystemException("write",errno); + if (n < 0) { + if(errno == EPIPE) + n = length; // Ignore EPIPE and fake successfull write, it doesn't matter that we are writing to closed socket, we will find out once we try to read from it. + else + throw SystemException("write", errno); + } gettimeofday(&lastWrite, NULL); ++++++ u_tigervnc-prioritize-anon-ecdh.patch ++++++ Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/CSecurityTLS.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/CSecurityTLS.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/CSecurityTLS.cxx @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ bool CSecurityTLS::processMsg(CConnectio void CSecurityTLS::setParam() { - static const int kx_anon_priority[] = { GNUTLS_KX_ANON_DH, 0 }; + static const int kx_anon_priority[] = { GNUTLS_KX_ANON_ECDH, GNUTLS_KX_ANON_DH, 0 }; static const int kx_priority[] = { GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS, GNUTLS_KX_RSA, GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA, GNUTLS_KX_SRP, 0 }; Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SSecurityTLS.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/common/rfb/SSecurityTLS.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/common/rfb/SSecurityTLS.cxx @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ bool SSecurityTLS::processMsg(SConnectio void SSecurityTLS::setParams(gnutls_session session) { - static const int kx_anon_priority[] = { GNUTLS_KX_ANON_DH, 0 }; + static const int kx_anon_priority[] = { GNUTLS_KX_ANON_ECDH, GNUTLS_KX_ANON_DH, 0 }; static const int kx_priority[] = { GNUTLS_KX_DHE_DSS, GNUTLS_KX_RSA, GNUTLS_KX_DHE_RSA, GNUTLS_KX_SRP, 0 }; ++++++ u_tigervnc-send-special-keys-directly.patch ++++++ Author: Michal Srb Subject: Send special keys directly to server. Patch-Mainline: To be upstreamed References: bnc#906922 Any key that doesn't have textual interpretation should be forwarded to server. Index: tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx =================================================================== --- tigervnc-1.4.1.orig/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx +++ tigervnc-1.4.1/vncviewer/Viewport.cxx @@ -1007,18 +1007,11 @@ rdr::U32 Viewport::translateKeyEvent(voi case FL_Favorites: return XF86XK_Favorites; #endif - case XK_ISO_Level3_Shift: - // FLTK tends to let this one leak through on X11... - return XK_ISO_Level3_Shift; - case XK_Multi_key: - // Same for this... - return XK_Multi_key; } // Unknown special key? if (keyTextLen == 0) { - vlog.error(_("Unknown FLTK key code %d (0x%04x)"), keyCode, keyCode); - return NoSymbol; + return keyCode; } // Control character? ++++++ u_tigervnc-use_preferred_mode.patch ++++++ Author: Michal Srb Subject: Use preferred mode. Patch-Mainline: To be upstreamed References: bnc#896540 If there is any resolution specified with -geometry or -screen parameters, report this resolution as preferred one. That way desktop environments won't change it immediately after start. Index: unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.cc =================================================================== --- unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.cc (revision 5186) +++ unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.cc (working copy) @@ -1319,12 +1319,22 @@ /* Make sure the CRTC has this output set */ vncRandRCrtcSet(pScreen, crtc, NULL, 0, 0, RR_Rotate_0, 1, &output); - /* Populate a list of default modes */ - RRModePtr modes[sizeof(vncRandRWidths)/sizeof(*vncRandRWidths)]; - int num_modes; + /* Populate a list of modes */ + RRModePtr modes[sizeof(vncRandRWidths)/sizeof(*vncRandRWidths) + 1]; + int num_modes = 0; - num_modes = 0; + /* Start with requested mode */ + mode = vncRandRModeGet(pScreen->width, pScreen->height); + if(mode != NULL) { + modes[num_modes] = mode; + num_modes++; + } + + /* Add default modes */ for (int i = 0;i < sizeof(vncRandRWidths)/sizeof(*vncRandRWidths);i++) { + if (vncRandRWidths[i] == pScreen->width && vncRandRHeights[i] == pScreen->height) + continue; + mode = vncRandRModeGet(vncRandRWidths[i], vncRandRHeights[i]); if (mode != NULL) { modes[num_modes] = mode; @@ -1332,7 +1342,7 @@ } } - RROutputSetModes(output, modes, num_modes, 0); + RROutputSetModes(output, modes, num_modes, 1); return crtc; } ++++++ u_tigervnc-vncserver-clean-pid-files.patch ++++++ Author: Egbert Eich Subject: Clean pid files of dead processes. Patch-Mainline: To be upstreamed References: bnc#948392 Signed-off-by: Michal Srb --- a/unix/vncserver 2015-05-19 18:01:12.000000000 +0200 +++ b/unix/vncserver 2015-10-01 15:52:50.920363305 +0200 @@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ } unless (kill 0, `cat $pidFile`) { warn "Could not start Xvnc.\n\n"; + unlink $pidFile; open(LOG, "<$desktopLog"); while (<LOG>) { print; } close(LOG); @@ -587,7 +588,12 @@ print "X DISPLAY #\tPROCESS ID\n"; foreach my $file (@filelist) { if ($file =~ /$host:(\d+)$\.pid/) { - print ":".$1."\t\t".`cat $vncUserDir/$file`; + chop($tmp_pid = `cat $vncUserDir/$file`); + if (kill 0, $tmp_pid) { + print ":".$1."\t\t".`cat $vncUserDir/$file`; + } else { + unlink ($vncUserDir . "/" . $file); + } } } exit 1; ++++++ u_xorg-server-xdmcp.patch ++++++ Author: Reinhard Max XDMCP: For IPv6 add IPv6 link local addresses to the end of the list For IPv6 add a link local addresses to the end of the list passed to the XDMCP servers. Reason: for link local addresses the XDMCP server would need to either know the interface thru a scope identifier or try all available interfaces. If they don't this address will fail in which case the XDMCP server could still try the other addresses passed - however some only try the first address and then give up. Even if this seems to be the wrong place to fix this it seems to be easier than fixing all display servers. Index: xorg-server-1.12.1/os/access.c =================================================================== --- xorg-server-1.12.1.orig/os/access.c +++ xorg-server-1.12.1/os/access.c @@ -714,7 +714,9 @@ DefineSelf(int fd) /* * ignore 'localhost' entries as they're not useful - * on the other end of the wire + * on the other end of the wire and because on hosts + * with shared home dirs they'll result in conflicting + * entries in ~/.Xauthority */ if (ifr->ifa_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) continue; @@ -735,6 +737,14 @@ DefineSelf(int fd) else if (family == FamilyInternet6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK((struct in6_addr *) addr)) continue; + + /* Ignore IPv6 link local addresses (fe80::/10), because + * they need a scope identifier, which we have no way + * of telling to the other end. + */ + if (family == FamilyInternet6 && + IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL((struct in6_addr *)addr)) + continue; #endif XdmcpRegisterConnection(family, (char *) addr, len); #if defined(IPv6) && defined(AF_INET6) ++++++ vnc-httpd.firewall ++++++ ## Name: VNC mini-HTTP server ## Description: Opens the VNC HTTP ports so that browsers can connect. TCP="5800:5899" ++++++ vnc-server.firewall ++++++ ## Name: VNC ## Description: Opens VNC server ports so that viewers can connect. TCP="5900:5999" ++++++ vnc.reg ++++++ ############################################################################# # # OpenSLP registration file # # register VNC remote logins via kdm # You need also to allow remote logins # ############################################################################# # Register VNC service for krdc (KDE VNC client in kdenetwork) service:remotedesktop.kde:vnc://$HOSTNAME:5901,en,65535 tcp-port=5901 description=VNC remote login [1024x768] # Register VNC service for krdc (KDE VNC client in kdenetwork) service:remotedesktop.kde:vnc://$HOSTNAME:5902,en,65535 tcp-port=5902 description=VNC remote login [1280x1024] # Register VNC service for krdc (KDE VNC client in kdenetwork) service:remotedesktop.kde:vnc://$HOSTNAME:5903,en,65535 tcp-port=5903 description=VNC remote login [1600x1200] # Register VNC service for Java clients # Can be used with every Web browser with enabled Java service:remotedesktop.java:http://$HOSTNAME:5801,en,65535 tcp-port=5801 description=VNC remote login [1024x768] # Register VNC service for Java clients # Can be used with every Web browser with enabled Java service:remotedesktop.java:http://$HOSTNAME:5802,en,65535 tcp-port=5802 description=VNC remote login [1280x1024] # Register VNC service for Java clients # Can be used with every Web browser with enabled Java service:remotedesktop.java:http://$HOSTNAME:5803,en,65535 tcp-port=5803 description=VNC remote login [1600x1200] ++++++ vnc.xinetd ++++++ # default: off # description: This serves out a VNC connection which starts at a KDM login \ # prompt. This VNC connection has a resolution of 1024x768, 16bit depth. service vnc1 { type = UNLISTED port = 5901 socket_type = stream protocol = tcp wait = no user = nobody server = /usr/bin/Xvnc server_args = -noreset -inetd -once -query localhost -geometry 1024x768 -securitytypes none disable = yes } # default: off # description: This serves out a VNC connection which starts at a KDM login \ # prompt. This VNC connection has a resolution of 1280x1024, 16bit depth. service vnc2 { type = UNLISTED port = 5902 socket_type = stream protocol = tcp wait = no user = nobody server = /usr/bin/Xvnc server_args = -noreset -inetd -once -query localhost -geometry 1280x1024 -securitytypes none disable = yes } # default: off # description: This serves out a VNC connection which starts at a KDM login \ # prompt. This VNC connection has a resolution of 1600x1200, 16bit depth. service vnc3 { type = UNLISTED port = 5903 socket_type = stream protocol = tcp wait = no user = nobody server = /usr/bin/Xvnc server_args = -noreset -inetd -once -query localhost -geometry 1600x1200 -securitytypes none disable = yes } # default: off # description: This serves out the vncviewer Java applet for the VNC \ # server running on port 5901, (vnc port 1). service vnchttpd1 { type = UNLISTED port = 5801 socket_type = stream protocol = tcp wait = no user = nobody server = /usr/bin/vnc_inetd_httpd server_args = 1024 768 5901 disable = yes } # default: off # description: This serves out the vncviewer Java applet for the VNC \ # server running on port 5902, (vnc port 2). service vnchttpd2 { type = UNLISTED port = 5802 socket_type = stream protocol = tcp wait = no user = nobody server = /usr/bin/vnc_inetd_httpd server_args = 1280 1024 5902 disable = yes } # default: off # description: This serves out the vncviewer Java applet for the VNC \ # server running on port 5902, (vnc port 3). service vnchttpd3 { type = UNLISTED port = 5803 socket_type = stream protocol = tcp wait = no user = nobody server = /usr/bin/vnc_inetd_httpd server_args = 1600 1200 5903 disable = yes } ++++++ vnc_inetd_httpd ++++++ #!/bin/bash read request url httptype || exit 0 url="${url/ /}" httptype="${httptype/ /}" width=$1 height=$2 port=$3 if [ "x$httptype" != "x" ]; then line="x" while [ -n "$line" ]; do read line || exit 0 line="${line/ /}" done fi case "$url" in /) # We need the size of the display for the current applet. # The VNC menubar is 20 pixels high ... height=$((height+20)) ctype="text/html" content=" <HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Remote Desktop</TITLE></HEAD> <BODY> </APPLET> </BODY></HTML>" ;; *.jar|*.class) # Use basename to make sure we have just a filename, not ../../... url=${url/.*\/} ctype="application/octet-stream" cfile="/usr/share/vnc/classes/$url" content="FILE" ;; esac if [ "x$httptype" != "x" ]; then echo "HTTP/1.0 200 OK" echo "Content-Type: $ctype" if [ "$content" == "FILE" ]; then clen=`wc -c "$cfile"` else clen=`echo "$content"|wc -c` fi echo "Content-Length: $clen" echo "Connection: close" echo fi if [ "$request" == "GET" ]; then if [ "$content" == "FILE" ]; then cat "$cfile" else echo "$content" fi fi exit 0 ++++++ vncpasswd.arg ++++++ #!/bin/sh # Compatibility replacement for vncpasswd.arg. if [ $# -ne 2 ]; then echo "Usage: $0 file password" exit 1 fi echo "$2" | vncpasswd -f > "$1"

0 0

Reply

Sign in to reply online Use email software

Back to the thread

Back to the list