Mailinglist Archive: opensuse-commit (1903 mails)

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commit docker-runc for openSUSE:Factory
Hello community,

here is the log from the commit of package docker-runc for openSUSE:Factory
checked in at 2019-04-28 19:57:43
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/docker-runc (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.docker-runc.new.5536 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Package is "docker-runc"

Sun Apr 28 19:57:43 2019 rev:17 rq:697553 version:1.0.0rc6+gitr3778_6635b4f0c6af

Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/docker-runc/docker-runc.changes 2019-03-26
22:28:32.457761988 +0100
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.docker-runc.new.5536/docker-runc.changes
2019-04-28 19:58:12.438980040 +0200
@@ -1,0 +2,7 @@
+Wed Apr 24 13:50:42 UTC 2019 - Aleksa Sarai <asarai@xxxxxxxx>
+
+- Backport various upstream patches to fix some kernel regression related to
+ O_TMPFILE. bsc#1131314 bsc#1131553
+ * bsc1131553-0001-nsenter-cloned_binary-various-cleanups.patch
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------

New:
----
bsc1131553-0001-nsenter-cloned_binary-various-cleanups.patch

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Other differences:
------------------
++++++ docker-runc.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.PpOB4c/_old 2019-04-28 19:58:13.802979218 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.PpOB4c/_new 2019-04-28 19:58:13.806979216 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
Url: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc
Source: %{realname}-git.%{git_version}.tar.xz
Source1: %{realname}-rpmlintrc
+# SUSE-FIX: Backport of various upstream patches. bsc#1131314 bsc#1131553
+Patch: bsc1131553-0001-nsenter-cloned_binary-various-cleanups.patch
BuildRequires: fdupes
BuildRequires: go-go-md2man
BuildRequires: libapparmor-devel
@@ -113,6 +115,8 @@

%prep
%setup -q -n %{realname}-git.%{git_version}
+# bsc#1131314 bsc#1131553
+%patch -p1

%build
# Do not use symlinks. If you want to run the unit tests for this package at

++++++ bsc1131553-0001-nsenter-cloned_binary-various-cleanups.patch ++++++
From 6ca2650b8da5e0d9c0d0ae75ca9b6b61da1cf2ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@xxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 15:56:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: cloned_binary: various cleanups

This is a merged patchset of the following upstream commits, in order
to make packaging less of a pain:

* bb7d8b1f41f7 ("nsexec (CVE-2019-5736): avoid parsing environ")
* 5b775bf297c4 ("nsenter: cloned_binary: detect and handle short copies")
* 2429d59352b8 ("nsenter: cloned_binary: expand and add pre-3.11 fallbacks")
* af9da0a45082 ("nsenter: cloned_binary: use the runc statedir for O_TMPFILE")
* 16612d74de5f ("nsenter: cloned_binary: try to ro-bind /proc/self/exe before
copying")
* 2d4a37b42716 ("nsenter: cloned_binary: userspace copy fallback if sendfile
fails")
* 6f714aa9288f ("Use getenv not secure_getenv")

SUSE-Bugs: bsc#1131314 bsc#1131553
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@xxxxxxx>
---
libcontainer/container_linux.go | 1 +
libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 384 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libcontainer/container_linux.go b/libcontainer/container_linux.go
index ef443f6fc16f..67b31c1a54ca 100644
--- a/libcontainer/container_linux.go
+++ b/libcontainer/container_linux.go
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ func (c *linuxContainer) commandTemplate(p *Process,
childPipe *os.File) (*exec.
cmd.ExtraFiles = append(cmd.ExtraFiles, childPipe)
cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env,
fmt.Sprintf("_LIBCONTAINER_INITPIPE=%d",
stdioFdCount+len(cmd.ExtraFiles)-1),
+ fmt.Sprintf("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR=%s", c.root),
)
// NOTE: when running a container with no PID namespace and the parent
process spawning the container is
// PID1 the pdeathsig is being delivered to the container's init
process by the kernel for some reason
diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
index c8a42c23f73f..ad10f14067b1 100644
--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>

@@ -36,18 +38,21 @@
#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
#endif
-#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
-# define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
-# ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
-# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
-# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
-# endif
+#ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
+# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
+# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
+#endif
int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
{
+#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
-}
+#else
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
#endif
+}
+

/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
@@ -64,12 +69,10 @@ int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
#endif

-#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
-#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-# define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
-# define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
+#define CLONED_BINARY_ENV "_LIBCONTAINER_CLONED_BINARY"
+#define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
+#define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
-#endif

static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
{
@@ -88,28 +91,61 @@ static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
static int is_self_cloned(void)
{
int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
+ struct stat statbuf = {};
+ struct statfs fsbuf = {};

fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;

-#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
+ /*
+ * Is the binary a fully-sealed memfd? We don't need CLONED_BINARY_ENV
for
+ * this, because you cannot write to a sealed memfd no matter what (so
+ * sharing it isn't a bad thing -- and an admin could bind-mount a
sealed
+ * memfd to /usr/bin/runc to allow re-use).
+ */
ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
- is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-#else
- struct stat statbuf = {0};
- ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
- if (ret >= 0)
- is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
-#endif
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * All other forms require CLONED_BINARY_ENV, since they are potentially
+ * writeable (or we can't tell if they're fully safe) and thus we must
+ * check the environment as an extra layer of defence.
+ */
+ if (!getenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV)) {
+ is_cloned = false;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Is the binary on a read-only filesystem? We can't detect bind-mounts
in
+ * particular (in-kernel they are identical to regular mounts) but we
can
+ * at least be sure that it's read-only. In addition, to make sure that
+ * it's *our* bind-mount we check CLONED_BINARY_ENV.
+ */
+ if (fstatfs(fd, &fsbuf) >= 0)
+ is_cloned |= (fsbuf.f_flags & MS_RDONLY);
+
+ /*
+ * Okay, we're a tmpfile -- or we're currently running on RHEL <=7.6
+ * which appears to have a borked backport of F_GET_SEALS. Either way,
+ * having a file which has no hardlinks indicates that we aren't using
+ * a host-side "runc" binary and this is something that a container
+ * cannot fake (because unlinking requires being able to resolve the
+ * path that you want to unlink).
+ */
+ if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0)
+ is_cloned |= (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
+
+out:
close(fd);
return is_cloned;
}

-/*
- * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
- * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
- */
+/* Read a given file into a new buffer, and providing the length. */
static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
{
int fd;
@@ -124,7 +160,7 @@ static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)

*length = 0;
for (;;) {
- int n;
+ ssize_t n;

n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n < 0)
@@ -169,100 +205,312 @@ static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length,
char ***output)
}

/*
- * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
+ * "Parse" out argv from /proc/self/cmdline.
* This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
* main() that we can just get the arguments from.
*/
-static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
+static int fetchve(char ***argv)
{
- char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
- size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
+ char *cmdline = NULL;
+ size_t cmdline_size;

cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
if (!cmdline)
goto error;
- environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
- if (!environ)
- goto error;

if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
goto error;
- if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
- goto error;

return 0;

error:
- free(environ);
free(cmdline);
return -EINVAL;
}

-static int clone_binary(void)
-{
- int binfd, memfd;
- ssize_t sent = 0;
+enum {
+ EFD_NONE = 0,
+ EFD_MEMFD,
+ EFD_FILE,
+};

-#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
- memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC |
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
-#else
- memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
+/*
+ * This comes from <linux/fcntl.h>. We can't hard-code __O_TMPFILE because it
+ * changes depending on the architecture. If we don't have O_TMPFILE we always
+ * have the mkostemp(3) fallback.
+ */
+#ifndef O_TMPFILE
+# if defined(__O_TMPFILE) && defined(O_DIRECTORY)
+# define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY)
+# endif
#endif
- if (memfd < 0)
+
+static int make_execfd(int *fdtype)
+{
+ int fd = -1;
+ char template[PATH_MAX] = {0};
+ char *prefix = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR");
+
+ if (!prefix || *prefix != '/')
+ prefix = "/tmp";
+ if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now try memfd, it's much nicer than actually creating a file in
STATEDIR
+ * since it's easily detected thanks to sealing and also doesn't require
+ * assumptions about STATEDIR.
+ */
+ *fdtype = EFD_MEMFD;
+ fd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ return fd;
+ if (errno != ENOSYS && errno != EINVAL)
+ goto error;
+
+#ifdef O_TMPFILE
+ /*
+ * Try O_TMPFILE to avoid races where someone might snatch our file.
Note
+ * that O_EXCL isn't actually a security measure here (since you can
just
+ * fd re-open it and clear O_EXCL).
+ */
+ *fdtype = EFD_FILE;
+ fd = open(prefix, O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0700);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ struct stat statbuf = {};
+ bool working_otmpfile = false;
+
+ /*
+ * open(2) ignores unknown O_* flags -- yeah, I was surprised
when I
+ * found this out too. As a result we can't check for EINVAL.
However,
+ * if we get nlink != 0 (or EISDIR) then we know that this
kernel
+ * doesn't support O_TMPFILE.
+ */
+ if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0)
+ working_otmpfile = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
+
+ if (working_otmpfile)
+ return fd;
+
+ /* Pretend that we got EISDIR since O_TMPFILE failed. */
+ close(fd);
+ errno = EISDIR;
+ }
+ if (errno != EISDIR)
+ goto error;
+#endif /* defined(O_TMPFILE) */
+
+ /*
+ * Our final option is to create a temporary file the old-school way,
and
+ * then unlink it so that nothing else sees it by accident.
+ */
+ *fdtype = EFD_FILE;
+ fd = mkostemp(template, O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ if (unlink(template) >= 0)
+ return fd;
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+error:
+ *fdtype = EFD_NONE;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int seal_execfd(int *fd, int fdtype)
+{
+ switch (fdtype) {
+ case EFD_MEMFD:
+ return fcntl(*fd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
+ case EFD_FILE: {
+ /* Need to re-open our pseudo-memfd as an O_PATH to avoid
execve(2) giving -ETXTBSY. */
+ int newfd;
+ char fdpath[PATH_MAX] = {0};
+
+ if (fchmod(*fd, 0100) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", *fd) <
0)
+ return -1;
+
+ newfd = open(fdpath, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (newfd < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ close(*fd);
+ *fd = newfd;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int try_bindfd(void)
+{
+ int fd, ret = -1;
+ char template[PATH_MAX] = {0};
+ char *prefix = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR");
+
+ if (!prefix || *prefix != '/')
+ prefix = "/tmp";
+ if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We need somewhere to mount it, mounting anything over /proc/self is a
+ * BAD idea on the host -- even if we do it temporarily.
+ */
+ fd = mkstemp(template);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return ret;
+ close(fd);
+
+ /*
+ * For obvious reasons this won't work in rootless mode because we
haven't
+ * created a userns+mntns -- but getting that to work will be a bit
+ * complicated and it's only worth doing if someone actually needs it.
+ */
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (mount("/proc/self/exe", template, "", MS_BIND, "") < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (mount("", template, "", MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY, "") < 0)
+ goto out_umount;
+
+
+ /* Get read-only handle that we're sure can't be made read-write. */
+ ret = open(template, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+
+out_umount:
+ /*
+ * Make sure the MNT_DETACH works, otherwise we could get remounted
+ * read-write and that would be quite bad (the fd would be made
read-write
+ * too, invalidating the protection).
+ */
+ if (umount2(template, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ close(ret);
+ ret = -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
+ }
+
+out:
+ /*
+ * We don't care about unlink errors, the worst that happens is that
+ * there's an empty file left around in STATEDIR.
+ */
+ unlink(template);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t fd_to_fd(int outfd, int infd)
+{
+ ssize_t total = 0;
+ char buffer[4096];
+
+ for (;;) {
+ ssize_t nread, nwritten = 0;
+
+ nread = read(infd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ if (nread < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (!nread)
+ break;
+
+ do {
+ ssize_t n = write(outfd, buffer + nwritten, nread -
nwritten);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ nwritten += n;
+ } while(nwritten < nread);
+
+ total += nwritten;
+ }
+
+ return total;
+}
+
+static int clone_binary(void)
+{
+ int binfd, execfd;
+ struct stat statbuf = {};
+ size_t sent = 0;
+ int fdtype = EFD_NONE;
+
+ /*
+ * Before we resort to copying, let's try creating an ro-binfd in one
shot
+ * by getting a handle for a read-only bind-mount of the execfd.
+ */
+ execfd = try_bindfd();
+ if (execfd >= 0)
+ return execfd;
+
+ /*
+ * Dammit, that didn't work -- time to copy the binary to a safe place
we
+ * can seal the contents.
+ */
+ execfd = make_execfd(&fdtype);
+ if (execfd < 0 || fdtype == EFD_NONE)
return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;

binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (binfd < 0)
goto error;

- sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
+ if (fstat(binfd, &statbuf) < 0)
+ goto error_binfd;
+
+ while (sent < statbuf.st_size) {
+ int n = sendfile(execfd, binfd, NULL, statbuf.st_size - sent);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ /* sendfile can fail so we fallback to a dumb
user-space copy. */
+ n = fd_to_fd(execfd, binfd);
+ if (n < 0)
+ goto error_binfd;
+ }
+ sent += n;
+ }
close(binfd);
- if (sent < 0)
+ if (sent != statbuf.st_size)
goto error;

-#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
- int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
- if (err < 0)
+ if (seal_execfd(&execfd, fdtype) < 0)
goto error;
-#else
- /* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving
-EXTBUSY. */
- int newfd;
- char *fdpath = NULL;

- if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
- goto error;
- newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
- free(fdpath);
- if (newfd < 0)
- goto error;
-
- close(memfd);
- memfd = newfd;
-#endif
- return memfd;
+ return execfd;

+error_binfd:
+ close(binfd);
error:
- close(memfd);
+ close(execfd);
return -EIO;
}

+/* Get cheap access to the environment. */
+extern char **environ;
+
int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
{
int execfd;
- char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
+ char **argv = NULL;

/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
int cloned = is_self_cloned();
if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
return cloned;

- if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
+ if (fetchve(&argv) < 0)
return -EINVAL;

execfd = clone_binary();
if (execfd < 0)
return -EIO;

- fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
+ if (putenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV "=1"))
+ goto error;
+
+ fexecve(execfd, argv, environ);
+error:
+ close(execfd);
return -ENOEXEC;
}
--
2.21.0


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