Mailinglist Archive: opensuse-security (601 mails)
| < Previous | Next > |
Re: [suse-security] Secure By Default - PLEASE!
- From: Ragnar Beer <rbeer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2000 13:44:08 +0200
- Message-id: <p04320400b5c807b1ff14@[134.76.136.114]>
I'm using SuSE Linux since 5.3 and was always annoyed by having to
deselect bazillions of packages that I didn't need and switch off
all kinds of services when I wanted a simple and secure webserver.
That's why after a lot of thinking I finally changed to OpenBSD which
I think is *the* choice for an OS secure out of the box, because it's
number one goal is to be secure. It's easy to install and easy to
maintain.
Still SuSE is my first choice for workstations.
Ragnar
Still SuSE is my first choice for workstations.
Ragnar
How bout it SuSE? I have bought every version of SuSE since 5.0,
I have Installed >30 SuSE servers for various clients and given
away 200 copies of the SuSE 6.4 demo CD at a Govt Expo (in Australia)
(Thanks to Michaela Geuthner [mailto:mg@xxxxxxx] for the promo material
he shiped me at short notice from Germany)
I love SuSE, and thinks it's the best Distro available, yet, a disabled by default
policy would IMHO be the best thing SuSE could ever do.
As far as I'm concerned the only thing that should be enabled by default is
sshd and _thats's_ even debatable.
Face it, it's not going to make it any harder for your average desktop
flunkie who want's to setup a kde box and browse the web. If they want
to run a personal web server or ftp server then that _should_ know how
to enable it from inetd.conf etc, or they should NOT be running the thing.
I think the harden SuSE script, and SuSE firewall is brilliant, but half of the
things harden_suse does should be _default_ not options available in an
optional package in the sec series....
PLEASE PLEASE make a few simple changes to the defaults to help make
SuSE the most secure Mainstream linux distro out there in.
Peter Nixon
Senior Security Consultant
IT Audit & Consulting (ITAC) Pty Ltd
http://www.itaudit.com.au
mailto:petern@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--snip--
To: BUGTRAQ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Aleph One wrote:
CERT Advisory CA-2000-17 Input Validation Problem in rpc.statd..
Original release date: August 18, 2000
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
RedHat
http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2000-043-03.html
It should be noted that Red Hat states:
"Although there is no known exploit for the flaw in rpc.statd, Red Hat urges
all users running rpc.statd to upgrade to the new nfs-utils package."
This is wrong.
Because of a message posted by "ron1n - <shellcode@xxxxxxxxxxx>" on the 5th
of August to Bugtraq.
I quote:
"Included below is an exploit for the recently exposed linux rpc.statd
format string vulnerability[0]. I have tailored it towards current Redhat
Linux 6.x installations. It can easily be incorporated into attacks against
the other vulnerable Linux distributions."
I hope Red Hat updates this information. Although I really hope they'll
just disable rpc.* services, most things in inetd, and other daemons *BY
DEFAULT*. If a user can't figure out how to turn on a service, they
probably shouldn't be running the service in the first place. This alone
would stop most of the "remote root in default" problems that Red Hat (and
other Linuxes) seem to face. OpenBSD gets this correct, how hard can it be
for the various Linux distrubtions to insert some #s in inetd.conf, or have
things chmod -x by default?
--
www.kuro5hin.org -- technology and culture, from the trenches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: suse-security-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxx
For additional commands, e-mail: suse-security-help@xxxxxxxx
| < Previous | Next > |