Hi,
when building RPMs in OBS, each of them is signed with a private key that is kept somewhere in the OBS infrastructure.
But it occurred to me, that this might not actually be needed because we sign repository metadata using the same keys and that metadata contains hashes of files, so those are already protected against malicious modification.
Are there tools, processes or people using those sigs on individual rpms?
The background is, that when trying to reproduce a build to verify that it is bit-by-bit identical to what was published before, we can only compare parts of it, because the signature and its timestamp will always be different.
We could try to strip such information that is known-to-vary
but it also has some appeal to get completely identical results.
Ciao
Bernhard M.
Am Montag, 28. November 2016, 05:40:54 CET schrieb Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
Hi,
when building RPMs in OBS, each of them is signed with a private key that is kept somewhere in the OBS infrastructure.
But it occurred to me, that this might not actually be needed because we sign repository metadata using the same keys and that metadata contains hashes of files, so those are already protected against malicious modification.
Are there tools, processes or people using those sigs on individual rpms?
Yup, rpm itself does. It can be set to refuse unsigned RPMs. You can also check against the digital signature when verifying packages. Lastly, people can always manually download and install packages without adding the repositories.
Cheers Mathias
On Montag, 28. November 2016, 09:34:04 CET wrote Mathias Homann:
Am Montag, 28. November 2016, 05:40:54 CET schrieb Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
Hi,
when building RPMs in OBS, each of them is signed with a private key that is kept somewhere in the OBS infrastructure.
But it occurred to me, that this might not actually be needed because we sign repository metadata using the same keys and that metadata contains hashes of files, so those are already protected against malicious modification.
Are there tools, processes or people using those sigs on individual rpms?
Yup, rpm itself does. It can be set to refuse unsigned RPMs. You can also check against the digital signature when verifying packages. Lastly, people can always manually download and install packages without adding the repositories.
and osc does. It downloads rpm which may not even pubished at that point of time and validates it (at least when not building in a safe env like kvm)
Hi
Am Montag, 28. November 2016, 09:41:13 schrieb Adrian Schröter:
On Montag, 28. November 2016, 09:34:04 CET wrote Mathias Homann:
Am Montag, 28. November 2016, 05:40:54 CET schrieb Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
Hi,
when building RPMs in OBS, each of them is signed with a private key that is kept somewhere in the OBS infrastructure.
But it occurred to me, that this might not actually be needed because we sign repository metadata using the same keys and that metadata contains hashes of files, so those are already protected against malicious modification.
Are there tools, processes or people using those sigs on individual rpms?
Yup, rpm itself does. It can be set to refuse unsigned RPMs. You can also check against the digital signature when verifying packages. Lastly, people can always manually download and install packages without adding the repositories.
and osc does. It downloads rpm which may not even pubished at that point of time and validates it (at least when not building in a safe env like kvm)
and newer libzypp/zypper/etc. is using it in case the metadata are not signed.
On Monday 2016-11-28 09:34, Mathias Homann wrote:
Am Montag, 28. November 2016, 05:40:54 CET schrieb Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
when building RPMs in OBS, each of them is signed with a private key that is kept somewhere in the OBS infrastructure. But it occurred to me, that this might not actually be needed because we sign repository metadata
Lastly, people can always manually download and install packages without adding the repositories.
This is where I need to point out the unsafety of the Debian package format :-)
-
Adrian Schröter -
Bernhard M. Wiedemann -
Jan Engelhardt -
Mathias Homann -
Michael Calmer