[opensuse-security] Re: [review-team] Submission with changed .keyring

On Wed, Nov 13, 2013 at 11:17:10AM +0100, Sascha Peilicke wrote:

On Wednesday 13 November 2013 10:14:48 Dominique Leuenberger a.k.a. Dimstar wrote:

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Quoting Michal Vyskocil :

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Hi all,

in order to get back to the work, I would like to point your attention to https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/206502

Tomcat got new release manager, which means changed tomcat.keyring. As there is no policy how to do that, I've made my best. So tomcat.keyring does use only new key and it is mentioned in .changes including new key and a linked to svn commit adds the new id to tomcat7/KEYS file.

Is there anything else you'd like to mention?

Michal,

I'd seen that request and I really appreciate the way it's documented. It shows that there has been clear thought and not 'just replacing' the .keyring.

Replacing the .keyring MUST be a sensible topic for the review team (if not: we can as well remove the logic: if injecting a random keyring into the package does not result in the verification of the keyring, it's wasted space).

I fail to see why this pops up now when a .keyring was changed. Did somebody verify how those .keyring files where created in the first place? As long as we don't have an automated way to trust keyring files, we have zero security gained.

We have some security gained. The attack might be some inbetween attack, that a new versions is submitted with a incorrect signature.

Others have state that the keyring files shouldn't be part of the package they're supposed to validate. Maybe only a very small set of trusted users would be allowed to change that.

Where to store them otherwise, do a new database? :/

We only need a package with openSUSE's blessed keyring and require that for gpg-offline verification during build. Put that package into Base:System or openSUSE:Tools or wherever it's save enough and have the security team be the only maintainers. As a Factory reviewer, you would normally trust SUSE's security team and wave through changes to the keyring package.

This might be possible, but it does not really scale out :/

Net result, one less review task that was spoiled since it's inception anyway.

CC'ed the sec guys therefore...

Missed this on the list :/ Ciao, Marcus -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: opensuse-security+unsubscribe@opensuse.org To contact the owner, e-mail: opensuse-security+owner@opensuse.org