Feature changed by: Arvin Schnell (aschnell)
Feature #305633, revision 40
Title: Support installation with encrypted root file system
Requested by: Stephan Kleine (bitshuffler)
One thing openSUSE is really missing, compared with other popular
distributions, is the ability to install into an encrypted root file
system so _everything_ is encrypted.
While the manual installation / setup like described at
it is still cumbersome and error-prone to setup - especially on systems
with small hard disks like e.g. laptops.
IMHO this subject gets more and more important not only for laptops but
also for normal workstations with respect to the global decline of
Since all the necessary software is in place and Yast already has the
option (including the GUI) to encrypt /home this shouldn't be that hard
to do and would be a great feature for 11.1 (especially if you keep in
mind that this will be the base for the next SLE version and
corporations love security functionality provided out of the box as an
Important points are:
1. it should work with LVMs as well 2. it should be possible to
automatically generate a key on startup to encrypt the swap partition
(given, this would disable suspend) 3. one should be able to use the
same password for several partitions so one has to enter it just one
time instead of once for every partition.
* Bug #397411 - Hibernation won't work with encrypted swap
* Bug #399298 - encrypt swap partions by default on every boot using a
* Bug #166067 - sysinfo:/ does not list encrypted /home partition
* Bug #467349 - Partitioner does not allow to configure LVM2 on top of
- Easy to use Full Disk Encryption (feature/id: 304470)
- Support installation with encrypted root file system
- Partitioner does not allow to configure LVM2 on top of DM-Crypt
#1: Arvin Schnell (aschnell) (2008-08-08 11:39:11)
Full disk encryption is already under discussion in fate #304470.
Sorry, but it's not public.
#2: Stephan Kleine (bitshuffler) (2008-12-17 09:49:10)
Reopened because the whole installer was rewritten but still no one
cared to add this.
I'm sorry, but this feature request is about adding root file system
encryption to openSUSE. When, or if at all, you add it to SLE, I
couldn't care less about it, but I surely don't want to wait till SLE
Also I understand that you don't want to track and update 2 different
locations but, since that feature is asked for quite often, IMHO there
should be a location for openSUSE users to express their need (as in
vote) for it and to CC themself to get notified on updates / when it
finally is implemented.
Making the fate entry public at https://features.opensuse.org/
nice to have as well (since it isn't actual rocket science and suse is
one of the last distributions to add this feature there shouldn't be a
reason to track this behind closed doors) but I can happily live
without it as long as you leave this request open so people can vote
for it & cc themself.
Thanks a lot.
#5: Andreas Jaeger (a_jaeger) (2009-01-21 15:13:20)
Bug #467349 says: With the current partitioner in the openSuSE 11.1
Installer it is not possible to configure a partition for encryption
using dm-crypt and then using the resulting device for LVM2. This
missing feature hurts a lot because it requires the user who wants to
encrypt the whole disk including swap to enter multiple passwords at
boot. Swap encryption with a user defined password is very useful for
encrypted suspend/resume on notebooks.
#6: Andreas Jaeger (a_jaeger) (2009-01-21 15:14:14) (reply to #5)
If we do this feature, we should check whether we do #5 as well - and
then might need to do an extra feature for it.
#7: Duncan Mac-Vicar (dmacvicar) (2009-01-30 14:45:44)
Duplicate of #304470 ?
#8: Olli Artemjev (grey_olli) (2009-05-15 03:42:44)
Just my vote - the entire encryption should be supported at
installation time.At least I've installed on pc designated to
collocation current debian w/entire encription and /boot on removable
(usb flash) w/o seriouse problems(short description in Russian here:
) via installation
interface - noterminal hand made commands intervention required.I see 3
variants: encrypted devices as physical volumes for LVM volume groups.
encryption of LVM logical volumesjust encrypted devices w/o LVMAt least
1st one is easy w/ Debian install now. Hope next SuSE will 've thiseasy
too, better if all 3 variants. :)
#9: Olli Artemjev (grey_olli) (2009-05-15 03:48:12)
generally I guess there're a lot (or some?) of people who're lasy
enough to move to anover distribution if it supports secure offline
data from the box . At least I've installed Debian due to lacking of
entire encryption in SuSE when I had such a must have option. =)
#10: Olli Artemjev (grey_olli) (2009-05-15 04:09:31)
And one more thing that should be implemented - after suspend to disk &
suspend to ram user MUST be prompted for password .
A password _must_ be required to decrypt keys used for encrypted
storage w/ have suspended too. W/o this anyone smart enough to steal
disk & analise it will be able to retrive encrypted data.
A password _must_ be required to unlock from suspend to ram or any
person awaked laptop will gain encrypted data. /me would be glad if
suspending to memory will encrypt in-memory disk encryption keys w/
user password, even if that sounds paranoid. :)
Also the screensaver must be uninterruptible - this is musthave - there
must be no way to get into w/o entering password.
I mean that situation in SLED10 when I'm able to supress gnome screen
saver to background is a very bad one. (After suspending screensaver
kill screensaver, thus giving touchpad back working & my mounted
encrypted data is gained avaliable for anauthorised access, not only my
Suppressing screensaver in SLED10 was done by fastly click on desctop
(or somthing similar, i.e. pressing keys or whatever). Hardware was HP-
mini laptop .
#11: Olli Artemjev (grey_olli) (2009-05-15 04:18:19)
And I've heared about even more secure solution - when user uses
external boot w/ key file encrypted by gpg. On boot gpg is decrypting
key file. So the user does not know password for encrypted data. If
he/she brokes the boot media there's no way to make user reveal the
password - it is in autogenerated key file, but after the boot media
broken remaining password to decrypt key file is useless. Thus user
cannot be forced (by any kind of pressure) to reveal the key to the
data - he/she doesn't know it. :-)
Implementing this ability in init-rd will give something similar
to plausible deniability (though even w/ similar result - forced to
reaveal data user doesn't reveal them actually this should be named
diffrently I guess - in real plausible deniability there's some false
data that is not present in above scenario).
#12: Duncan Mac-Vicar (dmacvicar) (2009-06-02 10:26:31)
Christoph, please reject for openSUSE 11.2 as duplicate of feature
#13: Stephan Kleine (bitshuffler) (2009-06-02 15:19:15) (reply to #12)
That it is a duplicate of #304470 is stated right in the very first
comment! The problem just is that you Novell people refuse, for some
unknown reason, to track that feature in the public / not behind closed
doors. And therefore this feature was created so your beloved
"community" also has the possibility to vote / get updated on changes.
So please leave either this one alone or make #304470 public! Thanks.
#14: Michael Löffler (michl19) (2009-06-02 15:54:38) (reply to #13)
Good point. I openened this one again and mark the other one as
duplicate. Reason for having the internal one not open is pretty
simple: it was created some time prior to the existence of openFATE.
#15: Stefan Behlert (sbehlert) (2009-06-02 17:39:39) (reply to #13)
And that's the reason why there are still two feature entries. As I
mentioned to several people asking me in the last weeks to make one a
duplicate of the other _there is information that needs to be
consolidated_. (Which to some degree means 'throw away'. Sigh.
#16: Arvin Schnell (aschnell) (2009-06-08 14:51:21)
Adding maintainers of mkinitrd and yast2-bootloader. Those components
must be able to automatically handle a root filesystem and swap (if
possible including suspend to disk) on a logical volume in a volume
group with encrypted physical volumes.
+ #17: Arvin Schnell (aschnell) (2009-06-16 16:35:49)
+ So far for some reason encryption is disabled on S390. Should
+ encryption be generally allowed (single volume and physical volumes) on
+ S390 now?