Mailinglist Archive: opensuse-java (8 mails)

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Re: [opensuse-java] jMemorize, XLogo and GeoGebra status update
  • From: "Roberto Mannai" <robermann@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 23:56:49 +0200
  • Message-id: <414e44f70806091456h79e89e80wb702d3e1ad9888bd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
IMHO you are right: if you download the sources and create a new
keystore (with a new password) you could resign the jar.

Anyway the repository of the tampered jar should not anymore the same
of your original package. Whoever use a package should trust the
repository that publish it; as far as I know, I could get whatever
package, crack any java source file with a malicious code, then
publish it into a my own repository.

Package security is related to the repository trust.

What do all of you think?

Ciao
Roberto

On Mon, Jun 9, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Kirill Kirillov
<kirill.kirillov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
В Пнд, 09/06/2008 в 09:55 +0200, Roberto Mannai пишет:

about signing jars, my project signed them, so it is possibile :) ;
I'm using the following ant task:

<!-- signing to use as a Java Web Start application -->
<signjar keystore="${src}/../myKeystore"
jar="${dist}\java2demo.jar"
alias="www.codesounding.org"
storepass="XYZ"
/>

See
https://build.opensuse.org/package/show?package=codesounding&project=home%3Arobermann79-

IMHO, it's not a secure solution, because by providing access to this
build.xml with password, anyone can build modified xxx.jar and sign it
with official signature and therefore it'll become useless. Am I wrong?

Kirill.

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