commit xen.2603 for openSUSE:12.3:Update

From Dom0 there is no way to guess the number and, or the complete

Hello community, here is the log from the commit of package xen.2603 for openSUSE:12.3:Update checked in at 2014-04-04 15:11:08 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:12.3:Update/xen.2603 (Old) and /work/SRC/openSUSE:12.3:Update/.xen.2603.new (New) ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Package is "xen.2603" Changes: -------- New Changes file: --- /dev/null 2014-02-13 01:09:38.344032506 +0100 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:12.3:Update/.xen.2603.new/xen.changes 2014-04-04 15:11:15.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,7656 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Feb 19 08:10:28 MST 2014 - carnold@suse.com + +- Upstream patch from Jan + 27691-x86-percpu-Force-INVALID_PERCPU_AREA-into-the-non-canonical-address-region.patch + 28304-x86-don-t-drop-guest-visible-state-updates-when-64-bit-PV-guest-is-in-user-mode.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Feb 18 13:53:10 MST 2014 - carnold@suse.com + +- Update to Xen version 4.2.4 c/s 26280 + xen-4.2.4-testing-src.tar.bz2 + qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote.tar.bz2 + qemu-xen-dir-remote.tar.bz2 +- bnc#861256 - VUL-0: xen: XSA-88: use-after-free in xc_cpupool_getinfo() + under memory pressure. (fix included with update) +- Dropped 45 patches now found in the tarballs. + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Feb 11 16:14:08 CET 2014 - ohering@suse.de + +- bnc#863297: xend/pvscsi: recognize also SCSI CDROM devices + xend-pvscsi-recognize-also-SCSI-CDROM-devices.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Jan 29 08:15:37 MST 2014 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#858496 - Xen: XSA-83: Out-of-memory condition yielding memory + corruption during IRQ setup + 28305-x86-irq-avoid-use-after-free-on-error-path-in-pirq_guest_bind.patch (Replaces xsa83.patch) +- bnc#860163 - VUL-0: xen: XSA-84: integer overflow in several + XSM/Flask hypercalls + xsa84.patch +- bnc#860165 - VUL-0: xen: XSA-85: Off-by-one error in + FLASK_AVC_CACHESTAT hypercall + xsa85.patch +- bnc#860300 - VUL-1: xen: XSA-86: libvchan failure handling + malicious ring indexes + xsa86.patch +- bnc#860302 - VUL-0: CVE-2014-1666: xen: XSA-87: + PHYSDEVOP_{prepare,release}_msix exposed to unprivileged guests + 28307-x86-PHYSDEVOP-prepare-release-msix-are-privileged.patch +- Upstream patches from Jan + 28296-mce-fix-race-condition-in-mctelem_xchg_head.patch + 28297-nested-EPT-fixing-wrong-handling-for-L2-guest-s-direct-mmio-access.patch + 28299-common-sysctl-Don-t-leak-status-in-SYSCTL_page_offline_op.patch + 28302-Nested-VMX-prohibit-virtual-vmentry-vmexit-during-IO-emulation.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri Jan 10 15:43:10 MST 2014 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#858311 - L3: Server is not booting in kernel XEN after latest + updates - (XEN) setup 0000:00:18.0 for d0 failed (-19) + 28068-x86-properly-handle-MSI-X-unmask-operation-from-guests.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri Jan 10 10:06:30 MST 2014 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#858496 - Xen: XSA-83: Out-of-memory condition yielding memory + corruption during IRQ setup + xsa83.patch +- Upstream patches from Jan + 28201-x86-mm-Prevent-leaking-domain-mappings-in-paging_log_dirty_op.patch + 28229-Nested-VMX-Setup-the-virtual-NMI-exiting-info.patch + 28235-VMX-apicv-Set-NMI-window-exiting-for-NMI.patch + 28248-VTD-DMAR-free-correct-pointer-on-error-from-acpi_parse_one_atsr.patch + 28249-AMD-IOMMU-fix-infinite-loop-due-to-ivrs_bdf_entries-larger-than-16-bit-value.patch + 28272-hvm_save_one-return-correct-data.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Dec 16 17:06:34 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#853049 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-6885: xen: XSA-82: Guest triggerable + AMD CPU erratum may cause host hang + 28102-x86-AMD-work-around-erratum-793.patch +- bnc#853048 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-6400: xen: XSA-80: IOMMU TLB + flushing may be inadvertently suppressed + 28164-IOMMU-clear-don-t-flush-override-on-error-paths.patch +- bnc#831120 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-2212: xen: XSA-60: Excessive time to + disable caching with HVM guests with PCI passthrough + 27852-VMX-disable-EPT-when-cpu_has_vmx_pat.patch + 27853-VMX-remove-the-problematic-set_uc_mode-logic.patch + 27854-VMX-fix-cr0.cd-handling.patch +- bnc#848014 - [HP HPS] Xen hypervisor panics on 8-blades nPar with + 46-bit memory addressing + 27829-x86-ACPI-x2APIC-guard-against-out-of-range-ACPI-or-APIC-IDs.patch + 27965-x86-consider-modules-when-cutting-off-memory.patch +- bnc#833251 - [HP BCS SLES11 Bug]: In HP’s UEFI x86_64 platform + and with xen environment, in booting stage ,xen hypervisor will + panic. + 28167-x86-cpuidle-publish-new-states-only-after-fully-initializing-them.patch +- Upstream patches from Jan + 27961-credit-Update-other-parameters-when-setting-tslice_ms.patch + 27962-fix-leaking-of-v-cpu_affinity_saved-on-domain-destruction.patch + 27963-nested-VMX-don-t-ignore-mapping-errors.patch + 28022-x86-hvm-reset-TSC-to-0-after-domain-resume-from-S3.patch + 28023-x86-crash-disable-the-watchdog-NMIs-on-the-crashing-cpu.patch + 28041-x86-xsave-fix-nonlazy-state-handling.patch + 28057-x86-hvm-fix-segment-validation.patch + 28065-x86-restrict-XEN_DOMCTL_getmemlist.patch (Replaces CVE-2013-4553-xsa74.patch) + 28066-x86-HVM-only-allow-ring-0-guest-code-to-make-hypercalls.patch (Replaces CVE-2013-4554-xsa76.patch) + 28068-x86-properly-handle-MSI-X-unmask-operation-from-guests.patch + 28092-Fix-ptr-calculation-when-converting-from-a-VA.patch + 28103-nested-vmx-fix-I-O-port-bitmap-indexing-arithmetic.patch + 28108-fix-locking-in-offline_page.patch + 28112-nested-VMX-fix-I-O-port-exit-emulation.patch + 28113-x86-fix-early-boot-command-line-parsing.patch + 28131-Nested-VMX-CR-emulation-fix-up.patch + 28133-x86-boot-fix-BIOS-memory-corruption-on-certain-IBM-systems.patch + 28144-defer-the-domain-mapping-in-scrub_one_page.patch + 28168-x86-PV-don-t-commit-debug-register-values-early-in-arch_set_info_guest.patch + 28169-kexec-x86-do-not-map-crash-kernel-area.patch + 28183-x86-p2m-restrict-auditing-to-debug-builds.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Dec 10 14:47:30 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- pygrub: Support (/dev/xvda) style disk specifications + 27756-pygrub-xvda-style-disk.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Nov 19 11:52:31 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#849667 - VUL-0: xen: XSA-74: Lock order reversal between + page_alloc_lock and mm_rwlock + CVE-2013-4553-xsa74.patch +- bnc#849668 - VUL-0: xen: XSA-76: Hypercalls exposed to privilege + rings 1 and 2 of HVM guests + CVE-2013-4554-xsa76.patch +- Fix for XSA-78 + 27964-TLB-flushing-in-dma_pte_clear_one.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Nov 13 09:28:28 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#842417 - In HP’s UEFI x86_64 platform and sles11sp3 with xen + environment, dom0 will soft lockup on multiple blades nPar. + 27870-x86-idle-reduce-contention-on-ACPI-register-accesses.patch +- bnc#848014 - [HP HPS] Xen hypervisor panics on 8-blades nPar with + 46-bit memory addressing + 27926-VMX-don-t-crash-processing-d-debug-key.patch +- bnc#846849 - L3: Soft lockup with PCI passthrough and many VCPUs + 27926-VMX-don-t-crash-processing-d-debug-key.patch +- bnc#833483 - Boot Failure with xen kernel in UEFI mode with error + "No memory for trampoline" + 27864-x86-EFI-make-trampoline-allocation-more-flexible.patch + (Replaces x86-EFI-trampoline-fallback.patch) +- Upstream patches from Jan + 27736-scheduler-adjust-internal-locking-interface.patch + 27737-sched-fix-race-between-sched_move_domain-and-vcpu_wake.patch + 27759-credit-unpause-parked-vcpu-before-destroying-it.patch + 27764-x86-print-relevant-tail-part-of-filename-for-warnings-and-crashes.patch + 27766-x86-xsave-also-save-restore-XCR0-across-suspend-ACPI-S3.patch + 27785-x86-refine-address-validity-checks-before-accessing-page-tables.patch + 27792-fix-locking-in-cpu_disable_scheduler.patch + 27848-x86-HVM-32-bit-IN-result-must-be-zero-extended-to-64-bits.patch + 27925-nested-SVM-adjust-guest-handling-of-structure-mappings.patch + 27928-x86-eliminate-has_arch_mmios.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Nov 11 10:22:20 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#849665 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-4551: xen: XSA-75: Host crash due to + guest VMX instruction execution + 27868-nested-VMX-VMLANUCH-VMRESUME-emulation-must-check-permission-1st.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri Nov 8 11:01:09 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- The upstream version of checking for xend when using the 'xl' + command is used is not working. + disable-xl-when-using-xend-fix.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Nov 6 14:47:34 MST 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#840997 - It is possible to start a VM twice on the same node. + xend-xm-reboot-fix.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Nov 4 09:42:36 MDT 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#848657 - VUL-0: xen: CVE-2013-4494: XSA-73: Lock order + reversal between page allocation and grant table locks + 27828-gnttab-correct-locking-order-reversal.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Oct 14 09:19:13 MDT 2013 - carnold@suse.com + +- bnc#845520 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-4416: xen: ocaml xenstored + mishandles oversized message replies + CVE-2013-4416-xsa72.patch +- bnc#833483 - Boot Failure with xen kernel in UEFI mode with error + "No memory for trampoline" + x86-EFI-trampoline-fallback.patch +- Upstream patches from Jan + 27678-x86-properly-handle-hvm_copy_from_guest_-phys-virt-errors.patch (Replaces CVE-2013-4355-xsa63.patch) ++++ 7459 more lines (skipped) ++++ between /dev/null ++++ and /work/SRC/openSUSE:12.3:Update/.xen.2603.new/xen.changes New: ---- 0001-net-move-the-tap-buffer-into-TAPState.patch 0002-net-increase-tap-buffer-size.patch 0003-e1000-fix-access-4-bytes-beyond-buffer-end.patch 0004-e1000-secrc-support.patch 0005-e1000-multi-buffer-packet-support.patch 0006-e1000-clear-EOP-for-multi-buffer-descriptors.patch 0007-e1000-verify-we-have-buffers-upfront.patch 0008-e1000-check-buffer-availability.patch 25861-x86-early-fixmap.patch 25862-sercon-non-com.patch 25863-sercon-ehci-dbgp.patch 25864-sercon-unused.patch 25866-sercon-ns16550-pci-irq.patch 25867-sercon-ns16550-parse.patch 25874-x86-EFI-chain-cfg.patch 25909-xenpm-consistent.patch 25920-x86-APICV-enable.patch 25921-x86-APICV-delivery.patch 25922-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch 25957-x86-TSC-adjust-HVM.patch 25958-x86-TSC-adjust-sr.patch 25959-x86-TSC-adjust-expose.patch 26077-stubdom_fix_compile_errors_in_grub.patch 26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch 26079-hotplug-Linux_close_lockfd_after_lock_attempt.patch 26081-stubdom_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch 26082-blktap2-libvhd_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch 26083-blktap_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch 26084-hotplug_install_hotplugpath.sh_as_data_file.patch 26085-stubdom_install_stubdompath.sh_as_data_file.patch 26086-hotplug-Linux_correct_sysconfig_tag_in_xendomains.patch 26087-hotplug-Linux_install_sysconfig_files_as_data_files.patch 26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch 26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch 26133-IOMMU-defer-BM-disable.patch 26189-xenstore-chmod.patch 26262-x86-EFI-secure-shim.patch 26324-IOMMU-assign-params.patch 26325-IOMMU-add-remove-params.patch 26326-VT-d-context-map-params.patch 26327-AMD-IOMMU-flush-params.patch 26328-IOMMU-pdev-type.patch 26329-IOMMU-phantom-dev.patch 26330-VT-d-phantom-MSI.patch 26331-IOMMU-phantom-dev-quirk.patch 26341-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26342-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26343-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26344-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26369-libxl-devid.patch 26370-libxc-x86-initial-mapping-fit.patch 26372-tools-paths.patch 26404-x86-forward-both-NMI-kinds.patch 26418-x86-trampoline-consider-multiboot.patch 26532-AMD-IOMMU-phantom-MSI.patch 26547-tools-xc_fix_logic_error_in_stdiostream_progress.patch 26548-tools-xc_handle_tty_output_differently_in_stdiostream_progress.patch 26549-tools-xc_turn_XCFLAGS__into_shifts.patch 26550-tools-xc_restore_logging_in_xc_save.patch 26551-tools-xc_log_pid_in_xc_save-xc_restore_output.patch 26554-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26555-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26556-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch 26576-x86-APICV-migration.patch 26577-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch 26675-tools-xentoollog_update_tty_detection_in_stdiostream_progress.patch 26754-hvm-Improve-APIC-INIT-SIPI-emulation.patch 26878-VMX-Detect-posted-interrupt-capability.patch 26879-VMX-Turn-on-posted-interrupt-bit-in-vmcs.patch 26880-VMX-Add-posted-interrupt-supporting.patch 26881-x86-HVM-Call-vlapic_set_irq-to-delivery-virtual-interrupt.patch 26882-VMX-Use-posted-interrupt-to-deliver-virtual-interrupt.patch 26902-x86-EFI-pass-boot-services-variable-info-to-runtime-code.patch 26953-x86-allow-Dom0-read-only-access-to-IO-APICs.patch 27179-VMX-Viridian-suppress-MSR-based-APIC-suggestion-when-having-APIC-V.patch 27184-libxl-devid-fix.patch 27249-VMX-fix-interaction-of-APIC-V-and-Viridian-emulation.patch 27353-VMX-add-boot-parameter-to-enable-disable-APIC-v-dynamically.patch 27405-Nested-VMX-Check-whether-interrupt-is-blocked-by-TPR.patch 27406-Nested-VMX-Force-check-ISR-when-L2-is-running.patch 27407-Nested-VMX-Clear-APIC-v-control-bit-in-vmcs02.patch 27408-Nested-VMX-Update-APIC-v-RVI-SVI-when-vmexit-to-L1.patch 27431-x86-don-t-allow-Dom0-access-to-the-HT-address-range.patch 27511-x86-fix-memory-cut-off-when-using-PFN-compression.patch 27512-libxc-x86-fix-page-table-creation-for-huge-guests.patch 27515-cpufreq-missing-check-of-copy_from_guest.patch 27519-x86-machine_restart-must-not-call-acpi_dmar_reinstate-twice.patch 27549-set-mtu-from-bridge-for-tap-interface.patch 27582-x86-HVM-fix-failure-path-in-hvm_vcpu_initialise.patch 27583-VMX-fix-failure-path-in-construct_vmcs.patch 27586-x86-HVM-properly-handle-wide-MMIO.patch 27611-x86-HVM-linear-address-must-be-canonical-for-the-whole-accessed-range.patch 27612-x86-HVM-refuse-doing-string-operations-in-certain-situations.patch 27691-x86-percpu-Force-INVALID_PERCPU_AREA-into-the-non-canonical-address-region.patch 27692-Nested-VMX-check-VMX-capability-before-read-VMX-related-MSRs.patch 27694-Nested-VMX-fix-IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1-msr-emulation.patch 27756-pygrub-xvda-style-disk.patch 27764-x86-print-relevant-tail-part-of-filename-for-warnings-and-crashes.patch 27870-x86-idle-reduce-contention-on-ACPI-register-accesses.patch 27925-nested-SVM-adjust-guest-handling-of-structure-mappings.patch 27963-nested-VMX-don-t-ignore-mapping-errors.patch 28103-nested-vmx-fix-I-O-port-bitmap-indexing-arithmetic.patch 28112-nested-VMX-fix-I-O-port-exit-emulation.patch 28131-Nested-VMX-CR-emulation-fix-up.patch 28229-Nested-VMX-Setup-the-virtual-NMI-exiting-info.patch 28235-VMX-apicv-Set-NMI-window-exiting-for-NMI.patch 28297-nested-EPT-fixing-wrong-handling-for-L2-guest-s-direct-mmio-access.patch 28302-Nested-VMX-prohibit-virtual-vmentry-vmexit-during-IO-emulation.patch 28304-x86-don-t-drop-guest-visible-state-updates-when-64-bit-PV-guest-is-in-user-mode.patch 32on64-extra-mem.patch README.SuSE VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch altgr_2.patch baselibs.conf bdrv_default_rwflag.patch bdrv_open2_fix_flags.patch bdrv_open2_flags_2.patch blktap-close-fifos.patch blktap-disable-debug-printf.patch blktap-pv-cdrom.patch blktap.patch blktapctrl-default-to-ioemu.patch block-dmmd block-iscsi block-nbd block-npiv block-npiv-common.sh block-npiv-vport boot.local.xenU boot.xen bridge-bonding.diff bridge-opensuse.patch bridge-record-creation.patch bridge-vlan.diff build-tapdisk-ioemu.patch capslock_enable.patch cdrom-removable.patch change-vnc-passwd.patch change_home_server.patch check_device_status.patch checkpoint-rename.patch del_usb_xend_entry.patch disable-xl-when-using-xend-fix.patch disable_emulated_device.diff domUloader.py domu-usb-controller.patch etc_pam.d_xen-api hibernate.patch hv_extid_compatibility.patch init.pciback init.xen_loop init.xend init.xendomains ioemu-7615-qcow2-fix-alloc_cluster_link_l2.patch ioemu-bdrv-open-CACHE_WB.patch ioemu-blktap-barriers.patch ioemu-blktap-fv-init.patch ioemu-blktap-image-format.patch ioemu-blktap-zero-size.patch ioemu-debuginfo.patch ioemu-disable-emulated-ide-if-pv.patch ioemu-disable-scsi.patch ioemu-vnc-resize.patch ioemu-watchdog-ib700-timer.patch ioemu-watchdog-linkage.patch ioemu-watchdog-support.patch ipxe-enable-nics.patch ipxe.tar.bz2 kernel-boot-hvm.patch kmp_filelist libxen_permissive.patch log-guest-console.patch logrotate.conf magic_ioport_compat.patch minios-fixups.patch multi-xvdp.patch network-nat-open-SuSEfirewall2-FORWARD.patch pvdrv-import-shared-info.patch pvdrv_emulation_control.patch pygrub-netware-xnloader.patch qemu-dm-segfault.patch qemu-ifup-set-mtu.patch qemu-security-etch1.diff qemu-xen-dir-remote.tar.bz2 qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote.tar.bz2 seabios-dir-remote.tar.bz2 serial-split.patch stdvga-cache.patch stubdom.tar.bz2 supported_module.diff suspend_evtchn_lock.patch sysconfig.pciback tapdisk-ioemu-logfile.patch tapdisk-ioemu-shutdown-fix.patch tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch tmp_build.patch tools-watchdog-support.patch udev-rules.patch usb-list.patch vif-bridge-no-iptables.patch vif-bridge-tap-fix.patch vif-route-ifup.patch x86-cpufreq-report.patch x86-dom-print.patch x86-extra-trap-info.patch x86-ioapic-ack-default.patch xen-4.2.4-testing-src.tar.bz2 xen-api-auth.patch xen-changeset.diff xen-cpupool-xl-config-format.patch xen-destdir.diff xen-disable-qemu-monitor.diff xen-domUloader.diff xen-fixme-doc.diff xen-hvm-default-bridge.diff xen-hvm-default-pae.diff xen-ioemu-hvm-pv-support.diff xen-managed-pci-device.patch xen-max-free-mem.diff xen-migration-bridge-check.patch xen-minimum-restart-time.patch xen-no-dummy-nfs-ip.diff xen-paths.diff xen-qemu-iscsi-fix.patch xen-updown.sh xen-utils-0.1.tar.bz2 xen-xm-top-needs-root.diff xen-xmexample-vti.diff xen-xmexample.diff xen.changes xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch xen.migrate.tools-xc_document_printf_calls_in_xc_restore.patch xen.migrate.tools-xc_print_messages_from_xc_save_with_xc_report.patch xen.migrate.tools-xc_rework_xc_save.cswitch_qemu_logdirty.patch xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch xen.migrate.tools_add_xm_migrate_--log_progress_option.patch xen.migrate.tools_set_migration_constraints_from_cmdline.patch xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch xen.sles11sp1.fate311487.xen_platform_pci.dmistring.patch xen.spec xen_pvdrivers.conf xenalyze.hg.tar.bz2 xenapi-console-protocol.patch xenapiusers xenconsole-no-multiple-connections.patch xend-config-enable-dump-comment.patch xend-config.diff xend-console-port-restore.patch xend-core-dump-loc.diff xend-cpuid.patch xend-devid-or-name.patch xend-disable-internal-logrotate.patch xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch xend-domain-lock.patch xend-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch xend-migration-domname-fix.patch xend-pvscsi-recognize-also-SCSI-CDROM-devices.patch xend-relocation-server.fw xend-relocation.sh xend-sysconfig.patch xend-vcpu-affinity-fix.patch xend-xm-reboot-fix.patch xenpaging.autostart.patch xenpaging.doc.patch xenpaging.qemu.flush-cache.patch xm-create-maxmem.patch xm-create-xflag.patch xm-save-check-file.patch xmclone.sh xmexample.disks xmexample.domUloader xnloader.py ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ xen.spec ++++++ ++++ 1503 lines (skipped) ++++++ 0001-net-move-the-tap-buffer-into-TAPState.patch ++++++ From: Mark McLoughlin Date: Mon, 18 May 2009 12:05:44 +0100 Subject: net: move the tap buffer into TAPState Patch-mainline: v0.11.0-rc0 Git-commit: 5b01e886d9eb4d5e94384a79634dcb43848e7bbf References: bnc#840196 KVM uses a 64k buffer for reading from tapfd (for GSO support) and allocates the buffer with TAPState rather than on the stack. Not allocating it on the stack probably makes sense for qemu anyway, so merge it in advance of GSO support. Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c index 0e7c77c..2ca85a3 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c @@ -700,6 +700,7 @@ typedef struct TAPState { char down_script[1024]; char down_script_arg[128]; char script_arg[1024]; + uint8_t buf[4096]; } TAPState; #ifndef CONFIG_STUBDOM @@ -735,20 +736,19 @@ static void tap_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) static void tap_send(void *opaque) { TAPState *s = opaque; - uint8_t buf[4096]; int size; #ifdef __sun__ struct strbuf sbuf; int f = 0; - sbuf.maxlen = sizeof(buf); - sbuf.buf = buf; + sbuf.maxlen = sizeof(s->buf); + sbuf.buf = s->buf; size = getmsg(s->fd, NULL, &sbuf, &f) >=0 ? sbuf.len : -1; #else - size = read(s->fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + size = read(s->fd, s->buf, sizeof(s->buf)); #endif if (size > 0) { - qemu_send_packet(s->vc, buf, size); + qemu_send_packet(s->vc, s->buf, size); } } -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0002-net-increase-tap-buffer-size.patch ++++++ From: Michal Kubecek Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 19:05:45 +0200 Subject: net: increase tap buffer size Patch-mainline: v0.12.0-rc0 Git-commit: 8e0f8e5bf8fd483dd28329055336cf895b74c89f (partial) References: bnc#840196 Increase size of buffere embedded in struct TAPState to allow jumbo frames longer then 4096 bytes. Part of upstream qemu commit 8e0f8e5b net: enable IFF_VNET_HDR on tap fds if available Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c index 2ca85a3..502a691 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c @@ -693,6 +693,11 @@ static void vmchannel_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) #if !defined(_WIN32) +/* Maximum GSO packet size (64k) plus plenty of room for + * the ethernet and virtio_net headers + */ +#define TAP_BUFSIZE (4096 + 65536) + typedef struct TAPState { VLANClientState *vc; int fd; @@ -700,7 +705,7 @@ typedef struct TAPState { char down_script[1024]; char down_script_arg[128]; char script_arg[1024]; - uint8_t buf[4096]; + uint8_t buf[TAP_BUFSIZE]; } TAPState; #ifndef CONFIG_STUBDOM -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0003-e1000-fix-access-4-bytes-beyond-buffer-end.patch ++++++ From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2010 20:24:59 +0300 Subject: e1000: fix access 4 bytes beyond buffer end Patch-mainline: v0.13.0-rc0 Git-commit: b0b900070c7cb29bbefb732ec00397abe5de6d73 References: bnc#840196 We do range check for size, and get size as buffer, but copy size + 4 bytes (4 is for FCS). Let's copy size bytes but put size + 4 in length. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c index c75bc5e..9b062db 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c @@ -659,7 +659,6 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) } rdh_start = s->mac_reg[RDH]; - size += 4; // for the header do { if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == s->mac_reg[RDT] && s->check_rxov) { set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO); @@ -673,7 +672,7 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) if (desc.buffer_addr) { cpu_physical_memory_write(le64_to_cpu(desc.buffer_addr), (void *)(buf + vlan_offset), size); - desc.length = cpu_to_le16(size); + desc.length = cpu_to_le16(size + 4 /* for FCS */); desc.status |= E1000_RXD_STAT_EOP|E1000_RXD_STAT_IXSM; } else // as per intel docs; skip descriptors with null buf addr DBGOUT(RX, "Null RX descriptor!!\n"); -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0004-e1000-secrc-support.patch ++++++ From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2010 20:41:02 +0300 Subject: e1000: secrc support Patch-mainline: v0.13.0-rc0 Git-commit: 55e8d1ce6b09300cc5f3adcd9a705156d168381d References: bnc#840196 Add support for secrc field. Reportedly needed by old RHEL guests. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c index 9b062db..07e681d 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c @@ -338,6 +338,15 @@ is_vlan_txd(uint32_t txd_lower) return ((txd_lower & E1000_TXD_CMD_VLE) != 0); } +/* FCS aka Ethernet CRC-32. We don't get it from backends and can't + * fill it in, just pad descriptor length by 4 bytes unless guest + * told us to trip it off the packet. */ +static inline int +fcs_len(E1000State *s) +{ + return (s->mac_reg[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_SECRC) ? 0 : 4; +} + static void xmit_seg(E1000State *s) { @@ -672,7 +681,7 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) if (desc.buffer_addr) { cpu_physical_memory_write(le64_to_cpu(desc.buffer_addr), (void *)(buf + vlan_offset), size); - desc.length = cpu_to_le16(size + 4 /* for FCS */); + desc.length = cpu_to_le16(size + fcs_len(s)); desc.status |= E1000_RXD_STAT_EOP|E1000_RXD_STAT_IXSM; } else // as per intel docs; skip descriptors with null buf addr DBGOUT(RX, "Null RX descriptor!!\n"); -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0005-e1000-multi-buffer-packet-support.patch ++++++ From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 18:27:48 +0200 Subject: e1000: multi-buffer packet support Patch-mainline: v0.15.0-rc0 Git-commit: b19487e27ed3009df7f555998a454ba19aefd4b8 References: bnc#840196 e1000 supports multi-buffer packets larger than rxbuf_size. This fixes the following (on linux): - in guest: ifconfig eth1 mtu 16110 - in host: ifconfig tap0 mtu 16110 ping -s 16082 <guest-ip> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi Acked-by: Alex Williamson Acked-by: Kevin Wolf Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c index 07e681d..34818e0 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c @@ -632,16 +632,13 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) uint32_t rdh_start; uint16_t vlan_special = 0; uint8_t vlan_status = 0, vlan_offset = 0; + size_t desc_offset; + size_t desc_size; + size_t total_size; if (!(s->mac_reg[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_EN)) return; - if (size > s->rxbuf_size) { - DBGOUT(RX, "packet too large for buffers (%d > %d)\n", size, - s->rxbuf_size); - return; - } - /* Discard oversized packets if !LPE and !SBP. */ if ((size > MAXIMUM_ETHERNET_LPE_SIZE || (size > MAXIMUM_ETHERNET_VLAN_SIZE @@ -668,8 +665,16 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) } rdh_start = s->mac_reg[RDH]; + desc_offset = 0; + total_size = size + fcs_len(s); do { + desc_size = total_size - desc_offset; + if (desc_size > s->rxbuf_size) { + desc_size = s->rxbuf_size; + } if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == s->mac_reg[RDT] && s->check_rxov) { + /* Discard all data written so far */ + s->mac_reg[RDH] = rdh_start; set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO); return; } @@ -679,10 +684,22 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) desc.special = vlan_special; desc.status |= (vlan_status | E1000_RXD_STAT_DD); if (desc.buffer_addr) { - cpu_physical_memory_write(le64_to_cpu(desc.buffer_addr), - (void *)(buf + vlan_offset), size); - desc.length = cpu_to_le16(size + fcs_len(s)); - desc.status |= E1000_RXD_STAT_EOP|E1000_RXD_STAT_IXSM; + if (desc_offset < size) { + size_t copy_size = size - desc_offset; + if (copy_size > s->rxbuf_size) { + copy_size = s->rxbuf_size; + } + cpu_physical_memory_write(le64_to_cpu(desc.buffer_addr), + (void *)(buf + desc_offset + vlan_offset), + copy_size); + } + desc_offset += desc_size; + if (desc_offset >= total_size) { + desc.length = cpu_to_le16(desc_size); + desc.status |= E1000_RXD_STAT_EOP | E1000_RXD_STAT_IXSM; + } else { + desc.length = cpu_to_le16(desc_size); + } } else // as per intel docs; skip descriptors with null buf addr DBGOUT(RX, "Null RX descriptor!!\n"); cpu_physical_memory_write(base, (void *)&desc, sizeof(desc)); @@ -697,7 +714,7 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO); return; } - } while (desc.buffer_addr == 0); + } while (desc_offset < total_size); s->mac_reg[GPRC]++; s->mac_reg[TPR]++; -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0006-e1000-clear-EOP-for-multi-buffer-descriptors.patch ++++++ From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 18:27:52 +0200 Subject: e1000: clear EOP for multi-buffer descriptors MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Patch-mainline: v0.15.0-rc0 Git-commit: ee912ccfa007351a62ba42bd60499769f6c02c1e References: bnc#840196 The e1000 spec says: if software statically allocates buffers, and uses memory read to check for completed descriptors, it simply has to zero the status byte in the descriptor to make it ready for reuse by hardware. This is not a hardware requirement (moving the hardware tail pointer is), but is necessary for performing an in–memory scan. Thus the guest does not have to clear the status byte. In case it doesn't we need to clear EOP for all descriptors except the last. While I don't know of any such guests, it's probably a good idea to stick to the spec. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Reported-by: Juan Quintela Acked-by: Alex Williamson Acked-by: Kevin Wolf Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno Acked-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c index 34818e0..7e791dc 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c @@ -694,11 +694,13 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) copy_size); } desc_offset += desc_size; + desc.length = cpu_to_le16(desc_size); if (desc_offset >= total_size) { - desc.length = cpu_to_le16(desc_size); desc.status |= E1000_RXD_STAT_EOP | E1000_RXD_STAT_IXSM; } else { - desc.length = cpu_to_le16(desc_size); + /* Guest zeroing out status is not a hardware requirement. + Clear EOP in case guest didn't do it. */ + desc.status &= ~E1000_RXD_STAT_EOP; } } else // as per intel docs; skip descriptors with null buf addr DBGOUT(RX, "Null RX descriptor!!\n"); -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0007-e1000-verify-we-have-buffers-upfront.patch ++++++ From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 18:27:55 +0200 Subject: e1000: verify we have buffers, upfront Patch-mainline: v0.15.0-rc0 Git-commit: 322fd48afbed1ef7b834ac343a0c8687bcb33695 References: bnc#840196 The spec says: Any descriptor with a non-zero status byte has been processed by the hardware, and is ready to be handled by the software. Thus, once we change a descriptor status to non-zero we should never move the head backwards and try to reuse this descriptor from hardware. This actually happened with a multibuffer packet that arrives when we don't have enough buffers. Fix by checking that we have enough buffers upfront so we never need to discard the packet midway through. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Alex Williamson Acked-by: Kevin Wolf Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno Acked-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c index 7e791dc..18d7597 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c @@ -622,6 +622,24 @@ e1000_can_receive(void *opaque) return (s->mac_reg[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_EN && s->mac_reg[RDLEN] != 0); } +static bool e1000_has_rxbufs(E1000State *s, size_t total_size) +{ + int bufs; + /* Fast-path short packets */ + if (total_size <= s->rxbuf_size) { + return s->mac_reg[RDH] != s->mac_reg[RDT] || !s->check_rxov; + } + if (s->mac_reg[RDH] < s->mac_reg[RDT]) { + bufs = s->mac_reg[RDT] - s->mac_reg[RDH]; + } else if (s->mac_reg[RDH] > s->mac_reg[RDT] || !s->check_rxov) { + bufs = s->mac_reg[RDLEN] / sizeof(struct e1000_rx_desc) + + s->mac_reg[RDT] - s->mac_reg[RDH]; + } else { + return false; + } + return total_size <= bufs * s->rxbuf_size; +} + static void e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) { @@ -667,17 +685,15 @@ e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) rdh_start = s->mac_reg[RDH]; desc_offset = 0; total_size = size + fcs_len(s); + if (!e1000_has_rxbufs(s, total_size)) { + set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO); + return; + } do { desc_size = total_size - desc_offset; if (desc_size > s->rxbuf_size) { desc_size = s->rxbuf_size; } - if (s->mac_reg[RDH] == s->mac_reg[RDT] && s->check_rxov) { - /* Discard all data written so far */ - s->mac_reg[RDH] = rdh_start; - set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICS_RXO); - return; - } base = ((uint64_t)s->mac_reg[RDBAH] << 32) + s->mac_reg[RDBAL] + sizeof(desc) * s->mac_reg[RDH]; cpu_physical_memory_read(base, (void *)&desc, sizeof(desc)); -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 0008-e1000-check-buffer-availability.patch ++++++ From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 13:37:35 +0200 Subject: e1000: check buffer availability Patch-mainline: v0.15.0-rc0 Git-commit: 6cdfab2868dd593902e2b7db3ba9f49f2cc03e3f References: bnc#840196 Reduce spurious packet drops on RX ring empty by verifying that we have at least 1 buffer ahead of the time. Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Acked-by: Michal Kubecek --- tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c index 18d7597..b07c6cb 100644 --- a/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c +++ b/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/e1000.c @@ -614,14 +614,6 @@ e1000_set_link_status(VLANClientState *vc) set_ics(s, 0, E1000_ICR_LSC); } -static int -e1000_can_receive(void *opaque) -{ - E1000State *s = opaque; - - return (s->mac_reg[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_EN && s->mac_reg[RDLEN] != 0); -} - static bool e1000_has_rxbufs(E1000State *s, size_t total_size) { int bufs; @@ -640,6 +632,15 @@ static bool e1000_has_rxbufs(E1000State *s, size_t total_size) return total_size <= bufs * s->rxbuf_size; } +static int +e1000_can_receive(void *opaque) +{ + E1000State *s = opaque; + + return (s->mac_reg[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_EN) && (s->mac_reg[RDLEN] != 0) && + e1000_has_rxbufs(s, 1); +} + static void e1000_receive(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) { -- 1.8.1.4 ++++++ 25861-x86-early-fixmap.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1347371120 -7200 # Node ID 51c2d7c83cbc2a0357ce112a463f91d354dcdba9 # Parent e4cb8411161043c726f699252cc761e77853e820 x86: allow early use of fixmaps As a prerequisite for adding an EHCI debug port based console implementation, set up the page tables needed for (a sub-portion of) the fixmaps together with other boot time page table construction. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -136,6 +137,9 @@ __start: add $8,%edx add $(1< #include #include +#define __ASSEMBLY__ /* avoid pulling in ACPI stuff (conflicts with EFI) */ +#include +#undef __ASSEMBLY__ #include #include #include @@ -1131,14 +1134,19 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY slot &= L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1; l2_bootmap[slot] = l2e_from_paddr(addr, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR|_PAGE_PSE); } + /* Initialise L2 fixmap page directory entry. */ + l2_fixmap[l2_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP - 1)] = + l2e_from_paddr((UINTN)l1_fixmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); /* Initialise L3 identity-map page directory entries. */ for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(l2_identmap) / L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i ) l3_identmap[i] = l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)(l2_identmap + i * L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); - /* Initialise L3 xen-map page directory entry. */ + /* Initialise L3 xen-map and fixmap page directory entries. */ l3_xenmap[l3_table_offset(XEN_VIRT_START)] = l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)l2_xenmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); + l3_xenmap[l3_table_offset(FIXADDR_TOP - 1)] = + l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)l2_fixmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); /* Initialise L3 boot-map page directory entries. */ l3_bootmap[l3_table_offset(xen_phys_start)] = l3e_from_paddr((UINTN)l2_bootmap, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c @@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ l1_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned"))) l1_identmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; +/* Mapping of the fixmap space needed early. */ +l1_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned"))) + l1_fixmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; + #define MEM_LOG(_f, _a...) gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING , _f "\n" , ## _a) /* Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c @@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ l3_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ l2_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned"))) l2_xenmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; +/* Enough page directories to map the early fixmap space. */ +l2_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned"))) + l2_fixmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; + /* Enough page directories to map into the bottom 1GB. */ l3_pgentry_t __attribute__ ((__section__ (".bss.page_aligned"))) l3_bootmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/config.h @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ extern unsigned char boot_edid_info[128] #define MACHPHYS_MBYTES 16 /* 1 MB needed per 1 GB memory */ #define FRAMETABLE_MBYTES (MACHPHYS_MBYTES * 6) -#define IOREMAP_VIRT_END 0UL +#define IOREMAP_VIRT_END _AC(0,UL) #define IOREMAP_VIRT_START (IOREMAP_VIRT_END - (IOREMAP_MBYTES<<20)) #define DIRECTMAP_VIRT_END IOREMAP_VIRT_START #define DIRECTMAP_VIRT_START (DIRECTMAP_VIRT_END - (DIRECTMAP_MBYTES<<20)) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h @@ -13,12 +13,17 @@ #define _ASM_FIXMAP_H #include +#include + +#define FIXADDR_TOP (IOREMAP_VIRT_END - PAGE_SIZE) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + #include #include #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -68,7 +73,6 @@ enum fixed_addresses { __end_of_fixed_addresses }; -#define FIXADDR_TOP (IOREMAP_VIRT_END - PAGE_SIZE) #define FIXADDR_SIZE (__end_of_fixed_addresses << PAGE_SHIFT) #define FIXADDR_START (FIXADDR_TOP - FIXADDR_SIZE) @@ -92,4 +96,6 @@ static inline unsigned long virt_to_fix( return __virt_to_fix(vaddr); } +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + #endif Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ #ifndef __X86_PAGE_H__ #define __X86_PAGE_H__ +#include + /* * It is important that the masks are signed quantities. This ensures that * the compiler sign-extends a 32-bit mask to 64 bits if that is required. @@ -306,13 +308,15 @@ extern l2_pgentry_t idle_pg_table_l2[ extern l2_pgentry_t *compat_idle_pg_table_l2; extern unsigned int m2p_compat_vstart; extern l2_pgentry_t l2_xenmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES], + l2_fixmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES], l2_bootmap[L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; extern l3_pgentry_t l3_xenmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES], l3_identmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES], l3_bootmap[L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; #endif extern l2_pgentry_t l2_identmap[4*L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; -extern l1_pgentry_t l1_identmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; +extern l1_pgentry_t l1_identmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES], + l1_fixmap[L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES]; void paging_init(void); void setup_idle_pagetable(void); #endif /* !defined(__ASSEMBLY__) */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/const.h =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/const.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* const.h: Macros for dealing with constants. */ + +#ifndef __XEN_CONST_H__ +#define __XEN_CONST_H__ + +/* Some constant macros are used in both assembler and + * C code. Therefore we cannot annotate them always with + * 'UL' and other type specifiers unilaterally. We + * use the following macros to deal with this. + * + * Similarly, _AT() will cast an expression with a type in C, but + * leave it unchanged in asm. + */ + +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define _AC(X,Y) X +#define _AT(T,X) X +#else +#define __AC(X,Y) (X##Y) +#define _AC(X,Y) __AC(X,Y) +#define _AT(T,X) ((T)(X)) +#endif + +#endif /* __XEN_CONST_H__ */ ++++++ 25862-sercon-non-com.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1347371236 -7200 # Node ID 776a23fa0e938e4cf3307fc2e3b3f1a9488a5927 # Parent 51c2d7c83cbc2a0357ce112a463f91d354dcdba9 console: prepare for non-COMn port support Widen SERHND_IDX (and use it where needed), introduce a flush low level driver method, and remove unnecessary peeking of the common code at the (driver specific) serial port identification string in the "console=" command line option value. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c @@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ void __init smp_intr_init(void) * Also ensure serial interrupts are high priority. We do not * want them to be blocked by unacknowledged guest-bound interrupts. */ - for ( seridx = 0; seridx < 2; seridx++ ) + for ( seridx = 0; seridx <= SERHND_IDX; seridx++ ) { if ( (irq = serial_irq(seridx)) < 0 ) continue; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/char/console.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/char/console.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/char/console.c @@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ void printk(const char *fmt, ...) void __init console_init_preirq(void) { char *p; + int sh; serial_init_preirq(); @@ -554,8 +555,9 @@ void __init console_init_preirq(void) vga_init(); else if ( !strncmp(p, "none", 4) ) continue; - else if ( strncmp(p, "com", 3) || - (sercon_handle = serial_parse_handle(p)) == -1 ) + else if ( (sh = serial_parse_handle(p)) >= 0 ) + sercon_handle = sh; + else { char *q = strchr(p, ','); if ( q != NULL ) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/char/serial.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/char/serial.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/char/serial.c @@ -22,9 +22,11 @@ size_param("serial_tx_buffer", serial_tx #define mask_serial_rxbuf_idx(_i) ((_i)&(serial_rxbufsz-1)) #define mask_serial_txbuf_idx(_i) ((_i)&(serial_txbufsz-1)) -static struct serial_port com[2] = { - { .rx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED, .tx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED }, - { .rx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED, .tx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED } +static struct serial_port com[SERHND_IDX + 1] = { + [0 ... SERHND_IDX] = { + .rx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED, + .tx_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED + } }; void serial_rx_interrupt(struct serial_port *port, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) @@ -81,6 +83,8 @@ void serial_tx_interrupt(struct serial_p port->driver->putc( port, port->txbuf[mask_serial_txbuf_idx(port->txbufc++)]); } + if ( i && port->driver->flush ) + port->driver->flush(port); } spin_unlock(&port->tx_lock); @@ -175,6 +179,9 @@ void serial_putc(int handle, char c) __serial_putc(port, c); + if ( port->driver->flush ) + port->driver->flush(port); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock, flags); } @@ -206,6 +213,9 @@ void serial_puts(int handle, const char __serial_putc(port, c); } + if ( port->driver->flush ) + port->driver->flush(port); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock, flags); } @@ -261,10 +271,10 @@ int __init serial_parse_handle(char *con switch ( conf[3] ) { case '1': - handle = 0; + handle = SERHND_COM1; break; case '2': - handle = 1; + handle = SERHND_COM2; break; default: goto fail; @@ -365,6 +375,8 @@ void serial_start_sync(int handle) port->driver->putc( port, port->txbuf[mask_serial_txbuf_idx(port->txbufc++)]); } + if ( port->driver->flush ) + port->driver->flush(port); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->tx_lock, flags); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/serial.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/serial.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/serial.h @@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ struct uart_driver { int (*tx_empty)(struct serial_port *); /* Put a character onto the serial line. */ void (*putc)(struct serial_port *, char); + /* Flush accumulated characters. */ + void (*flush)(struct serial_port *); /* Get a character from the serial line: returns 0 if none available. */ int (*getc)(struct serial_port *, char *); /* Get IRQ number for this port's serial line: returns -1 if none. */ @@ -67,10 +69,12 @@ struct uart_driver { }; /* 'Serial handles' are composed from the following fields. */ -#define SERHND_IDX (1<<0) /* COM1 or COM2? */ -#define SERHND_HI (1<<1) /* Mux/demux each transferred char by MSB. */ -#define SERHND_LO (1<<2) /* Ditto, except that the MSB is cleared. */ -#define SERHND_COOKED (1<<3) /* Newline/carriage-return translation? */ +#define SERHND_IDX (3<<0) /* COM1 or COM2? */ +# define SERHND_COM1 (0<<0) +# define SERHND_COM2 (1<<0) +#define SERHND_HI (1<<2) /* Mux/demux each transferred char by MSB. */ +#define SERHND_LO (1<<3) /* Ditto, except that the MSB is cleared. */ +#define SERHND_COOKED (1<<4) /* Newline/carriage-return translation? */ /* Two-stage initialisation (before/after IRQ-subsystem initialisation). */ void serial_init_preirq(void); ++++++ 25863-sercon-ehci-dbgp.patch ++++++ ++++ 1798 lines (skipped) ++++++ 25864-sercon-unused.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1347371512 -7200 # Node ID e1380b5311ccee14eb47d7badb75339933d42249 # Parent 0d0c55a1975db9c6cac2e9259b5ebea7a7bdbaec serial: avoid fully initializing unused consoles Defer calling the drivers' post-IRQ initialization functions (generally doing allocation of transmit buffers) until it is known that the respective console is actually going to be used. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c +++ b/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c @@ -1391,7 +1391,8 @@ static int ehci_dbgp_check_release(struc printk(XENLOG_INFO "Releasing EHCI debug port at %02x:%02x.%u\n", dbgp->bus, dbgp->slot, dbgp->func); - kill_timer(&dbgp->timer); + if ( dbgp->timer.function ) + kill_timer(&dbgp->timer); dbgp->ehci_debug = NULL; ctrl = readl(&ehci_debug->control); --- a/xen/drivers/char/serial.c +++ b/xen/drivers/char/serial.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ static struct serial_port com[SERHND_IDX } }; +static bool_t __read_mostly post_irq; + void serial_rx_interrupt(struct serial_port *port, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { char c; @@ -263,14 +265,12 @@ char serial_getc(int handle) int __init serial_parse_handle(char *conf) { - int handle; + int handle, flags = 0; if ( !strncmp(conf, "dbgp", 4) && (!conf[4] || conf[4] == ',') ) { - if ( !com[SERHND_DBGP].driver ) - goto fail; - - return SERHND_DBGP | SERHND_COOKED; + handle = SERHND_DBGP; + goto common; } if ( strncmp(conf, "com", 3) ) @@ -288,17 +288,25 @@ int __init serial_parse_handle(char *con goto fail; } - if ( !com[handle].driver ) - goto fail; - if ( conf[4] == 'H' ) - handle |= SERHND_HI; + flags |= SERHND_HI; else if ( conf[4] == 'L' ) - handle |= SERHND_LO; + flags |= SERHND_LO; - handle |= SERHND_COOKED; + common: + if ( !com[handle].driver ) + goto fail; + + if ( !post_irq ) + com[handle].state = serial_parsed; + else if ( com[handle].state != serial_initialized ) + { + if ( com[handle].driver->init_postirq ) + com[handle].driver->init_postirq(&com[handle]); + com[handle].state = serial_initialized; + } - return handle; + return handle | flags | SERHND_COOKED; fail: return -1; @@ -450,8 +458,13 @@ void __init serial_init_postirq(void) { int i; for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(com); i++ ) - if ( com[i].driver && com[i].driver->init_postirq ) - com[i].driver->init_postirq(&com[i]); + if ( com[i].state == serial_parsed ) + { + if ( com[i].driver->init_postirq ) + com[i].driver->init_postirq(&com[i]); + com[i].state = serial_initialized; + } + post_irq = 1; } void __init serial_endboot(void) @@ -475,7 +488,7 @@ void serial_suspend(void) { int i; for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(com); i++ ) - if ( com[i].driver && com[i].driver->suspend ) + if ( com[i].state == serial_initialized && com[i].driver->suspend ) com[i].driver->suspend(&com[i]); } @@ -483,7 +496,7 @@ void serial_resume(void) { int i; for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(com); i++ ) - if ( com[i].driver && com[i].driver->resume ) + if ( com[i].state == serial_initialized && com[i].driver->resume ) com[i].driver->resume(&com[i]); } --- a/xen/include/xen/serial.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/serial.h @@ -25,10 +25,17 @@ extern unsigned int serial_txbufsz; struct uart_driver; +enum serial_port_state { + serial_unused, + serial_parsed, + serial_initialized +}; + struct serial_port { /* Uart-driver parameters. */ struct uart_driver *driver; void *uart; + enum serial_port_state state; /* Number of characters the port can hold for transmit. */ int tx_fifo_size; /* Transmit data buffer (interrupt-driven uart). */ ++++++ 25866-sercon-ns16550-pci-irq.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1347371733 -7200 # Node ID ee12dc357fbecbb0517798f395d14bf1764c6766 # Parent 5fb5b3b70e34ef278d06aff27878b4b8e6d9145f ns16550: PCI initialization adjustments Besides single-port serial cards, also accept multi-port ones and such providing mixed functionality (e.g. also having a parallel port). Reading PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN before ACPI gets enabled generally produces an incorrect IRQ (below 16, whereas after enabling ACPI it frequently would end up at a higher one), so this is useful (almost) only when a system already boots in ACPI mode. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c @@ -504,7 +504,6 @@ static int __init check_existence(struct static int pci_uart_config (struct ns16550 *uart, int skip_amt, int bar_idx) { - uint16_t class; uint32_t bar, len; int b, d, f; @@ -515,9 +514,15 @@ pci_uart_config (struct ns16550 *uart, i { for ( f = 0; f < 0x8; f++ ) { - class = pci_conf_read16(0, b, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE); - if ( class != 0x700 ) + switch ( pci_conf_read16(0, b, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE) ) + { + case 0x0700: /* single port serial */ + case 0x0702: /* multi port serial */ + case 0x0780: /* other (e.g serial+parallel) */ + break; + default: continue; + } bar = pci_conf_read32(0, b, d, f, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_0 + bar_idx*4); @@ -540,7 +545,8 @@ pci_uart_config (struct ns16550 *uart, i uart->bar = bar; uart->bar_idx = bar_idx; uart->io_base = bar & 0xfffe; - uart->irq = 0; + uart->irq = pci_conf_read8(0, b, d, f, PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN) ? + pci_conf_read8(0, b, d, f, PCI_INTERRUPT_LINE) : 0; return 0; } ++++++ 25867-sercon-ns16550-parse.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1347371805 -7200 # Node ID b22f184e1a3cac03abeed92ec4b74235fd0881f4 # Parent ee12dc357fbecbb0517798f395d14bf1764c6766 ns16550: command line parsing adjustments Allow intermediate parts of the command line options to be absent (expressed by two immediately succeeding commas). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ If set, override Xen's calculation of th If set, override Xen's default choice for the platform timer. ### com1,com2 -> `= <baud>[/][,DPS[,<io-base>[,<irq>[,<port-bdf>[,<bridge-bdf>]]]] | pci | amt ] ` +> `= <baud>[/][,[DPS][,[<io-base>|pci|amt][,[<irq>][,[<port-bdf>][,[<bridge-bdf>]]]]]]` Both option `com1` and `com2` follow the same format. Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c @@ -591,26 +591,23 @@ static void __init ns16550_parse_port_co else if ( (baud = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10)) != 0 ) uart->baud = baud; - if ( *conf == '/') + if ( *conf == '/' ) { conf++; uart->clock_hz = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 0) << 4; } - if ( *conf != ',' ) - goto config_parsed; - conf++; - - uart->data_bits = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10); + if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' ) + { + uart->data_bits = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10); - uart->parity = parse_parity_char(*conf); - conf++; + uart->parity = parse_parity_char(*conf); - uart->stop_bits = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10); + uart->stop_bits = simple_strtoul(conf + 1, &conf, 10); + } - if ( *conf == ',' ) + if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' ) { - conf++; if ( strncmp(conf, "pci", 3) == 0 ) { if ( pci_uart_config(uart, 1/* skip AMT */, uart - ns16550_com) ) @@ -627,24 +624,21 @@ static void __init ns16550_parse_port_co { uart->io_base = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 0); } + } - if ( *conf == ',' ) - { - conf++; - uart->irq = simple_strtoul(conf, &conf, 10); - if ( *conf == ',' ) - { - conf++; - uart->ps_bdf_enable = 1; - parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->ps_bdf[0]); - if ( *conf == ',' ) - { - conf++; - uart->pb_bdf_enable = 1; - parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->pb_bdf[0]); - } - } - } + if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' ) + uart->irq = simple_strtol(conf, &conf, 10); + + if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' ) + { + uart->ps_bdf_enable = 1; + parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->ps_bdf[0]); + } + + if ( *conf == ',' && *++conf != ',' ) + { + uart->pb_bdf_enable = 1; + parse_pci_bdf(&conf, &uart->pb_bdf[0]); } config_parsed: ++++++ 25874-x86-EFI-chain-cfg.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1347437974 -7200 # Node ID 8c0aa97d529a55de2ab96be1a5a6e9ed6a9c6bf0 # Parent ac8f4afccd6c6786a3fd5691e8b0c9b38c47e994 x86-64/EFI: allow chaining of config files Namely when making use the CONFIG_XEN_COMPAT_* options in the legacy Linux kernels, newer kernels may not be compatible with older hypervisors, so trying to boot such a combination makes little sense. Booting older kernels on newer hypervisors, however, has to always work. With the way xen.efi looks for its configuration file, allowing individual configuration files to refer only to compatible kernels, and referring from an older- to a newer-hypervisor one (the kernels of which will, as said, necessarily be compatible with the older hypervisor) allows to greatly reduce redundancy at least in development environments where one frequently wants multiple hypervisors and kernles to be installed in parallel. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/docs/misc/efi.markdown =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/docs/misc/efi.markdown +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/docs/misc/efi.markdown @@ -75,6 +75,13 @@ Specifies an XSM module to load. Specifies a CPU microcode blob to load. +###`chain=<filename>` + +Specifies an alternate configuration file to use in case the specified section +(and in particular its `kernel=` setting) can't be found in the default (or +specified) configuration file. This is only meaningful in the [global] section +and really not meant to be used together with the `-cfg=` command line option. + Filenames must be specified relative to the location of the EFI binary. Extra options to be passed to Xen can also be specified on the command line, Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c @@ -815,7 +815,26 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY else section.s = get_value(&cfg, "global", "default"); - name.s = get_value(&cfg, section.s, "kernel"); + for ( ; ; ) + { + name.s = get_value(&cfg, section.s, "kernel"); + if ( name.s ) + break; + name.s = get_value(&cfg, "global", "chain"); + if ( !name.s ) + break; + efi_bs->FreePages(cfg.addr, PFN_UP(cfg.size)); + cfg.addr = 0; + if ( !read_file(dir_handle, s2w(&name), &cfg) ) + { + PrintStr(L"Chained configuration file '"); + PrintStr(name.w); + efi_bs->FreePool(name.w); + blexit(L"'not found\r\n"); + } + pre_parse(&cfg); + efi_bs->FreePool(name.w); + } if ( !name.s ) blexit(L"No Dom0 kernel image specified\r\n"); split_value(name.s); ++++++ 25909-xenpm-consistent.patch ++++++ ++++ 630 lines (skipped) ++++++ 25920-x86-APICV-enable.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313605 # HG changeset patch # User Jiongxi Li # Date 1347912248 -3600 # Node ID ec60de627945f17ec2ce5c14e1224b59403875f7 # Parent 62de66cec48a1716bb700912da451a26296b8d1e xen: enable APIC-Register Virtualization Add APIC register virtualization support - APIC read doesn't cause VM-Exit - APIC write becomes trap-like Signed-off-by: Gang Wei Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -836,6 +836,12 @@ static int vlapic_write(struct vcpu *v, return rc; } +int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset) +{ + uint32_t val = vlapic_get_reg(vcpu_vlapic(v), offset); + return vlapic_reg_write(v, offset, val); +} + int hvm_x2apic_msr_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int msr, uint64_t msr_content) { struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features( P(cpu_has_vmx_vnmi, "Virtual NMI"); P(cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap, "MSR direct-access bitmap"); P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest"); + P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization"); #undef P if ( !printed ) @@ -186,6 +187,14 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) if ( opt_unrestricted_guest_enabled ) opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST; + /* + * "APIC Register Virtualization" + * can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set + */ + if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW ) + opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT; + + _vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls( "Secondary Exec Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &mismatch); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2356,6 +2356,16 @@ static void vmx_idtv_reinject(unsigned l } } +static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void) +{ + unsigned long exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION); + unsigned int offset = exit_qualification & 0xfff; + + ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt); + + return vlapic_apicv_write(current, offset); +} + void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { unsigned int exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0, vector = 0; @@ -2816,6 +2826,11 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_ update_guest_eip(); /* Safe: XSETBV */ break; + case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE: + if ( vmx_handle_apic_write() ) + hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0); + break; + case EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_GDTR_OR_IDTR: case EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_LDTR_OR_TR: case EXIT_REASON_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_EXPIRED: Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h @@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high); +int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset); + struct vlapic *vlapic_lowest_prio( struct domain *d, struct vlapic *source, int short_hand, uint8_t dest, uint8_t dest_mode); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control; #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID 0x00000020 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080 +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT 0x00000100 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000 extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control; @@ -231,6 +232,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST) #define cpu_has_vmx_ple \ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING) +#define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \ + (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT) /* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */ #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001 Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct #define EXIT_REASON_INVVPID 53 #define EXIT_REASON_WBINVD 54 #define EXIT_REASON_XSETBV 55 +#define EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE 56 #define EXIT_REASON_INVPCID 58 /* ++++++ 25921-x86-APICV-delivery.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313605 # HG changeset patch # User Jiongxi Li # Date 1347912311 -3600 # Node ID 713b8849b11afa05f1dde157a3f5086fa3aaad08 # Parent ec60de627945f17ec2ce5c14e1224b59403875f7 xen: enable Virtual-interrupt delivery Virtual interrupt delivery avoids Xen to inject vAPIC interrupts manually, which is fully taken care of by the hardware. This needs some special awareness into existing interrupr injection path: For pending interrupt from vLAPIC, instead of direct injection, we may need update architecture specific indicators before resuming to guest. Before returning to guest, RVI should be updated if any pending IRRs EOI exit bitmap controls whether an EOI write should cause VM-Exit. If set, a trap-like induced EOI VM-Exit is triggered. The approach here is to manipulate EOI exit bitmap based on value of TMR. Level triggered irq requires a hook in vLAPIC EOI write, so that vIOAPIC EOI is triggered and emulated Signed-off-by: Gang Wei Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li Committed-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ int vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic if ( trig ) vlapic_set_vector(vec, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]); + if ( hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap ) + hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap(vlapic_vcpu(vlapic), vec ,trig); + /* We may need to wake up target vcpu, besides set pending bit here */ return !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic); } @@ -413,6 +416,14 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector); } +void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector) +{ + if ( vlapic_test_and_clear_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]) ) + vioapic_update_EOI(vlapic_domain(vlapic), vector); + + hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector); +} + int vlapic_ipi( struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high) { @@ -1017,6 +1028,14 @@ void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct d pt_adjust_global_vcpu_target(v); } +int vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(void) +{ + if ( hvm_funcs.virtual_intr_delivery_enabled ) + return hvm_funcs.virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(); + else + return 0; +} + int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v) { struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); @@ -1029,6 +1048,9 @@ int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu * if ( irr == -1 ) return -1; + if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() ) + return irr; + isr = vlapic_find_highest_isr(vlapic); isr = (isr != -1) ? isr : 0; if ( (isr & 0xf0) >= (irr & 0xf0) ) @@ -1041,6 +1063,9 @@ int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu * { struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); + if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() ) + return 1; + vlapic_set_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_ISR]); vlapic_clear_irr(vector, vlapic); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c @@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) struct vcpu *v = current; unsigned int tpr_threshold = 0; enum hvm_intblk intblk; + int pt_vector = -1; /* Block event injection when single step with MTF. */ if ( unlikely(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step) ) @@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) } /* Crank the handle on interrupt state. */ - pt_update_irq(v); + pt_vector = pt_update_irq(v); do { intack = hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(v); @@ -230,16 +231,34 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) goto out; intblk = hvm_interrupt_blocked(v, intack); - if ( intblk == hvm_intblk_tpr ) + if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + { + /* Set "Interrupt-window exiting" for ExtINT */ + if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) && + ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) || + ( intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector) ) ) + { + enable_intr_window(v, intack); + goto out; + } + + if ( __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK ) + { + if ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) || + (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_nmi) || + (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_mce) ) + enable_intr_window(v, intack); + + goto out; + } + } else if ( intblk == hvm_intblk_tpr ) { ASSERT(vlapic_enabled(vcpu_vlapic(v))); ASSERT(intack.source == hvm_intsrc_lapic); tpr_threshold = intack.vector >> 4; goto out; - } - - if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) || - (__vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) ) + } else if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) || + (__vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) ) { enable_intr_window(v, intack); goto out; @@ -256,6 +275,44 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) { hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_machine_check, HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE); } + else if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery && + intack.source != hvm_intsrc_pic && + intack.source != hvm_intsrc_vector ) + { + unsigned long status = __vmread(GUEST_INTR_STATUS); + + /* + * Set eoi_exit_bitmap for periodic timer interrup to cause EOI-induced VM + * exit, then pending periodic time interrups have the chance to be injected + * for compensation + */ + if (pt_vector != -1) + vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, pt_vector); + + /* we need update the RVI field */ + status &= ~(unsigned long)0x0FF; + status |= (unsigned long)0x0FF & + intack.vector; + __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); + if (v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed) { +#ifdef __i386__ +#define UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, e) { \ + if (test_and_clear_bit(e, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed)) { \ + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e]); \ + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e##_HIGH, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e] >> 32);}} +#else +#define UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, e) { \ + if (test_and_clear_bit(e, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed)) { \ + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP##e, v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[e]);}} +#endif + UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 0); + UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 1); + UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 2); + UPDATE_EOI_EXITMAP(v, 3); + } + + pt_intr_post(v, intack); + } else { HVMTRACE_2D(INJ_VIRQ, intack.vector, /*fake=*/ 0); @@ -265,11 +322,16 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) /* Is there another IRQ to queue up behind this one? */ intack = hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(v); - if ( unlikely(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none) ) - enable_intr_window(v, intack); + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery || + intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic || + intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector ) + { + if ( unlikely(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none) ) + enable_intr_window(v, intack); + } out: - if ( cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow ) + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery && cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow ) __vmwrite(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold); } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features( P(cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap, "MSR direct-access bitmap"); P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest"); P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization"); + P(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery, "Virtual Interrupt Delivery"); #undef P if ( !printed ) @@ -188,11 +189,12 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST; /* - * "APIC Register Virtualization" + * "APIC Register Virtualization" and "Virtual Interrupt Delivery" * can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set */ if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW ) - opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT; + opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY; _vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls( @@ -797,6 +799,22 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_A, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + 0)); __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr((char *)hvm_io_bitmap + PAGE_SIZE)); + if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + { + /* EOI-exit bitmap */ + v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[0] = (uint64_t)0; + v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[1] = (uint64_t)0; + v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[2] = (uint64_t)0; + v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[3] = (uint64_t)0; + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0); + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0); + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0); + __vmwrite(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0); + + /* Initialise Guest Interrupt Status (RVI and SVI) to 0 */ + __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0); + } + /* Host data selectors. */ __vmwrite(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS); __vmwrite(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS); @@ -1037,6 +1055,30 @@ int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr) return 0; } +void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector) +{ + int index, offset, changed; + + index = vector >> 6; + offset = vector & 63; + changed = !test_and_set_bit(offset, + (uint64_t *)&v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[index]); + if (changed) + set_bit(index, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed); +} + +void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector) +{ + int index, offset, changed; + + index = vector >> 6; + offset = vector & 63; + changed = test_and_clear_bit(offset, + (uint64_t *)&v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exit_bitmap[index]); + if (changed) + set_bit(index, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed); +} + int vmx_create_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) { struct arch_vmx_struct *arch_vmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1572,6 +1572,22 @@ static void vmx_set_info_guest(struct vc vmx_vmcs_exit(v); } +static void vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig) +{ + if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + { + if (trig) + vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, vector); + else + vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, vector); + } +} + +static int vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled(void) +{ + return cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery; +} + static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = { .name = "VMX", .cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare, @@ -1618,7 +1634,9 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_ .nhvm_vmcx_guest_intercepts_trap = nvmx_intercepts_exception, .nhvm_vcpu_vmexit_trap = nvmx_vmexit_trap, .nhvm_intr_blocked = nvmx_intr_blocked, - .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources + .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources, + .update_eoi_exit_bitmap = vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap, + .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled }; struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void) @@ -2366,6 +2384,17 @@ static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void) return vlapic_apicv_write(current, offset); } +/* + * When "Virtual Interrupt Delivery" is enabled, this function is used + * to handle EOI-induced VM exit + */ +void vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector) +{ + ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery); + + vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(vlapic, vector); +} + void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { unsigned int exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0, vector = 0; @@ -2766,6 +2795,16 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0); break; + case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED: + { + int vector; + exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION); + vector = exit_qualification & 0xff; + + vmx_handle_EOI_induced_exit(vcpu_vlapic(current), vector); + break; + } + case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION: exit_qualification = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION); if ( exit_qualification & 0x10 ) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static void pt_timer_fn(void *data) pt_unlock(pt); } -void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v) +int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v) { struct list_head *head = &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_list; struct periodic_time *pt, *temp, *earliest_pt = NULL; @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v) if ( earliest_pt == NULL ) { spin_unlock(&v->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_lock); - return; + return -1; } earliest_pt->irq_issued = 1; @@ -275,6 +275,17 @@ void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v) hvm_isa_irq_deassert(v->domain, irq); hvm_isa_irq_assert(v->domain, irq); } + + /* + * If periodic timer interrut is handled by lapic, its vector in + * IRR is returned and used to set eoi_exit_bitmap for virtual + * interrupt delivery case. Otherwise return -1 to do nothing. + */ + if ( vlapic_accept_pic_intr(v) && + (&v->domain->arch.hvm_domain)->vpic[0].int_output ) + return -1; + else + return pt_irq_vector(earliest_pt, hvm_intsrc_lapic); } static struct periodic_time *is_pt_irq( Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ struct hvm_function_table { enum hvm_intblk (*nhvm_intr_blocked)(struct vcpu *v); void (*nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources)(struct domain *d); + + /* Virtual interrupt delivery */ + void (*update_eoi_exit_bitmap)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig); + int (*virtual_intr_delivery_enabled)(void); }; extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ int vlapic_accept_pic_intr(struct vcpu * void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct domain *d); void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapic); +void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector); int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct { unsigned int host_msr_count; struct vmx_msr_entry *host_msr_area; + uint32_t eoi_exitmap_changed; + uint64_t eoi_exit_bitmap[4]; + unsigned long host_cr0; /* Is the guest in real mode? */ @@ -184,6 +187,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control; #define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT 0x00000100 +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY 0x00000200 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000 extern u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control; @@ -234,6 +238,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING) #define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT) +#define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \ + (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) /* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */ #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001 @@ -252,6 +258,7 @@ enum vmcs_field { GUEST_GS_SELECTOR = 0x0000080a, GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR = 0x0000080c, GUEST_TR_SELECTOR = 0x0000080e, + GUEST_INTR_STATUS = 0x00000810, HOST_ES_SELECTOR = 0x00000c00, HOST_CS_SELECTOR = 0x00000c02, HOST_SS_SELECTOR = 0x00000c04, @@ -279,6 +286,14 @@ enum vmcs_field { APIC_ACCESS_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002015, EPT_POINTER = 0x0000201a, EPT_POINTER_HIGH = 0x0000201b, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 = 0x0000201c, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0_HIGH = 0x0000201d, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1 = 0x0000201e, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1_HIGH = 0x0000201f, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2 = 0x00002020, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2_HIGH = 0x00002021, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3 = 0x00002022, + EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3_HIGH = 0x00002023, GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS = 0x00002400, GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x00002401, VMCS_LINK_POINTER = 0x00002800, @@ -399,6 +414,8 @@ int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr); int vmx_add_host_load_msr(u32 msr); void vmx_vmcs_switch(struct vmcs_struct *from, struct vmcs_struct *to); +void vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector); +void vmx_clear_eoi_exit_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector); #endif /* ASM_X86_HVM_VMX_VMCS_H__ */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct #define EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY 41 #define EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD 43 #define EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS 44 +#define EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED 45 #define EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_GDTR_OR_IDTR 46 #define EXIT_REASON_ACCESS_LDTR_OR_TR 47 #define EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION 48 Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct pl_time { /* platform time */ void pt_save_timer(struct vcpu *v); void pt_restore_timer(struct vcpu *v); -void pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v); +int pt_update_irq(struct vcpu *v); void pt_intr_post(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_intack intack); void pt_migrate(struct vcpu *v); ++++++ 25922-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313605 # HG changeset patch # User Jiongxi Li # Date 1347912362 -3600 # Node ID c2578dd96b8318e108fff0f340411135dedaa47d # Parent 713b8849b11afa05f1dde157a3f5086fa3aaad08 xen: add virtual x2apic support for apicv basically to benefit from apicv, we need clear MSR bitmap for corresponding x2apic MSRs: 0x800 - 0x8ff: no read intercept for apicv register virtualization TPR,EOI,SELF-IPI: no write intercept for virtual interrupt delivery Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li Committed-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static void vmx_set_host_env(struct vcpu (unsigned long)&get_cpu_info()->guest_cpu_user_regs.error_code); } -void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr) +void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type) { unsigned long *msr_bitmap = v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap; @@ -682,14 +682,18 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struc */ if ( msr <= 0x1fff ) { - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */ - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */ + if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) + __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */ + if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) + __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */ } else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) ) { msr &= 0x1fff; - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */ - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */ + if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) + __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */ + if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) + __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */ } } @@ -785,14 +789,26 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap = msr_bitmap; __vmwrite(MSR_BITMAP, virt_to_maddr(msr_bitmap)); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_FS_BASE); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_GS_BASE); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); if ( paging_mode_hap(d) && (!iommu_enabled || iommu_snoop) ) - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) + { + int msr; + for (msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++) + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R); + } + if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + { + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W); + } } /* I/O access bitmap. */ --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2112,7 +2112,7 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsig for ( ; (rc == 0) && lbr->count; lbr++ ) for ( i = 0; (rc == 0) && (i < lbr->count); i++ ) if ( (rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(lbr->base + i)) == 0 ) - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, lbr->base + i); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, lbr->base + i, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); } if ( (rc < 0) || --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -408,7 +408,9 @@ enum vmcs_field { #define VMCS_VPID_WIDTH 16 -void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr); +#define MSR_TYPE_R 1 +#define MSR_TYPE_W 2 +void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type); int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val); int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val); int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr); --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11) #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12) #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR 0x800 +#define MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR 0x808 +#define MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR 0x80b +#define MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR 0x83f #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079 #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b ++++++ 25957-x86-TSC-adjust-HVM.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313633 # HG changeset patch # User Liu, Jinsong # Date 1348654362 -7200 # Node ID c47ef9592fb39325e33f8406b4bd736cc84482e5 # Parent 5d63c633a60b9a1d695594f9c17cf933240bec81 x86: Implement TSC adjust feature for HVM guest IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is maintained separately for each logical processor. A logical processor maintains and uses the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR as follows: 1). On RESET, the value of the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is 0; 2). If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR adds (or subtracts) value X from the TSC, the logical processor also adds (or subtracts) value X from the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR; 3). If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR adds (or subtracts) value X from that MSR, the logical processor also adds (or subtracts) value X from the TSC. This patch provides tsc adjust support for hvm guest, with it guest OS would be happy when sync tsc. Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong Committed-by: Jan Beulich Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ int hvm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u6 void hvm_set_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v, u64 guest_tsc) { uint64_t tsc; + uint64_t delta_tsc; if ( v->domain->arch.vtsc ) { @@ -256,10 +257,22 @@ void hvm_set_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v, u rdtscll(tsc); } - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset = guest_tsc - tsc; + delta_tsc = guest_tsc - tsc; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust += delta_tsc + - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset = delta_tsc; + hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset); } +void hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(struct vcpu *v, u64 tsc_adjust) +{ + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset += tsc_adjust + - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust; + hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset); + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = tsc_adjust; +} + u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v) { uint64_t tsc; @@ -278,6 +291,11 @@ u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc(struct vcpu *v) return tsc + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset; } +u64 hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust(struct vcpu *v) +{ + return v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust; +} + void hvm_migrate_timers(struct vcpu *v) { rtc_migrate_timers(v); @@ -2852,6 +2870,10 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int *msr_content = hvm_get_guest_tsc(v); break; + case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST: + *msr_content = hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust(v); + break; + case MSR_TSC_AUX: *msr_content = hvm_msr_tsc_aux(v); break; @@ -2965,6 +2987,10 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, msr_content); break; + case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST: + hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(v, msr_content); + break; + case MSR_TSC_AUX: v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_aux = (uint32_t)msr_content; if ( cpu_has_rdtscp @@ -3531,6 +3557,8 @@ void hvm_vcpu_reset_state(struct vcpu *v v->domain->vcpu[0]->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset; hvm_funcs.set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.cache_tsc_offset); + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = 0; + paging_update_paging_modes(v); v->arch.flags |= TF_kernel_mode; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h @@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ struct hvm_vcpu { struct hvm_vcpu_asid n1asid; u32 msr_tsc_aux; + u64 msr_tsc_adjust; /* VPMU */ struct vpmu_struct vpmu; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID 0x00000017 #define MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON 0x0000002a #define MSR_IA32_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID 0x0000002c +#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE 0x0000001b #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP (1<<8) ++++++ 25958-x86-TSC-adjust-sr.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313633 # HG changeset patch # User Liu, Jinsong # Date 1348654418 -7200 # Node ID 56fb977ce6eb4626a02d4a7a34e85009bb8ee3e0 # Parent c47ef9592fb39325e33f8406b4bd736cc84482e5 x86: Save/restore TSC adjust during HVM guest migration Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong Committed-by: Jan Beulich Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/misc/xen-hvmctx.c @@ -390,6 +390,13 @@ static void dump_vmce_vcpu(void) printf(" VMCE_VCPU: caps %" PRIx64 "\n", p.caps); } +static void dump_tsc_adjust(void) +{ + HVM_SAVE_TYPE(TSC_ADJUST) p; + READ(p); + printf(" TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust %" PRIx64 "\n", p.tsc_adjust); +} + int main(int argc, char **argv) { int entry, domid; @@ -457,6 +464,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VIRIDIAN_DOMAIN): dump_viridian_domain(); break; case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VIRIDIAN_VCPU): dump_viridian_vcpu(); break; case HVM_SAVE_CODE(VMCE_VCPU): dump_vmce_vcpu(); break; + case HVM_SAVE_CODE(TSC_ADJUST): dump_tsc_adjust(); break; case HVM_SAVE_CODE(END): break; default: printf(" ** Don't understand type %u: skipping\n", Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -611,6 +611,46 @@ void hvm_domain_destroy(struct domain *d hvm_destroy_cacheattr_region_list(d); } +static int hvm_save_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) +{ + struct vcpu *v; + struct hvm_tsc_adjust ctxt; + int err = 0; + + for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) + { + ctxt.tsc_adjust = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust; + err = hvm_save_entry(TSC_ADJUST, v->vcpu_id, h, &ctxt); + if ( err ) + break; + } + + return err; +} + +static int hvm_load_tsc_adjust(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) +{ + unsigned int vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h); + struct vcpu *v; + struct hvm_tsc_adjust ctxt; + + if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[vcpuid]) == NULL ) + { + dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "HVM restore: dom%d has no vcpu%u\n", + d->domain_id, vcpuid); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if ( hvm_load_entry(TSC_ADJUST, h, &ctxt) != 0 ) + return -EINVAL; + + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_tsc_adjust = ctxt.tsc_adjust; + return 0; +} + +HVM_REGISTER_SAVE_RESTORE(TSC_ADJUST, hvm_save_tsc_adjust, + hvm_load_tsc_adjust, 1, HVMSR_PER_VCPU); + static int hvm_save_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) { struct vcpu *v; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/public/arch-x86/hvm/save.h @@ -581,9 +581,15 @@ struct hvm_vmce_vcpu { DECLARE_HVM_SAVE_TYPE(VMCE_VCPU, 18, struct hvm_vmce_vcpu); +struct hvm_tsc_adjust { + uint64_t tsc_adjust; +}; + +DECLARE_HVM_SAVE_TYPE(TSC_ADJUST, 19, struct hvm_tsc_adjust); + /* * Largest type-code in use */ -#define HVM_SAVE_CODE_MAX 18 +#define HVM_SAVE_CODE_MAX 19 #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_SAVE_X86_H__ */ ++++++ 25959-x86-TSC-adjust-expose.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313633 # HG changeset patch # User Liu, Jinsong # Date 1348654470 -7200 # Node ID 3aa66543a51ba77cb73e8c874e2416d065426a22 # Parent 56fb977ce6eb4626a02d4a7a34e85009bb8ee3e0 x86: Expose TSC adjust to HVM guest Intel latest SDM (17.13.3) release a new MSR CPUID.7.0.EBX[1]=1 indicates TSC_ADJUST MSR 0x3b is supported. This patch expose it to hvm guest. Signed-off-by: Liu, Jinsong Committed-by: Jan Beulich Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_cpufeature.h @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx) */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE 0 /* {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST 1 /* Tsc thread offset */ #define X86_FEATURE_BMI1 3 /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */ #define X86_FEATURE_HLE 4 /* Hardware Lock Elision */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX2 5 /* AVX2 instructions */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c @@ -362,7 +362,8 @@ static void xc_cpuid_hvm_policy( case 0x00000007: /* Intel-defined CPU features */ if ( input[1] == 0 ) { - regs[1] &= (bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_BMI1) | + regs[1] &= (bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST) | + bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_BMI1) | bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HLE) | bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) | bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) | ++++++ 26077-stubdom_fix_compile_errors_in_grub.patch ++++++ changeset: 26077:33348baecf37 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 files: stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff description: stubdom: fix compile errors in grub Building xen.rpm in SLES11 started to fail due to these compiler warnings: [ 1436s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined [ 1437s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined [ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213 [ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444 The reason for this is that the assignment is done twice: tp.u.ack.block = ((uint16_t)( (((uint16_t)((block = prevblock)) & (uint16_t)0x00ffU) << 8) | (((uint16_t)((block = prevblock)) & (uint16_t)0xff00U) >> 8))); Fix this package build error by adding another patch for grub, which moves the assignment out of the macro usage. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 8dcab28b8081 -r 33348baecf37 stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/stubdom/grub.patches/70compiler_warnings.diff Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +[ 1436s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined +[ 1437s] ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444: warning: operation on 'block' may be undefined + +[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/fsys_tftp.c:213 +[ 1234s] E: xen sequence-point ../grub-upstream/netboot/main.c:444 + +--- + netboot/fsys_tftp.c | 5 ++++- + netboot/main.c | 5 ++++- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-0.97/netboot/fsys_tftp.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-0.97.orig/netboot/fsys_tftp.c ++++ grub-0.97/netboot/fsys_tftp.c +@@ -209,8 +209,11 @@ buf_fill (int abort) + break; + + if ((block || bcounter) && (block != prevblock + (unsigned short) 1)) ++ { ++ block = prevblock; + /* Block order should be continuous */ +- tp.u.ack.block = htons (block = prevblock); ++ tp.u.ack.block = htons (block); ++ } + + /* Should be continuous. */ + tp.opcode = abort ? htons (TFTP_ERROR) : htons (TFTP_ACK); +Index: grub-0.97/netboot/main.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-0.97.orig/netboot/main.c ++++ grub-0.97/netboot/main.c +@@ -440,8 +440,11 @@ tftp (const char *name, int (*fnc) (unsi + break; + + if ((block || bcounter) && (block != prevblock + 1)) ++ { ++ block = prevblock; + /* Block order should be continuous */ +- tp.u.ack.block = htons (block = prevblock); ++ tp.u.ack.block = htons (block); ++ } + + /* Should be continuous. */ + tp.opcode = htons (TFTP_ACK); ++++++ 26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch ++++++ changeset: 26078:019ca95dfa34 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100 files: Makefile README install.sh tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent description: hotplug/Linux: remove hotplug support, rely on udev instead Hotplug has been replaced by udev since several years. Remove the hotplug related files and install udev unconditionally. This makes it possible to remove udev from rpm BuildRequires which reduces the buildtime dependency chain. For openSuSE:Factory it was done just now: http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-buildservice/2012-10/msg00085.html The patch by itself will have no practical impact unless someone attempts to build and run a Xen dom0 on a really old base system. e.g. circa SLES9/2007 or earlier Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 Makefile --- a/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 +++ b/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100 @@ -223,7 +223,6 @@ uninstall: $(MAKE) -C xen uninstall rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xendomains $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xend rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xencommons $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/init.d/xen-watchdog - rm -rf $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/hotplug/xen-backend.agent rm -f $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/udev/rules.d/xen-backend.rules rm -f $(D)$(CONFIG_DIR)/udev/rules.d/xend.rules rm -f $(D)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 README --- a/README Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 +++ b/README Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100 @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ provided by your OS distributor: * pkg-config * bridge-utils package (/sbin/brctl) * iproute package (/sbin/ip) - * hotplug or udev + * udev * GNU bison and GNU flex * GNU gettext * 16-bit x86 assembler, loader and compiler (dev86 rpm or bin86 & bcc debs) @@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ 4. To rebuild an existing tree without m make install and make dist differ in that make install does the right things for your local machine (installing the appropriate - version of hotplug or udev scripts, for example), but make dist - includes all versions of those scripts, so that you can copy the dist - directory to another machine and install from that distribution. + version of udev scripts, for example), but make dist includes all + versions of those scripts, so that you can copy the dist directory + to another machine and install from that distribution. Python Runtime Libraries ======================== diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 install.sh --- a/install.sh Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 +++ b/install.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100 @@ -27,20 +27,6 @@ echo "Installing Xen from '$src' to '$ds echo "Installing Xen from '$src' to '$dst'..." (cd $src; tar -cf - * ) | tar -C "$tmp" -xf - -[ -x "$(which udevinfo)" ] && \ - UDEV_VERSION=$(udevinfo -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/') - -[ -z "$UDEV_VERSION" -a -x /sbin/udevadm ] && \ - UDEV_VERSION=$(/sbin/udevadm info -V | awk '{print $NF}') - -if [ -n "$UDEV_VERSION" ] && [ $UDEV_VERSION -ge 059 ]; then - echo " - installing for udev-based system" - rm -rf "$tmp/etc/hotplug" -else - echo " - installing for hotplug-based system" - rm -rf "$tmp/etc/udev" -fi - echo " - modifying permissions" chmod -R a+rX "$tmp" diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile --- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100 @@ -27,31 +27,8 @@ XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm- XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-common.sh vtpm-hotplug-common.sh XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += vtpm-migration.sh vtpm-impl -XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/hotplug -XEN_HOTPLUG_SCRIPTS = xen-backend.agent - -UDEVVER = 0 -ifeq ($(shell [ -x /sbin/udevadm ] && echo 1),1) -UDEVVER = $(shell /sbin/udevadm info -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/' ) -endif -ifeq ($(shell [ -x /usr/bin/udevinfo ] && echo 1),1) -UDEVVER = $(shell /usr/bin/udevinfo -V | sed -e 's/^[^0-9]* \([0-9]\{1,\}\)[^0-9]\{0,\}/\1/' ) -endif - UDEV_RULES_DIR = $(CONFIG_DIR)/udev UDEV_RULES = xen-backend.rules xend.rules - -DI = $(if $(DISTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DISTDIR)),) -DE = $(if $(DESTDIR),$(shell readlink -f $(DESTDIR)),) -ifeq ($(findstring $(DI),$(DE)),$(DI)) -HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug install-udev -else -ifeq ($(shell [ $(UDEVVER) -ge 059 ] && echo 1),1) -HOTPLUGS=install-udev -else -HOTPLUGS=install-hotplug -endif -endif .PHONY: all all: @@ -60,7 +37,7 @@ build: build: .PHONY: install -install: all install-initd install-scripts $(HOTPLUGS) +install: all install-initd install-scripts install-udev # See docs/misc/distro_mapping.txt for INITD_DIR location .PHONY: install-initd @@ -87,15 +64,6 @@ install-scripts: $(INSTALL_DATA) $$i $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_SCRIPT_DIR); \ done -.PHONY: install-hotplug -install-hotplug: - [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR) ] || \ - $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR) - set -e; for i in $(XEN_HOTPLUG_SCRIPTS); \ - do \ - $(INSTALL_PROG) $$i $(DESTDIR)$(XEN_HOTPLUG_DIR); \ - done - .PHONY: install-udev install-udev: [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(UDEV_RULES_DIR) ] || \ diff -r 33348baecf37 -r 019ca95dfa34 tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent --- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.agent Thu Oct 18 09:34:59 2012 +0100 +++ /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -#! /bin/bash - -PATH=/etc/xen/scripts:$PATH - -. /etc/xen/scripts/locking.sh - -claim_lock xenbus_hotplug_global - -case "$XENBUS_TYPE" in - tap) - /etc/xen/scripts/blktap "$ACTION" - ;; - vbd) - /etc/xen/scripts/block "$ACTION" - ;; - vtpm) - /etc/xen/scripts/vtpm "$ACTION" - ;; - vif) - [ -n "$script" ] && $script "$ACTION" - ;; - vscsi) - /etc/xen/scripts/vscsi "$ACTION" - ;; -esac - -case "$ACTION" in - add) - ;; - remove) - /etc/xen/scripts/xen-hotplug-cleanup - ;; - online) - ;; - offline) - ;; -esac - -release_lock xenbus_hotplug_global ++++++ 26079-hotplug-Linux_close_lockfd_after_lock_attempt.patch ++++++ changeset: 26079:b3b03536789a user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:01 2012 +0100 files: tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh description: hotplug/Linux: close lockfd after lock attempt When a HVM guest is shutdown some of the 'remove' events can not claim the lock for some reason. Instead they try to grab the lock in a busy loop, until udev reaps the xen-hotplug-cleanup helper. After analyzing the resulting logfile its not obvious what the cause is. The only explanation is that bash (?) gets confused if the same lockfd is opened again and again. Closing it in each iteration seem to fix the issue. This was observed with sles11sp2 (bash 3.2) and 4.2 xend. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell [ ijc -- added the comment ] Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 019ca95dfa34 -r b3b03536789a tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh --- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:00 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/locking.sh Thu Oct 18 09:35:01 2012 +0100 @@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ claim_lock() print "y\n" if $fd_inum eq $file_inum; ' "$_lockfile" ) if [ x$rightfile = xy ]; then break; fi + # Some versions of bash appear to be buggy if the same + # $_lockfile is opened repeatedly. Close the current fd here. + eval "exec $_lockfd<&-" done } ++++++ 26081-stubdom_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch ++++++ changeset: 26081:02064298ebcb user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100 files: stubdom/Makefile description: stubdom: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm [ 1758s] xen-tools.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz [ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one [ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are [ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under [ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/stubdom/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/stubdom/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/stubdom/Makefile @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ install-grub: pv-grub install-xenstore: xenstore-stubdom $(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot" - $(INSTALL_PROG) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz" + $(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz" ####### # clean ++++++ 26082-blktap2-libvhd_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch ++++++ changeset: 26082:8cf26ace9ca0 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100 files: tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile description: blktap2/libvhd: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm [ 1758s] xen-devel.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib64/libvhd.a [ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one [ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are [ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under [ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 02064298ebcb -r 8cf26ace9ca0 tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile --- a/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100 @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR install: all $(INSTALL_DIR) -p $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR) - $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR) + $(INSTALL_DATA) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR) ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so ++++++ 26083-blktap_fix_rpmlint_warning_spurious-executable-perm.patch ++++++ changeset: 26083:3fbeb019d522 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100 files: tools/blktap/lib/Makefile description: blktap: fix rpmlint warning spurious-executable-perm [ 1758s] xen-devel.x86_64: E: spurious-executable-perm (Badness: 50) /usr/lib64/libblktap.a [ 1758s] The file is installed with executable permissions, but was identified as one [ 1758s] that probably should not be executable. Verify if the executable bits are [ 1758s] desired, and remove if not. NOTE: example scripts should be packaged under [ 1758s] %docdir/examples, which will avoid this warning. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 8cf26ace9ca0 -r 3fbeb019d522 tools/blktap/lib/Makefile --- a/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:03 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100 @@ -23,23 +23,25 @@ OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic) OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic) IBINS := -LIB = libblktap.a libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) +LIB = libblktap.a +LIB_SO = libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) .PHONY: all -all: $(LIB) +all: $(LIB) $(LIB_SO) .PHONY: install install: all $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR) - $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) + $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so $(INSTALL_DATA) blktaplib.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR) .PHONY: clean clean: - rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS + rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) $(LIB_SO) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR): $(OBJS_PIC) $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,$(SONAME_LDFLAG) -Wl,$(SONAME) $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) \ ++++++ 26084-hotplug_install_hotplugpath.sh_as_data_file.patch ++++++ changeset: 26084:fe9a0eb9aaaa user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100 files: tools/hotplug/common/Makefile description: hotplug: install hotplugpath.sh as data file rpmlint complains a script helper which is only sourced: [ 1875s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /etc/xen/scripts/hotplugpath.sh [ 1875s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for [ 1875s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is [ 1875s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the [ 1875s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 3fbeb019d522 -r fe9a0eb9aaaa tools/hotplug/common/Makefile --- a/tools/hotplug/common/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:04 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/hotplug/common/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:05 2012 +0100 @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ HOTPLUGPATH="hotplugpath.sh" # OS-independent hotplug scripts go in this directory # Xen scripts to go there. -XEN_SCRIPTS = $(HOTPLUGPATH) -XEN_SCRIPT_DATA = +XEN_SCRIPTS = +XEN_SCRIPT_DATA = $(HOTPLUGPATH) genpath-target = $(call buildmakevars2file,$(HOTPLUGPATH)) $(eval $(genpath-target)) ++++++ 26085-stubdom_install_stubdompath.sh_as_data_file.patch ++++++ changeset: 26085:e32f4301f384 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100 files: stubdom/Makefile description: stubdom: install stubdompath.sh as data file rpmlint complains a script helper which is only sourced: [ 1875s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /usr/lib/xen/bin/stubdompath.sh [ 1875s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for [ 1875s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is [ 1875s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the [ 1875s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/stubdom/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/stubdom/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/stubdom/Makefile @@ -381,7 +381,8 @@ install-readme: install-ioemu: ioemu-stubdom $(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)" - $(INSTALL_PROG) stubdompath.sh stubdom-dm "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)" + $(INSTALL_PROG) stubdom-dm "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)" + $(INSTALL_DATA) stubdompath.sh "$(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC)" $(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)$(XENFIRMWAREDIR)" $(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-ioemu/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)$(XENFIRMWAREDIR)/ioemu-stubdom.gz" ++++++ 26086-hotplug-Linux_correct_sysconfig_tag_in_xendomains.patch ++++++ changeset: 26086:ba6b1db89ec8 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100 files: tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains description: hotplug/Linux: correct sysconfig tag in xendomains Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r e32f4301f384 -r ba6b1db89ec8 tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains --- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains Thu Oct 18 09:35:06 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## Path: System/xen +## Path: System/Virtualization ## Description: xen domain start/stop on boot ## Type: string ## Default: ++++++ 26087-hotplug-Linux_install_sysconfig_files_as_data_files.patch ++++++ changeset: 26087:6239ace16749 user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100 files: tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile description: hotplug/Linux: install sysconfig files as data files rpmlint complains about wrong permissions of config files: [ 455s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.xendomains [ 455s] xen-tools.i586: W: script-without-shebang /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.xencommons [ 455s] This text file has executable bits set or is located in a path dedicated for [ 455s] executables, but lacks a shebang and cannot thus be executed. If the file is [ 455s] meant to be an executable script, add the shebang, otherwise remove the [ 455s] executable bits or move the file elsewhere. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r ba6b1db89ec8 -r 6239ace16749 tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile --- a/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100 +++ b/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile Thu Oct 18 09:35:07 2012 +0100 @@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ install-initd: [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR) ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XEND_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) - $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) - $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons $(INSTALL_PROG) init.d/xen-watchdog $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) .PHONY: install-scripts ++++++ 26114-pygrub-list-entries.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Charles Arnold # Date 1351249508 -3600 # Node ID 6f9e46917eb8771914041b98f714e8f485fca5ef # Parent 03af0abd2b72dfab3f2e50dd502108de8603f741 pygrub: Add option to list grub entries The argument to "--entry" allows 2 syntaxes, either directly the entry number in menu.lst, or the whole string behind the "title" key word. This poses the following issue: title string because this string contains the kernel version, which will change with a kernel update. This patch adds [-l|--list-entries] as an argument to pygrub. Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold Acked-by: Ian Jackson Committed-by: Ian Jackson Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub @@ -596,7 +596,17 @@ def run_grub(file, entry, fs, cfg_args): sel = g.run() g = Grub(file, fs) - if interactive: + + if list_entries: + for i in range(len(g.cf.images)): + img = g.cf.images[i] + print "title: %s" % img.title + print " root: %s" % img.root + print " kernel: %s" % img.kernel[1] + print " args: %s" % img.args + print " initrd: %s" % img.initrd[1] + + if interactive and not list_entries: curses.wrapper(run_main) else: sel = g.cf.default @@ -703,7 +713,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": sel = None def usage(): - print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive] [-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=] [--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>" %(sys.argv[0],) + print >> sys.stderr, "Usage: %s [-q|--quiet] [-i|--interactive] [-l|--list-entries] [-n|--not-really] [--output=] [--kernel=] [--ramdisk=] [--args=] [--entry=] [--output-directory=] [--output-format=sxp|simple|simple0] <image>" %(sys.argv[0],) def copy_from_image(fs, file_to_read, file_type, output_directory, not_really): @@ -737,8 +747,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": dataoff += len(data) try: - opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qinh::', - ["quiet", "interactive", "not-really", "help", + opts, args = getopt.gnu_getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'qilnh::', + ["quiet", "interactive", "list-entries", "not-really", "help", "output=", "output-format=", "output-directory=", "entry=", "kernel=", "ramdisk=", "args=", "isconfig", "debug"]) @@ -754,6 +764,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": output = None entry = None interactive = True + list_entries = False isconfig = False debug = False not_really = False @@ -772,6 +783,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": interactive = False elif o in ("-i", "--interactive"): interactive = True + elif o in ("-l", "--list-entries"): + list_entries = True elif o in ("-n", "--not-really"): not_really = True elif o in ("-h", "--help"): @@ -856,6 +869,9 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": fs = None continue + if list_entries: + sys.exit(0) + # Did looping through partitions find us a kernel? if not fs: raise RuntimeError, "Unable to find partition containing kernel" ++++++ 26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch ++++++ ++++ 649 lines (skipped) ++++++ 26133-IOMMU-defer-BM-disable.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1352709367 -3600 # Node ID fdb69dd527cd01a46f87efb380050559dcf12d37 # Parent 286ef4ced2164f4e9bf52fd0c52248182e69a6e6 IOMMU: don't immediately disable bus mastering on faults Instead, give the owning domain at least a small opportunity of fixing things up, and allow for rare faults to not bring down the device at all. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Tim Deegan Acked-by: Dario Faggioli Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static hw_irq_controller iommu_msi_type static void parse_event_log_entry(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u32 entry[]) { - u16 domain_id, device_id, cword; + u16 domain_id, device_id; unsigned int bdf; u32 code; u64 *addr; @@ -613,18 +613,10 @@ static void parse_event_log_entry(struct "fault address = 0x%"PRIx64"\n", event_str[code-1], domain_id, device_id, *addr); - /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to - * control it for us. */ for ( bdf = 0; bdf < ivrs_bdf_entries; bdf++ ) if ( get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf) == device_id ) - { - cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), - PCI_SLOT(bdf), PCI_FUNC(bdf), - PCI_COMMAND); - pci_conf_write16(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), PCI_SLOT(bdf), - PCI_FUNC(bdf), PCI_COMMAND, - cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); - } + pci_check_disable_device(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), + PCI_DEVFN2(bdf)); } else { Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static int device_assigned(u16 seg, u8 b static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) { struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d); + struct pci_dev *pdev; int rc = 0; if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops ) @@ -231,6 +232,10 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain * return -EXDEV; spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); + pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); + if ( pdev ) + pdev->fault.count = 0; + if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn)) ) goto done; @@ -384,6 +389,8 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u1 return ret; } + pdev->fault.count = 0; + if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && need_iommu(d) ) { d->need_iommu = 0; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c @@ -637,6 +637,36 @@ int __init pci_device_detect(u16 seg, u8 return 1; } +void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev; + s_time_t now = NOW(); + u16 cword; + + spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); + pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); + if ( pdev ) + { + if ( now < pdev->fault.time || + now - pdev->fault.time > MILLISECS(10) ) + pdev->fault.count >>= 1; + pdev->fault.time = now; + if ( ++pdev->fault.count < PT_FAULT_THRESHOLD ) + pdev = NULL; + } + spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); + + if ( !pdev ) + return; + + /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to + * control it for us. */ + cword = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + PCI_COMMAND); + pci_conf_write16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); +} + /* * scan pci devices to add all existed PCI devices to alldevs_list, * and setup pci hierarchy in array bus2bridge. Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct while (1) { u8 fault_reason; - u16 source_id, cword; + u16 source_id; u32 data; u64 guest_addr; int type; @@ -969,14 +969,8 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct iommu_page_fault_do_one(iommu, type, fault_reason, source_id, guest_addr); - /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to - * control it for us. */ - cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, - PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_SLOT(source_id), - PCI_FUNC(source_id), PCI_COMMAND); - pci_conf_write16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, PCI_BUS(source_id), - PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), - PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); + pci_check_disable_device(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, + PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_DEVFN2(source_id)); fault_index++; if ( fault_index > cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) ) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h @@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ struct pci_dev { const u8 devfn; struct pci_dev_info info; struct arch_pci_dev arch; + struct { + s_time_t time; + unsigned int count; +#define PT_FAULT_THRESHOLD 10 + } fault; u64 vf_rlen[6]; }; @@ -107,6 +112,7 @@ void arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn); struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain( struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn); +void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); uint8_t pci_conf_read8( unsigned int seg, unsigned int bus, unsigned int dev, unsigned int func, ++++++ 26189-xenstore-chmod.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 8b93ac0c93f3fb8a140b4688ba71841ac927d4e3 xenstore-chmod: handle arbitrary number of perms rather than MAX_PERMS constant Constant MAX_PERMS 16 is too small to use in some occasions, e.g. if there are more than 16 domU(s) on one hypervisor (it's easy to achieve) and one wants to do xenstore-chmod PATH to all domU(s). So, remove MAX_PERMS limitation and make it as arbitrary number of perms. Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu Acked-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 8b93ac0c93f3 tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c --- a/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c Tue Nov 13 11:19:17 2012 +0000 +++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c Mon Nov 26 11:33:38 2012 +0800 @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #define PATH_SEP '/' #define MAX_PATH_LEN 256 -#define MAX_PERMS 16 enum mode { MODE_unknown, @@ -407,44 +406,41 @@ perform(enum mode mode, int optind, int output("%s\n", list[i]); } free(list); - optind++; - break; - } - case MODE_ls: { - do_ls(xsh, argv[optind], 0, prefix); - optind++; - break; + optind++; + break; + } + case MODE_ls: { + do_ls(xsh, argv[optind], 0, prefix); + optind++; + break; } case MODE_chmod: { - struct xs_permissions perms[MAX_PERMS]; - int nperms = 0; /* save path pointer: */ char *path = argv[optind++]; - for (; argv[optind]; optind++, nperms++) + int nperms = argc - optind; + struct xs_permissions perms[nperms]; + int i; + for (i = 0; argv[optind]; optind++, i++) { - if (MAX_PERMS <= nperms) - errx(1, "Too many permissions specified. " - "Maximum per invocation is %d.", MAX_PERMS); - - perms[nperms].id = atoi(argv[optind]+1); + perms[i].id = atoi(argv[optind]+1); switch (argv[optind][0]) { case 'n': - perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_NONE; + perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_NONE; break; case 'r': - perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_READ; + perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_READ; break; case 'w': - perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_WRITE; + perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_WRITE; break; case 'b': - perms[nperms].perms = XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE; + perms[i].perms = XS_PERM_READ | XS_PERM_WRITE; break; default: errx(1, "Invalid permission specification: '%c'", - argv[optind][0]); + argv[optind][0]); } } ++++++ 26262-x86-EFI-secure-shim.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1354884272 -3600 # Node ID b62bd62b26836fafe19cf41fec194bcf33e2ead6 # Parent cb542e58da25211843eb79998ea8568ebe9c8056 x86/EFI: add code interfacing with the secure boot shim ... to validate the kernel image (which is required to be in PE format, as is e.g. the case for the Linux bzImage when built with CONFIG_EFI_STUB). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c @@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ /* Using SetVirtualAddressMap() is incompatible with kexec: */ #undef USE_SET_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_MAP +#define SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL_GUID \ + { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, {0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23} } + +typedef EFI_STATUS +(/* _not_ EFIAPI */ *EFI_SHIM_LOCK_VERIFY) ( + IN VOID *Buffer, + IN UINT32 Size); + +typedef struct { + EFI_SHIM_LOCK_VERIFY Verify; +} EFI_SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL; + extern char start[]; extern u32 cpuid_ext_features; @@ -647,12 +659,14 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY static EFI_GUID __initdata gop_guid = EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL_GUID; static EFI_GUID __initdata bio_guid = BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL; static EFI_GUID __initdata devp_guid = DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL; + static EFI_GUID __initdata shim_lock_guid = SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL_GUID; EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *loaded_image; EFI_STATUS status; unsigned int i, argc; CHAR16 **argv, *file_name, *cfg_file_name = NULL; UINTN cols, rows, depth, size, map_key, info_size, gop_mode = ~0; EFI_HANDLE *handles = NULL; + EFI_SHIM_LOCK_PROTOCOL *shim_lock; EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL *gop = NULL; EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_MODE_INFORMATION *mode_info; EFI_FILE_HANDLE dir_handle; @@ -841,6 +855,11 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY read_file(dir_handle, s2w(&name), &kernel); efi_bs->FreePool(name.w); + if ( !EFI_ERROR(efi_bs->LocateProtocol(&shim_lock_guid, NULL, + (void **)&shim_lock)) && + shim_lock->Verify(kernel.ptr, kernel.size) != EFI_SUCCESS ) + blexit(L"Dom0 kernel image could not be verified\r\n"); + name.s = get_value(&cfg, section.s, "ramdisk"); if ( name.s ) { ++++++ 26324-IOMMU-assign-params.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559364 -3600 # Node ID 62dd78a4e3fc9d190840549f13b4d613f2d19c41 # Parent 64b36dde26bc3c4fc80312cc9eeb0e511f0cf94b IOMMU: adjust (re)assign operation parameters ... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c @@ -348,34 +348,31 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(str disable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); } -static int reassign_device( struct domain *source, struct domain *target, - u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) +static int reassign_device(struct domain *source, struct domain *target, + u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct pci_dev *pdev; struct amd_iommu *iommu; int bdf; struct hvm_iommu *t = domain_hvm_iommu(target); - ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(source, seg, bus, devfn); - if ( !pdev ) - return -ENODEV; - - bdf = PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn); - iommu = find_iommu_for_device(seg, bdf); + bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn); + iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf); if ( !iommu ) { AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu." " %04x:%02x:%x02.%x cannot be assigned to dom%d\n", - seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), target->domain_id); return -ENODEV; } amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(source, iommu, bdf); - list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list); - pdev->domain = target; + if ( devfn == pdev->devfn ) + { + list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list); + pdev->domain = target; + } /* IO page tables might be destroyed after pci-detach the last device * In this case, we have to re-allocate root table for next pci-attach.*/ @@ -384,17 +381,18 @@ static int reassign_device( struct domai amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(target, iommu, bdf); AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Re-assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from dom%d to dom%d\n", - seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), source->domain_id, target->domain_id); return 0; } -static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) +static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struct domain *d, u8 devfn, + struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct ivrs_mappings *ivrs_mappings = get_ivrs_mappings(seg); - int bdf = (bus << 8) | devfn; - int req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(seg, bdf); + struct ivrs_mappings *ivrs_mappings = get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg); + int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, devfn); + int req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf); if ( ivrs_mappings[req_id].unity_map_enable ) { @@ -406,7 +404,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_assign_device(struc ivrs_mappings[req_id].read_permission); } - return reassign_device(dom0, d, seg, bus, devfn); + return reassign_device(dom0, d, devfn, pdev); } static void deallocate_next_page_table(struct page_info* pg, int level) @@ -471,12 +469,6 @@ static void amd_iommu_domain_destroy(str amd_iommu_flush_all_pages(d); } -static int amd_iommu_return_device( - struct domain *s, struct domain *t, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) -{ - return reassign_device(s, t, seg, bus, devfn); -} - static int amd_iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct amd_iommu *iommu; @@ -616,7 +608,7 @@ const struct iommu_ops amd_iommu_ops = { .teardown = amd_iommu_domain_destroy, .map_page = amd_iommu_map_page, .unmap_page = amd_iommu_unmap_page, - .reassign_device = amd_iommu_return_device, + .reassign_device = reassign_device, .get_device_group_id = amd_iommu_group_id, .update_ire_from_apic = amd_iommu_ioapic_update_ire, .update_ire_from_msi = amd_iommu_msi_msg_update_ire, Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c @@ -232,11 +232,16 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain * return -EXDEV; spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); - pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); - if ( pdev ) - pdev->fault.count = 0; + pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(dom0, seg, bus, devfn); + if ( !pdev ) + { + rc = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn) ? -EBUSY : -ENODEV; + goto done; + } + + pdev->fault.count = 0; - if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, seg, bus, devfn)) ) + if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pdev)) ) goto done; if ( has_arch_pdevs(d) && !need_iommu(d) ) @@ -369,18 +374,11 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u1 return -EINVAL; ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); + pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(d, seg, bus, devfn); if ( !pdev ) return -ENODEV; - if ( pdev->domain != d ) - { - dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, - "d%d: deassign a device not owned\n", d->domain_id); - return -EINVAL; - } - - ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, seg, bus, devfn); + ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev); if ( ret ) { dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -1692,17 +1692,10 @@ out: static int reassign_device_ownership( struct domain *source, struct domain *target, - u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) + u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct pci_dev *pdev; int ret; - ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - pdev = pci_get_pdev_by_domain(source, seg, bus, devfn); - - if (!pdev) - return -ENODEV; - /* * Devices assigned to untrusted domains (here assumed to be any domU) * can attempt to send arbitrary LAPIC/MSI messages. We are unprotected @@ -1711,16 +1704,19 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership( if ( (target != dom0) && !iommu_intremap ) untrusted_msi = 1; - ret = domain_context_unmap(source, seg, bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_unmap(source, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); if ( ret ) return ret; - ret = domain_context_mapping(target, seg, bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_mapping(target, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); if ( ret ) return ret; - list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list); - pdev->domain = target; + if ( devfn == pdev->devfn ) + { + list_move(&pdev->domain_list, &target->arch.pdev_list); + pdev->domain = target; + } return ret; } @@ -2225,36 +2221,26 @@ int __init intel_vtd_setup(void) } static int intel_iommu_assign_device( - struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) + struct domain *d, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr; int ret = 0, i; - struct pci_dev *pdev; - u16 bdf; + u16 bdf, seg; + u8 bus; if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) ) return -ENODEV; - ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); - if (!pdev) - return -ENODEV; - - if (pdev->domain != dom0) - { - dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, - "IOMMU: assign a assigned device\n"); - return -EBUSY; - } - - ret = reassign_device_ownership(dom0, d, seg, bus, devfn); + ret = reassign_device_ownership(dom0, d, devfn, pdev); if ( ret ) goto done; /* FIXME: Because USB RMRR conflicts with guest bios region, * ignore USB RMRR temporarily. */ - if ( is_usb_device(seg, bus, devfn) ) + seg = pdev->seg; + bus = pdev->bus; + if ( is_usb_device(seg, bus, pdev->devfn) ) { ret = 0; goto done; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h @@ -123,13 +123,13 @@ struct iommu_ops { int (*add_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev); int (*enable_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev); int (*remove_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev); - int (*assign_device)(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); + int (*assign_device)(struct domain *, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); void (*teardown)(struct domain *d); int (*map_page)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned long mfn, unsigned int flags); int (*unmap_page)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn); int (*reassign_device)(struct domain *s, struct domain *t, - u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); + u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); int (*get_device_group_id)(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); void (*update_ire_from_apic)(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg, unsigned int value); void (*update_ire_from_msi)(struct msi_desc *msi_desc, struct msi_msg *msg); ++++++ 26325-IOMMU-add-remove-params.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559482 -3600 # Node ID 75cc4943b1ff509c4074800a23ff51d773233b8a # Parent 62dd78a4e3fc9d190840549f13b4d613f2d19c41 IOMMU: adjust add/remove operation parameters ... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c @@ -83,14 +83,14 @@ static void disable_translation(u32 *dte } static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_device( - struct domain *domain, struct amd_iommu *iommu, int bdf) + struct domain *domain, struct amd_iommu *iommu, + u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { void *dte; unsigned long flags; int req_id, valid = 1; int dte_i = 0; - u8 bus = PCI_BUS(bdf); - u8 devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(bdf); + u8 bus = pdev->bus; struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(domain); @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic dte_i = 1; /* get device-table entry */ - req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf); + req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn)); dte = iommu->dev_table.buffer + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE); spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic (u32 *)dte, page_to_maddr(hd->root_table), hd->domain_id, hd->paging_mode, valid); - if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) && + if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) && iommu_has_cap(iommu, PCI_CAP_IOTLB_SHIFT) ) iommu_dte_set_iotlb((u32 *)dte, dte_i); @@ -132,32 +132,31 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) && - !pci_ats_enabled(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) ) + if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) && + !pci_ats_enabled(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) ) { - struct pci_dev *pdev; + if ( devfn == pdev->devfn ) + enable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); - enable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); - - ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); - - ASSERT( pdev != NULL ); amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev, INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, 0); } } -static void __init amd_iommu_setup_dom0_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) +static int __init amd_iommu_setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn); struct amd_iommu *iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf); - if ( likely(iommu != NULL) ) - amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, bdf); - else + if ( unlikely(!iommu) ) + { AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("No iommu for device %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", pdev->seg, pdev->bus, - PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn)); + PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); + return -ENODEV; + } + + amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, devfn, pdev); + return 0; } int __init amd_iov_detect(void) @@ -311,16 +310,16 @@ static void __init amd_iommu_dom0_init(s } void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(struct domain *domain, - struct amd_iommu *iommu, int bdf) + struct amd_iommu *iommu, + u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { void *dte; unsigned long flags; int req_id; - u8 bus = PCI_BUS(bdf); - u8 devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(bdf); + u8 bus = pdev->bus; BUG_ON ( iommu->dev_table.buffer == NULL ); - req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf); + req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn)); dte = iommu->dev_table.buffer + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE); spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); @@ -328,7 +327,7 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(str { disable_translation((u32 *)dte); - if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) && + if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, pdev->devfn) && iommu_has_cap(iommu, PCI_CAP_IOTLB_SHIFT) ) iommu_dte_set_iotlb((u32 *)dte, 0); @@ -343,7 +342,8 @@ void amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(str ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - if ( pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) && + if ( devfn == pdev->devfn && + pci_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) && pci_ats_enabled(iommu->seg, bus, devfn) ) disable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); } @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int reassign_device(struct domain return -ENODEV; } - amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(source, iommu, bdf); + amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(source, iommu, devfn, pdev); if ( devfn == pdev->devfn ) { @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static int reassign_device(struct domain if ( t->root_table == NULL ) allocate_domain_resources(t); - amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(target, iommu, bdf); + amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(target, iommu, devfn, pdev); AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Re-assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u from dom%d to dom%d\n", pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), source->domain_id, target->domain_id); @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_domain_destroy(str amd_iommu_flush_all_pages(d); } -static int amd_iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) +static int amd_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct amd_iommu *iommu; u16 bdf; @@ -482,16 +482,16 @@ static int amd_iommu_add_device(struct p { AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu." " %04x:%02x:%02x.%u cannot be assigned to dom%d\n", - pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), - PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn), pdev->domain->domain_id); + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + pdev->domain->domain_id); return -ENODEV; } - amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, bdf); + amd_iommu_setup_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, devfn, pdev); return 0; } -static int amd_iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) +static int amd_iommu_remove_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct amd_iommu *iommu; u16 bdf; @@ -504,12 +504,12 @@ static int amd_iommu_remove_device(struc { AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu." " %04x:%02x:%02x.%u cannot be removed from dom%d\n", - pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), - PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn), pdev->domain->domain_id); + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + pdev->domain->domain_id); return -ENODEV; } - amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, bdf); + amd_iommu_disable_domain_device(pdev->domain, iommu, devfn, pdev); return 0; } Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pde if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops ) return 0; - return hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev); + return hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev->devfn, pdev); } int iommu_enable_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev * if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops ) return 0; - return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev); + return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev->devfn, pdev); } /* Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c @@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ int __init scan_pci_devices(void) struct setup_dom0 { struct domain *d; - void (*handler)(struct pci_dev *); + int (*handler)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); }; static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct pci_seg *pseg, void *arg) @@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_device pdev->domain = ctxt->d; list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &ctxt->d->arch.pdev_list); - ctxt->handler(pdev); + ctxt->handler(devfn, pdev); } } @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_device } void __init setup_dom0_pci_devices( - struct domain *d, void (*handler)(struct pci_dev *)) + struct domain *d, int (*handler)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *)) { struct setup_dom0 ctxt = { .d = d, .handler = handler }; Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ int nr_iommus; static struct tasklet vtd_fault_tasklet; -static void setup_dom0_device(struct pci_dev *); +static int setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); static void setup_dom0_rmrr(struct domain *d); static int domain_iommu_domid(struct domain *d, @@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct return 0; } -static int intel_iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) +static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr; u16 bdf; @@ -1918,8 +1918,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(struct if ( !pdev->domain ) return -EINVAL; - ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, - pdev->devfn); + ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); if ( ret ) { dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: context mapping failed\n", @@ -1931,7 +1930,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(struct { if ( rmrr->segment == pdev->seg && PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus && - PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == pdev->devfn ) + PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn ) { ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, rmrr); if ( ret ) @@ -1956,7 +1955,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_enable_device(str return ret >= 0 ? 0 : ret; } -static int intel_iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) +static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr; u16 bdf; @@ -1974,19 +1973,22 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(str { if ( rmrr->segment == pdev->seg && PCI_BUS(bdf) == pdev->bus && - PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == pdev->devfn ) + PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn ) return 0; } } - return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, - pdev->devfn); + return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); } -static void __init setup_dom0_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) +static int __init setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { - domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn); - pci_vtd_quirk(pdev); + int err; + + err = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); + if ( !err && devfn == pdev->devfn ) + pci_vtd_quirk(pdev); + return err; } void clear_fault_bits(struct iommu *iommu) Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h @@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ bool_t pt_irq_need_timer(uint32_t flags) struct iommu_ops { int (*init)(struct domain *d); void (*dom0_init)(struct domain *d); - int (*add_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev); + int (*add_device)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); int (*enable_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev); - int (*remove_device)(struct pci_dev *pdev); + int (*remove_device)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); int (*assign_device)(struct domain *, u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); void (*teardown)(struct domain *d); int (*map_page)(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned long mfn, Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h @@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_lock_pdev(int seg, i struct pci_dev *pci_lock_domain_pdev( struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn); -void setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct domain *, void (*)(struct pci_dev *)); +void setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct domain *, + int (*)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *)); void pci_release_devices(struct domain *d); int pci_add_segment(u16 seg); const unsigned long *pci_get_ro_map(u16 seg); ++++++ 26326-VT-d-context-map-params.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559549 -3600 # Node ID afb598bd0f5436bea15b7ef842e8ad5c6adefa1a # Parent 75cc4943b1ff509c4074800a23ff51d773233b8a VT-d: adjust context map/unmap parameters ... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void free_pgtable_maddr(u64 maddr); void *map_vtd_domain_page(u64 maddr); void unmap_vtd_domain_page(void *va); int domain_context_mapping_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu, - u8 bus, u8 devfn); + u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *); int domain_context_unmap_one(struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu, u8 bus, u8 devfn); Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ static void __init intel_iommu_dom0_init int domain_context_mapping_one( struct domain *domain, struct iommu *iommu, - u8 bus, u8 devfn) + u8 bus, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(domain); struct context_entry *context, *context_entries; @@ -1328,11 +1328,9 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one( if ( context_present(*context) ) { int res = 0; - struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL; - /* First try to get domain ownership from device structure. If that's + /* Try to get domain ownership from device structure. If that's * not available, try to read it from the context itself. */ - pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); if ( pdev ) { if ( pdev->domain != domain ) @@ -1451,13 +1449,12 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one( } static int domain_context_mapping( - struct domain *domain, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) + struct domain *domain, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd; int ret = 0; u32 type; - u8 secbus; - struct pci_dev *pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); + u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, secbus; drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev); if ( !drhd ) @@ -1478,8 +1475,9 @@ static int domain_context_mapping( dprintk(VTDPREFIX, "d%d:PCIe: map %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", domain->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); - ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn); - if ( !ret && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 ) + ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn, + pdev); + if ( !ret && devfn == pdev->devfn && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 ) enable_ats_device(seg, bus, devfn); break; @@ -1490,14 +1488,16 @@ static int domain_context_mapping( domain->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); - ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn, + pdev); if ( ret ) break; if ( find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus) < 1 ) break; - ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, bus, devfn, + pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn)); /* * Devices behind PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge may generate different @@ -1506,7 +1506,8 @@ static int domain_context_mapping( */ if ( !ret && pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE && (secbus != pdev->bus || pdev->devfn != 0) ) - ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, secbus, 0); + ret = domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, secbus, 0, + pci_get_pdev(seg, secbus, 0)); break; @@ -1579,18 +1580,15 @@ int domain_context_unmap_one( } static int domain_context_unmap( - struct domain *domain, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) + struct domain *domain, u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd; struct iommu *iommu; int ret = 0; u32 type; - u8 tmp_bus, tmp_devfn, secbus; - struct pci_dev *pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); + u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn, secbus; int found = 0; - BUG_ON(!pdev); - drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev); if ( !drhd ) return -ENODEV; @@ -1610,7 +1608,7 @@ static int domain_context_unmap( domain->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); ret = domain_context_unmap_one(domain, iommu, bus, devfn); - if ( !ret && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 ) + if ( !ret && devfn == pdev->devfn && ats_device(pdev, drhd) > 0 ) disable_ats_device(seg, bus, devfn); break; @@ -1704,11 +1702,11 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership( if ( (target != dom0) && !iommu_intremap ) untrusted_msi = 1; - ret = domain_context_unmap(source, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_unmap(source, devfn, pdev); if ( ret ) return ret; - ret = domain_context_mapping(target, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_mapping(target, devfn, pdev); if ( ret ) return ret; @@ -1918,7 +1916,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 dev if ( !pdev->domain ) return -EINVAL; - ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); + ret = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev); if ( ret ) { dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: context mapping failed\n", @@ -1978,14 +1976,14 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8 } } - return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); + return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev); } static int __init setup_dom0_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev) { int err; - err = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, pdev->seg, pdev->bus, devfn); + err = domain_context_mapping(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev); if ( !err && devfn == pdev->devfn ) pci_vtd_quirk(pdev); return err; Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void map_me_phantom_function(stru /* map or unmap ME phantom function */ if ( map ) domain_context_mapping_one(domain, drhd->iommu, 0, - PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7)); + PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7), NULL); else domain_context_unmap_one(domain, drhd->iommu, 0, PCI_DEVFN(dev, 7)); ++++++ 26327-AMD-IOMMU-flush-params.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559599 -3600 # Node ID 2a2c63f641ee3bda4ad552eb0b3ea479d37590cc # Parent afb598bd0f5436bea15b7ef842e8ad5c6adefa1a AMD IOMMU: adjust flush function parameters ... to use a (struct pci_dev *, devfn) pair. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c @@ -285,12 +285,12 @@ void invalidate_iommu_all(struct amd_iom send_iommu_command(iommu, cmd); } -void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_dev *pdev, +void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev, uint64_t gaddr, unsigned int order) { unsigned long flags; struct amd_iommu *iommu; - unsigned int bdf, req_id, queueid, maxpend; + unsigned int req_id, queueid, maxpend; struct pci_ats_dev *ats_pdev; if ( !ats_enabled ) @@ -303,8 +303,8 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_de if ( !pci_ats_enabled(ats_pdev->seg, ats_pdev->bus, ats_pdev->devfn) ) return; - bdf = PCI_BDF2(ats_pdev->bus, ats_pdev->devfn); - iommu = find_iommu_for_device(ats_pdev->seg, bdf); + iommu = find_iommu_for_device(ats_pdev->seg, + PCI_BDF2(ats_pdev->bus, ats_pdev->devfn)); if ( !iommu ) { @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_de if ( !iommu_has_cap(iommu, PCI_CAP_IOTLB_SHIFT) ) return; - req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf); + req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, PCI_BDF2(ats_pdev->bus, devfn)); queueid = req_id; maxpend = ats_pdev->ats_queue_depth & 0xff; @@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_flush_all_iotlbs(s return; for_each_pdev( d, pdev ) - amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev, gaddr, order); + amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev->devfn, pdev, gaddr, order); } /* Flush iommu cache after p2m changes. */ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void amd_iommu_setup_domain_devic if ( devfn == pdev->devfn ) enable_ats_device(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); - amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev, INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, 0); + amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(devfn, pdev, INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS, 0); } } Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/svm/amd-iommu-proto.h @@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ void iommu_dte_set_guest_cr3(u32 *dte, u void amd_iommu_flush_all_pages(struct domain *d); void amd_iommu_flush_pages(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, unsigned int order); -void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(struct pci_dev *pdev, uint64_t gaddr, - unsigned int order); +void amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(u8 devfn, const struct pci_dev *pdev, + uint64_t gaddr, unsigned int order); void amd_iommu_flush_device(struct amd_iommu *iommu, uint16_t bdf); void amd_iommu_flush_intremap(struct amd_iommu *iommu, uint16_t bdf); void amd_iommu_flush_all_caches(struct amd_iommu *iommu); ++++++ 26328-IOMMU-pdev-type.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559679 -3600 # Node ID 11fa145c880ee814aaf56a7f47f47ee3e5560c7c # Parent 2a2c63f641ee3bda4ad552eb0b3ea479d37590cc IOMMU/PCI: consolidate pdev_type() and cache its result for a given device Add an "unknown" device types as well as one for PCI-to-PCIe bridges (the latter of which other IOMMU code with or without this patch doesn't appear to handle properly). Make sure we don't mistake a device for which we can't access its config space as a legacy PCI device (after all we in fact don't know how to deal with such a device, and hence shouldn't try to). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct spin_lock_init(&pdev->msix_table_lock); /* update bus2bridge */ - switch ( pdev_type(pseg->nr, bus, devfn) ) + switch ( pdev->type = pdev_type(pseg->nr, bus, devfn) ) { u8 sec_bus, sub_bus; @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct static void free_pdev(struct pci_seg *pseg, struct pci_dev *pdev) { /* update bus2bridge */ - switch ( pdev_type(pseg->nr, pdev->bus, pdev->devfn) ) + switch ( pdev->type ) { u8 dev, func, sec_bus, sub_bus; @@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ static void free_pdev(struct pci_seg *ps pseg->bus2bridge[sec_bus] = pseg->bus2bridge[pdev->bus]; spin_unlock(&pseg->bus2bridge_lock); break; + + default: + break; } list_del(&pdev->alldevs_list); @@ -563,20 +566,30 @@ void pci_release_devices(struct domain * #define PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI 0x0604 -int pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) +enum pdev_type pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) { u16 class_device, creg; u8 d = PCI_SLOT(devfn), f = PCI_FUNC(devfn); int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_CAP_ID_EXP); class_device = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, PCI_CLASS_DEVICE); - if ( class_device == PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI ) + switch ( class_device ) { + case PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_PCI: if ( !pos ) return DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE; creg = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, d, f, pos + PCI_EXP_FLAGS); - return ((creg & PCI_EXP_FLAGS_TYPE) >> 4) == PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE ? - DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE : DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE; + switch ( (creg & PCI_EXP_FLAGS_TYPE) >> 4 ) + { + case PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE: + return DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE; + case PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCIE_BRIDGE: + return DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE; + } + return DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE; + + case 0x0000: case 0xffff: + return DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN; } return pos ? DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT : DEV_TYPE_PCI; --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c @@ -426,7 +426,6 @@ void io_apic_write_remap_rte( static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct iremap_entry *ire) { - int type; u16 seg; u8 bus, devfn, secbus; int ret; @@ -437,8 +436,7 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci seg = pdev->seg; bus = pdev->bus; devfn = pdev->devfn; - type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn); - switch ( type ) + switch ( pdev->type ) { case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT: case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE: @@ -448,7 +446,7 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci case DEV_TYPE_PCI: case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE: - /* case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE: */ + case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE: ret = find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus); if ( ret == 0 ) /* integrated PCI device */ { @@ -474,7 +472,7 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci default: dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX, "d%d: unknown(%u): %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", - pdev->domain->domain_id, type, + pdev->domain->domain_id, pdev->type, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); break; } --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -1453,7 +1453,6 @@ static int domain_context_mapping( { struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd; int ret = 0; - u32 type; u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, secbus; drhd = acpi_find_matched_drhd_unit(pdev); @@ -1462,8 +1461,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping( ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock)); - type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn); - switch ( type ) + switch ( pdev->type ) { case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE: case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE: @@ -1513,7 +1511,7 @@ static int domain_context_mapping( default: dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d:unknown(%u): %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", - domain->domain_id, type, + domain->domain_id, pdev->type, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); ret = -EINVAL; break; @@ -1585,7 +1583,6 @@ static int domain_context_unmap( struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd; struct iommu *iommu; int ret = 0; - u32 type; u8 seg = pdev->seg, bus = pdev->bus, tmp_bus, tmp_devfn, secbus; int found = 0; @@ -1594,8 +1591,7 @@ static int domain_context_unmap( return -ENODEV; iommu = drhd->iommu; - type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn); - switch ( type ) + switch ( pdev->type ) { case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE: case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE: @@ -1642,7 +1638,7 @@ static int domain_context_unmap( default: dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d:unknown(%u): %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", - domain->domain_id, type, + domain->domain_id, pdev->type, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn)); ret = -EINVAL; goto out; --- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h @@ -63,6 +63,17 @@ struct pci_dev { const u16 seg; const u8 bus; const u8 devfn; + + enum pdev_type { + DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN, + DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT, + DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE, // PCIe root port, switch + DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE, // PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge + DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE, // PCI/PCIx-to-PCIe bridge + DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE, // Legacy PCI bridge + DEV_TYPE_PCI, + } type; + struct pci_dev_info info; struct arch_pci_dev arch; struct { @@ -84,18 +95,10 @@ struct pci_dev { extern spinlock_t pcidevs_lock; -enum { - DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT, - DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE, // PCIe root port, switch - DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE, // PCIe-to-PCI/PCIx bridge - DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE, // Legacy PCI bridge - DEV_TYPE_PCI, -}; - bool_t pci_known_segment(u16 seg); int pci_device_detect(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 dev, u8 func); int scan_pci_devices(void); -int pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); +enum pdev_type pdev_type(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); int find_upstream_bridge(u16 seg, u8 *bus, u8 *devfn, u8 *secbus); struct pci_dev *pci_lock_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn); struct pci_dev *pci_lock_domain_pdev( --- a/xen/include/xen/pci_regs.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/pci_regs.h @@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ #define PCI_EXP_TYPE_UPSTREAM 0x5 /* Upstream Port */ #define PCI_EXP_TYPE_DOWNSTREAM 0x6 /* Downstream Port */ #define PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCI_BRIDGE 0x7 /* PCI/PCI-X Bridge */ +#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_PCIE_BRIDGE 0x8 /* PCI/PCI-X to PCIE Bridge */ +#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_RC_END 0x9 /* Root Complex Integrated Endpoint */ +#define PCI_EXP_TYPE_RC_EC 0xa /* Root Complex Event Collector */ #define PCI_EXP_FLAGS_SLOT 0x0100 /* Slot implemented */ #define PCI_EXP_FLAGS_IRQ 0x3e00 /* Interrupt message number */ #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP 4 /* Device capabilities */ ++++++ 26329-IOMMU-phantom-dev.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559742 -3600 # Node ID c9a01b396cb4eaedef30e9a6ed615115a9f8bfc5 # Parent 11fa145c880ee814aaf56a7f47f47ee3e5560c7c IOMMU: add phantom function support Apart from generating device context entries for the base function, all phantom functions also need context entries to be generated for them. In order to distinguish different use cases, a variant of pci_get_pdev() is being introduced that, even when passed a phantom function number, would return the underlying actual device. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_cmd.c @@ -337,7 +337,15 @@ static void amd_iommu_flush_all_iotlbs(s return; for_each_pdev( d, pdev ) - amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(pdev->devfn, pdev, gaddr, order); + { + u8 devfn = pdev->devfn; + + do { + amd_iommu_flush_iotlb(devfn, pdev, gaddr, order); + devfn += pdev->phantom_stride; + } while ( devfn != pdev->devfn && + PCI_SLOT(devfn) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ); + } } /* Flush iommu cache after p2m changes. */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c @@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ void parse_ppr_log_entry(struct amd_iomm devfn = PCI_DEVFN2(device_id); spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); - pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); + pdev = pci_get_real_pdev(iommu->seg, bus, devfn); spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); if ( pdev ) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c @@ -612,7 +612,6 @@ static int update_paging_mode(struct dom for_each_pdev( d, pdev ) { bdf = (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn; - req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf); iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf); if ( !iommu ) { @@ -621,16 +620,21 @@ static int update_paging_mode(struct dom } spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); - device_entry = iommu->dev_table.buffer + - (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE); + do { + req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf); + device_entry = iommu->dev_table.buffer + + (req_id * IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE); - /* valid = 0 only works for dom0 passthrough mode */ - amd_iommu_set_root_page_table((u32 *)device_entry, - page_to_maddr(hd->root_table), - hd->domain_id, - hd->paging_mode, 1); + /* valid = 0 only works for dom0 passthrough mode */ + amd_iommu_set_root_page_table((u32 *)device_entry, + page_to_maddr(hd->root_table), + hd->domain_id, + hd->paging_mode, 1); - amd_iommu_flush_device(iommu, req_id); + amd_iommu_flush_device(iommu, req_id); + bdf += pdev->phantom_stride; + } while ( PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) != pdev->devfn && + PCI_SLOT(bdf) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags); } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ void __init iommu_dom0_init(struct domai int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct hvm_iommu *hd; + int rc; + u8 devfn; if ( !pdev->domain ) return -EINVAL; @@ -167,7 +169,20 @@ int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pde if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops ) return 0; - return hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev->devfn, pdev); + rc = hd->platform_ops->add_device(pdev->devfn, pdev); + if ( rc || !pdev->phantom_stride ) + return rc; + + for ( devfn = pdev->devfn ; ; ) + { + devfn += pdev->phantom_stride; + if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ) + return 0; + rc = hd->platform_ops->add_device(devfn, pdev); + if ( rc ) + printk(XENLOG_WARNING "IOMMU: add %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n", + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), rc); + } } int iommu_enable_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) @@ -190,6 +205,8 @@ int iommu_enable_device(struct pci_dev * int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct hvm_iommu *hd; + u8 devfn; + if ( !pdev->domain ) return -EINVAL; @@ -197,6 +214,22 @@ int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev * if ( !iommu_enabled || !hd->platform_ops ) return 0; + for ( devfn = pdev->devfn ; pdev->phantom_stride; ) + { + int rc; + + devfn += pdev->phantom_stride; + if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ) + break; + rc = hd->platform_ops->remove_device(devfn, pdev); + if ( !rc ) + continue; + + printk(XENLOG_ERR "IOMMU: remove %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n", + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), rc); + return rc; + } + return hd->platform_ops->remove_device(pdev->devfn, pdev); } @@ -244,6 +277,18 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain * if ( (rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pdev)) ) goto done; + for ( ; pdev->phantom_stride; rc = 0 ) + { + devfn += pdev->phantom_stride; + if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ) + break; + rc = hd->platform_ops->assign_device(d, devfn, pdev); + if ( rc ) + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "d%d: assign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n", + d->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + rc); + } + if ( has_arch_pdevs(d) && !need_iommu(d) ) { d->need_iommu = 1; @@ -378,6 +423,21 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u1 if ( !pdev ) return -ENODEV; + while ( pdev->phantom_stride ) + { + devfn += pdev->phantom_stride; + if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ) + break; + ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev); + if ( !ret ) + continue; + + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "d%d: deassign %04x:%02x:%02x.%u failed (%d)\n", + d->domain_id, seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), ret); + return ret; + } + + devfn = pdev->devfn; ret = hd->platform_ops->reassign_device(d, dom0, devfn, pdev); if ( ret ) { Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c @@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct /* update bus2bridge */ switch ( pdev->type = pdev_type(pseg->nr, bus, devfn) ) { + int pos; + u16 cap; u8 sec_bus, sub_bus; case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE: @@ -169,6 +171,20 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct break; case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT: + pos = pci_find_cap_offset(pseg->nr, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), + PCI_FUNC(devfn), PCI_CAP_ID_EXP); + BUG_ON(!pos); + cap = pci_conf_read16(pseg->nr, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), + PCI_FUNC(devfn), pos + PCI_EXP_DEVCAP); + if ( cap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PHANTOM ) + { + pdev->phantom_stride = 8 >> MASK_EXTR(cap, + PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PHANTOM); + if ( PCI_FUNC(devfn) >= pdev->phantom_stride ) + pdev->phantom_stride = 0; + } + break; + case DEV_TYPE_PCI: break; @@ -266,6 +282,27 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, in return NULL; } +struct pci_dev *pci_get_real_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev; + int stride; + + if ( seg < 0 || bus < 0 || devfn < 0 ) + return NULL; + + for ( pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn), stride = 4; + !pdev && stride; stride >>= 1 ) + { + if ( !(devfn & (8 - stride)) ) + continue; + pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn & ~(8 - stride)); + if ( pdev && stride != pdev->phantom_stride ) + pdev = NULL; + } + + return pdev; +} + struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain( struct domain *d, int seg, int bus, int devfn) { @@ -464,8 +501,19 @@ int pci_add_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 d out: spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); - printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "PCI add %s %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", pdev_type, - seg, bus, slot, func); + if ( !ret ) + { + printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "PCI add %s %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", pdev_type, + seg, bus, slot, func); + while ( pdev->phantom_stride ) + { + func += pdev->phantom_stride; + if ( PCI_SLOT(func) ) + break; + printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "PCI phantom %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n", + seg, bus, slot, func); + } + } return ret; } @@ -657,7 +705,7 @@ void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u u16 cword; spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); - pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); + pdev = pci_get_real_pdev(seg, bus, devfn); if ( pdev ) { if ( now < pdev->fault.time || @@ -674,6 +722,7 @@ void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to * control it for us. */ + devfn = pdev->devfn; cword = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), PCI_COMMAND); pci_conf_write16(seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), @@ -731,6 +780,27 @@ struct setup_dom0 { int (*handler)(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *); }; +static void setup_one_dom0_device(const struct setup_dom0 *ctxt, + struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + u8 devfn = pdev->devfn; + + do { + int err = ctxt->handler(devfn, pdev); + + if ( err ) + { + printk(XENLOG_ERR "setup %04x:%02x:%02x.%u for d%d failed (%d)\n", + pdev->seg, pdev->bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn), + ctxt->d->domain_id, err); + if ( devfn == pdev->devfn ) + return; + } + devfn += pdev->phantom_stride; + } while ( devfn != pdev->devfn && + PCI_SLOT(devfn) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ); +} + static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_devices(struct pci_seg *pseg, void *arg) { struct setup_dom0 *ctxt = arg; @@ -747,7 +817,7 @@ static int __init _setup_dom0_pci_device pdev->domain = ctxt->d; list_add(&pdev->domain_list, &ctxt->d->arch.pdev_list); - ctxt->handler(devfn, pdev); + setup_one_dom0_device(ctxt, pdev); } } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/lib.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/lib.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/lib.h @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ do { #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]) + __must_be_array(x)) +#define MASK_EXTR(v, m) (((v) & (m)) / ((m) & -(m))) +#define MASK_INSR(v, m) (((v) * ((m) & -(m))) & (m)) + #define reserve_bootmem(_p,_l) ((void)0) struct domain; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/pci.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/pci.h @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct pci_dev { const u8 bus; const u8 devfn; + u8 phantom_stride; + enum pdev_type { DEV_TYPE_PCI_UNKNOWN, DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT, @@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ int pci_remove_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u int pci_ro_device(int seg, int bus, int devfn); void arch_pci_ro_device(int seg, int bdf); struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn); +struct pci_dev *pci_get_real_pdev(int seg, int bus, int devfn); struct pci_dev *pci_get_pdev_by_domain( struct domain *, int seg, int bus, int devfn); void pci_check_disable_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn); ++++++ 26330-VT-d-phantom-MSI.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559812 -3600 # Node ID b514b7118958327605e33dd387944832bc8d734a # Parent c9a01b396cb4eaedef30e9a6ed615115a9f8bfc5 VT-d: relax source qualifier for MSI of phantom functions With ordinary requests allowed to come from phantom functions, the remapping tables ought to be set up to allow for MSI triggers to come from other than the "real" device too. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c @@ -438,10 +438,19 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci devfn = pdev->devfn; switch ( pdev->type ) { + unsigned int sq; + case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT: case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE: case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE: - set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn)); + switch ( pdev->phantom_stride ) + { + case 1: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_3; break; + case 2: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_2; break; + case 4: sq = SQ_13_IGNORE_1; break; + default: sq = SQ_ALL_16; break; + } + set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, sq, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn)); break; case DEV_TYPE_PCI: ++++++ 26331-IOMMU-phantom-dev-quirk.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1357559889 -3600 # Node ID 23c4bbc0111dd807561b2c62cbc5798220943a0d # Parent b514b7118958327605e33dd387944832bc8d734a IOMMU: add option to specify devices behaving like ones using phantom functions At least certain Marvell SATA controllers are known to issue bus master requests with a non-zero function as origin, despite themselves being single function devices. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown @@ -679,6 +679,16 @@ Defaults to booting secondary processors Default: `on` +### pci-phantom +> `=[<seg>:]<bus>:<device>,<stride>` + +Mark a group of PCI devices as using phantom functions without actually +advertising so, so the IOMMU can create translation contexts for them. + +All numbers specified must be hexadecimal ones. + +This option can be specified more than once (up to 8 times at present). + ### ple\_gap

`= <integer>`

Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c @@ -123,6 +123,49 @@ const unsigned long *pci_get_ro_map(u16 return pseg ? pseg->ro_map : NULL; } +static struct phantom_dev { + u16 seg; + u8 bus, slot, stride; +} phantom_devs[8]; +static unsigned int nr_phantom_devs; + +static void __init parse_phantom_dev(char *str) { + const char *s = str; + struct phantom_dev phantom; + + if ( !s || !*s || nr_phantom_devs >= ARRAY_SIZE(phantom_devs) ) + return; + + phantom.seg = simple_strtol(s, &s, 16); + if ( *s != ':' ) + return; + + phantom.bus = simple_strtol(s + 1, &s, 16); + if ( *s == ',' ) + { + phantom.slot = phantom.bus; + phantom.bus = phantom.seg; + phantom.seg = 0; + } + else if ( *s == ':' ) + phantom.slot = simple_strtol(s + 1, &s, 16); + else + return; + + if ( *s != ',' ) + return; + switch ( phantom.stride = simple_strtol(s + 1, &s, 0) ) + { + case 1: case 2: case 4: + if ( *s ) + default: + return; + } + + phantom_devs[nr_phantom_devs++] = phantom; +} +custom_param("pci-phantom", parse_phantom_dev); + static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct pci_seg *pseg, u8 bus, u8 devfn) { struct pci_dev *pdev; @@ -183,6 +226,20 @@ static struct pci_dev *alloc_pdev(struct if ( PCI_FUNC(devfn) >= pdev->phantom_stride ) pdev->phantom_stride = 0; } + else + { + unsigned int i; + + for ( i = 0; i < nr_phantom_devs; ++i ) + if ( phantom_devs[i].seg == pseg->nr && + phantom_devs[i].bus == bus && + phantom_devs[i].slot == PCI_SLOT(devfn) && + phantom_devs[i].stride > PCI_FUNC(devfn) ) + { + pdev->phantom_stride = phantom_devs[i].stride; + break; + } + } break; case DEV_TYPE_PCI: ++++++ 26341-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest # HG changeset patch # User Ross Philipson # Date 1357838188 0 # Node ID 07bf59a7ce837bd795e2df2f28166cfe41990d3d # Parent 19fd1237ff0dfa3d97a896d6ed6fbbd33f816a9f HVM xenstore strings and firmware passthrough header Add public HVM definitions header for xenstore strings used in HVMLOADER. In addition this header describes the use of the firmware passthrough values set using xenstore. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Committed-by: Keir Fraser diff -r 19fd1237ff0d -r 07bf59a7ce83 xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h Thu Jan 10 17:16:28 2013 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/****************************************************************************** + * hvm/hvm_xs_strings.h + * + * HVM xenstore strings used in HVMLOADER. + * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy + * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to + * deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the + * rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or + * sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in + * all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING + * FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER + * DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_XS_STRINGS_H__ +#define __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_XS_STRINGS_H__ + +#define HVM_XS_HVMLOADER "hvmloader" +#define HVM_XS_BIOS "hvmloader/bios" +#define HVM_XS_GENERATION_ID_ADDRESS "hvmloader/generation-id-address" + +/* The following values allow additional ACPI tables to be added to the + * virtual ACPI BIOS that hvmloader constructs. The values specify the guest + * physical address and length of a block of ACPI tables to add. The format of + * the block is simply concatenated raw tables (which specify their own length + * in the ACPI header). + */ +#define HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_ADDRESS "hvmloader/acpi/address" +#define HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_LENGTH "hvmloader/acpi/length" + +/* Any number of SMBIOS types can be passed through to an HVM guest using + * the following xenstore values. The values specify the guest physical + * address and length of a block of SMBIOS structures for hvmloader to use. + * The block is formatted in the following way: + * + * <length><struct><length><struct>... + * + * Each length separator is a 32b integer indicating the length of the next + * SMBIOS structure. For DMTF defined types (0 - 121), the passed in struct + * will replace the default structure in hvmloader. In addition, any + * OEM/vendortypes (128 - 255) will all be added. + */ +#define HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_ADDRESS "hvmloader/smbios/address" +#define HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_LENGTH "hvmloader/smbios/length" + +/* Set to 1 to enable SMBIOS default portable battery (type 22) values. */ +#define HVM_XS_SMBIOS_DEFAULT_BATTERY "hvmloader/smbios/default_battery" + +/* The following xenstore values are used to override some of the default + * string values in the SMBIOS table constructed in hvmloader. + */ +#define HVM_XS_BIOS_STRINGS "bios-strings" +#define HVM_XS_BIOS_VENDOR "bios-strings/bios-vendor" +#define HVM_XS_BIOS_VERSION "bios-strings/bios-version" +#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_MANUFACTURER "bios-strings/system-manufacturer" +#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_PRODUCT_NAME "bios-strings/system-product-name" +#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_VERSION "bios-strings/system-version" +#define HVM_XS_SYSTEM_SERIAL_NUMBER "bios-strings/system-serial-number" +#define HVM_XS_ENCLOSURE_MANUFACTURER "bios-strings/enclosure-manufacturer" +#define HVM_XS_ENCLOSURE_SERIAL_NUMBER "bios-strings/enclosure-serial-number" +#define HVM_XS_BATTERY_MANUFACTURER "bios-strings/battery-manufacturer" +#define HVM_XS_BATTERY_DEVICE_NAME "bios-strings/battery-device-name" + +/* 1 to 99 OEM strings can be set in xenstore using values of the form + * below. These strings will be loaded into the SMBIOS type 11 structure. + */ +#define HVM_XS_OEM_STRINGS "bios-strings/oem-%02d" + +#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_XS_STRINGS_H__ */ ++++++ 26342-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest # HG changeset patch # User Ross Philipson # Date 1357838241 0 # Node ID cabf395a6c849cc65e56f1640b18db0c3e0faf5d # Parent 07bf59a7ce837bd795e2df2f28166cfe41990d3d HVM firmware passthrough control tools support Xen control tools support for loading the firmware passthrough blocks during domain construction. SMBIOS and ACPI blocks are passed in using the new xc_hvm_build_args structure. Each block is read and loaded into the new domain address space behind the HVMLOADER image. The base address for the two blocks is returned as an out parameter to the caller via the args structure. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Committed-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_arm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_arm.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_arm.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args) + struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_build_x86.c @@ -49,6 +49,40 @@ #define NR_SPECIAL_PAGES 8 #define special_pfn(x) (0xff000u - NR_SPECIAL_PAGES + (x)) +static int modules_init(struct xc_hvm_build_args *args, + uint64_t vend, struct elf_binary *elf, + uint64_t *mstart_out, uint64_t *mend_out) +{ +#define MODULE_ALIGN 1UL << 7 +#define MB_ALIGN 1UL << 20 +#define MKALIGN(x, a) (((uint64_t)(x) + (a) - 1) & ~(uint64_t)((a) - 1)) + uint64_t total_len = 0, offset1 = 0; + + if ( (args->acpi_module.length == 0)&&(args->smbios_module.length == 0) ) + return 0; + + /* Find the total length for the firmware modules with a reasonable large + * alignment size to align each the modules. + */ + total_len = MKALIGN(args->acpi_module.length, MODULE_ALIGN); + offset1 = total_len; + total_len += MKALIGN(args->smbios_module.length, MODULE_ALIGN); + + /* Want to place the modules 1Mb+change behind the loader image. */ + *mstart_out = MKALIGN(elf->pend, MB_ALIGN) + (MB_ALIGN); + *mend_out = *mstart_out + total_len; + + if ( *mend_out > vend ) + return -1; + + if ( args->acpi_module.length != 0 ) + args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out = *mstart_out; + if ( args->smbios_module.length != 0 ) + args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out = *mstart_out + offset1; + + return 0; +} + static void build_hvm_info(void *hvm_info_page, uint64_t mem_size, uint64_t mmio_start, uint64_t mmio_size) { @@ -86,9 +120,8 @@ static void build_hvm_info(void *hvm_inf hvm_info->checksum = -sum; } -static int loadelfimage( - xc_interface *xch, - struct elf_binary *elf, uint32_t dom, unsigned long *parray) +static int loadelfimage(xc_interface *xch, struct elf_binary *elf, + uint32_t dom, unsigned long *parray) { privcmd_mmap_entry_t *entries = NULL; unsigned long pfn_start = elf->pstart >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -128,6 +161,66 @@ static int loadelfimage( return rc; } +static int loadmodules(xc_interface *xch, + struct xc_hvm_build_args *args, + uint64_t mstart, uint64_t mend, + uint32_t dom, unsigned long *parray) +{ + privcmd_mmap_entry_t *entries = NULL; + unsigned long pfn_start; + unsigned long pfn_end; + size_t pages; + uint32_t i; + uint8_t *dest; + int rc = -1; + + if ( (mstart == 0)||(mend == 0) ) + return 0; + + pfn_start = (unsigned long)(mstart >> PAGE_SHIFT); + pfn_end = (unsigned long)((mend + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + pages = pfn_end - pfn_start; + + /* Map address space for module list. */ + entries = calloc(pages, sizeof(privcmd_mmap_entry_t)); + if ( entries == NULL ) + goto error_out; + + for ( i = 0; i < pages; i++ ) + entries[i].mfn = parray[(mstart >> PAGE_SHIFT) + i]; + + dest = xc_map_foreign_ranges( + xch, dom, pages << PAGE_SHIFT, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 1 << PAGE_SHIFT, + entries, pages); + if ( dest == NULL ) + goto error_out; + + /* Zero the range so padding is clear between modules */ + memset(dest, 0, pages << PAGE_SHIFT); + + /* Load modules into range */ + if ( args->acpi_module.length != 0 ) + { + memcpy(dest, + args->acpi_module.data, + args->acpi_module.length); + } + if ( args->smbios_module.length != 0 ) + { + memcpy(dest + (args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out - mstart), + args->smbios_module.data, + args->smbios_module.length); + } + + munmap(dest, pages << PAGE_SHIFT); + rc = 0; + + error_out: + free(entries); + + return rc; +} + /* * Check whether there exists mmio hole in the specified memory range. * Returns 1 if exists, else returns 0. @@ -142,7 +235,7 @@ static int check_mmio_hole(uint64_t star } static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch, - uint32_t dom, const struct xc_hvm_build_args *args, + uint32_t dom, struct xc_hvm_build_args *args, char *image, unsigned long image_size) { xen_pfn_t *page_array = NULL; @@ -155,6 +248,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch uint32_t *ident_pt; struct elf_binary elf; uint64_t v_start, v_end; + uint64_t m_start = 0, m_end = 0; int rc; xen_capabilities_info_t caps; unsigned long stat_normal_pages = 0, stat_2mb_pages = 0, @@ -180,11 +274,19 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch goto error_out; } + if ( modules_init(args, v_end, &elf, &m_start, &m_end) != 0 ) + { + ERROR("Insufficient space to load modules."); + goto error_out; + } + IPRINTF("VIRTUAL MEMORY ARRANGEMENT:\n" " Loader: %016"PRIx64"->%016"PRIx64"\n" + " Modules: %016"PRIx64"->%016"PRIx64"\n" " TOTAL: %016"PRIx64"->%016"PRIx64"\n" " ENTRY ADDRESS: %016"PRIx64"\n", elf.pstart, elf.pend, + m_start, m_end, v_start, v_end, elf_uval(&elf, elf.ehdr, e_entry)); @@ -339,6 +441,9 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch if ( loadelfimage(xch, &elf, dom, page_array) != 0 ) goto error_out; + if ( loadmodules(xch, args, m_start, m_end, dom, page_array) != 0 ) + goto error_out; + if ( (hvm_info_page = xc_map_foreign_range( xch, dom, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, HVM_INFO_PFN)) == NULL ) @@ -420,7 +525,7 @@ static int setup_guest(xc_interface *xch * Create a domain for a virtualized Linux, using files/filenames. */ int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args) + struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args) { struct xc_hvm_build_args args = *hvm_args; void *image; @@ -448,6 +553,15 @@ int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint sts = setup_guest(xch, domid, &args, image, image_size); + if (!sts) + { + /* Return module load addresses to caller */ + hvm_args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out = + args.acpi_module.guest_addr_out; + hvm_args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out = + args.smbios_module.guest_addr_out; + } + free(image); return sts; @@ -468,6 +582,7 @@ int xc_hvm_build_target_mem(xc_interface { struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {}; + memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args)); args.mem_size = (uint64_t)memsize << 20; args.mem_target = (uint64_t)target << 20; args.image_file_name = image_name; Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xenguest.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h @@ -211,11 +211,23 @@ int xc_linux_build_mem(xc_interface *xch unsigned int console_evtchn, unsigned long *console_mfn); +struct xc_hvm_firmware_module { + uint8_t *data; + uint32_t length; + uint64_t guest_addr_out; +}; + struct xc_hvm_build_args { uint64_t mem_size; /* Memory size in bytes. */ uint64_t mem_target; /* Memory target in bytes. */ uint64_t mmio_size; /* Size of the MMIO hole in bytes. */ const char *image_file_name; /* File name of the image to load. */ + + /* Extra ACPI tables passed to HVMLOADER */ + struct xc_hvm_firmware_module acpi_module; + + /* Extra SMBIOS structures passed to HVMLOADER */ + struct xc_hvm_firmware_module smbios_module; }; /** @@ -228,7 +240,7 @@ struct xc_hvm_build_args { * are optional. */ int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args); + struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args); int xc_hvm_build_target_mem(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xg_private.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xg_private.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxc/xg_private.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ unsigned long csum_page(void *page) __attribute__((weak)) int xc_hvm_build(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - const struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args) + struct xc_hvm_build_args *hvm_args) { errno = ENOSYS; return -1; ++++++ 26343-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ ++++ 645 lines (skipped) ++++++ 26344-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest # HG changeset patch # User Ross Philipson # Date 1357838323 0 # Node ID b9c38bea15b117552ecb51809779c7cfef82dd44 # Parent a7ce196f40444fafbe8f13b2d80e4885d4321806 HVM firmware passthrough ACPI processing ACPI table passthrough support allowing additional static tables and SSDTs (AML code) to be loaded. These additional tables are added at the end of the secondary table list in the RSDT/XSDT tables. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Committed-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/build.c @@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ #include "ssdt_pm.h" #include "../config.h" #include "../util.h" +#include + +#define ACPI_MAX_SECONDARY_TABLES 16 #define align16(sz) (((sz) + 15) & ~15) #define fixed_strcpy(d, s) strncpy((d), (s), sizeof(d)) @@ -198,6 +201,52 @@ static struct acpi_20_waet *construct_wa return waet; } +static int construct_passthrough_tables(unsigned long *table_ptrs, + int nr_tables) +{ + const char *s; + uint8_t *acpi_pt_addr; + uint32_t acpi_pt_length; + struct acpi_header *header; + int nr_added; + int nr_max = (ACPI_MAX_SECONDARY_TABLES - nr_tables - 1); + uint32_t total = 0; + uint8_t *buffer; + + s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_ADDRESS, NULL); + if ( s == NULL ) + return 0; + + acpi_pt_addr = (uint8_t*)(uint32_t)strtoll(s, NULL, 0); + if ( acpi_pt_addr == NULL ) + return 0; + + s = xenstore_read(HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_LENGTH, NULL); + if ( s == NULL ) + return 0; + + acpi_pt_length = (uint32_t)strtoll(s, NULL, 0); + + for ( nr_added = 0; nr_added < nr_max; nr_added++ ) + { + if ( (acpi_pt_length - total) < sizeof(struct acpi_header) ) + break; + + header = (struct acpi_header*)acpi_pt_addr; + + buffer = mem_alloc(header->length, 16); + if ( buffer == NULL ) + break; + memcpy(buffer, header, header->length); + + table_ptrs[nr_tables++] = (unsigned long)buffer; + total += header->length; + acpi_pt_addr += header->length; + } + + return nr_added; +} + static int construct_secondary_tables(unsigned long *table_ptrs, struct acpi_info *info) { @@ -295,6 +344,9 @@ static int construct_secondary_tables(un } } + /* Load any additional tables passed through. */ + nr_tables += construct_passthrough_tables(table_ptrs, nr_tables); + table_ptrs[nr_tables] = 0; return nr_tables; } @@ -329,7 +381,7 @@ void acpi_build_tables(struct acpi_confi struct acpi_10_fadt *fadt_10; struct acpi_20_facs *facs; unsigned char *dsdt; - unsigned long secondary_tables[16]; + unsigned long secondary_tables[ACPI_MAX_SECONDARY_TABLES]; int nr_secondaries, i; unsigned long vm_gid_addr; ++++++ 26369-libxl-devid.patch ++++++ commit 5420f26507fc5c9853eb1076401a8658d72669da Author: Jim Fehlig Date: Fri Jan 11 12:22:26 2013 +0000 libxl: Set vfb and vkb devid if not done so by the caller Other devices set a sensible devid if the caller has not done so. Do the same for vfb and vkb. While at it, factor out the common code used to determine a sensible devid, so it can be used by other libxl__device_*_add functions. Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c @@ -1715,6 +1715,26 @@ out: return; } +/* common function to get next device id */ +static int libxl__device_nextid(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, char *device) +{ + char *dompath, **l; + unsigned int nb; + int nextid = -1; + + if (!(dompath = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid))) + return nextid; + + l = libxl__xs_directory(gc, XBT_NULL, + GCSPRINTF("%s/device/%s", dompath, device), &nb); + if (l == NULL || nb == 0) + nextid = 0; + else + nextid = strtoul(l[nb - 1], NULL, 10) + 1; + + return nextid; +} + /******************************************************************************/ int libxl__device_disk_setdefault(libxl__gc *gc, libxl_device_disk *disk) @@ -2569,8 +2589,7 @@ void libxl__device_nic_add(libxl__egc *e flexarray_t *front; flexarray_t *back; libxl__device *device; - char *dompath, **l; - unsigned int nb, rc; + unsigned int rc; rc = libxl__device_nic_setdefault(gc, nic, domid); if (rc) goto out; @@ -2587,17 +2606,10 @@ void libxl__device_nic_add(libxl__egc *e } if (nic->devid == -1) { - if (!(dompath = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid))) { + if ((nic->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vif") < 0)) { rc = ERROR_FAIL; goto out_free; } - if (!(l = libxl__xs_directory(gc, XBT_NULL, - libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/device/vif", dompath), &nb)) || - nb == 0) { - nic->devid = 0; - } else { - nic->devid = strtoul(l[nb - 1], NULL, 10) + 1; - } } GCNEW(device); @@ -2995,6 +3007,13 @@ int libxl__device_vkb_add(libxl__gc *gc, goto out_free; } + if (vkb->devid == -1) { + if ((vkb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vkb") < 0)) { + rc = ERROR_FAIL; + goto out_free; + } + } + rc = libxl__device_from_vkb(gc, domid, vkb, &device); if (rc != 0) goto out_free; @@ -3097,6 +3116,13 @@ int libxl__device_vfb_add(libxl__gc *gc, goto out_free; } + if (vfb->devid == -1) { + if ((vfb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vfb") < 0)) { + rc = ERROR_FAIL; + goto out_free; + } + } + rc = libxl__device_from_vfb(gc, domid, vfb, &device); if (rc != 0) goto out_free; ++++++ 26370-libxc-x86-initial-mapping-fit.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Ian Campbell # Date 1357906947 0 # Node ID ba2d73234d73fc0faa027cd9bdfd3ac90642733c # Parent 84d87ca765be81c215ef3b67d2ed71acfba73553 libxc: x86: ensure that the initial mapping fits into the guest's memory In particular we need to check that adding 512KB of slack and rounding up to a 4MB boundary do not overflow the guest's memory allocation. Otherwise we run off the end of the p2m when building the guest's initial page tables and populate them with garbage. Wei noticed this when build tiny (2MB) mini-os domains. Reported-by: Wei Liu Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell Acked-by: Jan Beulich Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_core.c @@ -930,7 +930,8 @@ int xc_dom_build_image(struct xc_dom_ima goto err; if ( dom->arch_hooks->count_pgtables ) { - dom->arch_hooks->count_pgtables(dom); + if ( dom->arch_hooks->count_pgtables(dom) != 0 ) + goto err; if ( (dom->pgtables > 0) && (xc_dom_alloc_segment(dom, &dom->pgtables_seg, "page tables", 0, dom->pgtables * page_size) != 0) ) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static int count_pgtables(struct xc_dom_ { int pages, extra_pages; xen_vaddr_t try_virt_end; + xen_pfn_t try_pfn_end; extra_pages = dom->alloc_bootstack ? 1 : 0; extra_pages += dom->extra_pages; @@ -91,6 +92,17 @@ static int count_pgtables(struct xc_dom_ { try_virt_end = round_up(dom->virt_alloc_end + pages * PAGE_SIZE_X86, bits_to_mask(22)); /* 4MB alignment */ + + try_pfn_end = (try_virt_end - dom->parms.virt_base) >> PAGE_SHIFT_X86; + + if ( try_pfn_end > dom->total_pages ) + { + xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_OUT_OF_MEMORY, + "%s: not enough memory for initial mapping (%#"PRIpfn" > %#"PRIpfn")", + __FUNCTION__, try_pfn_end, dom->total_pages); + return -ENOMEM; + } + dom->pg_l4 = nr_page_tables(dom, dom->parms.virt_base, try_virt_end, l4_bits); dom->pg_l3 = ++++++ 26372-tools-paths.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Bamvor Jian Zhang # Date 1357906948 0 # Node ID 2ad5792b4274d76ced39515cbd3f84898b181768 # Parent ba2d73234d73fc0faa027cd9bdfd3ac90642733c fix wrong path while calling pygrub and libxl-save-helper in current xen x86_64, the default libexec directory is /usr/lib/xen/bin, while the private binder is /usr/lib64/xen/bin. but some commands(pygrub, libxl-save-helper) located in private binder directory is called from libexec directory which lead to the following error: 1, for pygrub bootloader: libxl: debug: libxl_bootloader.c:429:bootloader_disk_attached_cb: /usr/lib/xen/bin/pygrub doesn't exist, falling back to config path 2, for libxl-save-helper: libxl: cannot execute /usr/lib/xen/bin/libxl-save-helper: No such file or directory libxl: error: libxl_utils.c:363:libxl_read_exactly: file/stream truncated reading ipc msg header from domain 3 save/restore helper stdout pipe libxl: error: libxl_exec.c:118:libxl_report_child_exitstatus: domain 3 save/restore helper [10222] exited with error status 255 there are two ways to fix above error. the first one is make such command store in the /usr/lib/xen/bin and /usr/lib64/xen/bin(symbol link to previous), e.g. qemu-dm. The second way is using private binder dir instead of libexec dir. e.g. xenconsole. For these cases, the latter one is suitable. Signed-off-by: Bamvor Jian Zhang Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_bootloader.c @@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static void bootloader_disk_attached_cb( const char *bltmp; struct stat st; - bltmp = libxl__abs_path(gc, bootloader, libxl__libexec_path()); + bltmp = libxl__abs_path(gc, bootloader, libxl__private_bindir_path()); /* Check to see if the file exists in this location; if not, * fall back to checking the path */ LOG(DEBUG, "Checking for bootloader in libexec path: %s", bltmp); Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static void run_helper(libxl__egc *egc, shs->stdout_what = GCSPRINTF("domain %"PRIu32" save/restore helper" " stdout pipe", domid); - *arg++ = getenv("LIBXL_SAVE_HELPER") ?: LIBEXEC "/" "libxl-save-helper"; + *arg++ = getenv("LIBXL_SAVE_HELPER") ?: PRIVATE_BINDIR "/" "libxl-save-helper"; *arg++ = mode_arg; const char **stream_fd_arg = arg++; for (i=0; i # Date 1358427591 -3600 # Node ID 76598d4bf61ef0c575deba539ff99078c80e651e # Parent 0dee85c061addb7124d77c5f6cfe2ea7bc03b760 x86: handle both NMI kinds if they occur simultaneously We shouldn't assume PCI SERR excludes IOCHK. Once at it, also remove the doubly redundant range restriction on "reason" - the variable already is "unsigned char". Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Andrew Cooper Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -3396,10 +3396,10 @@ void do_nmi(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) reason = inb(0x61); if ( reason & 0x80 ) pci_serr_error(regs); - else if ( reason & 0x40 ) + if ( reason & 0x40 ) io_check_error(regs); - else if ( !nmi_watchdog ) - unknown_nmi_error(regs, (unsigned char)(reason&0xff)); + if ( !(reason & 0xc0) && !nmi_watchdog ) + unknown_nmi_error(regs, reason); } } ++++++ 26418-x86-trampoline-consider-multiboot.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Paolo Bonzini # Date 1358505311 -3600 # Node ID 3b59a6c3e9b0fb5009bdfff97c8493bb9f0bec54 # Parent 025f202f3022c30d1ec3b6ffcb72861c43a32cf7 x86: find a better location for the real-mode trampoline On some machines, the location at 0x40e does not point to the beginning of the EBDA. Rather, it points to the beginning of the BIOS-reserved area of the EBDA, while the option ROMs place their data below that segment. For this reason, 0x413 is actually a better source than 0x40e to get the location of the real-mode trampoline. Xen was already using it as a second source, and this patch keeps that working. However, just in case, let's also fetch the information from the multiboot structure, where the boot loader should have placed it. This way we don't necessarily trust one of the BIOS or the multiboot loader more than the other. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Retain the previous code, thus using the multiboot value only if it's sane but lower than the BDA computed one. Also use the full 32-bit mem_lower value and prefer MBI_MEMLIMITS over open coding it (requiring a slight adjustment to multiboot.h to make its constants actually usable in assembly code, which previously they were only meant to be). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Committed-by: Jan Beulich --- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S @@ -88,6 +88,20 @@ __start: movzwl 0x413,%eax /* use base memory size on failure */ shl $10-4,%eax 1: + /* + * Compare the value in the BDA with the information from the + * multiboot structure (if available) and use the smallest. + */ + testb $MBI_MEMLIMITS,(%ebx) + jz 2f /* not available? BDA value will be fine */ + mov 4(%ebx),%edx + cmp $0x100,%edx /* is the multiboot value too small? */ + jb 2f /* if so, do not use it */ + shl $10-4,%edx + cmp %eax,%edx /* compare with BDA value */ + cmovb %edx,%eax /* and use the smaller */ + +2: /* Reserve 64kb for the trampoline */ sub $0x1000,%eax /* From arch/x86/smpboot.c: start_eip had better be page-aligned! */ --- a/xen/include/xen/multiboot.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/multiboot.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #ifndef __MULTIBOOT_H__ #define __MULTIBOOT_H__ +#include "const.h" /* * Multiboot header structure. @@ -31,17 +32,17 @@ /* The magic number passed by a Multiboot-compliant boot loader. */ #define MULTIBOOT_BOOTLOADER_MAGIC 0x2BADB002 -#define MBI_MEMLIMITS (1u<< 0) -#define MBI_BOOTDEV (1u<< 1) -#define MBI_CMDLINE (1u<< 2) -#define MBI_MODULES (1u<< 3) -#define MBI_AOUT_SYMS (1u<< 4) -#define MBI_ELF_SYMS (1u<< 5) -#define MBI_MEMMAP (1u<< 6) -#define MBI_DRIVES (1u<< 7) -#define MBI_BIOSCONFIG (1u<< 8) -#define MBI_LOADERNAME (1u<< 9) -#define MBI_APM (1u<<10) +#define MBI_MEMLIMITS (_AC(1,u) << 0) +#define MBI_BOOTDEV (_AC(1,u) << 1) +#define MBI_CMDLINE (_AC(1,u) << 2) +#define MBI_MODULES (_AC(1,u) << 3) +#define MBI_AOUT_SYMS (_AC(1,u) << 4) +#define MBI_ELF_SYMS (_AC(1,u) << 5) +#define MBI_MEMMAP (_AC(1,u) << 6) +#define MBI_DRIVES (_AC(1,u) << 7) +#define MBI_BIOSCONFIG (_AC(1,u) << 8) +#define MBI_LOADERNAME (_AC(1,u) << 9) +#define MBI_APM (_AC(1,u) << 10) #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ ++++++ 26532-AMD-IOMMU-phantom-MSI.patch ++++++ References: bnc#787169 # HG changeset patch # User Jan Beulich # Date 1360831377 -3600 # Node ID 788f4551580d476e13ea907e373e58806a32179e # Parent e68f14b9e73925e9d404e517ba510f73fe472e4e AMD IOMMU: handle MSI for phantom functions With ordinary requests allowed to come from phantom functions, the remapping tables ought to be set up to also allow for MSI triggers to come from other than the "real" device too. It is not clear to me whether the alias-ID handling also needs adjustment for this to work properly, or whether firmware can be expected to properly express this through a device alias range descriptor (or multiple device alias ones). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Ian Campbell --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c @@ -284,33 +284,32 @@ void amd_iommu_ioapic_update_ire( } static void update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg( - struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct pci_dev *pdev, - struct msi_desc *msi_desc, struct msi_msg *msg) + struct amd_iommu *iommu, u16 bdf, + int *remap_index, const struct msi_msg *msg) { unsigned long flags; u32* entry; - u16 bdf, req_id, alias_id; + u16 req_id, alias_id; u8 delivery_mode, dest, vector, dest_mode; spinlock_t *lock; int offset; - bdf = (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn; - req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf); - alias_id = get_intremap_requestor_id(pdev->seg, bdf); + req_id = get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf); + alias_id = get_intremap_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf); if ( msg == NULL ) { lock = get_intremap_lock(iommu->seg, req_id); spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags); - free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, req_id, msi_desc->remap_index); + free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, req_id, *remap_index); spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags); if ( ( req_id != alias_id ) && - get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL ) + get_ivrs_mappings(iommu->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL ) { lock = get_intremap_lock(iommu->seg, alias_id); spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags); - free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, alias_id, msi_desc->remap_index); + free_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, alias_id, *remap_index); spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags); } goto done; @@ -324,7 +323,10 @@ static void update_intremap_entry_from_m vector = (msg->data >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK; dest = (msg->address_lo >> MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_SHIFT) & 0xff; offset = get_intremap_offset(vector, delivery_mode); - msi_desc->remap_index = offset; + if ( *remap_index < 0) + *remap_index = offset; + else + BUG_ON(*remap_index != offset); entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, req_id, offset); update_intremap_entry(entry, vector, delivery_mode, dest_mode, dest); @@ -339,7 +341,7 @@ static void update_intremap_entry_from_m lock = get_intremap_lock(iommu->seg, alias_id); if ( ( req_id != alias_id ) && - get_ivrs_mappings(pdev->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL ) + get_ivrs_mappings(iommu->seg)[alias_id].intremap_table != NULL ) { spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags); entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(iommu->seg, alias_id, offset); @@ -362,27 +364,44 @@ void amd_iommu_msi_msg_update_ire( struct msi_desc *msi_desc, struct msi_msg *msg) { struct pci_dev *pdev = msi_desc->dev; + int bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn); struct amd_iommu *iommu = NULL; if ( !iommu_intremap ) return; - iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn); - + iommu = find_iommu_for_device(pdev->seg, bdf); if ( !iommu ) { - AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu for MSI device id = 0x%x\n", - (pdev->bus << 8) | pdev->devfn); + AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu for MSI device id = 0x%x\n", bdf); return; } if ( msi_desc->remap_index >= 0 ) - update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, pdev, msi_desc, NULL); + { + do { + update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, bdf, + &msi_desc->remap_index, NULL); + if ( !pdev || !pdev->phantom_stride ) + break; + bdf += pdev->phantom_stride; + } while ( PCI_SLOT(bdf) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ); + + msi_desc->remap_index = -1; + if ( pdev ) + bdf = PCI_BDF2(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn); + } if ( !msg ) return; - update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, pdev, msi_desc, msg); + do { + update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(iommu, bdf, &msi_desc->remap_index, + msg); + if ( !pdev || !pdev->phantom_stride ) + break; + bdf += pdev->phantom_stride; + } while ( PCI_SLOT(bdf) == PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) ); } void amd_iommu_read_msi_from_ire( ++++++ 26547-tools-xc_fix_logic_error_in_stdiostream_progress.patch ++++++ changeset: 26547:8285d20a6f5b user: Olaf Hering date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000 files: tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c description: tools/xc: fix logic error in stdiostream_progress Setting XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS should disable progress reporting. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 0141aeb86b79 -r 8285d20a6f5b tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c --- a/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:10 2013 +0000 +++ b/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000 @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static void stdiostream_progress(struct int newpel, extra_erase; xentoollog_level this_level; - if (!(lg->flags & XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS)) + if (lg->flags & XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS) return; if (percent < lg->progress_last_percent) { ++++++ 26548-tools-xc_handle_tty_output_differently_in_stdiostream_progress.patch ++++++ changeset: 26548:e7d9bac5c11d user: Olaf Hering date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000 files: tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c description: tools/xc: handle tty output differently in stdiostream_progress If the output goes to a tty, rewind the cursor and print everything in a single line as it was done up to now. If the output goes to a file or pipe print a newline after each progress output. This will fix logging of progress messages from xc_save to xend.log. To support XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID or XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_DATE print the output via vmessage if the output is not a tty. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r 8285d20a6f5b -r e7d9bac5c11d tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c --- a/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000 +++ b/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000 @@ -81,6 +81,17 @@ static void stdiostream_vmessage(xentool fflush(lg->f); } +static void stdiostream_message(struct xentoollog_logger *logger_in, + xentoollog_level level, + const char *context, + const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list al; + va_start(al,format); + stdiostream_vmessage(logger_in, level, -1, context, format, al); + va_end(al); +} + static void stdiostream_progress(struct xentoollog_logger *logger_in, const char *context, const char *doing_what, int percent, @@ -105,11 +116,18 @@ static void stdiostream_progress(struct if (this_level < lg->min_level) return; + lg->progress_last_percent = percent; + + if (isatty(fileno(lg->f)) <= 0) { + stdiostream_message(logger_in, this_level, context, + "%s: %lu/%lu %3d%%", + doing_what, done, total, percent); + return; + } + if (lg->progress_erase_len) putc('\r', lg->f); - lg->progress_last_percent = percent; - newpel = fprintf(lg->f, "%s%s" "%s: %lu/%lu %3d%%%s", context?context:"", context?": ":"", doing_what, done, total, percent, ++++++ 26549-tools-xc_turn_XCFLAGS__into_shifts.patch ++++++ changeset: 26549:d2991367ecd2 user: Olaf Hering date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:12 2013 +0000 files: tools/libxc/xenguest.h description: tools/xc: turn XCFLAGS_* into shifts to make it clear that these are bits and to make it easier to use in xend code. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r e7d9bac5c11d -r d2991367ecd2 tools/libxc/xenguest.h --- a/tools/libxc/xenguest.h Fri Feb 15 13:32:11 2013 +0000 +++ b/tools/libxc/xenguest.h Fri Feb 15 13:32:12 2013 +0000 @@ -23,11 +23,12 @@ #ifndef XENGUEST_H #define XENGUEST_H -#define XCFLAGS_LIVE 1 -#define XCFLAGS_DEBUG 2 -#define XCFLAGS_HVM 4 -#define XCFLAGS_STDVGA 8 -#define XCFLAGS_CHECKPOINT_COMPRESS 16 +#define XCFLAGS_LIVE (1 << 0) +#define XCFLAGS_DEBUG (1 << 1) +#define XCFLAGS_HVM (1 << 2) +#define XCFLAGS_STDVGA (1 << 3) +#define XCFLAGS_CHECKPOINT_COMPRESS (1 << 4) + #define X86_64_B_SIZE 64 #define X86_32_B_SIZE 32 ++++++ 26550-tools-xc_restore_logging_in_xc_save.patch ++++++ changeset: 26550:e6c373fcb73e user: Olaf Hering date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:13 2013 +0000 files: tools/xcutils/xc_save.c description: tools/xc: restore logging in xc_save Prior to xen-4.1 the helper xc_save would print some progress during migration. With the new xc_interface_open API no more messages were printed because no logger was configured. Restore previous behaviour by providing a logger. The progress in xc_domain_save will be disabled because it generates alot of output and fills up xend.log quickly. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell diff -r d2991367ecd2 -r e6c373fcb73e tools/xcutils/xc_save.c --- a/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:12 2013 +0000 +++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c Fri Feb 15 13:32:13 2013 +0000 @@ -166,17 +166,15 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi int main(int argc, char **argv) { - unsigned int maxit, max_f; + unsigned int maxit, max_f, lflags; int io_fd, ret, port; struct save_callbacks callbacks; + xentoollog_level lvl; + xentoollog_logger *l; if (argc != 6) errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid maxit maxf flags", argv[0]); - si.xch = xc_interface_open(0,0,0); - if (!si.xch) - errx(1, "failed to open control interface"); - io_fd = atoi(argv[1]); si.domid = atoi(argv[2]); maxit = atoi(argv[3]); @@ -185,6 +183,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) si.suspend_evtchn = -1; + lvl = si.flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG ? XTL_DEBUG: XTL_DETAIL; + lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; + l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags); + si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0); + if (!si.xch) + errx(1, "failed to open control interface"); + si.xce = xc_evtchn_open(NULL, 0); if (si.xce == NULL) warnx("failed to open event channel handle"); ++++++ 26551-tools-xc_log_pid_in_xc_save-xc_restore_output.patch ++++++ changeset: 26551:48f9436959dd user: Olaf Hering date: Fri Feb 15 13:32:13 2013 +0000 files: tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c tools/xcutils/xc_save.c description: tools/xc: log pid in xc_save/xc_restore output If several migrations log their output to xend.log its not clear which line belongs to a which guest. Print entry/exit of xc_save and xc_restore and also request to print pid with each log call. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c @@ -1387,6 +1387,8 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, struct restore_ctx *ctx = &_ctx; struct domain_info_context *dinfo = &ctx->dinfo; + DPRINTF("%s: starting restore of new domid %u", __func__, dom); + pagebuf_init(&pagebuf); memset(&tailbuf, 0, sizeof(tailbuf)); tailbuf.ishvm = hvm; @@ -1413,7 +1415,7 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, PERROR("read: p2m_size"); goto out; } - DPRINTF("xc_domain_restore start: p2m_size = %lx\n", dinfo->p2m_size); + DPRINTF("%s: p2m_size = %lx\n", __func__, dinfo->p2m_size); if ( !get_platform_info(xch, dom, &ctx->max_mfn, &ctx->hvirt_start, &ctx->pt_levels, &dinfo->guest_width) ) @@ -2247,7 +2249,7 @@ int xc_domain_restore(xc_interface *xch, fcntl(io_fd, F_SETFL, orig_io_fd_flags); - DPRINTF("Restore exit with rc=%d\n", rc); + DPRINTF("Restore exit of domid %u with rc=%d\n", dom, rc); return rc; } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c @@ -897,6 +897,8 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in int completed = 0; + DPRINTF("%s: starting save of domid %u", __func__, dom); + if ( hvm && !callbacks->switch_qemu_logdirty ) { ERROR("No switch_qemu_logdirty callback provided."); @@ -2112,7 +2114,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in free(pfn_err); free(to_fix); - DPRINTF("Save exit rc=%d\n",rc); + DPRINTF("Save exit of domid %u with rc=%d\n", dom, rc); return !!rc; } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c @@ -19,17 +19,22 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned int domid, store_evtchn, console_evtchn; - unsigned int hvm, pae, apic; + unsigned int hvm, pae, apic, lflags; xc_interface *xch; int io_fd, ret; int superpages; unsigned long store_mfn = 0, console_mfn = 0; + xentoollog_level lvl; + xentoollog_logger *l; if ( (argc != 8) && (argc != 9) ) errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid store_evtchn " "console_evtchn hvm pae apic [superpages]", argv[0]); - xch = xc_interface_open(0,0,0); + lvl = XTL_DETAIL; + lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID | XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; + l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags); + xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0); if ( !xch ) errx(1, "failed to open control interface"); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) si.suspend_evtchn = -1; lvl = si.flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG ? XTL_DEBUG: XTL_DETAIL; - lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; + lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID | XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags); si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0); if (!si.xch) ++++++ 26554-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Ross Philipson # Date 1360935136 0 # Node ID 3124ab7855fd7d4e0f3ea125cb21b60d693e8800 # Parent 71c15ae0998378b5c117bbd27a48015757685706 libxl: switch to using the new xc_hvm_build() libxc API. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c @@ -546,17 +546,24 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint libxl__domain_build_state *state) { libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); + struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {}; int ret, rc = ERROR_FAIL; const char *firmware = libxl__domain_firmware(gc, info); if (!firmware) goto out; - ret = xc_hvm_build_target_mem( - ctx->xch, - domid, - (info->max_memkb - info->video_memkb) / 1024, - (info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb) / 1024, - firmware); + + memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args)); + /* The params from the configuration file are in Mb, which are then + * multiplied by 1 Kb. This was then divided off when calling + * the old xc_hvm_build_target_mem() which then turned them to bytes. + * Do all this in one step here... + */ + args.mem_size = (uint64_t)(info->max_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10; + args.mem_target = (uint64_t)(info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10; + args.image_file_name = firmware; + + ret = xc_hvm_build(ctx->xch, domid, &args); if (ret) { LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm building failed"); goto out; ++++++ 26555-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Ross Philipson # Date 1360935136 0 # Node ID 17a228e37ec0913ff86b8b5f2d88f1b8e92146f1 # Parent 3124ab7855fd7d4e0f3ea125cb21b60d693e8800 libxl: HVM firmware passthrough support This patch introduces support for two new parameters in libxl: smbios_firmware= acpi_firmware= The changes are primarily in the domain building code where the firmware files are read and passed to libxc for loading into the new guest. After the domain building call to libxc, the addresses for the loaded blobs are returned and written to xenstore. LIBXL_HAVE_FIRMWARE_PASSTHROUGH is defined in libxl.h to allow users to determine if the feature is present. This patch also updates the xl.cfg man page with descriptions of the two new parameters for firmware passthrough. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/man/xl.cfg.pod.5 @@ -637,6 +637,25 @@ of Xen) within a Xen guest or to support which uses hardware virtualisation extensions (e.g. Windows XP compatibility mode on more modern Windows OS). +=item B + +Specify a path to a file that contains extra ACPI firmware tables to pass in to +a guest. The file can contain several tables in their binary AML form +concatenated together. Each table self describes its length so no additional +information is needed. These tables will be added to the ACPI table set in the +guest. Note that existing tables cannot be overridden by this feature. For +example this cannot be used to override tables like DSDT, FADT, etc. + +=item B + +Specify a path to a file that contains extra SMBIOS firmware structures to pass +in to a guest. The file can contain a set DMTF predefined structures which will +override the internal defaults. Not all predefined structures can be overridden, +only the following types: 0, 1, 2, 3, 11, 22, 39. The file can also contain any +number of vendor defined SMBIOS structures (type 128 - 255). Since SMBIOS +structures do not present their overall size, each entry in the file must be +preceded by a 32b integer indicating the size of the next structure. + =back =head3 Guest Virtual Time Controls Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.h +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.h @@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ */ /* + * LIBXL_HAVE_FIRMWARE_PASSTHROUGH indicates the feature for + * passing in SMBIOS and ACPI firmware to HVM guests is present + * in the library. + */ +#define LIBXL_HAVE_FIRMWARE_PASSTHROUGH 1 + +/* * libxl ABI compatibility * * The only guarantee which libxl makes regarding ABI compatibility Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include +#include libxl_domain_type libxl__domain_type(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid) { @@ -514,11 +515,61 @@ static int hvm_build_set_params(xc_inter return 0; } -static const char *libxl__domain_firmware(libxl__gc *gc, - libxl_domain_build_info *info) +static int hvm_build_set_xs_values(libxl__gc *gc, + uint32_t domid, + struct xc_hvm_build_args *args) +{ + char *path = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out) { + path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_ADDRESS, domid); + + ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%"PRIx64, + args->smbios_module.guest_addr_out); + if (ret) + goto err; + + path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_SMBIOS_PT_LENGTH, domid); + + ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%x", + args->smbios_module.length); + if (ret) + goto err; + } + + if (args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out) { + path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_ADDRESS, domid); + + ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%"PRIx64, + args->acpi_module.guest_addr_out); + if (ret) + goto err; + + path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/%d/"HVM_XS_ACPI_PT_LENGTH, domid); + + ret = libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "0x%x", + args->acpi_module.length); + if (ret) + goto err; + } + + return 0; + +err: + LOG(ERROR, "failed to write firmware xenstore value, err: %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +static int libxl__domain_firmware(libxl__gc *gc, + libxl_domain_build_info *info, + struct xc_hvm_build_args *args) { libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); const char *firmware; + int e, rc = ERROR_FAIL; + int datalen = 0; + void *data; if (info->u.hvm.firmware) firmware = info->u.hvm.firmware; @@ -532,13 +583,52 @@ static const char *libxl__domain_firmwar firmware = "hvmloader"; break; default: - LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "invalid device model version %d", - info->device_model_version); - return NULL; + LOG(ERROR, "invalid device model version %d", + info->device_model_version); + return ERROR_FAIL; break; } } - return libxl__abs_path(gc, firmware, libxl__xenfirmwaredir_path()); + args->image_file_name = libxl__abs_path(gc, firmware, + libxl__xenfirmwaredir_path()); + + if (info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware) { + data = NULL; + e = libxl_read_file_contents(ctx, info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware, + &data, &datalen); + if (e) { + LOGEV(ERROR, e, "failed to read SMBIOS firmware file %s", + info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware); + goto out; + } + libxl__ptr_add(gc, data); + if (datalen) { + /* Only accept non-empty files */ + args->smbios_module.data = data; + args->smbios_module.length = (uint32_t)datalen; + } + } + + if (info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware) { + data = NULL; + e = libxl_read_file_contents(ctx, info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware, + &data, &datalen); + if (e) { + LOGEV(ERROR, e, "failed to read ACPI firmware file %s", + info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware); + goto out; + } + libxl__ptr_add(gc, data); + if (datalen) { + /* Only accept non-empty files */ + args->acpi_module.data = data; + args->acpi_module.length = (uint32_t)datalen; + } + } + + return 0; +out: + return rc; } int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, @@ -548,10 +638,6 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); struct xc_hvm_build_args args = {}; int ret, rc = ERROR_FAIL; - const char *firmware = libxl__domain_firmware(gc, info); - - if (!firmware) - goto out; memset(&args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args)); /* The params from the configuration file are in Mb, which are then @@ -561,22 +647,34 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint */ args.mem_size = (uint64_t)(info->max_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10; args.mem_target = (uint64_t)(info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb) << 10; - args.image_file_name = firmware; + + if (libxl__domain_firmware(gc, info, &args)) { + LOG(ERROR, "initializing domain firmware failed"); + goto out; + } ret = xc_hvm_build(ctx->xch, domid, &args); if (ret) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm building failed"); + LOGEV(ERROR, ret, "hvm building failed"); goto out; } + ret = hvm_build_set_params(ctx->xch, domid, info, state->store_port, &state->store_mfn, state->console_port, &state->console_mfn, state->store_domid, state->console_domid); if (ret) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm build set params failed"); + LOGEV(ERROR, ret, "hvm build set params failed"); goto out; } - rc = 0; + + ret = hvm_build_set_xs_values(gc, domid, &args); + if (ret) { + LOG(ERROR, "hvm build set xenstore values failed (ret=%d)", ret); + goto out; + } + + return 0; out: return rc; } @@ -638,7 +736,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do memcpy(&count, ptr, sizeof(count)); ptr += sizeof(count); - + if (size < sizeof(version) + sizeof(count) + count * (sizeof(struct libxl__physmap_info))) { LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong size"); @@ -852,7 +950,7 @@ static void switch_logdirty_xswatch(libx rc = libxl__xs_rm_checked(gc, t, lds->ret_path); if (rc) goto out; - rc = libxl__xs_transaction_commit(gc, &t); + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_commit(gc, &t); if (!rc) break; if (rc<0) goto out; } @@ -1324,7 +1422,7 @@ void libxl__xc_domain_save_done(libxl__e if (type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM) { rc = libxl__domain_suspend_device_model(gc, dss); if (rc) goto out; - + libxl__domain_save_device_model(egc, dss, domain_suspend_done); return; } Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl @@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain ("vpt_align", libxl_defbool), ("timer_mode", libxl_timer_mode), ("nested_hvm", libxl_defbool), + ("smbios_firmware", string), + ("acpi_firmware", string), ("nographic", libxl_defbool), ("vga", libxl_vga_interface_info), ("vnc", libxl_vnc_info), Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c @@ -863,6 +863,11 @@ static void parse_config_data(const char } xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "nestedhvm", &b_info->u.hvm.nested_hvm, 0); + + xlu_cfg_replace_string(config, "smbios_firmware", + &b_info->u.hvm.smbios_firmware, 0); + xlu_cfg_replace_string(config, "acpi_firmware", + &b_info->u.hvm.acpi_firmware, 0); break; case LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_PV: { ++++++ 26556-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Ross Philipson # Date 1360935137 0 # Node ID 6a9549a15108669408123e5e39f52ad09dea1c10 # Parent 17a228e37ec0913ff86b8b5f2d88f1b8e92146f1 libxl: Cleanup, use LOG* and GCSPRINTF macro in libxl_dom.c Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Acked-by: Ian Campbell Committed-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c @@ -32,8 +32,7 @@ libxl_domain_type libxl__domain_type(lib ret = xc_domain_getinfolist(ctx->xch, domid, 1, &info); if (ret != 1 || info.domain != domid) { - LIBXL__LOG(CTX, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, - "unable to get domain type for domid=%"PRIu32, domid); + LOG(ERROR, "unable to get domain type for domid=%"PRIu32, domid); return LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_INVALID; } if (info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest) @@ -317,20 +316,19 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin ents = libxl__calloc(gc, 12 + (info->max_vcpus * 2) + 2, sizeof(char *)); ents[0] = "memory/static-max"; - ents[1] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRId64, info->max_memkb); + ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->max_memkb); ents[2] = "memory/target"; - ents[3] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRId64, - info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb); + ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb); ents[4] = "memory/videoram"; - ents[5] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRId64, info->video_memkb); + ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->video_memkb); ents[6] = "domid"; - ents[7] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%d", domid); + ents[7] = GCSPRINTF("%d", domid); ents[8] = "store/port"; - ents[9] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%"PRIu32, state->store_port); + ents[9] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRIu32, state->store_port); ents[10] = "store/ring-ref"; - ents[11] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%lu", state->store_mfn); + ents[11] = GCSPRINTF("%lu", state->store_mfn); for (i = 0; i < info->max_vcpus; i++) { - ents[12+(i*2)] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "cpu/%d/availability", i); + ents[12+(i*2)] = GCSPRINTF("cpu/%d/availability", i); ents[12+(i*2)+1] = libxl_bitmap_test(&info->avail_vcpus, i) ? "online" : "offline"; } @@ -339,7 +337,7 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin if (info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM) { hvm_ents = libxl__calloc(gc, 3, sizeof(char *)); hvm_ents[0] = "hvmloader/generation-id-address"; - hvm_ents[1] = libxl__sprintf(gc, "0x%lx", state->vm_generationid_addr); + hvm_ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("0x%lx", state->vm_generationid_addr); } dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid); @@ -347,7 +345,7 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uin return ERROR_FAIL; } - vm_path = xs_read(ctx->xsh, XBT_NULL, libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/vm", dom_path), NULL); + vm_path = xs_read(ctx->xsh, XBT_NULL, GCSPRINTF("%s/vm", dom_path), NULL); retry_transaction: t = xs_transaction_start(ctx->xsh); @@ -378,7 +376,7 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3 dom = xc_dom_allocate(ctx->xch, state->pv_cmdline, info->u.pv.features); if (!dom) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_allocate failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_allocate failed"); return ERROR_FAIL; } @@ -388,13 +386,13 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3 state->pv_kernel.data, state->pv_kernel.size); if ( ret != 0) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_mem failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_mem failed"); goto out; } } else { ret = xc_dom_kernel_file(dom, state->pv_kernel.path); if ( ret != 0) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_file failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_kernel_file failed"); goto out; } } @@ -402,12 +400,12 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3 if ( state->pv_ramdisk.path && strlen(state->pv_ramdisk.path) ) { if (state->pv_ramdisk.mapped) { if ( (ret = xc_dom_ramdisk_mem(dom, state->pv_ramdisk.data, state->pv_ramdisk.size)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_mem failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_mem failed"); goto out; } } else { if ( (ret = xc_dom_ramdisk_file(dom, state->pv_ramdisk.path)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_file failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_ramdisk_file failed"); goto out; } } @@ -420,31 +418,31 @@ int libxl__build_pv(libxl__gc *gc, uint3 dom->xenstore_domid = state->store_domid; if ( (ret = xc_dom_boot_xen_init(dom, ctx->xch, domid)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_xen_init failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_xen_init failed"); goto out; } if ( (ret = xc_dom_parse_image(dom)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_parse_image failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_parse_image failed"); goto out; } if ( (ret = xc_dom_mem_init(dom, info->target_memkb / 1024)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_mem_init failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_mem_init failed"); goto out; } if ( (ret = xc_dom_boot_mem_init(dom)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_mem_init failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_mem_init failed"); goto out; } if ( (ret = xc_dom_build_image(dom)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_build_image failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_build_image failed"); goto out; } if ( (ret = xc_dom_boot_image(dom)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_image failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_boot_image failed"); goto out; } if ( (ret = xc_dom_gnttab_init(dom)) != 0 ) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "xc_dom_gnttab_init failed"); + LOGE(ERROR, "xc_dom_gnttab_init failed"); goto out; } @@ -683,8 +681,7 @@ int libxl__qemu_traditional_cmd(libxl__g const char *cmd) { char *path = NULL; - path = libxl__sprintf(gc, "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/command", - domid); + path = GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/command", domid); return libxl__xs_write(gc, XBT_NULL, path, "%s", cmd); } @@ -701,8 +698,7 @@ struct libxl__physmap_info { static inline char *restore_helper(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, uint64_t phys_offset, char *node) { - return libxl__sprintf(gc, - "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%"PRIx64"/%s", + return GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%"PRIx64"/%s", domid, phys_offset, node); } @@ -712,7 +708,6 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do libxl__save_helper_state *shs = user; libxl__domain_create_state *dcs = CONTAINER_OF(shs, *dcs, shs); STATE_AO_GC(dcs->ao); - libxl_ctx *ctx = CTX; int i, ret; const uint8_t *ptr = buf; uint32_t count = 0, version = 0; @@ -722,7 +717,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do LOG(DEBUG,"domain=%"PRIu32" toolstack data size=%"PRIu32, domid, size); if (size < sizeof(version) + sizeof(count)) { - LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong size"); + LOG(ERROR, "wrong size"); return -1; } @@ -730,7 +725,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do ptr += sizeof(version); if (version != TOOLSTACK_SAVE_VERSION) { - LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong version"); + LOG(ERROR, "wrong version"); return -1; } @@ -739,7 +734,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_restore(uint32_t do if (size < sizeof(version) + sizeof(count) + count * (sizeof(struct libxl__physmap_info))) { - LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "wrong size"); + LOG(ERROR, "wrong size"); return -1; } @@ -988,15 +983,13 @@ static void switch_logdirty_done(libxl__ int libxl__domain_suspend_device_model(libxl__gc *gc, libxl__domain_suspend_state *dss) { - libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); int ret = 0; uint32_t const domid = dss->domid; const char *const filename = dss->dm_savefile; switch (libxl__device_model_version_running(gc, domid)) { case LIBXL_DEVICE_MODEL_VERSION_QEMU_XEN_TRADITIONAL: { - LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_DEBUG, - "Saving device model state to %s", filename); + LOG(DEBUG, "Saving device model state to %s", filename); libxl__qemu_traditional_cmd(gc, domid, "save"); libxl__wait_for_device_model(gc, domid, "paused", NULL, NULL, NULL); break; @@ -1172,8 +1165,7 @@ int libxl__domain_suspend_common_callbac static inline char *physmap_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, char *phys_offset, char *node) { - return libxl__sprintf(gc, - "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%s/%s", + return GCSPRINTF("/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap/%s/%s", domid, phys_offset, node); } @@ -1190,7 +1182,7 @@ int libxl__toolstack_save(uint32_t domid char **entries = NULL; struct libxl__physmap_info *pi; - entries = libxl__xs_directory(gc, 0, libxl__sprintf(gc, + entries = libxl__xs_directory(gc, 0, GCSPRINTF( "/local/domain/0/device-model/%d/physmap", domid), &num); count = num; @@ -1331,7 +1323,7 @@ void libxl__domain_suspend(libxl__egc *e char *path; char *addr; - path = libxl__sprintf(gc, "%s/hvmloader/generation-id-address", + path = GCSPRINTF("%s/hvmloader/generation-id-address", libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid)); addr = libxl__xs_read(gc, XBT_NULL, path); @@ -1545,10 +1537,7 @@ static void domain_suspend_done(libxl__e char *libxl__uuid2string(libxl__gc *gc, const libxl_uuid uuid) { - char *s = libxl__sprintf(gc, LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(uuid)); - if (!s) - LIBXL__LOG(libxl__gc_owner(gc), LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "cannot allocate for uuid"); - return s; + return GCSPRINTF(LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(uuid)); } static const char *userdata_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, @@ -1556,34 +1545,27 @@ static const char *userdata_path(libxl__ const char *wh) { libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); - char *path, *uuid_string; + char *uuid_string; libxl_dominfo info; int rc; rc = libxl_domain_info(ctx, &info, domid); if (rc) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "unable to find domain info" - " for domain %"PRIu32, domid); + LOGE(ERROR, "unable to find domain info for domain %"PRIu32, domid); return NULL; } - uuid_string = libxl__sprintf(gc, LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(info.uuid)); + uuid_string = GCSPRINTF(LIBXL_UUID_FMT, LIBXL_UUID_BYTES(info.uuid)); - path = libxl__sprintf(gc, "/var/lib/xen/" - "userdata-%s.%u.%s.%s", - wh, domid, uuid_string, userdata_userid); - if (!path) - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "unable to allocate for" - " userdata path"); - return path; + return GCSPRINTF("/var/lib/xen/userdata-%s.%u.%s.%s", + wh, domid, uuid_string, userdata_userid); } static int userdata_delete(libxl__gc *gc, const char *path) { - libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); int r; r = unlink(path); if (r) { - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "remove failed for %s", path); + LOGE(ERROR, "remove failed for %s", path); return errno; } return 0; @@ -1591,7 +1573,6 @@ static int userdata_delete(libxl__gc *gc void libxl__userdata_destroyall(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid) { - libxl_ctx *ctx = libxl__gc_owner(gc); const char *pattern; glob_t gl; int r, i; @@ -1607,7 +1588,7 @@ void libxl__userdata_destroyall(libxl__g if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) goto out; if (r) - LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "glob failed for %s", pattern); + LOGE(ERROR, "glob failed for %s", pattern); for (i=0; i # Date 1361176078 -3600 # Node ID 4c3355d776e115f979fd2abc135bb77ba710f0d4 # Parent 217a4fc4cd46e8de06f2f43eed727838891e9398 x86/VMX: fix live migration while enabling APICV SVI should be restored in case guest is processing virtual interrupt while saveing a domain state. Otherwise SVI would be missed when virtual interrupt delivery is enabled. Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li Acked-by: Eddie Dong Acked-by: Jun Nakajima Committed-by: Jan Beulich Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -1215,6 +1215,9 @@ static int lapic_load_regs(struct domain if ( hvm_load_entry(LAPIC_REGS, h, s->regs) != 0 ) return -EINVAL; + if ( hvm_funcs.process_isr ) + hvm_funcs.process_isr(vlapic_find_highest_isr(s), v); + vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(d); lapic_rearm(s); return 0; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c @@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) vmx_set_eoi_exit_bitmap(v, pt_vector); /* we need update the RVI field */ - status &= ~(unsigned long)0x0FF; - status |= (unsigned long)0x0FF & + status &= ~VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK; + status |= VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK & intack.vector; __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); if (v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed) { Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1588,6 +1588,29 @@ static int vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_ena return cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery; } +static void vmx_process_isr(int isr, struct vcpu *v) +{ + unsigned long status; + u8 old; + + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + return; + + if ( isr < 0 ) + isr = 0; + + vmx_vmcs_enter(v); + status = __vmread(GUEST_INTR_STATUS); + old = status >> VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET; + if ( isr != old ) + { + status &= VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK; + status |= isr << VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET; + __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); + } + vmx_vmcs_exit(v); +} + static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = { .name = "VMX", .cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare, @@ -1636,7 +1659,8 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_ .nhvm_intr_blocked = nvmx_intr_blocked, .nhvm_domain_relinquish_resources = nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources, .update_eoi_exit_bitmap = vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap, - .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled + .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled, + .process_isr = vmx_process_isr, }; struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table { /* Virtual interrupt delivery */ void (*update_eoi_exit_bitmap)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig); int (*virtual_intr_delivery_enabled)(void); + void (*process_isr)(int isr, struct vcpu *v); }; extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -247,6 +247,10 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_SMI 0x00000004 #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_NMI 0x00000008 +/* Guest interrupt status */ +#define VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK 0x0FF +#define VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET 8 + /* VMCS field encodings. */ enum vmcs_field { VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID = 0x00000000, ++++++ 26577-x86-APICV-x2APIC.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313605 # HG changeset patch # User Jiongxi Li # Date 1361176458 -3600 # Node ID 45d59b822ed187c535b127679e32853b148ed411 # Parent 4c3355d776e115f979fd2abc135bb77ba710f0d4 x86/VMX: fix VMCS setting for x2APIC mode guest while enabling APICV The "APIC-register virtualization" and "virtual-interrupt deliver" VM-execution control has no effect on the behavior of RDMSR/WRMSR if the "virtualize x2APIC mode" VM-execution control is 0. When guest uses x2APIC mode, we should enable "virtualize x2APIC mode" for APICV first. Signed-off-by: Jiongxi Li Acked-by: Eddie Dong Acked-by: Jun Nakajima Committed-by: Jan Beulich --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -194,7 +194,8 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) */ if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW ) opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY; + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE; _vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls( @@ -682,19 +683,59 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struc */ if ( msr <= 0x1fff ) { - if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */ - if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */ + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R ) + clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */ + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W ) + clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */ } else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) ) { msr &= 0x1fff; - if (type & MSR_TYPE_R) - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */ - if (type & MSR_TYPE_W) - __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */ + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R ) + clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */ + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W ) + clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */ } + else + HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_0, + "msr %x is out of the control range" + "0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff" + "RDMSR or WRMSR will cause a VM exit", msr); +} + +void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap; + + /* VMX MSR bitmap supported? */ + if ( msr_bitmap == NULL ) + return; + + /* + * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals + * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round. + * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff. + */ + if ( msr <= 0x1fff ) + { + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R ) + set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-low */ + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W ) + set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-low */ + } + else if ( (msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff) ) + { + msr &= 0x1fff; + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_R ) + set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* read-high */ + if ( type & MSR_TYPE_W ) + set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00/BYTES_PER_LONG); /* write-high */ + } + else + HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_0, + "msr %x is out of the control range" + "0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff" + "RDMSR or WRMSR will cause a VM exit", msr); } /* @@ -760,6 +801,10 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v vmentry_ctl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT; } + /* Disable Virtualize x2APIC mode by default. */ + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE; + /* Do not enable Monitor Trap Flag unless start single step debug */ v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG; @@ -797,18 +842,6 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); if ( paging_mode_hap(d) && (!iommu_enabled || iommu_snoop) ) vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); - if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) - { - int msr; - for (msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++) - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R); - } - if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) - { - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W); - vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR, MSR_TYPE_W); - } } /* I/O access bitmap. */ --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2081,18 +2081,63 @@ static void vmx_install_vlapic_mapping(s void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v) { + int virtualize_x2apic_mode; struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); - if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses ) + virtualize_x2apic_mode = ( (cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt || + cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery) && + cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode ); + + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses && + !virtualize_x2apic_mode ) return; vmx_vmcs_enter(v); v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= - ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE); if ( !vlapic_hw_disabled(vlapic) && (vlapic_base_address(vlapic) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE) ) - v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |= - SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + { + unsigned int msr; + + if ( virtualize_x2apic_mode && vlapic_x2apic_mode(vlapic) ) + { + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |= + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE; + if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) + { + for ( msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; + msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++ ) + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, MSR_TYPE_R); + + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICPPR_MSR, + MSR_TYPE_R); + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTMICT_MSR, + MSR_TYPE_R); + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTMCCT_MSR, + MSR_TYPE_R); + } + if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + { + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR, + MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR, + MSR_TYPE_W); + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR, + MSR_TYPE_W); + } + } + else + { + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |= + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + for ( msr = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR; + msr <= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR + 0xff; msr++ ) + vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr, + MSR_TYPE_R | MSR_TYPE_W); + } + } vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(v); vmx_vmcs_exit(v); } --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control; #define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES 0x00000001 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT 0x00000002 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP 0x00000008 +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE 0x00000010 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID 0x00000020 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING 0x00000040 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST 0x00000080 @@ -240,6 +241,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT) #define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) +#define cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode \ + (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE) /* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */ #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001 @@ -415,6 +418,7 @@ enum vmcs_field { #define MSR_TYPE_R 1 #define MSR_TYPE_W 2 void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type); +void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type); int vmx_read_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 *val); int vmx_write_guest_msr(u32 msr, u64 val); int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr); --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -296,7 +296,10 @@ #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12) #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_MSR 0x800 #define MSR_IA32_APICTPR_MSR 0x808 +#define MSR_IA32_APICPPR_MSR 0x80a #define MSR_IA32_APICEOI_MSR 0x80b +#define MSR_IA32_APICTMICT_MSR 0x838 +#define MSR_IA32_APICTMCCT_MSR 0x839 #define MSR_IA32_APICSELF_MSR 0x83f #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079 ++++++ 26675-tools-xentoollog_update_tty_detection_in_stdiostream_progress.patch ++++++ changeset: 26675:3eb62c576a1a user: Olaf Hering date: Wed Feb 27 14:16:36 2013 +0000 files: tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c description: tools/xentoollog: update tty detection in stdiostream_progress As suggested by IanJ: Check isatty only once to preserve the errno of ->progress users, and to reduce the noice in strace output. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering Acked-by: Ian Jackson diff -r 4b25c1e6cfbb -r 3eb62c576a1a tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c --- a/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Wed Feb 27 11:16:47 2013 +0000 +++ b/tools/libxc/xtl_logger_stdio.c Wed Feb 27 14:16:36 2013 +0000 @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct xentoollog_logger_stdiostream { xentoollog_level min_level; unsigned flags; int progress_erase_len, progress_last_percent; + int tty; }; static void progress_erase(xentoollog_logger_stdiostream *lg) { @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ static void stdiostream_progress(struct lg->progress_last_percent = percent; - if (isatty(fileno(lg->f)) <= 0) { + if (!lg->tty) { stdiostream_message(logger_in, this_level, context, "%s: %lu/%lu %3d%%", doing_what, done, total, percent); @@ -166,6 +167,7 @@ xentoollog_logger_stdiostream *xtl_creat newlogger.f = f; newlogger.min_level = min_level; newlogger.flags = flags; + newlogger.tty = isatty(fileno(newlogger.f)) > 0; if (newlogger.flags & XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_DATE) tzset(); ++++++ 26754-hvm-Improve-APIC-INIT-SIPI-emulation.patch ++++++ References: FATE#313605 # Commit 7242e0dc2c6c083ded570de159007d112ee34e88 # Date 2013-03-28 11:44:11 +0000 # Author Keir Fraser # Committer Keir Fraser hvm: Improve APIC INIT/SIPI emulation, fixing it for call paths other than x86_emulate(). In particular, on broadcast/multicast INIT/SIPI, we handle all target APICs at once in a single invocation of the init/sipi tasklet. This avoids needing to return an X86EMUL_RETRY error code to the caller, which was being ignored by all except x86_emulate(). The original bug, and the general approach in this fix, pointed out by Intel (yang.z.zhang@intel.com). Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -3530,8 +3530,6 @@ void hvm_vcpu_reset_state(struct vcpu *v struct domain *d = v->domain; struct segment_register reg; - BUG_ON(vcpu_runnable(v)); - domain_lock(d); if ( v->is_initialised ) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c @@ -241,8 +241,8 @@ int wrmsr_viridian_regs(uint32_t idx, ui eax &= ~(1 << 12); edx &= 0xff000000; vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR2, edx); - if ( vlapic_ipi(vlapic, eax, edx) == X86EMUL_OKAY ) - vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR, eax); + vlapic_ipi(vlapic, eax, edx); + vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR, eax); break; } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -243,12 +243,8 @@ bool_t vlapic_match_dest( return 0; } -static void vlapic_init_sipi_action(unsigned long _vcpu) +static void vlapic_init_sipi_one(struct vcpu *target, uint32_t icr) { - struct vcpu *origin = (struct vcpu *)_vcpu; - struct vcpu *target = vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.target; - uint32_t icr = vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.icr; - vcpu_pause(target); switch ( icr & APIC_MODE_MASK ) @@ -257,6 +253,14 @@ static void vlapic_init_sipi_action(unsi bool_t fpu_initialised; int rc; + /* No work on INIT de-assert for P4-type APIC. */ + if ( (icr & (APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG | APIC_INT_ASSERT)) == + APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG ) + break; + /* Nothing to do if the VCPU is already reset. */ + if ( !target->is_initialised ) + break; + hvm_vcpu_down(target); domain_lock(target->domain); /* Reset necessary VCPU state. This does not include FPU state. */ fpu_initialised = target->fpu_initialised; @@ -279,36 +283,36 @@ static void vlapic_init_sipi_action(unsi } vcpu_unpause(target); - - vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.target = NULL; - vcpu_unpause(origin); } -static int vlapic_schedule_init_sipi_tasklet(struct vcpu *target, uint32_t icr) +static void vlapic_init_sipi_action(unsigned long _vcpu) { - struct vcpu *origin = current; + struct vcpu *origin = (struct vcpu *)_vcpu; + uint32_t icr = vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.icr; + uint32_t dest = vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.dest; + uint32_t short_hand = icr & APIC_SHORT_MASK; + uint32_t dest_mode = !!(icr & APIC_DEST_MASK); + struct vcpu *v; + + if ( icr == 0 ) + return; - if ( vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.target != NULL ) + for_each_vcpu ( origin->domain, v ) { - WARN(); /* should be impossible but don't BUG, just in case */ - return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if ( vlapic_match_dest(vcpu_vlapic(v), vcpu_vlapic(origin), + short_hand, dest, dest_mode) ) + vlapic_init_sipi_one(v, icr); } - vcpu_pause_nosync(origin); - - vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.target = target; - vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.icr = icr; - tasklet_schedule(&vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.tasklet); - - return X86EMUL_RETRY; + vcpu_vlapic(origin)->init_sipi.icr = 0; + vcpu_unpause(origin); } /* Add a pending IRQ into lapic. */ -static int vlapic_accept_irq(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t icr_low) +static void vlapic_accept_irq(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t icr_low) { struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); uint8_t vector = (uint8_t)icr_low; - int rc = X86EMUL_OKAY; switch ( icr_low & APIC_MODE_MASK ) { @@ -342,31 +346,15 @@ static int vlapic_accept_irq(struct vcpu break; case APIC_DM_INIT: - /* No work on INIT de-assert for P4-type APIC. */ - if ( (icr_low & (APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG | APIC_INT_ASSERT)) == - APIC_INT_LEVELTRIG ) - break; - /* Nothing to do if the VCPU is already reset. */ - if ( !v->is_initialised ) - break; - hvm_vcpu_down(v); - rc = vlapic_schedule_init_sipi_tasklet(v, icr_low); - break; - case APIC_DM_STARTUP: - /* Nothing to do if the VCPU is already initialised. */ - if ( v->is_initialised ) - break; - rc = vlapic_schedule_init_sipi_tasklet(v, icr_low); - break; + /* Handled in vlapic_ipi(). */ + BUG(); default: gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "TODO: unsupported delivery mode in ICR %x\n", icr_low); domain_crash(v->domain); } - - return rc; } struct vlapic *vlapic_lowest_prio( @@ -424,15 +412,12 @@ void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(stru hvm_dpci_msi_eoi(current->domain, vector); } -int vlapic_ipi( +void vlapic_ipi( struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high) { unsigned int dest; unsigned int short_hand = icr_low & APIC_SHORT_MASK; unsigned int dest_mode = !!(icr_low & APIC_DEST_MASK); - struct vlapic *target; - struct vcpu *v; - int rc = X86EMUL_OKAY; HVM_DBG_LOG(DBG_LEVEL_VLAPIC, "icr = 0x%08x:%08x", icr_high, icr_low); @@ -440,25 +425,40 @@ int vlapic_ipi( ? icr_high : GET_xAPIC_DEST_FIELD(icr_high)); - if ( (icr_low & APIC_MODE_MASK) == APIC_DM_LOWEST ) + switch ( icr_low & APIC_MODE_MASK ) { - target = vlapic_lowest_prio(vlapic_domain(vlapic), vlapic, - short_hand, dest, dest_mode); + case APIC_DM_INIT: + case APIC_DM_STARTUP: + if ( vlapic->init_sipi.icr != 0 ) + { + WARN(); /* should be impossible but don't BUG, just in case */ + break; + } + vcpu_pause_nosync(vlapic_vcpu(vlapic)); + vlapic->init_sipi.icr = icr_low; + vlapic->init_sipi.dest = dest; + tasklet_schedule(&vlapic->init_sipi.tasklet); + break; + + case APIC_DM_LOWEST: { + struct vlapic *target = vlapic_lowest_prio( + vlapic_domain(vlapic), vlapic, short_hand, dest, dest_mode); if ( target != NULL ) - rc = vlapic_accept_irq(vlapic_vcpu(target), icr_low); - return rc; + vlapic_accept_irq(vlapic_vcpu(target), icr_low); + break; } - for_each_vcpu ( vlapic_domain(vlapic), v ) - { - if ( vlapic_match_dest(vcpu_vlapic(v), vlapic, - short_hand, dest, dest_mode) ) - rc = vlapic_accept_irq(v, icr_low); - if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) - break; + default: { + struct vcpu *v; + for_each_vcpu ( vlapic_domain(vlapic), v ) + { + if ( vlapic_match_dest(vcpu_vlapic(v), vlapic, + short_hand, dest, dest_mode) ) + vlapic_accept_irq(v, icr_low); + } + break; + } } - - return rc; } static uint32_t vlapic_get_tmcct(struct vlapic *vlapic) @@ -701,9 +701,8 @@ static int vlapic_reg_write(struct vcpu case APIC_ICR: val &= ~(1 << 12); /* always clear the pending bit */ - rc = vlapic_ipi(vlapic, val, vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR2)); - if ( rc == X86EMUL_OKAY ) - vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR, val); + vlapic_ipi(vlapic, val, vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR2)); + vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, APIC_ICR, val); break; case APIC_ICR2: Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h @@ -62,8 +62,7 @@ struct vlapic { struct page_info *regs_page; /* INIT-SIPI-SIPI work gets deferred to a tasklet. */ struct { - struct vcpu *target; - uint32_t icr; + uint32_t icr, dest; struct tasklet tasklet; } init_sipi; }; @@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct d void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapic); void vlapic_handle_EOI_induced_exit(struct vlapic *vlapic, int vector); -int vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high); +void vlapic_ipi(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint32_t icr_low, uint32_t icr_high); int vlapic_apicv_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int offset); ++++++ 26878-VMX-Detect-posted-interrupt-capability.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 FATE#313605 # Commit b266924990af96ee47ee299e1b6bb87fac2e2548 # Date 2013-04-18 11:32:02 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: Detect posted interrupt capability Check whether the Hardware supports posted interrupt capability. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Reviewed-by: Jun Nakajima Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: George Dunlap (from a release perspective) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ static void __init vmx_display_features( P(cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest, "Unrestricted Guest"); P(cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt, "APIC Register Virtualization"); P(cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery, "Virtual Interrupt Delivery"); + P(cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing, "Posted Interrupt Processing"); #undef P if ( !printed ) @@ -140,7 +141,8 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) min = (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING); - opt = PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS; + opt = (PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS | + PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT); _vmx_pin_based_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls( "Pin-Based Exec Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS, &mismatch); @@ -276,6 +278,14 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) _vmx_vmexit_control = adjust_vmx_controls( "VMExit Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS, &mismatch); + /* + * "Process posted interrupt" can be set only when "virtual-interrupt + * delivery" and "acknowledge interrupt on exit" is set + */ + if ( !(_vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) + || !(_vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT) ) + _vmx_pin_based_exec_control &= ~ PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT; + min = 0; opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT; _vmx_vmentry_control = adjust_vmx_controls( Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ extern u32 vmx_cpu_based_exec_control; #define PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING 0x00000008 #define PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS 0x00000020 #define PIN_BASED_PREEMPT_TIMER 0x00000040 +#define PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT 0x00000080 extern u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_control; #define VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CNTRLS 0x00000004 @@ -243,6 +244,8 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) #define cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode \ (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE) +#define cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing \ + (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT) /* GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO flags. */ #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_STI 0x00000001 @@ -257,6 +260,7 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr /* VMCS field encodings. */ enum vmcs_field { VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID = 0x00000000, + POSTED_INTR_NOTIFICATION_VECTOR = 0x00000002, GUEST_ES_SELECTOR = 0x00000800, GUEST_CS_SELECTOR = 0x00000802, GUEST_SS_SELECTOR = 0x00000804, @@ -291,6 +295,8 @@ enum vmcs_field { VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002013, APIC_ACCESS_ADDR = 0x00002014, APIC_ACCESS_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002015, + PI_DESC_ADDR = 0x00002016, + PI_DESC_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002017, EPT_POINTER = 0x0000201a, EPT_POINTER_HIGH = 0x0000201b, EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 = 0x0000201c, ++++++ 26879-VMX-Turn-on-posted-interrupt-bit-in-vmcs.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 FATE#313605 # Commit 1c0ac49b1d6c3d54fc1f75661742a988ca7cf255 # Date 2013-04-18 11:34:04 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: Turn on posted interrupt bit in vmcs Turn on posted interrupt for vcpu if posted interrupt is avaliable. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Reviewed-by: Jun Nakajima Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: George Dunlap (from a release perspective) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -874,6 +874,12 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0); } + if ( cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing ) + { + __vmwrite(PI_DESC_ADDR, virt_to_maddr(&v->arch.hvm_vmx.pi_desc)); + __vmwrite(POSTED_INTR_NOTIFICATION_VECTOR, posted_intr_vector); + } + /* Host data selectors. */ __vmwrite(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS); __vmwrite(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsig static void vmx_invlpg_intercept(unsigned long vaddr); static void __ept_sync_domain(void *info); +uint8_t __read_mostly posted_intr_vector; + static int vmx_domain_initialise(struct domain *d) { int rc; @@ -1694,6 +1696,9 @@ struct hvm_function_table * __init start setup_ept_dump(); } + if ( cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing ) + alloc_direct_apic_vector(&posted_intr_vector, event_check_interrupt); + setup_vmcs_dump(); return &vmx_function_table; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include +#include extern void vmcs_dump_vcpu(struct vcpu *v); extern void setup_vmcs_dump(void); @@ -70,6 +71,12 @@ struct vmx_domain { cpumask_var_t ept_synced; }; +struct pi_desc { + DECLARE_BITMAP(pir, NR_VECTORS); + u32 control; + u32 rsvd[7]; +} __attribute__ ((aligned (64))); + #define ept_get_wl(d) \ ((d)->arch.hvm_domain.vmx.ept_control.ept_wl) #define ept_get_asr(d) \ @@ -112,6 +119,7 @@ struct arch_vmx_struct { uint32_t eoi_exitmap_changed; uint64_t eoi_exit_bitmap[4]; + struct pi_desc pi_desc; unsigned long host_cr0; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct #define MODRM_EAX_ECX ".byte 0xc1\n" /* EAX, ECX */ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap; +extern uint8_t posted_intr_vector; #define cpu_has_vmx_ept_wl4_supported \ (vmx_ept_vpid_cap & VMX_EPT_WALK_LENGTH_4_SUPPORTED) ++++++ 26880-VMX-Add-posted-interrupt-supporting.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 FATE#313605 # Commit d7dafa375bc13772e2e3274d975d544af4208939 # Date 2013-04-18 11:34:49 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: Add posted interrupt supporting Add the supporting of using posted interrupt to deliver interrupt. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Reviewed-by: Jun Nakajima Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: George Dunlap (from a release perspective) # Commit e4e1e0ecc023caf4cf3b87a4aa4d5e210760f4e8 # Date 2013-04-19 12:31:18 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: adjust correct table when there's no posted interrupt support The caller of start_vmx() will overwrite hvm_funcs, so there's no point in adjusting that table in start_vmx(). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -90,24 +90,6 @@ static unsigned int vlapic_lvt_mask[VLAP ((vlapic_get_reg(vlapic, APIC_LVTT) & APIC_TIMER_MODE_MASK) \ == APIC_TIMER_MODE_TSC_DEADLINE) - -/* - * Generic APIC bitmap vector update & search routines. - */ - -#define VEC_POS(v) ((v)%32) -#define REG_POS(v) (((v)/32) * 0x10) -#define vlapic_test_and_set_vector(vec, bitmap) \ - test_and_set_bit(VEC_POS(vec), \ - (unsigned long *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) -#define vlapic_test_and_clear_vector(vec, bitmap) \ - test_and_clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), \ - (unsigned long *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) -#define vlapic_set_vector(vec, bitmap) \ - set_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (unsigned long *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) -#define vlapic_clear_vector(vec, bitmap) \ - clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (unsigned long *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) - static int vlapic_find_highest_vector(void *bitmap) { uint32_t *word = bitmap; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include enum handler_return { HNDL_done, HNDL_unhandled, HNDL_exception_raised }; @@ -1613,6 +1614,60 @@ static void vmx_process_isr(int isr, str vmx_vmcs_exit(v); } +static void __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct vcpu *v) +{ + bool_t running = v->is_running; + + vcpu_unblock(v); + if ( running && (in_irq() || (v != current)) ) + { + unsigned int cpu = v->processor; + + if ( !test_and_set_bit(VCPU_KICK_SOFTIRQ, &softirq_pending(cpu)) + && (cpu != smp_processor_id()) ) + send_IPI_mask(cpumask_of(cpu), posted_intr_vector); + } +} + +static void vmx_deliver_posted_intr(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector) +{ + if ( pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &v->arch.hvm_vmx.pi_desc) ) + return; + + if ( unlikely(v->arch.hvm_vmx.eoi_exitmap_changed) ) + { + /* + * If EOI exitbitmap needs to changed or notification vector + * can't be allocated, interrupt will not be injected till + * VMEntry as it used to be. + */ + pi_set_on(&v->arch.hvm_vmx.pi_desc); + } + else if ( !pi_test_and_set_on(&v->arch.hvm_vmx.pi_desc) ) + { + __vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(v); + return; + } + + vcpu_kick(v); +} + +static void vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct vcpu *v) +{ + struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); + unsigned int group, i; + DECLARE_BITMAP(pending_intr, NR_VECTORS); + + if ( !pi_test_and_clear_on(&v->arch.hvm_vmx.pi_desc) ) + return; + + for ( group = 0; group < ARRAY_SIZE(pending_intr); group++ ) + pending_intr[group] = pi_get_pir(&v->arch.hvm_vmx.pi_desc, group); + + for_each_set_bit(i, pending_intr, NR_VECTORS) + vlapic_set_vector(i, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_IRR]); +} + static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = { .name = "VMX", .cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare, @@ -1663,6 +1718,8 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_ .update_eoi_exit_bitmap = vmx_update_eoi_exit_bitmap, .virtual_intr_delivery_enabled = vmx_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled, .process_isr = vmx_process_isr, + .deliver_posted_intr = vmx_deliver_posted_intr, + .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr, }; struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void) @@ -1698,6 +1755,11 @@ struct hvm_function_table * __init start if ( cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing ) alloc_direct_apic_vector(&posted_intr_vector, event_check_interrupt); + else + { + vmx_function_table.deliver_posted_intr = NULL; + vmx_function_table.sync_pir_to_irr = NULL; + } setup_vmcs_dump(); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/bitops.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/bitops.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/bitops.h @@ -367,6 +367,16 @@ static inline unsigned int __scanbit(uns ((off)+(__scanbit(~(((*(const unsigned long *)addr)) >> (off)), size))) : \ __find_next_zero_bit(addr,size,off))) +/** + * for_each_set_bit - iterate over every set bit in a memory region + * @bit: The integer iterator + * @addr: The address to base the search on + * @size: The maximum size to search + */ +#define for_each_set_bit(bit, addr, size) \ + for ( (bit) = find_first_bit(addr, size); \ + (bit) < (size); \ + (bit) = find_next_bit(addr, size, (bit) + 1) ) /** * find_first_set_bit - find the first set bit in @word Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ struct hvm_function_table { void (*update_eoi_exit_bitmap)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector, u8 trig); int (*virtual_intr_delivery_enabled)(void); void (*process_isr)(int isr, struct vcpu *v); + void (*deliver_posted_intr)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector); + void (*sync_pir_to_irr)(struct vcpu *v); }; extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h @@ -54,6 +54,21 @@ #define vlapic_x2apic_mode(vlapic) \ ((vlapic)->hw.apic_base_msr & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_EXTD) +/* + * Generic APIC bitmap vector update & search routines. + */ + +#define VEC_POS(v) ((v) % 32) +#define REG_POS(v) (((v) / 32) * 0x10) +#define vlapic_test_and_set_vector(vec, bitmap) \ + test_and_set_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (uint32_t *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) +#define vlapic_test_and_clear_vector(vec, bitmap) \ + test_and_clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (uint32_t *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) +#define vlapic_set_vector(vec, bitmap) \ + set_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (uint32_t *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) +#define vlapic_clear_vector(vec, bitmap) \ + clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (uint32_t *)((bitmap) + REG_POS(vec))) + struct vlapic { struct hvm_hw_lapic hw; struct hvm_hw_lapic_regs *regs; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -71,6 +71,31 @@ void vmx_update_debug_state(struct vcpu void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct vcpu *v); void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct vcpu *v); +#define POSTED_INTR_ON 0 +static inline int pi_test_and_set_pir(int vector, struct pi_desc *pi_desc) +{ + return test_and_set_bit(vector, pi_desc->pir); +} + +static inline int pi_test_and_set_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc) +{ + return test_and_set_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON, &pi_desc->control); +} + +static inline void pi_set_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc) +{ + set_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON, &pi_desc->control); +} + +static inline int pi_test_and_clear_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc) +{ + return test_and_clear_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON, &pi_desc->control); +} + +static inline unsigned long pi_get_pir(struct pi_desc *pi_desc, int group) +{ + return xchg(&pi_desc->pir[group], 0); +} /* * Exit Reasons ++++++ 26881-x86-HVM-Call-vlapic_set_irq-to-delivery-virtual-interrupt.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 FATE#313605 # Commit 04015d6326f17e4aafb32593b94dac44b72ef4c1 # Date 2013-04-18 11:35:43 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich x86/HVM: Call vlapic_set_irq() to delivery virtual interrupt Move kick_vcpu into vlapic_set_irq. And call it to deliver virtual interrupt instead set vIRR directly. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: George Dunlap (from a release perspective) Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vioapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vioapic.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vioapic.c @@ -263,8 +263,7 @@ static void ioapic_inj_irq( ASSERT((delivery_mode == dest_Fixed) || (delivery_mode == dest_LowestPrio)); - if ( vlapic_set_irq(target, vector, trig_mode) ) - vcpu_kick(vlapic_vcpu(target)); + vlapic_set_irq(target, vector, trig_mode); } static inline int pit_channel0_enabled(void) Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -122,16 +122,19 @@ static int vlapic_find_highest_irr(struc return vlapic_find_highest_vector(&vlapic->regs->data[APIC_IRR]); } -int vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint8_t vec, uint8_t trig) +void vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint8_t vec, uint8_t trig) { + struct vcpu *target = vlapic_vcpu(vlapic); + if ( trig ) vlapic_set_vector(vec, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]); if ( hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap ) - hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap(vlapic_vcpu(vlapic), vec ,trig); + hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap(target, vec, trig); /* We may need to wake up target vcpu, besides set pending bit here */ - return !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic); + if ( !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic) ) + vcpu_kick(target); } static int vlapic_find_highest_isr(struct vlapic *vlapic) @@ -300,9 +303,8 @@ static void vlapic_accept_irq(struct vcp { case APIC_DM_FIXED: case APIC_DM_LOWEST: - if ( vlapic_enabled(vlapic) && - !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vector, vlapic) ) - vcpu_kick(v); + if ( vlapic_enabled(vlapic) ) + vlapic_set_irq(vlapic, vector, 0); break; case APIC_DM_REMRD: Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c @@ -57,8 +57,7 @@ static void vmsi_inj_irq( { case dest_Fixed: case dest_LowestPrio: - if ( vlapic_set_irq(target, vector, trig_mode) ) - vcpu_kick(vlapic_vcpu(target)); + vlapic_set_irq(target, vector, trig_mode); break; default: gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "error delivery mode %d\n", delivery_mode); Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static inline void vlapic_set_reg( bool_t is_vlapic_lvtpc_enabled(struct vlapic *vlapic); -int vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint8_t vec, uint8_t trig); +void vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint8_t vec, uint8_t trig); int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v); int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v, int vector); ++++++ 26882-VMX-Use-posted-interrupt-to-deliver-virtual-interrupt.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 FATE#313605 # Commit 8d266f6b2c5c3d2d0da42f1e40ba1fb2ac8fdf1a # Date 2013-04-18 11:36:28 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: Use posted interrupt to deliver virutal interrupt Deliver virtual interrupt through posted way if posted interrupt is enabled. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Reviewed-by: Jun Nakajima Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: George Dunlap (from a release perspective) --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ static void vlapic_clear_irr(int vector, static int vlapic_find_highest_irr(struct vlapic *vlapic) { + if ( hvm_funcs.sync_pir_to_irr ) + hvm_funcs.sync_pir_to_irr(vlapic_vcpu(vlapic)); + return vlapic_find_highest_vector(&vlapic->regs->data[APIC_IRR]); } @@ -132,8 +135,9 @@ void vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapi if ( hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap ) hvm_funcs.update_eoi_exit_bitmap(target, vec, trig); - /* We may need to wake up target vcpu, besides set pending bit here */ - if ( !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic) ) + if ( hvm_funcs.deliver_posted_intr ) + hvm_funcs.deliver_posted_intr(target, vec); + else if ( !vlapic_test_and_set_irr(vec, vlapic) ) vcpu_kick(target); } ++++++ 26902-x86-EFI-pass-boot-services-variable-info-to-runtime-code.patch ++++++ References: FATE#314499, FATE#314509 # Commit 9be8a4447103d92843fcfeaad8be42408c90e9a9 # Date 2013-04-22 13:58:01 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86/EFI: pass boot services variable info to runtime code EFI variables can be flagged as being accessible only within boot services. This makes it awkward for us to figure out how much space they use at runtime. In theory we could figure this out by simply comparing the results from QueryVariableInfo() to the space used by all of our variables, but that fails if the platform doesn't garbage collect on every boot. Thankfully, calling QueryVariableInfo() while still inside boot services gives a more reliable answer. This patch passes that information from the EFI boot stub up to the efi platform code. Based on a similarly named Linux patch by Matthew Garrett . Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: George Dunlap # Commit 47f71a8ccb0c881cf3d9e0b917ef5f0dc084b062 # Date 2013-05-23 13:08:51 +0200 # Author Eric Shelton # Committer Jan Beulich x86/EFI: fix boot for pre-UEFI systems efi/boot.c makes a call to QueryVariableInfo on all systems. However, as it is only promised for UEFI 2.0+ systems, pre-UEFI systems can hang or crash on this call. The below patch adds a version check, a technique used in other parts of the Xen EFI codebase. Signed-off-by: Eric Shelton Check runtime services version instead of EFI version (while generally they would be in sync, nothing requires them to be). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c @@ -1146,6 +1146,25 @@ efi_start(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_SY if (efi.smbios != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) dmi_efi_get_table((void *)(long)efi.smbios); + /* Get snapshot of variable store parameters. */ + status = (efi_rs->Hdr.Revision >> 16) >= 2 ? + efi_rs->QueryVariableInfo(EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, + &efi_boot_max_var_store_size, + &efi_boot_remain_var_store_size, + &efi_boot_max_var_size) : + EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION; + if ( EFI_ERROR(status) ) + { + efi_boot_max_var_store_size = 0; + efi_boot_remain_var_store_size = 0; + efi_boot_max_var_size = status; + PrintStr(L"Warning: Could not query variable store: "); + DisplayUint(status, 0); + PrintStr(newline); + } + /* Allocate space for trampoline (in first Mb). */ cfg.addr = 0x100000; cfg.size = trampoline_end - trampoline_start; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi.h @@ -22,5 +22,8 @@ extern void *efi_memmap; extern l4_pgentry_t *efi_l4_pgtable; +extern UINT64 efi_boot_max_var_store_size, efi_boot_remain_var_store_size, + efi_boot_max_var_size; + unsigned long efi_rs_enter(void); void efi_rs_leave(unsigned long); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c @@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ UINTN __read_mostly efi_memmap_size; UINTN __read_mostly efi_mdesc_size; void *__read_mostly efi_memmap; +UINT64 __read_mostly efi_boot_max_var_store_size; +UINT64 __read_mostly efi_boot_remain_var_store_size; +UINT64 __read_mostly efi_boot_max_var_size; + struct efi __read_mostly efi = { .acpi = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .acpi20 = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, @@ -446,6 +450,35 @@ int efi_runtime_call(struct xenpf_efi_ru break; case XEN_EFI_query_variable_info: + if ( op->misc & ~XEN_EFI_VARINFO_BOOT_SNAPSHOT ) + return -EINVAL; + + if ( op->misc & XEN_EFI_VARINFO_BOOT_SNAPSHOT ) + { + if ( (op->u.query_variable_info.attr + & ~EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE) != + (EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) ) + return -EINVAL; + + op->u.query_variable_info.max_store_size = + efi_boot_max_var_store_size; + op->u.query_variable_info.remain_store_size = + efi_boot_remain_var_store_size; + if ( efi_boot_max_var_store_size ) + { + op->u.query_variable_info.max_size = efi_boot_max_var_size; + status = EFI_SUCCESS; + } + else + { + op->u.query_variable_info.max_size = 0; + status = efi_boot_max_var_size; + } + break; + } + cr3 = efi_rs_enter(); if ( (efi_rs->Hdr.Revision >> 16) < 2 ) { @@ -462,6 +495,9 @@ int efi_runtime_call(struct xenpf_efi_ru case XEN_EFI_query_capsule_capabilities: case XEN_EFI_update_capsule: + if ( op->misc ) + return -EINVAL; + cr3 = efi_rs_enter(); if ( (efi_rs->Hdr.Revision >> 16) < 2 ) { Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/efi/efiapi.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/efi/efiapi.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/efi/efiapi.h @@ -213,6 +213,10 @@ VOID #define EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE 0x00000001 #define EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS 0x00000002 #define EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS 0x00000004 +#define EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD 0x00000008 +#define EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS 0x00000010 +#define EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS 0x00000020 +#define EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE 0x00000040 // Variable size limitation #define EFI_MAXIMUM_VARIABLE_SIZE 1024 Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/efi/efierr.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/efi/efierr.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/efi/efierr.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ Revision History #define EFI_ICMP_ERROR EFIERR(22) #define EFI_TFTP_ERROR EFIERR(23) #define EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR EFIERR(24) +#define EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION EFIERR(25) #define EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH EFIWARN(1) #define EFI_WARN_DELETE_FAILURE EFIWARN(2) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/public/platform.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/public/platform.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/public/platform.h @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ struct xenpf_efi_runtime_call { struct xenpf_efi_guid vendor_guid; } get_next_variable_name; +#define XEN_EFI_VARINFO_BOOT_SNAPSHOT 0x00000001 struct { uint32_t attr; uint64_t max_store_size; ++++++ 26953-x86-allow-Dom0-read-only-access-to-IO-APICs.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808085 # Commit d1222afda4d27916580c28533762e362d64ace22 # Date 2013-05-02 16:46:02 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86: allow Dom0 read-only access to IO-APICs There are BIOSes that want to map the IO-APIC MMIO region from some ACPI method(s), and there is at least one BIOS flavor that wants to use this mapping to clear an RTE's mask bit. While we can't allow the latter, we can permit reads and simply drop write attempts, leveraging the already existing infrastructure introduced for dealing with AMD IOMMUs' representation as PCI devices. This fixes an interrupt setup problem on a system where _CRS evaluation involved the above described BIOS/ACPI behavior, and is expected to also deal with a boot time crash of pv-ops Linux upon encountering the same kind of system. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c @@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0( for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ ) { mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr); - if ( smp_found_config ) + if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) ) rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, mfn, mfn); } /* MSI range. */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c @@ -2567,6 +2567,11 @@ void __init init_ioapic_mappings(void) reg_01.raw = io_apic_read(i, 1); nr_ioapic_entries[i] = reg_01.bits.entries + 1; nr_irqs_gsi += nr_ioapic_entries[i]; + + if ( rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, + ioapic_phys >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) + printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to mark IO-APIC page %lx read-only\n", + ioapic_phys); } } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/mm.c @@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ unsigned long __read_mostly pdx_group_va bool_t __read_mostly machine_to_phys_mapping_valid = 0; +struct rangeset *__read_mostly mmio_ro_ranges; + #define PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS (_PAGE_PAT|_PAGE_PCD|_PAGE_PWT) bool_t __read_mostly opt_allow_superpage; Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/setup.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c @@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb zap_low_mappings(); #endif + mmio_ro_ranges = rangeset_new(NULL, "r/o mmio ranges", + RANGESETF_prettyprint_hex); + init_apic_mappings(); normalise_cpu_order(); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/io.c @@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ #include #include -struct rangeset *__read_mostly mmio_ro_ranges; - static void hvm_dirq_assist(unsigned long _d); bool_t pt_irq_need_timer(uint32_t flags) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c @@ -107,8 +107,6 @@ void __init pt_pci_init(void) radix_tree_init(&pci_segments); if ( !alloc_pseg(0) ) panic("Could not initialize PCI segment 0\n"); - mmio_ro_ranges = rangeset_new(NULL, "r/o mmio ranges", - RANGESETF_prettyprint_hex); } int __init pci_add_segment(u16 seg) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h @@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ extern bool_t machine_to_phys_mapping_va _set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn, pfn); \ } while (0) +extern struct rangeset *mmio_ro_ranges; + #define get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn) (machine_to_phys_mapping[(mfn)]) #define mfn_to_gmfn(_d, mfn) \ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/xen/iommu.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/xen/iommu.h @@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ extern bool_t amd_iommu_perdev_intremap; /* Does this domain have a P2M table we can use as its IOMMU pagetable? */ #define iommu_use_hap_pt(d) (hap_enabled(d) && iommu_hap_pt_share) -extern struct rangeset *mmio_ro_ranges; - #define domain_hvm_iommu(d) (&d->arch.hvm_domain.hvm_iommu) #define MAX_IOMMUS 32 ++++++ 27179-VMX-Viridian-suppress-MSR-based-APIC-suggestion-when-having-APIC-V.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 # Commit 7f2e992b824ec62a2818e64390ac2ccfbd74e6b7 # Date 2013-06-25 15:57:44 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich VMX/Viridian: suppress MSR-based APIC suggestion when having APIC-V When the CPU has the necessary capabilities, having Windows use synthetic MSR reads/writes is bogus, as this still requires emulation (which is pretty much guaranteed to be slower than having the hardware carry out the operation). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Paul Durrant Acked-by: George Dunlap --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c @@ -87,8 +87,9 @@ int cpuid_viridian_leaves(unsigned int l if ( (d->arch.hvm_domain.viridian.guest_os_id.raw == 0) || (d->arch.hvm_domain.viridian.guest_os_id.fields.os < 4) ) break; - *eax = (CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC | - CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT); + *eax = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT; + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt ) + *eax |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC; *ebx = 2047; /* long spin count */ break; } ++++++ 27184-libxl-devid-fix.patch ++++++ commit dfeccbeaa6536ceb3303380361b7ac18e1013292 Author: Jim Fehlig Date: Tue Jun 25 16:02:15 2013 -0600 libxl: Fix assignment of devid value returned from libxl__device_nextid Commit 5420f265 has some misplaced parenthesis that caused devid to be assigned 1 or 0 based on checking return value of libxl__device_nextid < 0, e.g. devid = libxl__device_nextid(...) < 0 This works when only one instance of a given device type exists, but subsequent devices of the same type will also have a devid = 1 if libxl__device_nextid succeeds. Fix by checking the value assigned to devid, e.g. (devid = libxl__device_nextid(...)) < 0 Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig Acked-by: George Dunlap Acked-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/tools/libxl/libxl.c @@ -2606,7 +2606,7 @@ void libxl__device_nic_add(libxl__egc *e } if (nic->devid == -1) { - if ((nic->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vif") < 0)) { + if ((nic->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vif")) < 0) { rc = ERROR_FAIL; goto out_free; } @@ -3008,7 +3008,7 @@ int libxl__device_vkb_add(libxl__gc *gc, } if (vkb->devid == -1) { - if ((vkb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vkb") < 0)) { + if ((vkb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vkb")) < 0) { rc = ERROR_FAIL; goto out_free; } @@ -3117,7 +3117,7 @@ int libxl__device_vfb_add(libxl__gc *gc, } if (vfb->devid == -1) { - if ((vfb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vfb") < 0)) { + if ((vfb->devid = libxl__device_nextid(gc, domid, "vfb")) < 0) { rc = ERROR_FAIL; goto out_free; } ++++++ 27249-VMX-fix-interaction-of-APIC-V-and-Viridian-emulation.patch ++++++ References: bnc#808269 # Commit 303066fdb1e4fe816e48acd665453f58b8399e81 # Date 2013-07-17 08:47:18 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: fix interaction of APIC-V and Viridian emulation Viridian using a synthetic MSR for issuing EOI notifications bypasses the normal in-processor handling, which would clear GUEST_INTR_STATUS.SVI. Hence we need to do this in software in order for future interrupts to get delivered. Based on analysis by Yang Z Zhang . Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Yang Zhang Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -386,6 +386,9 @@ void vlapic_EOI_set(struct vlapic *vlapi vlapic_clear_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_ISR]); + if ( hvm_funcs.handle_eoi ) + hvm_funcs.handle_eoi(vector); + if ( vlapic_test_and_clear_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_TMR]) ) vioapic_update_EOI(vlapic_domain(vlapic), vector); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1668,6 +1668,15 @@ static void vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct v vlapic_set_vector(i, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_IRR]); } +static void vmx_handle_eoi(u8 vector) +{ + unsigned long status = __vmread(GUEST_INTR_STATUS); + + /* We need to clear the SVI field. */ + status &= VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK; + __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); +} + static struct hvm_function_table __read_mostly vmx_function_table = { .name = "VMX", .cpu_up_prepare = vmx_cpu_up_prepare, @@ -1720,6 +1729,7 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __read_ .process_isr = vmx_process_isr, .deliver_posted_intr = vmx_deliver_posted_intr, .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr, + .handle_eoi = vmx_handle_eoi, }; struct hvm_function_table * __init start_vmx(void) @@ -1753,6 +1763,9 @@ struct hvm_function_table * __init start setup_ept_dump(); } + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + vmx_function_table.handle_eoi = NULL; + if ( cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing ) alloc_direct_apic_vector(&posted_intr_vector, event_check_interrupt); else Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table { void (*process_isr)(int isr, struct vcpu *v); void (*deliver_posted_intr)(struct vcpu *v, u8 vector); void (*sync_pir_to_irr)(struct vcpu *v); + void (*handle_eoi)(u8 vector); }; extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs; ++++++ 27353-VMX-add-boot-parameter-to-enable-disable-APIC-v-dynamically.patch ++++++ # Commit 0c006b41a283a0a569c863d44abde5aa5750ae01 # Date 2013-08-13 17:47:16 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: add boot parameter to enable/disable APIC-v dynamically Add a boot parameter to enable/disable the APIC-v dynamically. APIC-v is enabled by default. User can use apicv=0 to disable it. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang --- 2013-08-06.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c 2013-08-06 00:00:00.000000000 +0200 +++ 2013-08-06/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c 2013-08-20 15:11:22.000000000 +0200 @@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ boolean_param("vpid", opt_vpid_enabled); static bool_t __read_mostly opt_unrestricted_guest_enabled = 1; boolean_param("unrestricted_guest", opt_unrestricted_guest_enabled); +static bool_t __read_mostly opt_apicv_enabled = 1; +boolean_param("apicv", opt_apicv_enabled); + /* * These two parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting: * ple_gap: upper bound on the amount of time between two successive @@ -194,12 +197,12 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) * "APIC Register Virtualization" and "Virtual Interrupt Delivery" * can be set only when "use TPR shadow" is set */ - if ( _vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW ) + if ( (_vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) && + opt_apicv_enabled ) opt |= SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE; - _vmx_secondary_exec_control = adjust_vmx_controls( "Secondary Exec Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &mismatch); ++++++ 27405-Nested-VMX-Check-whether-interrupt-is-blocked-by-TPR.patch ++++++ # Commit 7fb5c6b9ef22915e3fcac95cd44857f4457ba783 # Date 2013-08-22 10:49:24 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: Check whether interrupt is blocked by TPR If interrupt is blocked by L1's TPR, L2 should not see it and keep running. Adding the check before L2 to retrive interrupt. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: "Dong, Eddie" --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c @@ -165,6 +165,11 @@ static int nvmx_intr_intercept(struct vc { u32 ctrl; + /* If blocked by L1's tpr, then nothing to do. */ + if ( nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) && + hvm_interrupt_blocked(v, intack) == hvm_intblk_tpr ) + return 1; + if ( nvmx_intr_blocked(v) != hvm_intblk_none ) { enable_intr_window(v, intack); ++++++ 27406-Nested-VMX-Force-check-ISR-when-L2-is-running.patch ++++++ # Commit b35d0a26983843c092bfa353fd6b9aa8c3bf4886 # Date 2013-08-22 10:50:13 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: Force check ISR when L2 is running External interrupt is allowed to notify CPU only when it has higher priority than current in servicing interrupt. With APIC-v, the priority comparing is done by hardware and hardware will inject the interrupt to VCPU when it recognizes an interrupt. Currently, there is no virtual APIC-v feature available for L1 to use, so when L2 is running, we still need to compare interrupt priority with ISR in hypervisor instead via hardware. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: "Dong, Eddie" Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1038,7 +1039,8 @@ int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu * if ( irr == -1 ) return -1; - if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() ) + if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() && + !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) ) return irr; isr = vlapic_find_highest_isr(vlapic); ++++++ 27407-Nested-VMX-Clear-APIC-v-control-bit-in-vmcs02.patch ++++++ # Commit 375a1035002fb257087756a86e6caeda649fc0f1 # Date 2013-08-22 10:52:05 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: Clear APIC-v control bit in vmcs02 There is no vAPIC-v support, so mask APIC-v control bit when constructing vmcs02. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: "Dong, Eddie" --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -529,6 +529,10 @@ void nvmx_update_exec_control(struct vcp void nvmx_update_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long value) { + u32 apicv_bit = SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY; + + value &= ~apicv_bit; set_shadow_control(v, SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, value); } @@ -537,7 +541,12 @@ static void nvmx_update_pin_control(stru u32 shadow_cntrl; struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v); + host_cntrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT; shadow_cntrl = __get_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL); + + /* No vAPIC-v support, so it shouldn't be set in vmcs12. */ + ASSERT(!(shadow_cntrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT)); + shadow_cntrl &= ~PIN_BASED_PREEMPT_TIMER; shadow_cntrl |= host_cntrl; __vmwrite(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, shadow_cntrl); ++++++ 27408-Nested-VMX-Update-APIC-v-RVI-SVI-when-vmexit-to-L1.patch ++++++ # Commit 84e6af58707520baf59c1c86c29237419e439afb # Date 2013-08-22 10:59:01 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: Update APIC-v(RVI/SVI) when vmexit to L1 If enabling APIC-v, all interrupts to L1 are delivered through APIC-v. But when L2 is running, external interrupt will casue L1 vmexit with reason external interrupt. Then L1 will pick up the interrupt through vmcs12. when L1 ack the interrupt, since the APIC-v is enabled when L1 is running, so APIC-v hardware still will do vEOI updating. The problem is that the interrupt is delivered not through APIC-v hardware, this means SVI/RVI/vPPR are not setting, but hardware required them when doing vEOI updating. The solution is that, when L1 tried to pick up the interrupt from vmcs12, then hypervisor will help to update the SVI/RVI/vPPR to make sure the following vEOI updating and vPPR updating corrently. Also, since interrupt is delivered through vmcs12, so APIC-v hardware will not cleare vIRR and hypervisor need to clear it before L1 running. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: "Dong, Eddie" Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ struct hvm_intack hvm_vcpu_ack_pending_i intack.vector = (uint8_t)vector; break; case hvm_intsrc_lapic: - if ( !vlapic_ack_pending_irq(v, intack.vector) ) + if ( !vlapic_ack_pending_irq(v, intack.vector, 0) ) intack = hvm_intack_none; break; case hvm_intsrc_vector: Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c @@ -168,6 +168,14 @@ static uint32_t vlapic_get_ppr(struct vl return ppr; } +uint32_t vlapic_set_ppr(struct vlapic *vlapic) +{ + uint32_t ppr = vlapic_get_ppr(vlapic); + + vlapic_set_reg(vlapic, APIC_PROCPRI, ppr); + return ppr; +} + static int vlapic_match_logical_addr(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint8_t mda) { int result = 0; @@ -1051,15 +1059,15 @@ int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu * return irr; } -int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v, int vector) +int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v, int vector, bool_t force_ack) { struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); - if ( vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() ) - return 1; - - vlapic_set_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_ISR]); - vlapic_clear_irr(vector, vlapic); + if ( force_ack || !vlapic_virtual_intr_delivery_enabled() ) + { + vlapic_set_vector(vector, &vlapic->regs->data[APIC_ISR]); + vlapic_clear_irr(vector, vlapic); + } return 1; } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int nvmx_intr_intercept(struct vc if ( !(ctrl & PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK) ) return 0; - vmx_inject_extint(intack.vector); + vmx_inject_extint(intack.vector, intack.source); ctrl = __get_vvmcs(vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcx, VM_EXIT_CONTROLS); if ( ctrl & VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT ) @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) else { HVMTRACE_2D(INJ_VIRQ, intack.vector, /*fake=*/ 0); - vmx_inject_extint(intack.vector); + vmx_inject_extint(intack.vector, intack.source); pt_intr_post(v, intack); } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ void ept_sync_domain(struct domain *d) } void nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions(struct vcpu *v, - unsigned long intr_fields, int error_code) + unsigned long intr_fields, int error_code, uint8_t source) { struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v); @@ -1382,6 +1382,7 @@ void nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions(struct v /* enqueue the exception till the VMCS switch back to L1 */ nvmx->intr.intr_info = intr_fields; nvmx->intr.error_code = error_code; + nvmx->intr.source = source; vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vmexit_pending = 1; return; } @@ -1393,7 +1394,8 @@ void nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions(struct v static int nvmx_vmexit_trap(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_trap *trap) { - nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions(v, trap->vector, trap->error_code); + nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions(v, trap->vector, trap->error_code, + hvm_intsrc_none); return NESTEDHVM_VMEXIT_DONE; } @@ -1424,7 +1426,7 @@ static void __vmx_inject_exception(int t curr->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_emulate = 1; } -void vmx_inject_extint(int trap) +void vmx_inject_extint(int trap, uint8_t source) { struct vcpu *v = current; u32 pin_based_cntrl; @@ -1435,7 +1437,7 @@ void vmx_inject_extint(int trap) if ( pin_based_cntrl & PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK ) { nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (v, INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (X86_EVENTTYPE_EXT_INTR<<8) | trap, - HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE); + HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE, source); return; } } @@ -1454,7 +1456,7 @@ void vmx_inject_nmi(void) if ( pin_based_cntrl & PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING ) { nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (v, INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI<<8) | TRAP_nmi, - HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE); + HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE, hvm_intsrc_nmi); return; } } @@ -1522,7 +1524,7 @@ static void vmx_inject_trap(struct hvm_t { nvmx_enqueue_n2_exceptions (curr, INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | (_trap.type<<8) | _trap.vector, - _trap.error_code); + _trap.error_code, hvm_intsrc_none); return; } else Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -959,6 +959,36 @@ static void sync_exception_state(struct } } +static void nvmx_update_apicv(struct vcpu *v) +{ + struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v); + struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v); + unsigned long reason = __get_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, VM_EXIT_REASON); + uint32_t intr_info = __get_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO); + + if ( reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT && + nvmx->intr.source == hvm_intsrc_lapic && + (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) ) + { + uint16_t status; + uint32_t rvi, ppr; + uint32_t vector = intr_info & 0xff; + struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v); + + vlapic_ack_pending_irq(v, vector, 1); + + ppr = vlapic_set_ppr(vlapic); + WARN_ON((ppr & 0xf0) != (vector & 0xf0)); + + status = vector << 8; + rvi = vlapic_has_pending_irq(v); + if ( rvi != -1 ) + status |= rvi & 0xff; + + __vmwrite(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status); + } +} + static void virtual_vmexit(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { struct vcpu *v = current; @@ -1005,6 +1035,9 @@ static void virtual_vmexit(struct cpu_us /* updating host cr0 to sync TS bit */ __vmwrite(HOST_CR0, v->arch.hvm_vmx.host_cr0); + if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) + nvmx_update_apicv(v); + vmreturn(regs, VMSUCCEED); } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vlapic.h @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ bool_t is_vlapic_lvtpc_enabled(struct vl void vlapic_set_irq(struct vlapic *vlapic, uint8_t vec, uint8_t trig); int vlapic_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v); -int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v, int vector); +int vlapic_ack_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v, int vector, bool_t force_ack); int vlapic_init(struct vcpu *v); void vlapic_destroy(struct vcpu *v); @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void vlapic_tdt_msr_set(struct vlapic *v uint64_t vlapic_tdt_msr_get(struct vlapic *vlapic); int vlapic_accept_pic_intr(struct vcpu *v); +uint32_t vlapic_set_ppr(struct vlapic *vlapic); void vlapic_adjust_i8259_target(struct domain *d); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static inline int __vmxon(u64 addr) return rc; } -void vmx_inject_extint(int trap); +void vmx_inject_extint(int trap, uint8_t source); void vmx_inject_nmi(void); void ept_p2m_init(struct p2m_domain *p2m); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct nestedvmx { struct { unsigned long intr_info; u32 error_code; + u8 source; } intr; }; ++++++ 27431-x86-don-t-allow-Dom0-access-to-the-HT-address-range.patch ++++++ # Commit d838ac2539cf1987bea6e15662fd6a80a58fe26d # Date 2013-08-27 11:12:12 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86: don't allow Dom0 access to the HT address range In particular, MMIO assignments should not be done using this area. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c @@ -1265,6 +1265,10 @@ int __init construct_dom0( rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO), paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO + MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK)); + /* HyperTransport range. */ + if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) + rc |= iomem_deny_access(dom0, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32), + paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1)); /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */ for ( i = 0; i < e820.nr_map; i++ ) ++++++ 27511-x86-fix-memory-cut-off-when-using-PFN-compression.patch ++++++ References: bnc#839600 # Commit 8efce9d69998a3d3c720ac7dbdb9b7e240369957 # Date 2013-09-12 09:52:53 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86: fix memory cut-off when using PFN compression For one setup_max_pdx(), when invoked a second time (after SRAT got parsed), needs to start from the original max_page value again (using the already adjusted one from the first invocation would not allow the cut-off boundary to be moved up). Second, _if_ we need to cut off some part of memory, we must not allow this to also propagate into the NUMA accounting. Otherwise cutoff_node() results in nodes_cover_memory() to find some parts of memory apparently not having a PXM association, causing all SRAT info to be ignored. The only possibly problematic consumer of node_spanned_pages (the meaning of which gets altered here in that it now also includes memory Xen can't actively make use of) is XEN_SYSCTL_numainfo: At a first glance the potentially larger reported memory size shouldn't confuse tool stacks. And finally we must not put our boot time modules at addresses which (at that time) can't be guaranteed to be accessible later. This applies to both the EFI boot loader and the module relocation code. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Acked-by: Dario Faggioli Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/efi/boot.c @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static bool_t __init read_file(EFI_FILE_ what = what ?: L"Seek"; else { - file->addr = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)1 << (32 + PAGE_SHIFT); + file->addr = min(1UL << (32 + PAGE_SHIFT), DIRECTMAP_SIZE); ret = efi_bs->AllocatePages(AllocateMaxAddress, EfiLoaderData, PFN_UP(size), &file->addr); } Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/setup.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/setup.c @@ -382,10 +382,10 @@ static uint64_t __init consider_modules( return e; } -static void __init setup_max_pdx(void) +static void __init setup_max_pdx(unsigned long top_page) { #ifdef __x86_64__ - max_pdx = pfn_to_pdx(max_page - 1) + 1; + max_pdx = pfn_to_pdx(top_page - 1) + 1; if ( max_pdx > (DIRECTMAP_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) max_pdx = DIRECTMAP_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb unsigned int initrdidx; multiboot_info_t *mbi = __va(mbi_p); module_t *mod = (module_t *)__va(mbi->mods_addr); - unsigned long nr_pages, modules_headroom, *module_map; + unsigned long nr_pages, raw_max_page, modules_headroom, *module_map; int i, j, e820_warn = 0, bytes = 0; bool_t acpi_boot_table_init_done = 0; struct ns16550_defaults ns16550 = { @@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb } /* Sanitise the raw E820 map to produce a final clean version. */ - max_page = init_e820(memmap_type, e820_raw, &e820_raw_nr); + max_page = raw_max_page = init_e820(memmap_type, e820_raw, &e820_raw_nr); /* Create a temporary copy of the E820 map. */ memcpy(&boot_e820, &e820, sizeof(e820)); @@ -821,7 +821,8 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb } #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) - e = min_t(uint64_t, e, 1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + 32)); + if ( e > min(DIRECTMAP_SIZE, 1UL << (PAGE_SHIFT + 32)) ) + e = min(DIRECTMAP_SIZE, 1UL << (PAGE_SHIFT + 32)); #define reloc_size ((__pa(&_end) + mask) & ~mask) /* Is the region suitable for relocating Xen? */ if ( !xen_phys_start && e <= limit ) @@ -979,7 +980,7 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb /* Late kexec reservation (dynamic start address). */ kexec_reserve_area(&boot_e820); - setup_max_pdx(); + setup_max_pdx(raw_max_page); /* * Walk every RAM region and map it in its entirety (on x86/64, at least) @@ -1010,7 +1011,7 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb { acpi_boot_table_init_done = 1; srat_parse_regions(s); - setup_max_pdx(); + setup_max_pdx(raw_max_page); } if ( pfn_to_pdx((e - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT) >= max_pdx ) @@ -1153,7 +1154,7 @@ void __init __start_xen(unsigned long mb acpi_numa_init(); - numa_initmem_init(0, max_page); + numa_initmem_init(0, raw_max_page); #if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) /* Initialise the Xen heap. */ ++++++ 27512-libxc-x86-fix-page-table-creation-for-huge-guests.patch ++++++ # Commit 06d086832155fc7f5344e9d108b979de34674d11 # Date 2013-09-12 17:41:04 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich libxc/x86: fix page table creation for huge guests The switch-over logic from one page directory to the next was wrong; it needs to be deferred until we actually reach the last page within a given region, instead of being done when the last entry of a page directory gets started with. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Acked-by: Ian Jackson --- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_x86.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(str l3_pgentry_64_t *l3tab; l2_pgentry_64_t *l2tab = NULL; l1_pgentry_64_t *l1tab = NULL; - unsigned long l3off, l2off, l1off; + unsigned long l3off, l2off = 0, l1off; xen_vaddr_t addr; xen_pfn_t pgpfn; xen_pfn_t l3mfn = xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l3pfn); @@ -317,8 +317,6 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(str l2off = l2_table_offset_pae(addr); l2tab[l2off] = pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT; - if ( l2off == (L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_PAE - 1) ) - l2tab = NULL; l1pfn++; } @@ -330,8 +328,13 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_32_pae(str if ( (addr >= dom->pgtables_seg.vstart) && (addr < dom->pgtables_seg.vend) ) l1tab[l1off] &= ~_PAGE_RW; /* page tables are r/o */ + if ( l1off == (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_PAE - 1) ) + { l1tab = NULL; + if ( l2off == (L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_PAE - 1) ) + l2tab = NULL; + } } if ( dom->virt_pgtab_end <= 0xc0000000 ) @@ -379,7 +382,7 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct l3_pgentry_64_t *l3tab = NULL; l2_pgentry_64_t *l2tab = NULL; l1_pgentry_64_t *l1tab = NULL; - uint64_t l4off, l3off, l2off, l1off; + uint64_t l4off, l3off = 0, l2off = 0, l1off; uint64_t addr; xen_pfn_t pgpfn; @@ -410,8 +413,6 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct l3off = l3_table_offset_x86_64(addr); l3tab[l3off] = pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l2pfn)) | L3_PROT; - if ( l3off == (L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_X86_64 - 1) ) - l3tab = NULL; l2pfn++; } @@ -424,8 +425,6 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct l2off = l2_table_offset_x86_64(addr); l2tab[l2off] = pfn_to_paddr(xc_dom_p2m_guest(dom, l1pfn)) | L2_PROT; - if ( l2off == (L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_X86_64 - 1) ) - l2tab = NULL; l1pfn++; } @@ -437,8 +436,17 @@ static int setup_pgtables_x86_64(struct if ( (addr >= dom->pgtables_seg.vstart) && (addr < dom->pgtables_seg.vend) ) l1tab[l1off] &= ~_PAGE_RW; /* page tables are r/o */ + if ( l1off == (L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_X86_64 - 1) ) + { l1tab = NULL; + if ( l2off == (L2_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_X86_64 - 1) ) + { + l2tab = NULL; + if ( l3off == (L3_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES_X86_64 - 1) ) + l3tab = NULL; + } + } } return 0; ++++++ 27515-cpufreq-missing-check-of-copy_from_guest.patch ++++++ # Commit 803f9a6cdfeda64beee908576de0ad02d6b0c480 # Date 2013-09-12 17:47:08 +0100 # Author Tim Deegan # Committer Tim Deegan cpufreq: missing check of copy_from_guest() Coverity CID 1055131 Coverity CID 1055132 Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper Acked-by: Jan Beulich --- a/xen/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c +++ b/xen/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c @@ -471,8 +471,12 @@ int set_px_pminfo(uint32_t acpi_id, stru ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - copy_from_guest(pxpt->states, dom0_px_info->states, - dom0_px_info->state_count); + if ( copy_from_guest(pxpt->states, dom0_px_info->states, + dom0_px_info->state_count) ) + { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } pxpt->state_count = dom0_px_info->state_count; if ( cpufreq_verbose ) ++++++ 27519-x86-machine_restart-must-not-call-acpi_dmar_reinstate-twice.patch ++++++ # Commit a54dc5f4fe1eae6b1beb21326ef0338cd3969cd1 # Date 2013-09-13 14:27:34 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86: machine_restart() must not call acpi_dmar_reinstate() twice .. as that function is not idempotent (it always alters the table checksum). The (generally) duplicate call was a result from it being made before machine_restart() re-invoking itself on the boot CPU. Considering that no problem arose so far from the table corruption I doubt that we need to restore the correct table signature on the reboot path in general. The only case I can see this as potentially necessary is the tboot one, hence do the call just in that case. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c @@ -310,8 +310,6 @@ void machine_restart(unsigned int delay_ console_start_sync(); spin_debug_disable(); - acpi_dmar_reinstate(); - local_irq_enable(); /* Ensure we are the boot CPU. */ @@ -336,7 +334,10 @@ void machine_restart(unsigned int delay_ mdelay(delay_millisecs); if ( tboot_in_measured_env() ) + { + acpi_dmar_reinstate(); tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT); + } efi_reset_system(reboot_mode != 0); ++++++ 27549-set-mtu-from-bridge-for-tap-interface.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Charles Arnold # Date 1379427987 -3600 # Node ID e6da6ffd6749237316d4440799f0a0272bbdae9c # Parent 5597ce99ec7f2587a29f3b2dee0bde98d59bf327 tools/hotplug: set mtu from bridge for tap interface With changeset 22885 support was added for setting the MTU in the vif-bridge script for when a vif interface was set to 'online'. The was not done for the 'add' operation. The 'add' operation was added to the script for when tap devices were specified (c/s 21944). With the setting of the MTU for the 'online' case was there a reason for omitting the 'add'? This patch sets the MTU for both 'online' and 'add' in the vif-bridge script. Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold Acked-by: Ian Campbell Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge @@ -82,11 +82,7 @@ fi case "$command" in online) setup_virtual_bridge_port "$dev" - mtu="`ip link show $bridge | awk '/mtu/ { print $5 }'`" - if [ -n "$mtu" ] && [ "$mtu" -gt 0 ] - then - ip link set $dev mtu $mtu || : - fi + set_mtu "$bridge" "$dev" add_to_bridge "$bridge" "$dev" ;; @@ -97,6 +93,7 @@ case "$command" in add) setup_virtual_bridge_port "$dev" + set_mtu "$bridge" "$dev" add_to_bridge "$bridge" "$dev" ;; esac Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-network-common.sh @@ -132,3 +132,13 @@ add_to_bridge () { ip link set ${dev} up } +# Usage: set_mtu bridge dev +set_mtu () { + local bridge=$1 + local dev=$2 + mtu="`ip link show ${bridge}| awk '/mtu/ { print $5 }'`" + if [ -n "$mtu" ] && [ "$mtu" -gt 0 ] + then + ip link set ${dev} mtu $mtu || : + fi +} ++++++ 27582-x86-HVM-fix-failure-path-in-hvm_vcpu_initialise.patch ++++++ # Commit 925fbcb7fdd6238f26b1576dc1f3e297f1f24f1e # Date 2013-09-18 14:45:24 +0200 # Author George Dunlap # Committer Jan Beulich x86/HVM: fix failure path in hvm_vcpu_initialise It looks like one of the failure cases in hvm_vcpu_initialise jumps to the wrong label; this could lead to slow leaks if something isn't cleaned up properly. I will probably change these labels in a future patch, but I figured it was better to have this fix separately. This is also a candidate for backport. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ int hvm_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v) /* Create bufioreq event channel. */ rc = alloc_unbound_xen_event_channel(v, 0, NULL); if ( rc < 0 ) - goto fail2; + goto fail4; v->domain->arch.hvm_domain.params[HVM_PARAM_BUFIOREQ_EVTCHN] = rc; } ++++++ 27583-VMX-fix-failure-path-in-construct_vmcs.patch ++++++ # Commit dad7e45bf44c0569546a3ed7d0fa4182a4a73f0a # Date 2013-09-18 14:45:42 +0200 # Author George Dunlap # Committer Jan Beulich VMX: fix failure path in construct_vmcs If the allocation fails, make sure to call vmx_vmcs_exit(). This is a candidate for backport. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -841,7 +841,10 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v unsigned long *msr_bitmap = alloc_xenheap_page(); if ( msr_bitmap == NULL ) + { + vmx_vmcs_exit(v); return -ENOMEM; + } memset(msr_bitmap, ~0, PAGE_SIZE); v->arch.hvm_vmx.msr_bitmap = msr_bitmap; ++++++ 27586-x86-HVM-properly-handle-wide-MMIO.patch ++++++ # Commit 3b89f08a498ddac09d4002d9849e329018ceb107 # Date 2013-09-20 11:01:08 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86/HVM: properly handle MMIO reads and writes wider than a machine word Just like real hardware we ought to split such accesses transparently to the caller. With little extra effort we can at once even handle page crossing accesses correctly. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c @@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ static int __hvmemul_read( { struct vcpu *curr = current; unsigned long addr, reps = 1; + unsigned int off, chunk = min(bytes, 1U << LONG_BYTEORDER); uint32_t pfec = PFEC_page_present; struct hvm_vcpu_io *vio = &curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io; paddr_t gpa; @@ -447,16 +448,38 @@ static int __hvmemul_read( seg, offset, bytes, &reps, access_type, hvmemul_ctxt, &addr); if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) return rc; + off = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + /* + * We only need to handle sizes actual instruction operands can have. All + * such sizes are either powers of 2 or the sum of two powers of 2. Thus + * picking as initial chunk size the largest power of 2 not greater than + * the total size will always result in only power-of-2 size requests + * issued to hvmemul_do_mmio() (hvmemul_do_io() rejects non-powers-of-2). + */ + while ( chunk & (chunk - 1) ) + chunk &= chunk - 1; + if ( off + bytes > PAGE_SIZE ) + while ( off & (chunk - 1) ) + chunk >>= 1; if ( unlikely(vio->mmio_gva == (addr & PAGE_MASK)) && vio->mmio_gva ) { - unsigned int off = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); if ( access_type == hvm_access_insn_fetch ) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; gpa = (((paddr_t)vio->mmio_gpfn << PAGE_SHIFT) | off); - if ( (off + bytes) <= PAGE_SIZE ) - return hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, bytes, 0, - IOREQ_READ, 0, p_data); + while ( (off + chunk) <= PAGE_SIZE ) + { + rc = hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, chunk, 0, IOREQ_READ, 0, p_data); + if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY || bytes == chunk ) + return rc; + addr += chunk; + off += chunk; + gpa += chunk; + p_data += chunk; + bytes -= chunk; + if ( bytes < chunk ) + chunk = bytes; + } } if ( (seg != x86_seg_none) && @@ -473,14 +496,32 @@ static int __hvmemul_read( return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION; case HVMCOPY_unhandleable: return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; - case HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn: + case HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn: if ( access_type == hvm_access_insn_fetch ) return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; - rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys( - addr, &gpa, bytes, &reps, pfec, hvmemul_ctxt); - if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) - return rc; - return hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, bytes, 0, IOREQ_READ, 0, p_data); + rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys(addr, &gpa, chunk, &reps, pfec, + hvmemul_ctxt); + while ( rc == X86EMUL_OKAY ) + { + rc = hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, chunk, 0, IOREQ_READ, 0, p_data); + if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY || bytes == chunk ) + break; + addr += chunk; + off += chunk; + p_data += chunk; + bytes -= chunk; + if ( bytes < chunk ) + chunk = bytes; + if ( off < PAGE_SIZE ) + gpa += chunk; + else + { + rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys(addr, &gpa, chunk, &reps, pfec, + hvmemul_ctxt); + off = 0; + } + } + return rc; case HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out: return X86EMUL_RETRY; case HVMCOPY_gfn_shared: @@ -537,6 +578,7 @@ static int hvmemul_write( container_of(ctxt, struct hvm_emulate_ctxt, ctxt); struct vcpu *curr = current; unsigned long addr, reps = 1; + unsigned int off, chunk = min(bytes, 1U << LONG_BYTEORDER); uint32_t pfec = PFEC_page_present | PFEC_write_access; struct hvm_vcpu_io *vio = &curr->arch.hvm_vcpu.hvm_io; paddr_t gpa; @@ -546,14 +588,30 @@ static int hvmemul_write( seg, offset, bytes, &reps, hvm_access_write, hvmemul_ctxt, &addr); if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) return rc; + off = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + /* See the respective comment in __hvmemul_read(). */ + while ( chunk & (chunk - 1) ) + chunk &= chunk - 1; + if ( off + bytes > PAGE_SIZE ) + while ( off & (chunk - 1) ) + chunk >>= 1; if ( unlikely(vio->mmio_gva == (addr & PAGE_MASK)) && vio->mmio_gva ) { - unsigned int off = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); gpa = (((paddr_t)vio->mmio_gpfn << PAGE_SHIFT) | off); - if ( (off + bytes) <= PAGE_SIZE ) - return hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, bytes, 0, - IOREQ_WRITE, 0, p_data); + while ( (off + chunk) <= PAGE_SIZE ) + { + rc = hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, chunk, 0, IOREQ_WRITE, 0, p_data); + if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY || bytes == chunk ) + return rc; + addr += chunk; + off += chunk; + gpa += chunk; + p_data += chunk; + bytes -= chunk; + if ( bytes < chunk ) + chunk = bytes; + } } if ( (seg != x86_seg_none) && @@ -569,12 +627,29 @@ static int hvmemul_write( case HVMCOPY_unhandleable: return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; case HVMCOPY_bad_gfn_to_mfn: - rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys( - addr, &gpa, bytes, &reps, pfec, hvmemul_ctxt); - if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) - return rc; - return hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, bytes, 0, - IOREQ_WRITE, 0, p_data); + rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys(addr, &gpa, chunk, &reps, pfec, + hvmemul_ctxt); + while ( rc == X86EMUL_OKAY ) + { + rc = hvmemul_do_mmio(gpa, &reps, chunk, 0, IOREQ_WRITE, 0, p_data); + if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY || bytes == chunk ) + break; + addr += chunk; + off += chunk; + p_data += chunk; + bytes -= chunk; + if ( bytes < chunk ) + chunk = bytes; + if ( off < PAGE_SIZE ) + gpa += chunk; + else + { + rc = hvmemul_linear_to_phys(addr, &gpa, chunk, &reps, pfec, + hvmemul_ctxt); + off = 0; + } + } + return rc; case HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out: return X86EMUL_RETRY; case HVMCOPY_gfn_shared: ++++++ 27611-x86-HVM-linear-address-must-be-canonical-for-the-whole-accessed-range.patch ++++++ # Commit 7f12732670b31b2fea899a4160d455574658474f # Date 2013-09-23 09:53:55 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86/HVM: linear address must be canonical for the whole accessed range ... rather than just for the first byte. While at it, also - make the real mode case at least dpo a wrap around check - drop the mis-named "gpf" label (we're not generating faults here) and use in-place returns instead Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -1960,8 +1960,7 @@ int hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr( unsigned int addr_size, unsigned long *linear_addr) { - unsigned long addr = offset; - uint32_t last_byte; + unsigned long addr = offset, last_byte; if ( !(current->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] & X86_CR0_PE) ) { @@ -1970,6 +1969,9 @@ int hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr( * Certain of them are not done in native real mode anyway. */ addr = (uint32_t)(addr + reg->base); + last_byte = (uint32_t)addr + bytes - 1; + if ( last_byte < addr ) + return 0; } else if ( addr_size != 64 ) { @@ -1981,17 +1983,17 @@ int hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr( { case hvm_access_read: if ( (reg->attr.fields.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ) - goto gpf; /* execute-only code segment */ + return 0; /* execute-only code segment */ break; case hvm_access_write: if ( (reg->attr.fields.type & 0xa) != 0x2 ) - goto gpf; /* not a writable data segment */ + return 0; /* not a writable data segment */ break; default: break; } - last_byte = offset + bytes - 1; + last_byte = (uint32_t)offset + bytes - 1; /* Is this a grows-down data segment? Special limit check if so. */ if ( (reg->attr.fields.type & 0xc) == 0x4 ) @@ -2002,10 +2004,10 @@ int hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr( /* Check first byte and last byte against respective bounds. */ if ( (offset <= reg->limit) || (last_byte < offset) ) - goto gpf; + return 0; } else if ( (last_byte > reg->limit) || (last_byte < offset) ) - goto gpf; /* last byte is beyond limit or wraps 0xFFFFFFFF */ + return 0; /* last byte is beyond limit or wraps 0xFFFFFFFF */ /* * Hardware truncates to 32 bits in compatibility mode. @@ -2022,15 +2024,14 @@ int hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr( if ( (seg == x86_seg_fs) || (seg == x86_seg_gs) ) addr += reg->base; - if ( !is_canonical_address(addr) ) - goto gpf; + last_byte = addr + bytes - 1; + if ( !is_canonical_address(addr) || last_byte < addr || + !is_canonical_address(last_byte) ) + return 0; } *linear_addr = addr; return 1; - - gpf: - return 0; } /* On non-NULL return, we leave this function holding an additional ++++++ 27612-x86-HVM-refuse-doing-string-operations-in-certain-situations.patch ++++++ # Commit 14fcce2fa883405bab26b60821a6cc5f2c770833 # Date 2013-09-23 09:55:14 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86/HVM: refuse doing string operations in certain situations We shouldn't do any acceleration for - "rep movs" when either side is passed through MMIO or when both sides are handled by qemu - "rep ins" and "rep outs" when the memory operand is any kind of MMIO Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c @@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static int hvmemul_rep_ins( unsigned long addr; uint32_t pfec = PFEC_page_present | PFEC_write_access; paddr_t gpa; + p2m_type_t p2mt; int rc; rc = hvmemul_virtual_to_linear( @@ -702,6 +703,10 @@ static int hvmemul_rep_ins( if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) return rc; + (void) get_gfn_query_unlocked(current->domain, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &p2mt); + if ( p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm ) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + return hvmemul_do_pio(src_port, reps, bytes_per_rep, gpa, IOREQ_READ, !!(ctxt->regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF), NULL); } @@ -719,6 +724,7 @@ static int hvmemul_rep_outs( unsigned long addr; uint32_t pfec = PFEC_page_present; paddr_t gpa; + p2m_type_t p2mt; int rc; rc = hvmemul_virtual_to_linear( @@ -735,6 +741,10 @@ static int hvmemul_rep_outs( if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY ) return rc; + (void) get_gfn_query_unlocked(current->domain, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &p2mt); + if ( p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct || p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm ) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + return hvmemul_do_pio(dst_port, reps, bytes_per_rep, gpa, IOREQ_WRITE, !!(ctxt->regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_DF), NULL); } @@ -787,6 +797,10 @@ static int hvmemul_rep_movs( (void) get_gfn_query_unlocked(current->domain, sgpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &sp2mt); (void) get_gfn_query_unlocked(current->domain, dgpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &dp2mt); + if ( sp2mt == p2m_mmio_direct || dp2mt == p2m_mmio_direct || + (sp2mt == p2m_mmio_dm && dp2mt == p2m_mmio_dm) ) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if ( sp2mt == p2m_mmio_dm ) return hvmemul_do_mmio( sgpa, reps, bytes_per_rep, dgpa, IOREQ_READ, df, NULL); ++++++ 27691-x86-percpu-Force-INVALID_PERCPU_AREA-into-the-non-canonical-address-region.patch ++++++ # Commit 7cfb0053629c4dd1a6f01dc43cca7c0c25b8b7bf # Date 2013-10-04 12:24:34 +0200 # Author Andrew Cooper # Committer Jan Beulich x86-64/percpu: Force INVALID_PERCPU_AREA into the non-canonical address region This causes accidental uses of per_cpu() on a pcpu with an INVALID_PERCPU_AREA to result in a #GF for attempting to access the middle of the non-canonical virtual address region. This is preferable to the current behaviour, where incorrect use of per_cpu() will result in an effective NULL structure dereference which has security implication in the context of PV guests. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/percpu.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/percpu.c @@ -6,7 +6,17 @@ #include unsigned long __per_cpu_offset[NR_CPUS]; +#ifdef __i386__ #define INVALID_PERCPU_AREA (-(long)__per_cpu_start) +#else +/* + * Force uses of per_cpu() with an invalid area to attempt to access the + * middle of the non-canonical address space resulting in a #GP, rather than a + * possible #PF at (NULL + a little) which has security implications in the + * context of PV guests. + */ +#define INVALID_PERCPU_AREA (0x8000000000000000L - (long)__per_cpu_start) +#endif #define PERCPU_ORDER (get_order_from_bytes(__per_cpu_data_end-__per_cpu_start)) void __init percpu_init_areas(void) ++++++ 27692-Nested-VMX-check-VMX-capability-before-read-VMX-related-MSRs.patch ++++++ # Commit 190b667ac20e8175758f4a3a0f13c4d990e6af7e # Date 2013-10-04 12:28:14 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: check VMX capability before read VMX related MSRs VMX MSRs only available when the CPU support the VMX feature. In addition, VMX_TRUE* MSRs only available when bit 55 of VMX_BASIC MSR is set. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Cleanup. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Jun Nakajima Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool_t, vmxon); static u32 vmcs_revision_id __read_mostly; +u64 __read_mostly vmx_basic_msr; static void __init vmx_display_features(void) { @@ -308,6 +309,8 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) vmx_vmexit_control = _vmx_vmexit_control; vmx_vmentry_control = _vmx_vmentry_control; cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr_info = !!(vmx_basic_msr_high & (1U<<22)); + vmx_basic_msr = ((u64)vmx_basic_msr_high << 32) | + vmx_basic_msr_low; vmx_display_features(); } else Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1339,12 +1339,33 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_ */ int nvmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, u64 *msr_content) { + unsigned int ecx, dummy; u64 data = 0, tmp; int r = 1; if ( !nestedhvm_enabled(current->domain) ) return 0; + /* VMX capablity MSRs are available only when guest supports VMX. */ + hvm_cpuid(0x1, &dummy, &dummy, &ecx, &dummy); + if ( !(ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VMXE)) ) + return 0; + + /* + * Those MSRs are available only when bit 55 of + * MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC is set. + */ + switch ( msr ) + { + case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS: + case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS: + case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS: + case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS: + if ( !(vmx_basic_msr & VMX_BASIC_DEFAULT1_ZERO) ) + return 0; + break; + } + /* * Remove unsupport features from n1 guest capability MSR */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h @@ -261,6 +261,14 @@ extern bool_t cpu_has_vmx_ins_outs_instr #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_SMI 0x00000004 #define VMX_INTR_SHADOW_NMI 0x00000008 +/* + * bit 55 of IA32_VMX_BASIC MSR, indicating whether any VMX controls that + * default to 1 may be cleared to 0. + */ +#define VMX_BASIC_DEFAULT1_ZERO (1ULL << 55) + +extern u64 vmx_basic_msr; + /* Guest interrupt status */ #define VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SUBFIELD_BITMASK 0x0FF #define VMX_GUEST_INTR_STATUS_SVI_OFFSET 8 ++++++ 27694-Nested-VMX-fix-IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1-msr-emulation.patch ++++++ # Commit c6f92aed0e209df823d2cb5780dbb1ea12fc6d4a # Date 2013-10-04 12:30:09 +0200 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: fix IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 msr emulation Currently, it use hardcode value for IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1. This is wrong. We should check guest's cpuid to know which bits are writeable in CR4 by guest and allow the guest to set the corresponding bit only when guest has the feature. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Cleanup. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Jun Nakajima Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_ */ int nvmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, u64 *msr_content) { - unsigned int ecx, dummy; + unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, dummy; u64 data = 0, tmp; int r = 1; @@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ int nvmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int return 0; /* VMX capablity MSRs are available only when guest supports VMX. */ - hvm_cpuid(0x1, &dummy, &dummy, &ecx, &dummy); + hvm_cpuid(0x1, &dummy, &dummy, &ecx, &edx); if ( !(ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VMXE)) ) return 0; @@ -1440,8 +1440,55 @@ int nvmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int data = X86_CR4_VMXE; break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1: - /* allow 0-settings except SMXE */ - data = 0x267ff & ~X86_CR4_SMXE; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VME) ) + data |= X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_TSC) ) + data |= X86_CR4_TSD; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_DE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_DE; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PSE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_PSE; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PAE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_PAE; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MCE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_MCE; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PGE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_PGE; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FXSR) ) + data |= X86_CR4_OSFXSR; + if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XMM) ) + data |= X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT; + if ( ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VMXE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_VMXE; + if ( ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMXE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_SMXE; + if ( ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_PCID) ) + data |= X86_CR4_PCIDE; + if ( ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_OSXSAVE; + + hvm_cpuid(0x0, &eax, &dummy, &dummy, &dummy); + switch ( eax ) + { + default: + hvm_cpuid(0xa, &eax, &dummy, &dummy, &dummy); + /* Check whether guest has the perf monitor feature. */ + if ( (eax & 0xff) && (eax & 0xff00) ) + data |= X86_CR4_PCE; + /* fall through */ + case 0x7 ... 0x9: + ecx = 0; + hvm_cpuid(0x7, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &dummy); + if ( ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ) + data |= X86_CR4_FSGSBASE; + if ( ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP) ) + data |= X86_CR4_SMEP; + if ( ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP) ) + data |= X86_CR4_SMAP; + /* fall through */ + case 0x0 ... 0x6: + break; + } break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC: gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "VMX MSR %x not fully supported yet.\n", msr); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h @@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID (7*32+10) /* Invalidate Process Context ID */ #define X86_FEATURE_RTM (7*32+11) /* Restricted Transactional Memory */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_FPU_SEL (7*32+13) /* FPU CS/DS stored as zero */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP (7*32+20) /* Supervisor Mode Access Prevention */ #define cpu_has(c, bit) test_bit(bit, (c)->x86_capability) #define boot_cpu_has(bit) test_bit(bit, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ #define X86_CR4_PCIDE 0x20000 /* enable PCID */ #define X86_CR4_OSXSAVE 0x40000 /* enable XSAVE/XRSTOR */ #define X86_CR4_SMEP 0x100000/* enable SMEP */ +#define X86_CR4_SMAP 0x200000/* enable SMAP */ /* * Trap/fault mnemonics. ++++++ 27756-pygrub-xvda-style-disk.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Ian Campbell # Date 1381768836 -3600 # Node ID 2bddf95a879f3e75dff243a340493985f6502d5b # Parent 522b00942ed31f8194d3c551b01bea824d5bda83 pygrub: Support (/dev/xvda) style disk specifications You get these if you install Debian Wheezy as HVM and then try to convert to PV. This is Debian bug #603391. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell Tested-by: Tril Acked-by: Ian Jackson diff -r 522b00942ed3 -r 2bddf95a879f tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py --- a/tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py Mon Oct 14 10:25:39 2013 +0200 +++ b/tools/pygrub/src/GrubConf.py Mon Oct 14 17:40:36 2013 +0100 @@ -67,7 +67,11 @@ class GrubDiskPart(object): return self._disk def set_disk(self, val): val = val.replace("(", "").replace(")", "") - self._disk = int(val[2:]) + if val.startswith("/dev/xvd"): + disk = val[len("/dev/xvd")] + self._disk = ord(disk)-ord('a') + else: + self._disk = int(val[2:]) disk = property(get_disk, set_disk) def get_part(self): ++++++ 27764-x86-print-relevant-tail-part-of-filename-for-warnings-and-crashes.patch ++++++ # Commit f72cb6bbc10348f4f7671428e5db509731e9e6a5 # Date 2013-10-17 11:35:26 +0200 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86: print relevant (tail) part of filename for warnings and crashes In particular when the origin construct is in a header file (and hence the file name is an absolute path instead of just the file name portion) the information can otherwise become rather useless when the build tree isn't sitting relatively close to the file system root. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs { struct bug_frame bug; struct bug_frame_str bug_str; - const char *p, *filename, *predicate, *eip = (char *)regs->eip; + const char *p, *prefix = "", *filename, *predicate, *eip = (char *)regs->eip; unsigned long fixup; int id, lineno; @@ -1032,12 +1032,19 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs } /* WARN, BUG or ASSERT: decode the filename pointer and line number. */ - filename = p; + fixup = strlen(p); + if ( fixup > 50 ) + { + filename = p + fixup - 47; + prefix = "..."; + } + else + filename = p; lineno = bug.id >> 2; if ( id == BUGFRAME_warn ) { - printk("Xen WARN at %.50s:%d\n", filename, lineno); + printk("Xen WARN at %s%s:%d\n", prefix, filename, lineno); show_execution_state(regs); regs->eip = (unsigned long)eip; return; @@ -1045,10 +1052,10 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs if ( id == BUGFRAME_bug ) { - printk("Xen BUG at %.50s:%d\n", filename, lineno); + printk("Xen BUG at %s%s:%d\n", prefix, filename, lineno); DEBUGGER_trap_fatal(TRAP_invalid_op, regs); show_execution_state(regs); - panic("Xen BUG at %.50s:%d\n", filename, lineno); + panic("Xen BUG at %s%s:%d\n", prefix, filename, lineno); } /* ASSERT: decode the predicate string pointer. */ @@ -1062,12 +1069,12 @@ void do_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs if ( !is_kernel(predicate) ) predicate = "<unknown>"; - printk("Assertion '%s' failed at %.50s:%d\n", - predicate, filename, lineno); + printk("Assertion '%s' failed at %s%s:%d\n", + predicate, prefix, filename, lineno); DEBUGGER_trap_fatal(TRAP_invalid_op, regs); show_execution_state(regs); - panic("Assertion '%s' failed at %.50s:%d\n", - predicate, filename, lineno); + panic("Assertion '%s' failed at %s%s:%d\n", + predicate, prefix, filename, lineno); die: if ( (fixup = search_exception_table(regs->eip)) != 0 ) ++++++ 27870-x86-idle-reduce-contention-on-ACPI-register-accesses.patch ++++++ References: bnc#842417 # Commit 178fd279dc138243b514b4ecd48509e4bf5d1ede # Date 2013-11-11 11:01:04 +0100 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86/idle: reduce contention on ACPI register accesses Other than when they're located in I/O port space, accessing them when in MMIO space (currently) implies usage of some sort of global lock: In -unstable this would be due to the use of vmap(), is older trees the necessary locking was introduced by 2ee9cbf9 ("ACPI: fix acpi_os_map_memory()"). This contention was observed to result in Dom0 kernel soft lockups during the loading of the ACPI processor driver there on systems with very many CPU cores. There are a couple of things being done for this: - re-order elements of an if() condition so that the register access only happens when we really need it - turn off arbitration disabling only when the first CPU leaves C3 (paralleling how arbitration disabling gets turned on) - only set the (global) bus master reload flag once (when the first target CPU gets processed) Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Keir Fraser --- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static void acpi_processor_idle(void) (next_state = cpuidle_current_governor->select(power)) > 0 ) { cx = &power->states[next_state]; - if ( power->flags.bm_check && acpi_idle_bm_check() - && cx->type == ACPI_STATE_C3 ) + if ( cx->type == ACPI_STATE_C3 && power->flags.bm_check && + acpi_idle_bm_check() ) cx = power->safe_state; if ( cx->idx > max_cstate ) cx = &power->states[max_cstate]; @@ -551,8 +551,8 @@ static void acpi_processor_idle(void) { /* Enable bus master arbitration */ spin_lock(&c3_cpu_status.lock); - acpi_set_register(ACPI_BITREG_ARB_DISABLE, 0); - c3_cpu_status.count--; + if ( c3_cpu_status.count-- == num_online_cpus() ) + acpi_set_register(ACPI_BITREG_ARB_DISABLE, 0); spin_unlock(&c3_cpu_status.lock); } @@ -837,12 +837,10 @@ static int check_cx(struct acpi_processo } /* All the logic here assumes flags.bm_check is same across all CPUs */ - if ( bm_check_flag == -1 ) + if ( bm_check_flag < 0 ) { /* Determine whether bm_check is needed based on CPU */ acpi_processor_power_init_bm_check(&(power->flags)); - bm_check_flag = power->flags.bm_check; - bm_control_flag = power->flags.bm_control; } else { @@ -869,14 +867,13 @@ static int check_cx(struct acpi_processo } } /* - * On older chipsets, BM_RLD needs to be set - * in order for Bus Master activity to wake the - * system from C3. Newer chipsets handle DMA - * during C3 automatically and BM_RLD is a NOP. - * In either case, the proper way to - * handle BM_RLD is to set it and leave it set. + * On older chipsets, BM_RLD needs to be set in order for Bus + * Master activity to wake the system from C3, hence + * acpi_set_register() is always being called once below. Newer + * chipsets handle DMA during C3 automatically and BM_RLD is a + * NOP. In either case, the proper way to handle BM_RLD is to + * set it and leave it set. */ - acpi_set_register(ACPI_BITREG_BUS_MASTER_RLD, 1); } else { @@ -891,7 +888,13 @@ static int check_cx(struct acpi_processo " for C3 to be enabled on SMP systems\n")); return -EINVAL; } - acpi_set_register(ACPI_BITREG_BUS_MASTER_RLD, 0); + } + + if ( bm_check_flag < 0 ) + { + bm_check_flag = power->flags.bm_check; + bm_control_flag = power->flags.bm_control; + acpi_set_register(ACPI_BITREG_BUS_MASTER_RLD, bm_check_flag); } break; ++++++ 27925-nested-SVM-adjust-guest-handling-of-structure-mappings.patch ++++++ # Commit b1e87805bf37b446dade93a7eb922bb7d1269756 # Date 2013-11-12 11:51:15 +0100 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich nested SVM: adjust guest handling of structure mappings For one, nestedsvm_vmcb_map() error checking must not consist of using assertions: Mappings can legitimately fail. And then the I/O port access bitmap handling was broken: It checked only to first of the accessed ports rather than each of them. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Christoph Egger Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static int nsvm_vmrun_permissionmap(stru unsigned int i; enum hvm_copy_result ret; unsigned long *ns_viomap; - bool_t ioport_80, ioport_ed; + bool_t ioport_80 = 1, ioport_ed = 1; ns_msrpm_ptr = (unsigned long *)svm->ns_cached_msrpm; @@ -359,10 +359,12 @@ static int nsvm_vmrun_permissionmap(stru svm->ns_iomap_pa = ns_vmcb->_iopm_base_pa; ns_viomap = hvm_map_guest_frame_ro(svm->ns_iomap_pa >> PAGE_SHIFT); - ASSERT(ns_viomap != NULL); - ioport_80 = test_bit(0x80, ns_viomap); - ioport_ed = test_bit(0xed, ns_viomap); - hvm_unmap_guest_frame(ns_viomap); + if ( ns_viomap ) + { + ioport_80 = test_bit(0x80, ns_viomap); + ioport_ed = test_bit(0xed, ns_viomap); + hvm_unmap_guest_frame(ns_viomap); + } svm->ns_iomap = nestedhvm_vcpu_iomap_get(ioport_80, ioport_ed); @@ -865,40 +867,45 @@ nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_msr(unsigned static int nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_ioio(paddr_t iopm_pa, uint64_t exitinfo1) { - unsigned long iopm_gfn = iopm_pa >> PAGE_SHIFT; - unsigned long *io_bitmap = NULL; + unsigned long gfn = iopm_pa >> PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned long *io_bitmap; ioio_info_t ioinfo; uint16_t port; + unsigned int size; bool_t enabled; - unsigned long gfn = 0; /* gcc ... */ ioinfo.bytes = exitinfo1; port = ioinfo.fields.port; + size = ioinfo.fields.sz32 ? 4 : ioinfo.fields.sz16 ? 2 : 1; - switch (port) { - case 0 ... 32767: /* first 4KB page */ - gfn = iopm_gfn; + switch ( port ) + { + case 0 ... 8 * PAGE_SIZE - 1: /* first 4KB page */ break; - case 32768 ... 65535: /* second 4KB page */ - port -= 32768; - gfn = iopm_gfn + 1; + case 8 * PAGE_SIZE ... 2 * 8 * PAGE_SIZE - 1: /* second 4KB page */ + port -= 8 * PAGE_SIZE; + ++gfn; break; default: BUG(); break; } - io_bitmap = hvm_map_guest_frame_ro(gfn); - if (io_bitmap == NULL) { - gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, - "IOIO intercept: mapping of permission map failed\n"); - return NESTEDHVM_VMEXIT_ERROR; + for ( io_bitmap = hvm_map_guest_frame_ro(gfn); ; ) + { + enabled = io_bitmap && test_bit(port, io_bitmap); + if ( !enabled || !--size ) + break; + if ( unlikely(++port == 8 * PAGE_SIZE) ) + { + hvm_unmap_guest_frame(io_bitmap); + io_bitmap = hvm_map_guest_frame_ro(++gfn); + port -= 8 * PAGE_SIZE; + } } - - enabled = test_bit(port, io_bitmap); hvm_unmap_guest_frame(io_bitmap); - if (!enabled) + if ( !enabled ) return NESTEDHVM_VMEXIT_HOST; return NESTEDHVM_VMEXIT_INJECT; @@ -965,8 +972,8 @@ nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_exitcode(stru switch (exitcode) { case VMEXIT_MSR: ASSERT(regs != NULL); - nestedsvm_vmcb_map(v, nv->nv_vvmcxaddr); - ASSERT(nv->nv_vvmcx != NULL); + if ( !nestedsvm_vmcb_map(v, nv->nv_vvmcxaddr) ) + break; ns_vmcb = nv->nv_vvmcx; vmexits = nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_msr(svm->ns_cached_msrpm, regs->ecx, ns_vmcb->exitinfo1 != 0); @@ -974,8 +981,8 @@ nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_exitcode(stru return 0; break; case VMEXIT_IOIO: - nestedsvm_vmcb_map(v, nv->nv_vvmcxaddr); - ASSERT(nv->nv_vvmcx != NULL); + if ( !nestedsvm_vmcb_map(v, nv->nv_vvmcxaddr) ) + break; ns_vmcb = nv->nv_vvmcx; vmexits = nsvm_vmcb_guest_intercepts_ioio(ns_vmcb->_iopm_base_pa, ns_vmcb->exitinfo1); ++++++ 27963-nested-VMX-don-t-ignore-mapping-errors.patch ++++++ # Commit e02b14e531a95399fc9d8647ec3cc6f310a7d455 # Date 2013-11-18 09:39:01 +0100 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich nested VMX: don't ignore mapping errors Rather than ignoring failures to map the virtual VMCS as well as MSR or I/O port bitmaps, convert those into failures of the respective instructions (avoiding to dereference NULL pointers). Ultimately such failures should be handled transparently (by using transient mappings when they actually need to be accessed, just like nested SVM does). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper Acked-by: Eddie Dong --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static void __clear_current_vvmcs(struct __vmpclear(virt_to_maddr(nvcpu->nv_n2vmcx)); } -static void __map_io_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u64 vmcs_reg) +static bool_t __must_check _map_io_bitmap(struct vcpu *v, u64 vmcs_reg) { struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v); unsigned long gpa; @@ -600,12 +600,14 @@ static void __map_io_bitmap(struct vcpu hvm_unmap_guest_frame (nvmx->iobitmap[index]); gpa = __get_vvmcs(vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcx, vmcs_reg); nvmx->iobitmap[index] = hvm_map_guest_frame_ro(gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); + + return nvmx->iobitmap[index] != NULL; } -static inline void map_io_bitmap_all(struct vcpu *v) +static inline bool_t __must_check map_io_bitmap_all(struct vcpu *v) { - __map_io_bitmap (v, IO_BITMAP_A); - __map_io_bitmap (v, IO_BITMAP_B); + return _map_io_bitmap(v, IO_BITMAP_A) && + _map_io_bitmap(v, IO_BITMAP_B); } static void nvmx_purge_vvmcs(struct vcpu *v) @@ -1211,8 +1213,14 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmptrld(struct cpu_user_ if ( nvcpu->nv_vvmcxaddr == VMCX_EADDR ) { nvcpu->nv_vvmcx = hvm_map_guest_frame_rw(gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); - nvcpu->nv_vvmcxaddr = gpa; - map_io_bitmap_all (v); + if ( nvcpu->nv_vvmcx ) + nvcpu->nv_vvmcxaddr = gpa; + if ( !nvcpu->nv_vvmcx || + !map_io_bitmap_all(v) ) + { + vmreturn(regs, VMFAIL_VALID); + goto out; + } } vmreturn(regs, VMSUCCEED); @@ -1316,6 +1324,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_ struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v); unsigned long operand; u64 vmcs_encoding; + bool_t okay = 1; if ( decode_vmx_inst(regs, &decode, &operand, 0) != X86EMUL_OKAY ) @@ -1324,13 +1333,18 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_ vmcs_encoding = reg_read(regs, decode.reg2); __set_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, vmcs_encoding, operand); - if ( vmcs_encoding == IO_BITMAP_A || vmcs_encoding == IO_BITMAP_A_HIGH ) - __map_io_bitmap (v, IO_BITMAP_A); - else if ( vmcs_encoding == IO_BITMAP_B || - vmcs_encoding == IO_BITMAP_B_HIGH ) - __map_io_bitmap (v, IO_BITMAP_B); + switch ( vmcs_encoding ) + { + case IO_BITMAP_A: case IO_BITMAP_A_HIGH: + okay = _map_io_bitmap(v, IO_BITMAP_A); + break; + case IO_BITMAP_B: case IO_BITMAP_B_HIGH: + okay = _map_io_bitmap(v, IO_BITMAP_B); + break; + } + + vmreturn(regs, okay ? VMSUCCEED : VMFAIL_VALID); - vmreturn(regs, VMSUCCEED); return X86EMUL_OKAY; } ++++++ 28103-nested-vmx-fix-I-O-port-bitmap-indexing-arithmetic.patch ++++++ # Commit b80e4583501904297d2ff5b0f905e68f81f8f2c9 # Date 2013-12-03 09:51:54 +0100 # Author Matthew Daley # Committer Jan Beulich nested vmx: fix I/O port bitmap indexing arithmetic The I/O port bitmap holds 8 ports per element, and hence the port number used when indexing into it should be shifted right by 3 bits, not 4. Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley Reviewed-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: Eddie Dong --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us { port = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION) >> 16; bitmap = nvmx->iobitmap[port >> 15]; - if ( bitmap[(port & 0x7fff) >> 4] & (1 << (port & 0x7)) ) + if ( bitmap[(port & 0x7fff) >> 3] & (1 << (port & 0x7)) ) nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; if ( !nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending ) gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "L0 PIO %x.\n", port); ++++++ 28112-nested-VMX-fix-I-O-port-exit-emulation.patch ++++++ # Commit e1978480c76e36bc22ec12657121ac91d08aca6b # Date 2013-12-04 13:23:27 +0100 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich nested VMX: fix I/O port exit emulation For multi-byte operations all affected ports' bits in the bitmap need to be checked, not just the first port's one. Reported-by: Matthew Daley Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper Acked-by: Eddie Dong --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1571,8 +1571,6 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v); struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v); u32 ctrl; - u16 port; - u8 *bitmap; nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 0; nvmx->intr.intr_info = 0; @@ -1641,12 +1639,22 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us ctrl = __n2_exec_control(v); if ( ctrl & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_IO_BITMAP ) { - port = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION) >> 16; - bitmap = nvmx->iobitmap[port >> 15]; - if ( bitmap[(port & 0x7fff) >> 3] & (1 << (port & 0x7)) ) - nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; + unsigned long qual = __vmread(EXIT_QUALIFICATION); + u16 port = qual >> 16; + u16 size = (qual & 7) + 1; + + do { + const u8 *bitmap = nvmx->iobitmap[port >> 15]; + + if ( bitmap[(port & 0x7fff) >> 3] & (1 << (port & 7)) ) + nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; + if ( !--size ) + break; + if ( !++port ) + nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; + } while ( !nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending ); if ( !nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending ) - gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "L0 PIO %x.\n", port); + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "L0 PIO %04x\n", port); } else if ( ctrl & CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING ) nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; ++++++ 28131-Nested-VMX-CR-emulation-fix-up.patch ++++++ # Commit ef17e127c4111d8e01fe208495d83d15e8834cce # Date 2013-12-06 11:08:20 +0100 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: CR emulation fix up This patch fixs two issues: 1. The CR_READ_SHADOW should only cover the value that L2 wirtes to CR when L2 is running. But currently, L0 wirtes wrong value to it during virtual vmentry and L2's CR access emualtion. 2. L2 changed cr[0/4] in a way that did not change any of L1's shadowed bits, but did change L0 shadowed bits. In this case, the effective cr[0/4] value that L1 would like to write into the hardware is consist of the L2-owned bits from the new value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest cr[0/4]. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: Eddie Dong Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -1749,6 +1749,13 @@ void hvm_shadow_handle_cd(struct vcpu *v } } +static void hvm_update_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr, unsigned long value) +{ + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[cr] = value; + nestedhvm_set_cr(v, cr, value); + hvm_update_guest_cr(v, cr); +} + int hvm_set_cr0(unsigned long value) { struct vcpu *v = current; @@ -1844,8 +1851,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr0(unsigned long value) hvm_funcs.handle_cd ) hvm_funcs.handle_cd(v, value); - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] = value; - hvm_update_guest_cr(v, 0); + hvm_update_cr(v, 0, value); if ( (value ^ old_value) & X86_CR0_PG ) { if ( !nestedhvm_vmswitch_in_progress(v) && nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) ) @@ -1926,8 +1932,7 @@ int hvm_set_cr4(unsigned long value) goto gpf; } - v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] = value; - hvm_update_guest_cr(v, 4); + hvm_update_cr(v, 4, value); hvm_memory_event_cr4(value, old_cr); /* Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1223,6 +1223,11 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct v vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v); } + if ( !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) ) + __vmwrite(CR0_READ_SHADOW, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0]); + else + nvmx_set_cr_read_shadow(v, 0); + if ( !(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] & X86_CR0_TS) ) { if ( v != current ) @@ -1271,7 +1276,6 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct v v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0] = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] | hw_cr0_mask; __vmwrite(GUEST_CR0, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0]); - __vmwrite(CR0_READ_SHADOW, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0]); /* Changing CR0 can change some bits in real CR4. */ vmx_update_guest_cr(v, 4); @@ -1296,6 +1300,12 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct v v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] = HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK; if ( paging_mode_hap(v->domain) ) v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] &= ~X86_CR4_PAE; + + if ( !nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) ) + __vmwrite(CR4_READ_SHADOW, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4]); + else + nvmx_set_cr_read_shadow(v, 4); + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] |= v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4]; if ( v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_realmode ) v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] |= X86_CR4_VME; @@ -1315,7 +1325,6 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct v v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] &= ~X86_CR4_SMEP; } __vmwrite(GUEST_CR4, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4]); - __vmwrite(CR4_READ_SHADOW, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4]); break; default: BUG(); Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -786,6 +786,8 @@ static void load_shadow_guest_state(stru for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_gstate_field); i++ ) vvmcs_to_shadow(vvmcs, vmcs_gstate_field[i]); + nvcpu->guest_cr[0] = __get_vvmcs(vvmcs, CR0_READ_SHADOW); + nvcpu->guest_cr[4] = __get_vvmcs(vvmcs, CR4_READ_SHADOW); hvm_set_cr0(__get_vvmcs(vvmcs, GUEST_CR0)); hvm_set_cr4(__get_vvmcs(vvmcs, GUEST_CR4)); hvm_set_cr3(__get_vvmcs(vvmcs, GUEST_CR3)); @@ -1765,3 +1767,45 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_us return ( nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending == 1 ); } +void nvmx_set_cr_read_shadow(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) +{ + unsigned long cr_field, read_shadow_field, mask_field; + + switch ( cr ) + { + case 0: + cr_field = GUEST_CR0; + read_shadow_field = CR0_READ_SHADOW; + mask_field = CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK; + break; + case 4: + cr_field = GUEST_CR4; + read_shadow_field = CR4_READ_SHADOW; + mask_field = CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK; + break; + default: + gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Set read shadow for CR%d.\n", cr); + return; + } + + if ( !nestedhvm_vmswitch_in_progress(v) ) + { + unsigned long virtual_cr_mask = + __get_vvmcs(vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcx, mask_field); + + /* + * We get here when L2 changed cr in a way that did not change + * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler), + * but did change L0 shadowed bits. So we first calculate the + * effective cr value that L1 would like to write into the + * hardware. It consists of the L2-owned bits from the new + * value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest cr. + */ + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[cr] &= ~virtual_cr_mask; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[cr] |= virtual_cr_mask & + __get_vvmcs(vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcx, cr_field); + } + + /* nvcpu.guest_cr is what L2 write to cr actually. */ + __vmwrite(read_shadow_field, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.nvcpu.guest_cr[cr]); +} Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/nestedhvm.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/nestedhvm.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/nestedhvm.h @@ -67,4 +67,12 @@ void nestedhvm_vmcx_flushtlb(struct p2m_ bool_t nestedhvm_is_n2(struct vcpu *v); +static inline void nestedhvm_set_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr, + unsigned long value) +{ + if ( !nestedhvm_vmswitch_in_progress(v) && + nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) ) + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.nvcpu.guest_cr[cr] = value; +} + #endif /* _HVM_NESTEDHVM_H */ Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vcpu.h @@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ struct nestedvcpu { */ bool_t nv_ioport80; bool_t nv_ioportED; + + /* L2's control-resgister, just as the L2 sees them. */ + unsigned long guest_cr[5]; }; #define vcpu_nestedhvm(v) ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.nvcpu) Index: xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.4-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h +++ xen-4.2.4-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ void nvmx_idtv_handling(void); u64 nvmx_get_tsc_offset(struct vcpu *v); int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, unsigned int exit_reason); +void nvmx_set_cr_read_shadow(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr); #endif /* __ASM_X86_HVM_VVMX_H__ */ ++++++ 28229-Nested-VMX-Setup-the-virtual-NMI-exiting-info.patch ++++++ # Commit 136058cc5ce4f1e630d5bac199304fdc9429faa3 # Date 2013-12-20 11:57:14 +0100 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: Setup the virtual NMI exiting info When inject a virtual nmi exit to L1, hypervisor need to set the virtual vmcs with right vaule which is missing in current Xen. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: Eddie Dong --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -956,6 +956,12 @@ static void sync_exception_state(struct nvmx->intr.error_code); break; case X86_EVENTTYPE_NMI: + __set_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, VM_EXIT_REASON, + EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI); + __set_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, EXIT_QUALIFICATION, 0); + __set_vvmcs(nvcpu->nv_vvmcx, VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO, + nvmx->intr.intr_info); + break; default: gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Exception state %lx not handled\n", nvmx->intr.intr_info); ++++++ 28235-VMX-apicv-Set-NMI-window-exiting-for-NMI.patch ++++++ # Commit 185e83591ce420e0b004646b55c5e4783e388531 # Date 2014-01-07 14:30:21 +0100 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich VMX,apicv: Set "NMI-window exiting" for NMI Enable NMI-window exiting if interrupt is blocked by NMI under apicv enabled platform. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c @@ -238,10 +238,11 @@ void vmx_intr_assist(void) intblk = hvm_interrupt_blocked(v, intack); if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery ) { - /* Set "Interrupt-window exiting" for ExtINT */ + /* Set "Interrupt-window exiting" for ExtINT and NMI. */ if ( (intblk != hvm_intblk_none) && - ( (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic) || - ( intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector) ) ) + (intack.source == hvm_intsrc_pic || + intack.source == hvm_intsrc_vector || + intack.source == hvm_intsrc_nmi) ) { enable_intr_window(v, intack); goto out; ++++++ 28297-nested-EPT-fixing-wrong-handling-for-L2-guest-s-direct-mmio-access.patch ++++++ # Commit 0b988ba711171b39aed9851cfe90fded50f775c5 # Date 2014-01-17 16:00:21 +0100 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich nested EPT: fixing wrong handling for L2 guest's direct mmio access L2 guest will access the physical device directly(nested VT-d). For such access, Shadow EPT table should point to device's MMIO. But in current logic, L0 doesn't distinguish the MMIO whether from qemu or physical device when building shadow EPT table. This is wrong. This patch will setup the correct shadow EPT table for such MMIO ranges. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: Tim Deegan --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_hap.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_hap.c @@ -153,8 +153,11 @@ nestedhap_walk_L0_p2m(struct p2m_domain mfn = get_gfn_type_access(p2m, L1_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, p2mt, &p2ma, 0, page_order); + rc = NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_DIRECT_MMIO; + if ( *p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct ) + goto direct_mmio_out; rc = NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_MMIO; - if ( p2m_is_mmio(*p2mt) ) + if ( *p2mt == p2m_mmio_dm ) goto out; rc = NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_L0_ERROR; @@ -167,8 +170,9 @@ nestedhap_walk_L0_p2m(struct p2m_domain if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) goto out; - *L0_gpa = (mfn_x(mfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) + (L1_gpa & ~PAGE_MASK); rc = NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_DONE; +direct_mmio_out: + *L0_gpa = (mfn_x(mfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) + (L1_gpa & ~PAGE_MASK); out: __put_gfn(p2m, L1_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT); return rc; @@ -256,6 +260,8 @@ nestedhvm_hap_nested_page_fault(struct v break; case NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_MMIO: return rv; + case NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_DIRECT_MMIO: + break; default: BUG(); break; --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/nestedhvm.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/nestedhvm.h @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ bool_t nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(struc #define NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_L1_ERROR 2 #define NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_L0_ERROR 3 #define NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_MMIO 4 +#define NESTEDHVM_PAGEFAULT_DIRECT_MMIO 6 int nestedhvm_hap_nested_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, paddr_t *L2_gpa, bool_t access_r, bool_t access_w, bool_t access_x); ++++++ 28302-Nested-VMX-prohibit-virtual-vmentry-vmexit-during-IO-emulation.patch ++++++ # Commit 09bb434748af9bfe3f7fca4b6eef721a7d5042a4 # Date 2014-01-23 10:27:34 +0100 # Author Yang Zhang # Committer Jan Beulich Nested VMX: prohibit virtual vmentry/vmexit during IO emulation Sometimes, L0 needs to decode L2's instruction to handle IO access directly. And L0 may get X86EMUL_RETRY when handling this IO request. At same time, if there is a virtual vmexit pending (for example, an interrupt pending to inject to L1) and hypervisor will switch the VCPU context from L2 to L1. Now we already are in L1's context, but since we got a X86EMUL_RETRY just now and this means hypervisor will retry to handle the IO request later and unfortunately, the retry will happen in L1's context. And it will cause the problem. The fixing is that if there is a pending IO request, no virtual vmexit/vmentry is allowed. Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang Acked-by: Jun Nakajima --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1058,6 +1058,13 @@ void nvmx_switch_guest(void) struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs(); /* + * a pending IO emualtion may still no finished. In this case, + * no virtual vmswith is allowed. Or else, the following IO + * emulation will handled in a wrong VCPU context. + */ + if ( get_ioreq(v)->state != STATE_IOREQ_NONE ) + return; + /* * a softirq may interrupt us between a virtual vmentry is * just handled and the true vmentry. If during this window, * a L1 virtual interrupt causes another virtual vmexit, we ++++++ 28304-x86-don-t-drop-guest-visible-state-updates-when-64-bit-PV-guest-is-in-user-mode.patch ++++++ # Commit 231d7f4098c8ac9cdb78f18fcb820d8618c8b0c2 # Date 2014-01-23 10:30:08 +0100 # Author Jan Beulich # Committer Jan Beulich x86: don't drop guest visible state updates when 64-bit PV guest is in user mode Since 64-bit PV uses separate kernel and user mode page tables, kernel addresses (as usually provided via VCPUOP_register_runstate_memory_area) aren't necessarily accessible when the respective updating occurs. Add logic for toggle_guest_mode() to take care of this (if necessary) the next time the vCPU switches to kernel mode. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c @@ -1563,10 +1563,10 @@ static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(stru } /* Update per-VCPU guest runstate shared memory area (if registered). */ -static void update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *v) +bool_t update_runstate_area(const struct vcpu *v) { if ( guest_handle_is_null(runstate_guest(v)) ) - return; + return 1; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT if ( has_32bit_shinfo(v->domain) ) @@ -1575,11 +1575,19 @@ static void update_runstate_area(struct XLAT_vcpu_runstate_info(&info, &v->runstate); __copy_to_guest(v->runstate_guest.compat, &info, 1); - return; + return 1; } #endif - __copy_to_guest(runstate_guest(v), &v->runstate, 1); + return __copy_to_guest(runstate_guest(v), &v->runstate, 1) != + sizeof(v->runstate); +} + +static void _update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *v) +{ + if ( !update_runstate_area(v) && !is_hvm_vcpu(v) && + !(v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode) ) + v->arch.pv_vcpu.need_update_runstate_area = 1; } static inline int need_full_gdt(struct vcpu *v) @@ -1684,8 +1692,8 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, s flush_tlb_mask(&dirty_mask); } - if (prev != next) - update_runstate_area(prev); + if ( prev != next ) + _update_runstate_area(prev); if ( is_hvm_vcpu(prev) && !list_empty(&prev->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_list) ) pt_save_timer(prev); @@ -1730,8 +1738,8 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, s context_saved(prev); - if (prev != next) - update_runstate_area(next); + if ( prev != next ) + _update_runstate_area(next); schedule_tail(next); BUG(); --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c @@ -266,6 +266,13 @@ void toggle_guest_mode(struct vcpu *v) #else write_ptbase(v); #endif + + if ( !(v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode) ) + return; + + if ( v->arch.pv_vcpu.need_update_runstate_area && + update_runstate_area(v) ) + v->arch.pv_vcpu.need_update_runstate_area = 0; } unsigned long do_iret(void) --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h @@ -419,6 +419,9 @@ struct pv_vcpu /* Current LDT details. */ unsigned long shadow_ldt_mapcnt; spinlock_t shadow_ldt_lock; + + /* Deferred VA-based update state. */ + bool_t need_update_runstate_area; }; struct arch_vcpu @@ -514,6 +517,8 @@ struct arch_vcpu #define hvm_vmx hvm_vcpu.u.vmx #define hvm_svm hvm_vcpu.u.svm +bool_t update_runstate_area(const struct vcpu *); + void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *); void vcpu_show_registers(const struct vcpu *); ++++++ 32on64-extra-mem.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -2995,7 +2995,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: self.guest_bitsize = self.image.getBitSize() # Make sure there's enough RAM available for the domain - balloon.free(memory + shadow + vtd_mem, self) + balloon.free(memory + shadow + vtd_mem + 512, self) # Set up the shadow memory shadow_cur = xc.shadow_mem_control(self.domid, shadow / 1024) ++++++ README.SuSE ++++++ README for the Xen packages =========================== This file contains SUSE-specific instructions and suggestions for using Xen. For more in-depth documentation of using Xen on SUSE, consult the virtualization chapter in the SLES or SUSE Linux manual, or read up-to-date virtualization information, including a list of known issues, at http://www.novell.com/documentation/vmserver/. For more complete documentation on Xen itself, please install one of the xen-doc-* packages and read the documentation installed into /usr/share/doc/packages/xen/. About ----- Xen allows you to run multiple virtual machines on a single physical machine. See the Xen homepage for more information: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/srg/netos/xen/ If you want to use Xen, you need to install the Xen hypervisor and a number of supporting packages. During the initial SUSE installation (or when installing from YaST) check-mark the "Xen Virtual Machine Host Server" pattern. If, instead, you wish to install Xen manually later, click on the "Install Hypervisor and Tools" icon in YaST. If you want to install and manage VMs graphically, be sure to install a graphical desktop environment like KDE or GNOME. The following optional packages are needed to manage VMs graphically. Note that "Install Hypervisor and Tools" installs all the packages below: vm-install (Optional, to install VMs) virt-manager (Optional, to manage VMs graphically) virt-viewer (Optional, to view VMs outside virt-manager) Additional packages: nbd-client (Optional, to access virtual disks stored on NBD servers) open-iscsi (Optional, to access virtual disks stored on iSCSI targets) You then need to reboot your machine. Instead of booting a normal Linux kernel, you will boot the Xen hypervisor and a slightly changed Linux kernel. This Linux kernel runs in the first virtual machine and will drive most of your hardware. This approach is called paravirtualization, since it is a partial virtualization (the Linux kernel needs to be changed slightly, to make the virtualization easier). It results in very good performance (consult http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/srg/netos/xen/performance.html) but has the downside of unchanged operating systems not being supported. However, new hardware features (e.g., Intel VT and AMD-V) are overcoming this limitation. Terminology ----------- The Xen open-source community has a number of terms that you should be familiar with. A "domain" is Xen's term for a virtual machine. "Domain 0" is the first virtual machine. It can control all other virtual machines. It also (usually) controls the physical hardware. A kernel used in domain 0 may sometimes be referred to as a dom0 kernel. "Domain U" is any virtual machine other than domain 0. The "U" indicates it is unprivileged (that is, it cannot control other domains). A kernel used in an unprivileged domain may be referred to as a domU kernel. Novell documentation will use the more industry-standard term "virtual machine", or "VM", rather than "domain" where possible. And to that end, domain 0 will be called the "virtual machine server", since it essentially the server on which the other VMs run. All other domains are simply "virtual machines". The acronym "HVM" refers to a hardware-assisted virtual machine. These are VMs that have not been modified (e.g., Windows) and therefore need hardware support such as Intel VT or AMD-V to run on Xen. Kernels ------- Xen supports two kinds of kernels: A privileged kernel (which boots the machine, controls other VMs, and usually controls all your physical hardware) and unprivileged kernels (which can't control other VMs, and usually don't need drivers for physical hardware). The privileged kernel boots first (as the VM server); an unprivileged kernel is used in all subsequent VMs. The VM server takes control of the boot process after Xen has initialized the CPU and the memory. This VM contains a privileged kernel and all the hardware drivers. For the other virtual machines, you usually don't need the hardware drivers. (It is possible to hide a PCI device from the VM server and re-assign it to another VM for direct access, but that is a more advanced topic.) Instead you use virtual network and block device drivers in the unprivileged VMs to access the physical network and block drivers in the VM server. For simplicity, SUSE ships a single Xen-enabled Linux kernel, rather than separate privileged and unprivileged kernels. As most of the hardware drivers are modules anyway, using this kernel as an unprivileged kernel has very little extra overhead. The kernel is contained in the kernel-xen package, which you need to install to use Xen. Booting ------- If you installed Xen during the initial SUSE installation, or installed one of the kernel-xen* packages later, a "XEN" option should exist in your Grub bootloader. Select that to boot SUSE on top of Xen. If you want to add additional entries, or modify the existing ones, you will have to edit Grub yourself. All Xen entries in the Grub configuration file (usually /boot/grub/menu.lst) look something like this: title XEN root (hd0,5) kernel /xen.gz module /vmlinuz-xen <parameters> module /initrd-xen Replace (hd0,5) with the partition that holds your /boot directory in grub-speak, e.g., hda1 -> (hd0,0) and sda5 -> (hd2,4). Normally, xen.gz requires no parameters. If you want to add parameters, see below. Replace "<parameters>" with the kernel parameters that you want to pass to your kernel. These should be very similar, if not identical, to those passed to a normal kernel that you boot on bare iron. Once you have booted this configuration successfully, you are running Xen with a privileged kernel on top of it. Xen Boot Parameters ------------------- Normally, xen.gz requires no parameters. However, in special cases (such as debugging or a dedicated VM server) you may wish to pass it parameters. In particular in case of problems you may want to attach a serial terminal and direct Xen to send its output not only to the screen, but also to that terminal. In order to do so, add "console=vga,com<n> com<n>=<baud>" (without the quotes and with <n> replaced by the serial port number - generally 1 or 2 - and with <baud> replaced by the baud rate the serial terminal is configured for) to the xen.gz line. For a more complete discussion of possible parameters, see the user documentation in the xen-doc-* packages. Init scripts ------------ Before you can create additional VMs (or use any other xm command) xend must be running. This init script is part of the xen-tools package, and it is activated at installation time. You can (de)activate it using insserv. You can also start it manually with "rcxend start". The deprecated xendomains script is also shipped, but disabled by default. In SLES 10 GA (xen 3.0.2) and older, this script allowed VMs to be started and stopped automatically when the machine starts and stops. In SLES 10 SP1 (xen 3.0.4) and newer, the proper way to start and stop VMs automatically is to set the "on_xend_start" and "on_xend_stop" settings in the VMs configuration. (Deprecating xendomains was necessary because xend, not the configuration file in /etc/xen/vm, is now the authoritative source for the VM's settings.) Consult the online documentation for more information. Creating a VM with vm-install ----------------------------- The vm-install program (part of the vm-install package, and accessible through YaST's Control Center) is the recommended method to create VMs. This program handles creating both the VM's configuration file and disk(s). It can help install any operating system, not just SUSE.

From the command line, run "vm-install". If the DISPLAY environment variable is set and the supporting packages (python-gtk) are installed, a graphical wizard will start. Otherwise, a text wizard will start.

Each VM needs to have its own root filesystem. The root filesystem can live on a block device (e.g., a hard disk partition, or an LVM2 or EVMS volume) or in a file that holds the filesystem image. VMs can share filesystems, such as /usr or /opt, that are mounted read-only from _all_ VMs. Never try to share a filesystem that is mounted read-write; filesystem corruption will result. For sharing writable data between VMs, use NFS or other networked or cluster filesystems. When defining the virtual network adapter(s), we recommend using a static MAC for the VM rather than allowing Xen to randomly select one each time the VM boots. (See "Network Troubleshooting" below.) XenSource has been allocated a range of MAC addresses with the OUI of 00-16-3E. By using MACs from this range you can be sure they will not conflict with any physical adapters. Once you have the VM configured, click "OK". The wizard will now create a configuration file for the VM, and create a disk image. The disk image will exist in /var/lib/xen/images, and a corresponding config file will exist in /etc/xen/vm. The operating system's installation program will then run within the VM. When the VM shuts down (because the installation -- or at least the first stage of it -- is done), the wizard finalizes the VM's configuration and restarts the VM. The creation of VMs can be automated; read the vm-install man page for more details. The installation of an OS within the VM can be automated if the OS supports it. Creating a VM Manually ---------------------- If you create a VM manually (as opposed to using vm-install, which is the recommended way), you will need to create a disk (or reuse an existing one) and a configuration file. If you are using a disk or disk image that is already installed with an operating system, you'll probably need to replace its kernel with a Xen-enabled kernel. The kernel and ramdisk used to bootstrap the VM must match any kernel modules that might be present in the VM's disk. It is possible to manually copy the kernel and ramdisk from the VM's disk (for example, after updating the kernel within that VM) to the VM server's filesystem. However, an easier (and less error-prone) method is to use something called the "domUloader". Before a new VM is started, this loader automatically copies the kernel and ramdisk into the VM server's filesystem, so that it can be used to bootstrap the new VM. See /etc/xen/examples/xmexample.domUloader for an example. Next, make a copy of one of the /etc/xen/examples/* files, and modify it to suit your needs. For paravirtualized VMs, start with /etc/xen/examples/xmexample1; for fully virtualized VMs, start with /etc/xen/examples/xmexample.hvm. You'll need to change (at very least) the "name" and "disk" parameters. Managing Virtual Machines ------------------------- VMs can be managed from the command line or from virt-manager. Before a VM can be started, xend must be informed of it. vm-install will automatically import new VM configurations into xend. However, if you copy a VM from another machine, or manually create a VM configuration file, you will need to import it into xend with a command like: xm new my-vm If your VM's configuration file is not located in /etc/xen/vm, you must specify the full path. This imports the configuration into xend (and therefore virt-manager becomes aware of it, also). Now to start the VM: xm start my-vm or start it graphically from virt-manager. Have a look at running sessions with "xm list". Note the ID of the newly created VM. Attach to the VM's text console with "xm console <ID>" (replacing ID with the VM's ID). Attaching to multiple VM consoles is most conveniently done with the terminal multiplexer "screen". Have a look at the other xm commands by typing "xm help". Note that most xm commands must be done as root. Using the Mouse via VNC in Fully Virtual Mode --------------------------------------------- In a fully virtualized VM, the mouse may be emulated as a PS/2 mouse, USB mouse, or USB tablet. The vm-install tool selects the best emulation that is known to be automatically detected and supported by the operating system. However, when accessing some fully virtualized operating systems via VNC, the mouse may be difficult to control if the VM is emulating a PS/2 mouse. PS/2 provides mouse deltas, but VNC only provides absolute coordinates. In such cases, you may want to manually switch the operating system and VM to use a USB tablet. Emulation of a SummaSketch graphics tablet is provided for this reason. To use the Summa emulation, you will need to configure your fully virtualized OS. Note that the virtual tablet is connected to the second virtual serial port (/dev/ttyS1 or COM2). Most Linux distributions ship with appropriate drivers, and only need to be configured. To configure gpm, edit /etc/sysconfig/mouse and add these lines: MOUSETYPE="summa" XMOUSETYPE="SUMMA" DEVICE=/dev/ttyS1 The format and location of your configuration file could vary depending upon your Linux distribution. The goal is to run the gpm daemon as follows: gpm -t summa -m /dev/ttyS1 X also needs to be configured to use the Summa emulation. Add the following stanza to /etc/X11/xorg.conf, or use your distribution's tools to add these settings: Section "InputDevice" Identifier "Mouse0" Driver "summa" Option "Device" "/dev/ttyS1" Option "InputFashion" "Tablet" Option "Mode" "Absolute" Option "Name" "EasyPen" Option "Compatible" "True" Option "Protocol" "Auto" Option "SendCoreEvents" "on" Option "Vendor" "GENIUS" EndSection After making these changes, restart gpm and X. To ensure the VM is emulating a USB tablet, add these lines to the configuration file in /etc/xen/vm: usb=1 usbdevice='tablet' Then re-import the configuration into xend: xm new my-vm HVM Console in Fully Virtual Mode --------------------------------- When running a VM in fully virtual mode, a special console is available that provides some additional ways to control the VM. Press Ctrl-Alt-2 to access the console; press Ctrl-Alt-1 to return to the VM. While at the console, type "help" for help. The two most important commands are "send-key" and "change". The "send-key" command allows you to send any key sequence to the VM, which might otherwise be intercepted by your local window manager. The "change" command allows the target of a block device to be changed; for example, use it to change from one CD ISO to another. Some versions of Xen have this command disabled for security reasons. Consult the online documentation for workarounds. Networking ---------- Your virtual machines become much more useful if you can reach them via the network. Starting with openSUSE11.1 and SLE11, networking in domain 0 is configured and managed via YaST. The yast2-networking module can be used to create and manage bridged networks. During initial installation, a bridged networking proposal will be presented if the "Xen Virtual Machine Host Server" pattern is selected. The proposal will also be presented if you install Xen after initial installation using the "Install Hypervisor and Tools" module in YaST. The default proposal creates a virtual bridge in domain 0 for each active ethernet device, enslaving the device to the bridge. Consider a machine containing two ethernet devices (eth0 and eth1), both with active carriers. YaST will create br0 and br1, enslaving the eth0 and eth1 devices repectively. VMs get a virtual network interface (e.g. eth0), which is visible in domain 0 as vifN.0 and connected to the bridge. This means that if you set up an IP address in the VMs belonging to the same subnet as br0 from your domain 0, you'll be able to communicate not only with the other slave VMs, but also with domain 0 and with the external network. If you have a DHCP server running in your network, your VMs should succeed in getting an IP address. Be aware that this may have unwanted security implications. You may want to opt for routing instead of bridging, so you can set up firewalling rules in domain 0. Please read about the network configuration in the Xen manual. You can set up bridging or routing for other interfaces also. For debugging, here's what happens on bootup of a domU: - xenstored saves the device setup in xenstore - domU is created - vifN.0 shows up in domain 0 and a hotplug event is triggered - hotplug is /sbin/udev; udev looks at /etc/udev/rules.d/40-xen.rules and calls /etc/xen/scripts/vif-bridge online - vif-bridge set the vifN.0 device up and enslaves it to the bridge - eth0 shows up in domU (hotplug event triggered) Similar things happen for block devices, except that /etc/xen/scripts/block is called. It's not recommended to use ifplugd nor NetworkManager for managing the interfaces if you use bridging mode. Use routing with nat or proxy-arp in that case. You also need to do that in case you want to send out packets on wireless; you can't bridge Xen "ethernet" packets into 802.11 packets. Thread-Local Storage -------------------- For some time now, the glibc thread library (NPTL) has used a shortcut to access thread-local variables at a negative segment offset from the segment selector GS instead of reading the linear address from the TDB (offset 0). Unfortunately, this optimization has been made the default by the glibc and gcc maintainers, as it saves one indirection. For Xen this is bad: The access to these variables will trap, and Xen will need to use some tricks to make the access work. It does work, but it's very slow. SUSE Linux 9.1 and SLES 9 were prior to this change, and thus are not affected. SUSE Linux 9.2 and 9.3 are affected. For SUSE Linux 10.x and SLES 10, we have disabled negative segment references in gcc and glibc, and so these are not affected. Other non-SUSE Linux distributions may be affected. For affected distributions, one way to work around the problem is to rename the /lib/tls directory, so the pre-i686 version gets used, where no such tricks are done. An example LSB-compliant init script which automates these steps is installed at /usr/share/doc/packages/xen/boot.xen. This script renames /lib/tls when running on Xen, and restores it when not running on Xen. Modify this script to work with your specific distribution. Mono has a similar problem, but this has been fixed in SUSE Linux 10.1 and SLES 10. Older or non-SUSE versions of Mono may have a performance impact. Security -------- Domain 0 has control over all domains. This means that care should be taken to keep domain 0 safe; ideally you strip it down to only do as little there as possible, preferably with no local users except for the system administrator. Most commands in domain 0 can only be performed as root, but this protection scheme only has moderate security and might be defeated. In case domain 0 is compromised, all other domains are compromised as well. To allow relocation of VMs (migration), the receiving machine listens on TCP port 8002. You might want to put firewall rules in place in domain 0 to restrict this to machines which you trust. You have some access control in xend-config.sxp as well by tweaking the xend-relocation-hosts-allow setting. Relocating VMs with sensitive data is not a good idea in untrusted networks, since the data is not sent encrypted. The memory protections for the domUs are effective; so far no way to break out of a virtual machine is known. A VM is an effective jail. Limitations ----------- When booting, Linux reserves data structures matching the amount of RAM found. This has the side-effect that you can't dynamically grow the memory beyond what the kernel has been booted with. But you can trick domU Linux to prepare for a larger amount of RAM by passing the mem= boot parameter. The export of virtual hard disks from files in Xen can be handled via the loopback driver (although in Xen >= 3.0.4, this is can be replaced by the "blktap" user-space driver.) If you are still using loopback, it may be possible to run out of loopback devices, as by default only 64 are supported. You can change this by inserting: options loop max_loop=128 into /etc/modprobe.conf.local in domain 0. Network Troubleshooting ----------------------- First ensure the VM server is configured correctly and can access the network. Do not use ifplugd or NetworkManager, neither are bridge aware. Specify a static virtual MAC in the VM's configuration file. Random MACs can be problematic, since with each boot of the VM it appears that some hardware has been removed (the previous random MAC) and new hardware is present (the new random MAC). This can cause network configuration files (which were intended for the old MAC) to not be matched up with the new virtual hardware. In the VM's filesystem, ensure the ifcfg-eth* files are named appropriately. For example, if you do decide to use a randomly-selected MAC for the VM, the ifcfg-eth* file must not include the MAC in its name; name it generically ("ifcfg-eth0") instead. If you use a static virtual MAC for the VM, be sure that is reflected in the file's name. Troubleshooting --------------- First try to get Linux running on bare iron before trying with Xen. Be sure your Xen hypervisor (xen) and VM kernels (kernel-xen) are compatible. The hypervisor and domain 0 kernel are a matched set, and usually must be upgraded together. Consult the online documentation for a matrix of supported 32- and 64-bit combinations On certain machines with 2GB or less of RAM, domain 0 Linux may fail to boot, printing the following messages: PCI-DMA: Using software bounce buffering for IO (SWIOTLB) ... Kernel panic - not syncing: PCI-DMA: Memory would be corrupted Fix this by adding "swiotlb=16" to the Linux kernel command line, which reserves additional memory for the swiotlb (the actual number to be used here of course depends on the system configuration). If you have trouble early in the boot, try passing pnpacpi=off to the Linux kernel. If you have trouble with interrupts or timers, passing lapic to Xen may help. Xen and Linux understand similar ACPI boot parameters. Try the options acpi=off,force,strict,ht,noirq or acpi_skip_timer_override. Other useful debugging options to Xen may be nosmp, noreboot, mem=1024M, sync_console, noirqbalance (Dell). For a complete list of Xen boot options, consult chapter 11.3 of the Xen users' manual. If domain 0 Linux crashes on X11 startup, please try to boot into runlevel 3. To debug Xen or domain 0 Linux crashes or hangs, it may be useful to use the debug-enabled hypervisor, and/or to prevent automatic rebooting. Change your Grub configuration from something like this: kernel (hd0,5)/xen.gz To something like this: kernel (hd0,5)/xen-dbg.gz noreboot After rebooting, the Xen hypervisor will write any error messages to the log file (viewable with the "xm dmesg" command). If problems persist, check if a newer version is available. Well-tested versions will be shipped with SUSE and via YaST Online Update. More frequent (but less supported) updates are available on Novell's Forge site: http://forge.novell.com/modules/xfmod/project/?xenpreview Upgrading the Host Operating System ----------------------------------- When upgrading the host operating system from one major release to another (for example, SLES 10 to SLES 11 or openSUSE 11.4 to openSUSE 12.1) or when applying a service pack like SLES 11 SP2 to SLES 11 SP1 all running VMs must be shut down before the upgrade process is begun. Memory Ballooning in VMs ------------------------ Setting a VMs maximum memory value greater than the initial memory value requires support for memory ballooning in the VMs operating system. Modern SLES and openSUSE guests have this capabilitity built-in. Windows installation media does not support memory ballooning so you must first install the VM without memory ballooning (maxmem equal to initial memory). After the installation, the Virtual Machine Driver Pack (vmdp) must be installed. After this, the VMs maxmem value may be increased. A reboot of the VM is required for this action to take effect. Known Issues ------------ For a list of known issues and work-arounds, see http://www.novell.com/documentation/vmserver/. Disclaimer ---------- Xen performed amazingly well in our tests and proved very stable. Still, you should be careful when using it, just like you'd be careful if you boot an experimental kernel. Expect that it may not boot and be prepared to have a fall-back solution for that scenario. Be prepared that it may not support all of your hardware. And for the worst of all cases, have your most valuable data backed up. (This is always a good idea, of course.) Feedback -------- In case you have remarks about, problems with, ideas for, or praise for Xen, please report it back to the xen-devel list: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com If you find issues with the packaging or setup done by Novell/SUSE, please report it to: http://www.suse.de/feedback/ ENJOY! Your Novell SUSE Team. ++++++ VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch ++++++

From 9ca313aa0824f2d350a7a6c9b1ef6c47e0408f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: aliguori Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2008 23:27:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] VNC: Support for ExtendedKeyEvent client message

This patch adds support for the ExtendedKeyEvent client message. This message allows a client to send raw scan codes directly to the server. If the client and server are using the same keymap, then it's unnecessary to use the '-k' option with QEMU when this extension is supported. This is extension is currently only implemented by gtk-vnc based clients (gvncviewer, virt-manager, vinagre, etc.). Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@5076 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162 --- vnc.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c @@ -1285,35 +1285,22 @@ static void press_key_altgr_down(VncStat } } -static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym) +static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym, int shift) { - int keycode; int shift_keys = 0; - int shift = 0; int keypad = 0; int altgr = 0; int altgr_keys = 0; if (is_graphic_console()) { - if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z') { - sym = sym - 'A' + 'a'; - shift = 1; - } - else { + if (!shift) shift = keysym_is_shift(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF); - } altgr = keysym_is_altgr(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF); } shift_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36]; altgr_keys = vs->modifiers_state[0xb8]; - keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF); - if (keycode == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Key lost : keysym=0x%x(%d)\n", sym, sym); - return; - } - /* QEMU console switch */ switch(keycode) { case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */ @@ -1445,7 +1432,25 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym) { - do_key_event(vs, down, sym); + int keycode; + int shift = 0; + + if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) { + sym = sym - 'A' + 'a'; + shift = 1; + } + keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF); + do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym, shift); +} + +static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, + uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode) +{ + /* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */ + if (keyboard_layout) + key_event(vs, down, sym); + else + do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym, 0); } static void framebuffer_set_updated(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h) @@ -1534,6 +1539,15 @@ static void framebuffer_update_request(V qemu_mod_timer(vs->timer, qemu_get_clock(rt_clock)); } +static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs) +{ + vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); + vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); + vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); + vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, ds_get_width(vs->ds), ds_get_height(vs->ds), -258); + vnc_flush(vs); +} + static void set_encodings(VncState *vs, int32_t *encodings, size_t n_encodings) { int i; @@ -1562,6 +1576,9 @@ static void set_encodings(VncState *vs, case -257: vs->has_pointer_type_change = 1; break; + case -258: + send_ext_key_event_ack(vs); + break; case 0x574D5669: vs->has_WMVi = 1; default: @@ -1774,6 +1791,24 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), (char *)(data + 8)); break; + case 255: + if (len == 1) + return 2; + + switch (read_u8(data, 1)) { + case 0: + if (len == 2) + return 12; + + ext_key_event(vs, read_u16(data, 2), + read_u32(data, 4), read_u32(data, 8)); + break; + default: + printf("Msg: %d\n", read_u16(data, 0)); + vnc_client_error(vs); + break; + } + break; default: printf("Msg: %d\n", data[0]); vnc_client_error(vs); @@ -2445,10 +2480,11 @@ void vnc_display_init(DisplayState *ds) vs->ds = ds; - if (!keyboard_layout) - keyboard_layout = "en-us"; + if (keyboard_layout) + vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(keyboard_layout); + else + vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout("en-us"); - vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(keyboard_layout); if (!vs->kbd_layout) exit(1); vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 1; /* NumLock on - on boot */ ++++++ altgr_2.patch ++++++ When access domU from Windows VNC client, spanish keyboard altgr key doesn't work. According to log info, we found that the keycodes passed from vncclient to qemu vncserver have something wrong. When altgr and "2" pressed, keycodes vncserver receives are: ALT_R down, CTRL_L down, CTRL_L up, ATL_R up, "2" down, "2" up, ... Since when send "2" down, there is no altgr modifier, the char displayed on screen will be "2" but not "@". To solve this problem, there is another patch applied by upstream which sends an additional altgr modifier before "2" down in the above case. It works well when domU is windows, but on sles10 sp3 domU, sometimes it display "@" and sometimes it still displays "2", especially when press altgr+2 continuously. For the sles10 sp3 domU problem, maybe because there are two many alt_r (same keycode as altgr on "es") up and down events and the domU OS couldn't handle it well. To furtherly solve this problem, I write this patch, when vncserver is "es" and receives a alt_r keysym (this is already abnormal since "es" has no alt_r), then treat the alt_r as alt_l. This can avoid too many altgr keycodes up and down events and make sure the intentionally added altgr keycode can take effect. Signed-off by Chunyan Liu (cyliu@novell.com) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c @@ -1440,6 +1440,9 @@ static void key_event(VncState *vs, int int keycode; int shift = 0; + if ( sym == 0xffea && keyboard_layout && !strcmp(keyboard_layout,"es") ) + sym = 0xffe9; + if (sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) { sym = sym - 'A' + 'a'; shift = 1; ++++++ baselibs.conf ++++++ xen-libs ++++++ bdrv_default_rwflag.patch ++++++ Subject: modify default read/write flag in bdrv_init. Signed-off by Chunyan Liu Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c @@ -2627,6 +2627,8 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in strncpy(drives_table[nb_drives].serial, serial, sizeof(serial)); nb_drives++; + bdrv_flags = BDRV_O_RDWR; + switch(type) { case IF_IDE: case IF_XEN: @@ -2640,6 +2642,7 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in break; case MEDIA_CDROM: bdrv_set_type_hint(bdrv, BDRV_TYPE_CDROM); + bdrv_flags &= ~BDRV_O_RDWR; break; } break; @@ -2660,7 +2663,6 @@ int drive_init(struct drive_opt *arg, in } if (!file[0]) return -2; - bdrv_flags = 0; if (snapshot) { bdrv_flags |= BDRV_O_SNAPSHOT; cache = 2; /* always use write-back with snapshot */ ++++++ bdrv_open2_fix_flags.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ int bdrv_file_open(BlockDriverState **pb int bdrv_open(BlockDriverState *bs, const char *filename, int flags) { - return bdrv_open2(bs, filename, flags, NULL); + return bdrv_open2(bs, filename, flags|BDRV_O_RDWR, NULL); } int bdrv_open2(BlockDriverState *bs, const char *filename, int flags, @@ -419,12 +419,13 @@ int bdrv_open2(BlockDriverState *bs, con } bs->drv = drv; bs->opaque = qemu_mallocz(drv->instance_size); - /* Note: for compatibility, we open disk image files as RDWR, and - RDONLY as fallback */ if (!(flags & BDRV_O_FILE)) - open_flags = (flags & BDRV_O_ACCESS) | (flags & BDRV_O_CACHE_MASK); + open_flags = flags; else open_flags = flags & ~(BDRV_O_FILE | BDRV_O_SNAPSHOT); + if (!(open_flags & BDRV_O_RDWR)) + bs->read_only = 1; + ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, filename, open_flags); if ((ret == -EACCES || ret == -EPERM) && !(flags & BDRV_O_FILE)) { ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, filename, open_flags & ~BDRV_O_RDWR); Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/usb-msd.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/usb-msd.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/usb-msd.c @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ USBDevice *usb_msd_init(const char *file s = qemu_mallocz(sizeof(MSDState)); bdrv = bdrv_new("usb"); - if (bdrv_open2(bdrv, filename, 0, drv) < 0) + if (bdrv_open2(bdrv, filename, BDRV_O_RDWR, drv) < 0) goto fail; s->bs = bdrv; *pbs = bdrv; Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-img.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-img.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-img.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ #endif /* Default to cache=writeback as data integrity is not important for qemu-tcg. */ -#define BRDV_O_FLAGS BDRV_O_CACHE_WB +#define BDRV_O_FLAGS BDRV_O_CACHE_WB static void QEMU_NORETURN error(const char *fmt, ...) { @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static int read_password(char *buf, int #endif static BlockDriverState *bdrv_new_open(const char *filename, - const char *fmt) + const char *fmt, int flags) { BlockDriverState *bs; BlockDriver *drv; @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static BlockDriverState *bdrv_new_open(c } else { drv = &bdrv_raw; } - if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BRDV_O_FLAGS, drv) < 0) { + if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, flags, drv) < 0) { error("Could not open '%s'", filename); } if (bdrv_is_encrypted(bs)) { @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int img_create(int argc, char **a size = 0; if (base_filename) { BlockDriverState *bs; - bs = bdrv_new_open(base_filename, NULL); + bs = bdrv_new_open(base_filename, NULL, BDRV_O_RDWR); bdrv_get_geometry(bs, &size); size *= 512; bdrv_delete(bs); @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int img_commit(int argc, char **a } else { drv = NULL; } - if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BRDV_O_FLAGS, drv) < 0) { + if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BDRV_O_RDWR, drv) < 0) { error("Could not open '%s'", filename); } ret = bdrv_commit(bs); @@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ static int img_convert(int argc, char ** total_sectors = 0; for (bs_i = 0; bs_i < bs_n; bs_i++) { - bs[bs_i] = bdrv_new_open(argv[optind + bs_i], fmt); + bs[bs_i] = bdrv_new_open(argv[optind + bs_i], fmt, + BDRV_O_CACHE_WB|BDRV_O_RDONLY); if (!bs[bs_i]) error("Could not open '%s'", argv[optind + bs_i]); bdrv_get_geometry(bs[bs_i], &bs_sectors); @@ -483,7 +484,7 @@ static int img_convert(int argc, char ** } } - out_bs = bdrv_new_open(out_filename, out_fmt); + out_bs = bdrv_new_open(out_filename, out_fmt, BDRV_O_CACHE_WB|BDRV_O_RDWR); bs_i = 0; bs_offset = 0; @@ -706,7 +707,7 @@ static int img_info(int argc, char **arg } else { drv = NULL; } - if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BRDV_O_FLAGS, drv) < 0) { + if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BDRV_O_FLAGS|BDRV_O_RDWR, drv) < 0) { error("Could not open '%s'", filename); } bdrv_get_format(bs, fmt_name, sizeof(fmt_name)); @@ -810,7 +811,7 @@ static void img_snapshot(int argc, char if (!bs) error("Not enough memory"); - if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, 0, NULL) < 0) { + if (bdrv_open2(bs, filename, BDRV_O_RDWR, NULL) < 0) { error("Could not open '%s'", filename); } ++++++ bdrv_open2_flags_2.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, BlockDriver* drv; char* devname; static int devnumber = 0; + int flags = readonly ? BDRV_O_RDONLY : BDRV_O_RDWR; int i; DPRINTF("Opening %s as blktap%d\n", path, devnumber); @@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, DPRINTF("%s driver specified\n", drv ? drv->format_name : "No"); /* Open the image */ - if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, 0, drv) != 0) { + if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, flags, drv) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not open image file %s\n", path); return -ENOMEM; } Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ static void insert_media(void *opaque) else format = &bdrv_raw; - bdrv_open2(bs, media_filename[i], 0, format); + /* Temporary BDRV_O_RDWR */ + bdrv_open2(bs, media_filename[i], BDRV_O_RDWR, format); #ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM { char *buf, *backend, *params_path, *params; @@ -509,7 +510,8 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { - format = NULL; /* don't know what the format is yet */ + flags = 0; + format = NULL; /* don't know what the format is yet */ /* read the backend path */ xenstore_get_backend_path(&bpath, "vbd", danger_path, hvm_domid, e_danger[i]); if (bpath == NULL) @@ -595,6 +597,17 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv format = &bdrv_raw; } + /* read the mode of the device */ + if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/mode", bpath) == -1) + continue; + free(mode); + mode = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); + + if (!strcmp(mode, "r") || !strcmp(mode, "ro")) + flags |= BDRV_O_RDONLY; + if (!strcmp(mode, "w") || !strcmp(mode, "rw")) + flags |= BDRV_O_RDWR; + #if 0 /* Phantom VBDs are disabled because the use of paths * from guest-controlled areas in xenstore is unsafe. @@ -662,7 +675,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv #ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM if (pasprintf(&danger_buf, "%s/device/vbd/%s", danger_path, e_danger[i]) == -1) continue; - if (bdrv_open2(bs, danger_buf, BDRV_O_CACHE_WB /* snapshot and write-back */, &bdrv_raw) == 0) { + if (bdrv_open2(bs, danger_buf, flags|BDRV_O_CACHE_WB /* snapshot and write-back */, &bdrv_raw) == 0) { if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/params", bpath) == -1) continue; free(params); ++++++ blktap-close-fifos.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static int del_disktype(blkif_t *blkif) * qemu-dm instance. We may close the file handle only if there is * no other disk left for this domain. */ - if (dtypes[type]->use_ioemu) + if (dtypes[type]->use_ioemu && dtypes[type]->idnum != DISK_TYPE_AIO && dtypes[type]->idnum != DISK_TYPE_QCOW2) return !qemu_instance_has_disks(blkif->tappid); /* Caller should close() if no single controller, or list is empty. */ ++++++ blktap-disable-debug-printf.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/blktapctrl.c @@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ #include "list.h" #include "xs_api.h" /* for xs_fire_next_watch() */ +#undef DPRINTF +#define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) ((void)0) + #define PIDFILE "/var/run/blktapctrl.pid" #define NUM_POLL_FDS 2 Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ #define BLKTAP_CTRL_DIR "/var/run/tap" /* If enabled, print debug messages to stderr */ -#if 1 +#if 0 #define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) fprintf(stderr, __FILE__ ":%d: " _f, __LINE__, ##_a) #else #define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) ((void)0) ++++++ blktap-pv-cdrom.patch ++++++ ++++ 847 lines (skipped) ++++++ blktap.patch ++++++ bug #239173 bug #242953 Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -3317,7 +3317,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: (fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE)) vbd = { - 'mode': 'RO', + 'mode': 'RW', 'device': BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, } Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c @@ -448,9 +448,9 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv { char **e_danger = NULL; char *buf = NULL; - char *fpath = NULL, *bpath = NULL, + char *fpath = NULL, *bpath = NULL, *btype = NULL, *dev = NULL, *params = NULL, *drv = NULL; - int i, ret; + int i, ret, is_tap; unsigned int len, num, hd_index, pci_devid = 0; BlockDriverState *bs; BlockDriver *format; @@ -487,6 +487,14 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv e_danger[i]); if (bpath == NULL) continue; + /* check to see if type is tap or not */ + if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/type", bpath) == -1) + continue; + free(btype); + btype = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); + if (btype == NULL) + continue; + is_tap = !strncmp(btype, "tap", 3); /* read the name of the device */ if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/dev", bpath) == -1) continue; @@ -778,6 +786,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv free(mode); free(params); free(dev); + free(btype); free(bpath); free(buf); free(danger_buf); ++++++ blktapctrl-default-to-ioemu.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/drivers/tapdisk.h @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static disk_info_t aio_disk = { "raw image (aio)", "aio", 0, - 0, + 1, #ifdef TAPDISK &tapdisk_aio, #endif @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static disk_info_t sync_disk = { "raw image (sync)", "sync", 0, - 0, + 1, #ifdef TAPDISK &tapdisk_sync, #endif @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static disk_info_t vmdk_disk = { "vmware image (vmdk)", "vmdk", 1, - 0, + 1, #ifdef TAPDISK &tapdisk_vmdk, #endif @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static disk_info_t qcow_disk = { "qcow disk (qcow)", "qcow", 0, - 0, + 1, #ifdef TAPDISK &tapdisk_qcow, #endif @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static disk_info_t qcow2_disk = { "qcow2 disk (qcow2)", "qcow2", 0, - 0, + 1, #ifdef TAPDISK &tapdisk_qcow2, #endif ++++++ block-dmmd ++++++ #! /bin/bash # Usage: block-dmmd [add args | remove args] # # the dmmd device syntax (in xm commands/configs) is something like: # dmmd:md;/dev/md0;md;/dev/md1;lvm;/dev/vg1/lv1 # or # dmmd:lvm;/dev/vg1/lv1;lvm;/dev/vg1/lv2;md;/dev/md0 # device pairs (type;dev) are processed in order, with the last device # assigned to the VM # # md devices can optionally: # specify a config file through: # md;/dev/md100(/var/xen/config/mdadm.conf) # use an array name (mdadm -N option): # dmmd:md;My-MD-name;lvm;/dev/vg1/lv1 # # History: # 2013-07-03, loic.devulder@mpsa.com: # Partial rewrite of the script for supporting MD activation by name # 2009-06-09, mh@novell.com: # Emit debugging messages into a temporary file; if no longer needed, # just comment the exec I/O redirection below # Make variables used in functions local to avoid global overridings # Use vgscan and vgchange where required # Use the C locale to avoid dealing with localized messages # Assign output from assembling an MD device to a variable to aid debugging # We do not want to deal with localized messages: LANG=C LC_MESSAGES=C export LANG LC_MESSAGES dir=$(dirname "$0") . "$dir/block-common.sh" #exec >> /tmp/block-dmmd-`date +%F_%T.%N`.log 2>&1 #echo shell-flags: $- command=$1 # We check for errors ourselves: set +e function run_mdadm() { local mdadm_cmd=$1 local msg local rc msg="$(/sbin/mdadm $mdadm_cmd 2>&1)" rc=$? case "$msg" in *"has been started"* | *"already active"* ) return 0 ;; *"is already in use"* ) # hmm, might be used by another device in this domU # leave it to upper layers to detect a real error return 2 ;; * ) return $rc ;; esac return 1 } function activate_md() { # Make it explicitly local local par=$1 local cfg dev dev_path rc t mdadm_opts if [ ${par} = ${par%%(*} ]; then # No configuration file specified dev=$par cfg= else dev=${par%%(*} t=${par#*(} cfg="-c ${t%%)*}" fi # Looking for device name or aliase if [ ${dev:0:1} = / ]; then dev_path=${dev%/*} mdadm_opts= else dev_path=/dev/md mdadm_opts="-s -N" fi # Is md device already active? # We need to use full path name, aliase is not possible... /sbin/mdadm -Q -D $dev_path/${dev##*/} > /dev/null 2>&1 \ && return 0 run_mdadm "-A $mdadm_opts $dev $cfg" rc=$? [ $rc -eq 2 ] && return 0 return $rc } function deactivate_md() { local par=$1 local dev if [ ${par} = ${par%%(*} ]; then # No configuration file specified dev=${par} else dev=${par%%(*} fi # Looking for device name or aliase if [ ${dev:0:1} = / ]; then dev_path=${dev%/*} else dev_path=/dev/md fi # We need the device name only while deactivating /sbin/mdadm -S ${dev_path}/${dev##*/} > /dev/null 2>&1 return $? } function activate_lvm() { local run_timeout=90 local parsed_timeout local end_time # Parse device-create-timeout from /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp # If not set, use default timeout of 90s parsed_timeout=$(grep -v "^[ \t]*#.*" /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp \ | sed -n 's/(device-create-timeout \+\([0-9]\+\))/\1/p') [ ! -z $parsed_timeout ] \ && run_timeout=$((${parsed_timeout}*9/10)) # First scan for PVs and VGs # We need this for using md device as PV /sbin/pvscan > /dev/null 2>&1 # /sbin/vgscan --mknodes > /dev/null 2>&1 end_time=$(($(date +%s)+${run_timeout})) while true; do /sbin/lvchange -aey $1 > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 -a -e $1 ]; then return 0 fi sleep 0.1 if [ $(date +%s) -ge ${end_time} ]; then log err "Failed to activate $1 within ${run_timeout} seconds" return 1 fi done return 1 } function deactivate_lvm() { /sbin/lvchange -aen $1 > /dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then # We may have to deactivate the VG now, but can ignore errors: # /sbin/vgchange -an ${1%/*} || : # Maybe we need to cleanup the LVM cache: # /sbin/vgscan --mknodes || : return 0 fi return 1 } BP=100 SP=$BP VBD= declare -a stack function push() { if [ -z "$1" ]; then return fi let "SP -= 1" stack[$SP]="${1}" } function pop() { VBD= if [ "$SP" -eq "$BP" ]; then return fi VBD=${stack[$SP]} let "SP += 1" } function activate_dmmd() { case $1 in md) activate_md $2 return ;; lvm) activate_lvm $2 return ;; esac } function deactivate_dmmd() { case "$1" in md) deactivate_md $2 return ;; lvm) deactivate_lvm $2 return ;; esac } function cleanup_stack() { while [ 1 ]; do pop if [ -z "$VBD" ]; then break fi deactivate_dmmd $VBD done } function parse_par() { local ac par rc s t # Make these explicitly local vars ac=$1 par="$2" par="$par;" while [ 1 ]; do t=${par%%;*} if [ -z "$t" ]; then return 0 fi par=${par#*;} s=${par%%;*} if [ -z "$s" ]; then return 1 fi par=${par#*;} if [ "$ac" = "activate" ]; then activate_dmmd $t $s rc=$? if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then return 1 fi fi push "$t $s" done } case "$command" in add) p=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true claim_lock "dmmd" dmmd=$p parse_par activate "$dmmd" rc=$? if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then cleanup_stack release_lock "dmmd" exit 1 fi lastparam=${dmmd##*;} usedevice=${lastparam%(*} xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/node "$usedevice" write_dev "$usedevice" release_lock "dmmd" exit 0 ;; remove) p=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true claim_lock "dmmd" dmmd=$p parse_par noactivate "$dmmd" cleanup_stack release_lock "dmmd" exit 0 ;; esac ++++++ block-iscsi ++++++ #!/bin/bash # Usage: block-iscsi [add tgtname | remove dev] # # This assumes you're running a correctly configured # iscsi target (server) at the other end! # Note that we assume that the passwords for discovery (if needed) # are in /etc/iscsid.conf # and the node session passwords (if required) in the # open-iscsi database below /var/lib/open-iscsi/node.db # # (c) Kurt Garloff , 2006-09-04, GNU GPL # Contributors: Jim Fehlig # Stefan de Konink dir=$(dirname "$0") . "$dir/block-common.sh" # echo "DBG:xen/scripts/block-iscsi $1 $2 XENBUS_PATH=$XENBUS_PATH $par $node" find_sdev() { unset dev for session in /sys/class/iscsi_session/session*; do if [ "$1" = "`cat $session/targetname 2>/dev/null`" ]; then dev=`basename $session/device/target*/*:0:*/block*/*` return fi done } find_sdev_rev() { unset tgt for session in /sys/class/iscsi_session/session*; do dev=`basename $session/device/target*/*:0:*/block*/*` if [ "$dev" = "$1" ]; then tgt=`cat $session/targetname 2>/dev/null` return fi done } case "$command" in add) # load modules and start iscsid /etc/init.d/open-iscsi status >/dev/null 2>&1 || { /etc/init.d/open-iscsi start >/dev/null 2>&1; sleep 1; } par=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true TGTID=`echo $par | sed "s/\/\///g"` while read rec uuid; do if [ "$uuid" = "$TGTID" ]; then find_sdev $TGTID if [ -z "$dev" ]; then /sbin/iscsiadm -m node -T $uuid -p $rec --login || exit 2 sleep 4 find_sdev $TGTID fi xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/node /dev/$dev write_dev /dev/$dev exit 0 fi done < <(/sbin/iscsiadm -m node) exit 1 ;; remove) node=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/node` || true dev=$node; dev=${dev#/dev/} find_sdev_rev $dev if [ -x /sbin/blockdev -a -n "$node" ]; then blockdev --flushbufs "$node"; fi test -z "$tgt" && exit 2 /sbin/iscsiadm -m node -T $tgt --logout exit 1 ;; esac ++++++ block-nbd ++++++ #!/bin/sh # Usage: block-nbd [bind server ctl_port |unbind node] # # The node argument to unbind is the name of the device node we are to # unbind. # # This assumes you're running a correctly configured server at the other end! dir=$(dirname "$0") . "$dir/block-common.sh" #set -x par=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true #echo $par case "$command" in add) modprobe nbd for dev in /dev/nbd*; do if nbd-client $par $dev; then xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/node $dev write_dev $dev exit 0 fi done exit 1 ;; remove) node=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/node` || true nbd-client -d $node exit 0 ;; esac ++++++ block-npiv ++++++ #!/bin/bash # Usage: block-npiv [add npiv | remove dev] dir=$(dirname "$0") . "$dir/block-npiv-common.sh" . "$dir/block-common.sh" #set -x #command=$1 case "$command" in add) # Params is one big arg, with fields separated by hyphens: # single path: # FABRIC-VPWWPN-VPWWNN-TGTWWPN-LUN# # multipath: # {FABRIC1.FABRIC2}-{VPWWPN1.VPWWPN2.VPWWPN3}-VPWWNN-TGTWWPN-LUN# # arg 2 - Fabric Name # arg 3 - VPORT's WWPN # arg 4 - VPORT's WWNN # arg 5 - Target's WWPN # arg 6 - LUN # on Target # no wwn contains a leading 0x - it is a 16 character hex value # You may want to optionally pick a specific adapter ? par=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true #par=$2 NPIVARGS=$par; LUN=${NPIVARGS##*-*-*-*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $LUN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi TGTWWPN=${NPIVARGS##*-*-*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $TGTWWPN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi VPORTWWNN=${NPIVARGS##*-*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $VPORTWWNN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi VPORTWWPNS=${NPIVARGS##*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $VPORTWWPNS = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi FABRICNMS=$NPIVARGS # Ensure we compare everything using lower-case hex characters TGTWWPN=`echo $TGTWWPN | tr A-Z a-z` VPORTWWPNS=`echo $VPORTWWPNS | tr A-Z a-z |sed 's/[{.}]/ /g'` VPORTWWNN=`echo $VPORTWWNN | tr A-Z a-z` FABRICNMS=`echo $FABRICNMS | tr A-Z a-z |sed 's/[{.}]/ /g'` claim_lock "npiv" paths=0 for FABRICNM in $FABRICNMS; do for VPORTWWPN in $VPORTWWPNS; do find_vhost $VPORTWWPN $FABRICNM if test -z "$vhost" ; then create_vport $FABRICNM $VPORTWWPN $VPORTWWNN if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then exit 2; fi sleep 8 find_vhost $VPORTWWPN $FABRICNM if test -z "$vhost" ; then exit 3; fi fi find_sdev $vhost $TGTWWPN $LUN if test -z "$dev"; then echo "- - -" > /sys/class/scsi_host/$vhost/scan sleep 2 find_sdev $vhost $TGTWWPN $LUN fi if test -z "$dev"; then exit 4 fi paths=$(($paths+1)) done done release_lock "npiv" if test $paths -gt 1; then xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/multipath 1 /etc/init.d/multipathd start if test $? -ne 0 ; then exit 4; fi dm=`multipath -l /dev/$dev | grep dm | cut -f2 -d' '` else xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/multipath 0 dm=$dev fi if test ! -z "$dm"; then xenstore-write $XENBUS_PATH/node /dev/$dm write_dev /dev/$dm exit 0 fi exit 4 ;; remove) node=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/node` || true multipath=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/multipath` || true # this is really screwy. the first delete of a lun will # terminate the entire vport (all luns) if test $multipath = 1; then par=`xenstore-read $XENBUS_PATH/params` || true NPIVARGS=$par; FABRICNMS=${NPIVARGS%%-*}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS#*-} VPORTWWPNS=${NPIVARGS%%-*} VPORTWWPNS=`echo $VPORTWWPNS | tr A-Z a-z |sed 's/[{.}]/ /g'` FABRICNMS=`echo $FABRICNMS | tr A-Z a-z |sed 's/[{.}]/ /g'` for FABRICNM in $FABRICNMS; do for VPORTWWPN in $VPORTWWPNS; do find_vhost $VPORTWWPN $FABRICNM if test -z "$vhost" ; then exit 5; fi flush_nodes_on_vhost $vhost delete_vhost $vhost done done else dev=$node; dev=${dev#/dev/} find_vhost_from_dev $dev if test -z "$vhost" ; then exit 5; fi flush_nodes_on_vhost $vhost delete_vhost $vhost fi exit 0 ;; esac ++++++ block-npiv-common.sh ++++++ # Look for the NPIV vport with the WWPN # $1 contains the WWPN (assumes it does not contain a leading "0x") # $2 contains the FABRICNM (assumes it does not contain "0x") find_vhost() { unset vhost # look in upstream locations for fchost in /sys/class/fc_vports/* ; do if test -e $fchost/port_name ; then wwpn=`cat $fchost/port_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if test $wwpn = $1 ; then # Note: makes the assumption the vport will always have an scsi_host child vhost=`ls -d $fchost/device/host*` vhost=`basename $vhost` fname=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$vhost/fabric_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if test $fname = $2 ; then return fi fi fi done # look in vendor-specific locations # Emulex - just looks like another scsi_host - so look at fc_hosts... for fchost in /sys/class/fc_host/* ; do if test -e $fchost/port_name ; then wwpn=`cat $fchost/port_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if test $wwpn = $1 ; then # Note: makes the assumption the vport will always have an scsi_host child vhost=`basename $fchost` fname=`cat $fchost/fabric_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if test $fname = $2 ; then return fi fi fi done } # Create a NPIV vport on the fabric w/ FABRICNM, with WWPN,WWNN # $1 contains FABRICNM # $2 contains the VPORT WWPN # $3 contains the VPORT WWNN # (assumes no name contains a leading "0x") create_vport() { # find a base adapter with npiv support that is on the right fabric # Look via upstream interfaces for fchost in /sys/class/fc_host/* ; do if test -e $fchost/vport_create ; then # is the link up, w/ NPIV support ? pstate=`cat $fchost/port_state` ptype=`cat $fchost/port_type | cut -c 1-5` fname=`cat $fchost/fabric_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if [ $pstate = "Online" -a $ptype = "NPort" -a $fname = $1 ] ; then vmax=`cat $fchost/max_npiv_vports` vinuse=`cat $fchost/npiv_vports_inuse` avail=`expr $vmax - $vinuse` if [ $avail -gt 0 ] ; then # create the vport echo $2":"$3 > $fchost/vport_create if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then return 0 fi # failed - so we'll just look for the next adapter fi fi fi done # Look in vendor-specific locations # Emulex: interfaces mirror upstream, but are under adapter scsi_host for shost in /sys/class/scsi_host/* ; do if [ -e $shost/vport_create ] ; then fchost=`ls -d $shost/device/fc_host*` # is the link up, w/ NPIV support ? if [ -e $fchost/port_state ] ; then pstate=`cat $fchost/port_state` ptype=`cat $fchost/port_type | cut -c 1-5` fname=`cat $fchost/fabric_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if [ $pstate = "Online" -a $ptype = "NPort" -a $fname = $1 ] ; then vmax=`cat $shost/max_npiv_vports` vinuse=`cat $shost/npiv_vports_inuse` avail=`expr $vmax - $vinuse` if [ $avail -gt 0 ] ; then # create the vport echo $2":"$3 > $shost/vport_create if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then return 0 fi # failed - so we'll just look for the next adapter fi fi fi fi done # BFA are under adapter scsi_host for shost in /sys/class/scsi_host/* ; do if [ -e $shost/vport_create ] ; then fchost=`ls -d $shost/device/fc_host/*` # is the link up, w/ NPIV support ? if [ -e $fchost/port_state ] ; then pstate=`cat $fchost/port_state` ptype=`cat $fchost/port_type | cut -c 1-5` fname=`cat $fchost/fabric_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if [ $pstate = "Online" -a $ptype = "NPort" -a $fname = $1 ] ; then # create the vport echo $2":"$3 > $shost/vport_create if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then return 0 fi # failed - so we'll just look for the next adapter fi fi fi done return 1 } # Look for the LUN on the indicated scsi_host (which is an NPIV vport) # $1 is the scsi_host name (normalized to simply the hostX name) # $2 is the WWPN of the tgt port the lun is on # Note: this implies we don't support a multipath'd lun, or we # are explicitly identifying a "path" # $3 is the LUN number of the scsi device find_sdev() { unset dev hostno=${1/*host/} for sdev in /sys/class/scsi_device/${hostno}:*:$3 ; do if test -e $sdev/device/../fc_trans*/target${hostno}*/port_name ; then tgtwwpn=`cat $sdev/device/../fc_trans*/target${hostno}*/port_name | sed -e s/^0x//` if test $tgtwwpn = $2 ; then if test -e $sdev/device/block* ; then dev=`ls $sdev/device/block*` dev=${dev##*/} return fi fi fi done } # Look for the NPIV vhost based on a scsi "sdX" name # $1 is the "sdX" name find_vhost_from_dev() { unset vhost hostno=`readlink /sys/block/$1/device` hostno=${hostno##*/} hostno=${hostno%%:*} if test -z "$hostno" ; then return; fi vhost="host"$hostno } # We're about to terminate a vhost based on a scsi device # Flush all nodes on that vhost as they are about to go away # $1 is the vhost flush_nodes_on_vhost() { if test ! -x /sbin/blockdev ; then return; fi hostno=${1/*host/} for sdev in /sys/class/scsi_device/${hostno}:* ; do if test -e $sdev/device/block* ; then dev=`ls $sdev/device/block*` dev="/dev/"$dev if test -n "$dev"; then blockdev --flushbufs $dev fi fi done } # Terminate a NPIV vhost # $1 is vhost delete_vhost() { # use upstream interface for vport in /sys/class/fc_vports/* ; do if test -e $vport/device/$1 ; then if test -e $vport/vport_delete ; then echo "1" > $vport/vport_delete if test $? -ne 0 ; then exit 6; fi sleep 4 return fi fi done # use vendor specific interface # Emulex if test -e /sys/class/fc_host/$1/device/../scsi_host*/lpfc_drvr_version ; then shost=`ls -1d /sys/class/fc_host/$1/device/../scsi_host* | sed s/.*scsi_host://` vportwwpn=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$1/port_name | sed s/^0x//` vportwwnn=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$1/node_name | sed s/^0x//` echo "$vportwwpn:$vportwwnn" > /sys/class/scsi_host/$shost/vport_delete if test $? -ne 0 ; then exit 6; fi sleep 4 return fi # Qlogic if test -e /sys/class/fc_host/$1/device/../scsi_host*/driver_version ; then shost=`ls -1d /sys/class/fc_host/$1/device/../scsi_host* | sed s/.*scsi_host://` vportwwpn=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$1/port_name | sed s/^0x//` vportwwnn=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$1/node_name | sed s/^0x//` echo "$vportwwpn:$vportwwnn" > /sys/class/scsi_host/$shost/vport_delete if test $? -ne 0 ; then exit 6; fi sleep 4 return fi # BFA if test -e /sys/class/fc_host/$1/device/../scsi_host/*/driver_name ; then shost=`ls -1d /sys/class/fc_host/$1/device/../scsi_host/* | sed s#.*scsi_host/##` vportwwpn=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$1/port_name | sed s/^0x//` vportwwnn=`cat /sys/class/fc_host/$1/node_name | sed s/^0x//` echo "$vportwwpn:$vportwwnn" > /sys/class/scsi_host/$shost/vport_delete if test $? -ne 0 ; then exit 6; fi sleep 4 return fi exit 6 } vport_status() { # Look via upstream interfaces for fchost in /sys/class/fc_host/* ; do if test -e $fchost/vport_create ; then vport_status_display $fchost $fchost fi done # Look in vendor-specific locations # Emulex: interfaces mirror upstream, but are under adapter scsi_host for shost in /sys/class/scsi_host/* ; do if [ -e $shost/vport_create ] ; then fchost=`ls -d $shost/device/fc_host*` vport_status_display $fchost $shost fi done return 0 } vport_status_display() { echo echo "fc_host: " $2 echo "port_state: " `cat $1/port_state` echo "port_type: " `cat $1/port_type` echo "fabric_name: " `cat $1/fabric_name` echo "max_npiv_vports: " `cat $2/max_npiv_vports` echo "npiv_vports_inuse: " `cat $2/npiv_vports_inuse` echo "modeldesc: " `cat $2/modeldesc` echo "speed: " `cat $1/speed` return 0 } ++++++ block-npiv-vport ++++++ #!/bin/bash # Usage: block-npiv-vport [create npivargs | delete vportwwpn | status] dir=$(dirname "$0") . "$dir/block-npiv-common.sh" #set -x command=$1 params=$2 case "$command" in create) # Params is one big arg, with fields separated by hyphens: # FABRIC-VPWWPN-VPWWNN-TGTWWPN-LUN# # arg 2 - Fabric Name # arg 3 - VPORT's WWPN # arg 4 - VPORT's WWNN # arg 5 - Target's WWPN # arg 6 - LUN # on Target # no wwn contains a leading 0x - it is a 16 character hex value # You may want to optionally pick a specific adapter ? NPIVARGS=$params; LUN=${NPIVARGS##*-*-*-*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $LUN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi TGTWWPN=${NPIVARGS##*-*-*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $TGTWWPN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi VPORTWWNN=${NPIVARGS##*-*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $VPORTWWNN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi VPORTWWPN=${NPIVARGS##*-}; NPIVARGS=${NPIVARGS%-*} if test $VPORTWWPN = $NPIVARGS ; then exit 1; fi FABRICNM=$NPIVARGS # Ensure we compare everything using lower-case hex characters TGTWWPN=`echo $TGTWWPN | tr A-Z a-z` VPORTWWPN=`echo $VPORTWWPN | tr A-Z a-z` VPORTWWNN=`echo $VPORTWWNN | tr A-Z a-z` FABRICNM=`echo $FABRICNM | tr A-Z a-z` find_vhost $VPORTWWPN $FABRICNM if test -z "$vhost" ; then create_vport $FABRICNM $VPORTWWPN $VPORTWWNN if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then exit 2; fi sleep 8 find_vhost $VPORTWWPN $FABRICNM if test -z "$vhost" ; then exit 3; fi fi exit 0 ;; delete) # Params is VPORT's WWPN # no wwn contains a leading 0x - it is a 16 character hex value VPORTWWPN=$params # Ensure we compare everything using lower-case hex characters VPORTWWPN=`echo $VPORTWWPN | tr A-Z a-z` find_vhost $VPORTWWPN $FABRICNM if test -z "$vhost" ; then exit 4; fi delete_vhost $vhost exit 0 ;; status) vport_status exit 0 ;; *) echo "Usage: block-npiv-vport [create npivargs | delete vportwwpn | status]" exit 1 ;; esac ++++++ boot.local.xenU ++++++ #! /bin/sh # # Copyright (c) 1996 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany. All rights reserved. # # Author: Werner Fink , 1996 # Burchard Steinbild , 1996 # # /etc/init.d/boot.local # # script with local commands to be executed from init on system startup # # # Here you should add things, that should happen directly after booting # before we're going to the first run level. # date # echo "$MACHINE: running $0 $*" my_REDIRECT="$(echo $REDIRECT | sed 's#^/dev/##')" my_DEVICE="$(echo $my_REDIRECT | sed 's#^tty##')" my_SPEED="$(stty speed)" # echo REDIRECT $REDIRECT $my_REDIRECT # echo my_DEVICE $my_DEVICE # echo my_SPEED $my_SPEED # compose a line like that for inittab # S0:12345:respawn:/sbin/agetty -L 9600 ttyS0 vt102 case $my_REDIRECT in ttyS*) echo adding this line to inittab echo "$my_DEVICE:12345:respawn:/sbin/agetty -L $my_SPEED $my_REDIRECT vt102" echo "$my_DEVICE:12345:respawn:/sbin/agetty -L $my_SPEED $my_REDIRECT vt102" >> /etc/inittab echo $my_REDIRECT >> /etc/securetty ;; hvc*) echo adding this line to inittab echo "$my_DEVICE:12345:respawn:/sbin/agetty -L $my_SPEED $my_REDIRECT vt320" echo "$my_DEVICE:12345:respawn:/sbin/agetty -L $my_SPEED $my_REDIRECT vt320" >> /etc/inittab echo $my_REDIRECT >> /etc/securetty ;; *) echo "no modification in inittab needed for: $my_REDIRECT" ;; esac telinit q # Changes for Xen test -f /lib/modules/`uname -r`/modules.dep || depmod -ae CMDLINE=`cat /proc/cmdline | grep 'ip='` if test ! -z "$CMDLINE"; then OLDIFS=$IFS IFS=":" read ip oth mask gw hostname dev dhcp rest < /proc/cmdline IFS=$OLDIFS hostname $hostname ip=`echo $ip | sed 's/ip= *//'` if test ! -z "$ip"; then if test -z "$mask"; then if [ ${ip%/*} = $ip ]; then ip="$ip/27" fi echo "ip addr add $ip dev $dev" ip addr add $ip dev $dev ip link set $dev up else ifconfig add $ip netmask $mask $dev fi fi if test "${dhcp#dhcp}" != "$dhcp"; then ifup-dhcp $dev fi fi ++++++ boot.xen ++++++ #! /bin/sh # Copyright (c) 2005-2006 SUSE Linux AG, Nuernberg, Germany. # All rights reserved. # # /etc/init.d/boot.xen # # LSB compatible service control script; see http://www.linuxbase.org/spec/ # ### BEGIN INIT INFO # Provides: Xen # Required-Start: boot.localfs # Should-Start: boot.localnet # Required-Stop: boot.localfs # Should-Stop: # Default-Start: B # Default-Stop: # Short-Description: Switch on and off TLS depending on whether Xen is running # Description: Xen gets a major performance hit by the way # recent glibc (& gcc) set up the TLS offset, as it needs to # play segmentation tricks. This can be avoided by moving away # the tls libs. ### END INIT INFO . /etc/rc.status # Reset status of this service rc_reset case "$1" in start) echo -n "Starting Xen setup " if test -d /proc/xen; then export LD_ASSUME_KERNEL=2.4.21 echo -n "Xen running " fi if test -d /proc/xen -a -d /lib/tls; then echo -n "move /lib/tls away " mv /lib/tls /lib/tls.save elif test ! -d /proc/xen -a -d /lib/tls.save; then echo -n "move back /lib/tls " mv /lib/tls.save /lib/tls fi rc_status -v ;; stop) # rc_status -v ;; try-restart|condrestart) $0 restart # Remember status and be quiet rc_status ;; restart) ## Stop the service and regardless of whether it was ## running or not, start it again. $0 start # Remember status and be quiet rc_status ;; force-reload) $0 try-restart rc_status ;; reload) rc_failed 3 rc_status -v ;; status) echo -n "Checking for Xen " # Return value is slightly different for the status command: # 0 - service up and running # 1 - service dead, but /var/run/ pid file exists # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists # 3 - service not running (unused) # 4 - service status unknown :-( # 5--199 reserved (5--99 LSB, 100--149 distro, 150--199 appl.) if test -d /proc/xen; then if test -d /lib/tls; then echo -n "Xen running, /lib/tls existing " rc_failed 1 else echo -n "Xen running, /lib/tls not existing " fi else if test -d /lib/tls.save; then echo -n "Xen not running, /lib/tls existing " rc_failed 2 else echo -n "Xen not running, /lib/tls not existing " rc_failed 3 fi fi rc_status -v ;; *) echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload}" exit 1 ;; esac rc_exit ++++++ bridge-bonding.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge @@ -251,6 +251,9 @@ op_start () { claim_lock "network-bridge" + local bonded="" + [ -e /sys/class/net/${netdev}/bonding ] && bonded="yes" + vlans=$(find_active_vlans "${netdev}") for vlan in $vlans ; do ifdown $vlan ; done @@ -268,18 +271,32 @@ op_start () { ip link set ${netdev} down ip addr flush ${netdev} fi - ip link set ${netdev} name ${pdev} - ip link set ${tdev} name ${bridge} - - setup_physical_bridge_port ${pdev} - # Restore slaves - if [ -n "${slaves}" ]; then - ip link set ${pdev} up - ifenslave ${pdev} ${slaves} + if [ "x${bonded}" = "xyes" ] + then + ip link set ${tdev} name ${bridge} + ln -sf /etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-${netdev} /etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-${pdev} + ifup ${pdev} + local gw=`ip route show dev ${pdev} | fgrep default | sed 's/default via //'` + ip addr flush ${pdev} + rm -f /etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-${pdev} + brctl addif ${bridge} ${pdev} + ip link set ${bridge} up + [ -n "$gw" ] && ip route add default via ${gw} + else + ip link set ${netdev} name ${pdev} + ip link set ${tdev} name ${bridge} + + _setup_bridge_port ${pdev} + + # Restore slaves + if [ -n "${slaves}" ]; then + ip link set ${pdev} up + ifenslave ${pdev} ${slaves} + fi + add_to_bridge2 ${bridge} ${pdev} + do_ifup ${bridge} fi - add_to_bridge2 ${bridge} ${pdev} - do_ifup ${bridge} for vlan in $vlans ; do ifup $vlan ; done ++++++ bridge-opensuse.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge @@ -280,19 +280,19 @@ op_stop () { transfer_addrs ${bridge} ${pdev} if ! ifdown ${bridge}; then get_ip_info ${bridge} - fi - ip link set ${pdev} down - ip addr flush ${bridge} + ip link set ${pdev} down + ip addr flush ${bridge} - brctl delif ${bridge} ${pdev} - ip link set ${bridge} down + brctl delif ${bridge} ${pdev} + ip link set ${bridge} down - ip link set ${bridge} name ${tdev} + ip link set ${bridge} name ${tdev} + brctl delbr ${tdev} + fi + ip link set ${pdev} down ip link set ${pdev} name ${netdev} do_ifup ${netdev} - brctl delbr ${tdev} - release_lock "network-bridge" } ++++++ bridge-record-creation.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge @@ -259,6 +259,11 @@ op_start () { create_bridge ${tdev} + # Record creation of bridge in /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges so other + # tools, e.g. yast2 lan, know that Xen bridging is active. + [ -d /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges ] || mkdir /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges + touch /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges/${bridge} + preiftransfer ${netdev} transfer_addrs ${netdev} ${tdev} # Remember slaves for bonding interface. @@ -340,6 +345,13 @@ op_stop () { ip link set ${pdev} name ${netdev} do_ifup ${netdev} + # Remove record of bridge from /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges ... + rm -f /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges/${bridge} + # ... and directory itself if empty + if [ -z "$(ls -A /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges 2>/dev/null)" ]; then + rmdir /dev/.sysconfig/network/xenbridges + fi + for vlan in $vlans ; do ifup $vlan ; done release_lock "network-bridge" ++++++ bridge-vlan.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-bridge @@ -195,6 +195,28 @@ antispoofing () { iptables -A FORWARD -m physdev --physdev-in ${pdev} -j ACCEPT } +find_active_vlans() { + local netdev=$1 + local vlan + local vlans + vlans="" + for vifcfg in /etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-vlan* ; do + vlan=${vifcfg/*\/ifcfg-} + if [ "$vlan" = "vlan*" ]; then + continue + fi + . $vifcfg + etherdevice="$ETHERDEVICE" + if [ -x /sbin/getcfg-interface ]; then + etherdevice=$(/sbin/getcfg-interface "$ETHERDEVICE") + fi + if [ "$ETHERDEVICE" = "$netdev" ] || [ "$etherdevice" = "$netdev" ] ; then + link_exists "$vlan" && vlans="$vlans $vlan" + fi + done + echo "$vlans" +} + # Usage: show_status dev bridge # Print ifconfig and routes. show_status () { @@ -229,6 +251,9 @@ op_start () { claim_lock "network-bridge" + vlans=$(find_active_vlans "${netdev}") + for vlan in $vlans ; do ifdown $vlan ; done + create_bridge ${tdev} preiftransfer ${netdev} @@ -256,6 +281,8 @@ op_start () { add_to_bridge2 ${bridge} ${pdev} do_ifup ${bridge} + for vlan in $vlans ; do ifup $vlan ; done + if [ ${antispoof} = 'yes' ] ; then antispoofing fi @@ -277,6 +304,9 @@ op_stop () { claim_lock "network-bridge" + vlans=$(find_active_vlans "${netdev}") + for vlan in $vlans ; do ifdown $vlan ; done + transfer_addrs ${bridge} ${pdev} if ! ifdown ${bridge}; then get_ip_info ${bridge} @@ -293,6 +323,8 @@ op_stop () { ip link set ${pdev} name ${netdev} do_ifup ${netdev} + for vlan in $vlans ; do ifup $vlan ; done + release_lock "network-bridge" } ++++++ build-tapdisk-ioemu.patch ++++++

From f1ebeae7802a5775422004f62630c42e46dcf664 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Wolf Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:32:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/6] ioemu: Build tapdisk-ioemu binary

When changing away from the old ioemu, changes in the Makefiles resulted in tapdisk-ioemu appearing there, but actually not being built. This patch re-enables the build of tapdisk-ioemu. Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf --- Makefile | 22 +++++++++++++++------- configure | 2 +- qemu-tool.c | 2 +- tapdisk-ioemu.c | 17 ----------------- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile @@ -46,14 +46,6 @@ $(filter %-user,$(SUBDIR_RULES)): libqem recurse-all: $(SUBDIR_RULES) -CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc -CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/blktap/lib -CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/xenstore -CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/include - -tapdisk-ioemu: tapdisk-ioemu.c cutils.c block.c block-raw.c block-cow.c block-qcow.c aes.c block-vmdk.c block-cloop.c block-dmg.c block-bochs.c block-vpc.c block-vvfat.c block-qcow2.c hw/xen_blktap.c osdep.c - $(CC) -DQEMU_TOOL $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(BASE_CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $(BASE_LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lz $(LIBS) - ####################################################################### # BLOCK_OBJS is code used by both qemu system emulation and qemu-img @@ -72,6 +64,21 @@ endif BLOCK_OBJS += block-raw-posix.o endif +####################################################################### +# tapdisk-ioemu + +hw/tapdisk-xen_blktap.o: hw/xen_blktap.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -DQEMU_IMG -DQEMU_TOOL -c -o $@ $< +tapdisk-ioemu.o: tapdisk-ioemu.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -DQEMU_IMG -DQEMU_TOOL -c -o $@ $< + +tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc +tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/blktap/lib +tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/xenstore +tapdisk-ioemu: CPPFLAGS += -I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/include +tapdisk-ioemu: tapdisk-ioemu.o $(BLOCK_OBJS) qemu-tool.o hw/tapdisk-xen_blktap.o + $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lz $(LIBS) + ###################################################################### # libqemu_common.a: Target independent part of system emulation. The # long term path is to suppress *all* target specific code in case of Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/configure @@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ bsd) ;; esac -tools= +tools="tapdisk-ioemu" if test `expr "$target_list" : ".*softmmu.*"` != 0 ; then tools="qemu-img\$(EXESUF) $tools" if [ "$linux" = "yes" ] ; then Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-tool.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-tool.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-tool.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void qemu_bh_delete(QEMUBH *bh) qemu_free(bh); } -int qemu_set_fd_handler2(int fd, +int __attribute__((weak)) qemu_set_fd_handler2(int fd, IOCanRWHandler *fd_read_poll, IOHandler *fd_read, IOHandler *fd_write, Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c @@ -12,34 +12,12 @@ extern void qemu_aio_init(void); extern void qemu_aio_poll(void); -extern void bdrv_init(void); - -extern void *qemu_mallocz(size_t size); -extern void qemu_free(void *ptr); extern void *fd_start; int domid = 0; FILE* logfile; -void term_printf(const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list ap; - va_start(ap, fmt); - vprintf(fmt, ap); - va_end(ap); -} - -void term_print_filename(const char *filename) -{ - term_printf(filename); -} - - -typedef void IOReadHandler(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size); -typedef int IOCanRWHandler(void *opaque); -typedef void IOHandler(void *opaque); - typedef struct IOHandlerRecord { int fd; IOCanRWHandler *fd_read_poll; @@ -103,7 +81,6 @@ int main(void) logfile = stderr; bdrv_init(); - qemu_aio_init(); init_blktap(); /* Daemonize */ @@ -115,8 +92,6 @@ int main(void) * completed aio operations. */ while (1) { - qemu_aio_poll(); - max_fd = -1; FD_ZERO(&rfds); for(ioh = first_io_handler; ioh != NULL; ioh = ioh->next) ++++++ capslock_enable.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c @@ -1329,6 +1329,11 @@ static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, i } break; case 0x3a: /* CapsLock */ + if(!down){ + vs->modifiers_state[keycode] ^= 1; + kbd_put_keycode(keycode | 0x80); + } + return; case 0x45: /* NumLock */ if (down) { kbd_put_keycode(keycode & 0x7f); ++++++ cdrom-removable.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/HalDaemon.py =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/HalDaemon.py @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python +# -*- mode: python; -*- +#============================================================================ +# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of version 2.1 of the GNU Lesser General Public +# License as published by the Free Software Foundation. +# +# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public +# License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA +#============================================================================ +# Copyright (C) 2007 Pat Campbell +# Copyright (C) 2007 Novell Inc. +#============================================================================ + +"""hald (Hardware Abstraction Layer Daemon) watcher for Xen management + of removable block device media. + +""" + +import gobject +import dbus +import dbus.glib +import os +import types +import sys +import signal +import traceback +from xen.xend.xenstore.xstransact import xstransact, complete +from xen.xend.xenstore.xsutil import xshandle +from xen.xend import PrettyPrint +from xen.xend import XendLogging +from xen.xend.XendLogging import log + +DEVICE_TYPES = ['vbd', 'tap'] + +class HalDaemon: + """The Hald block device watcher for XEN + """ + + """Default path to the log file. """ + logfile_default = "/var/log/xen/hald.log" + + """Default level of information to be logged.""" + loglevel_default = 'INFO' + + + def __init__(self): + + XendLogging.init(self.logfile_default, self.loglevel_default) + log.debug( "%s", "__init__") + + self.udi_dict = {} + self.debug = 0 + self.dbpath = "/local/domain/0/backend" + self.bus = dbus.SystemBus() + self.hal_manager_obj = self.bus.get_object('org.freedesktop.Hal', '/org/freedesktop/Hal/Manager') + self.hal_manager = dbus.Interface( self.hal_manager_obj, 'org.freedesktop.Hal.Manager') + self.gatherBlockDevices() + self.registerDeviceCallbacks() + + def run(self): + log.debug( "%s", "In new run" ); + try: + self.mainloop = gobject.MainLoop() + self.mainloop.run() + except KeyboardInterrupt, ex: + log.debug('Keyboard exception handler: %s', ex ) + self.mainloop.quit() + except Exception, ex: + log.debug('Generic exception handler: %s', ex ) + self.mainloop.quit() + + def __del__(self): + log.debug( "%s", "In del " ); + self.unRegisterDeviceCallbacks() + self.mainloop.quit() + + def shutdown(self): + log.debug( "%s", "In shutdown now " ); + self.unRegisterDeviceCallbacks() + self.mainloop.quit() + + def stop(self): + log.debug( "%s", "In stop now " ); + self.unRegisterDeviceCallbacks() + self.mainloop.quit() + + def gatherBlockDevices(self): + + # Get all the current devices from hal and save in a dictionary + try: + device_names = self.hal_manager.GetAllDevices() + i = 0; + for name in device_names: + #log.debug("device name, device=%s",name) + dev_obj = self.bus.get_object ('org.freedesktop.Hal', name) + dev = dbus.Interface (dev_obj, 'org.freedesktop.Hal.Device') + dev_properties = dev_obj.GetAllProperties(dbus_interface="org.freedesktop.Hal.Device") + if dev_properties.has_key('block.device'): + dev_str = dev_properties['block.device'] + dev_major = dev_properties['block.major'] + dev_minor = dev_properties['block.minor'] + udi_info = {} + udi_info['device'] = dev_str + udi_info['major'] = dev_major + udi_info['minor'] = dev_minor + udi_info['udi'] = name + self.udi_dict[i] = udi_info + i = i + 1 + except Exception, ex: + print >>sys.stderr, 'Exception gathering block devices:', ex + log.warn("Exception gathering block devices (%s)",ex) + + # + def registerDeviceCallbacks(self): + # setup the callbacks for when the gdl changes + self.hal_manager.connect_to_signal('DeviceAdded', self.device_added_callback) + self.hal_manager.connect_to_signal('DeviceRemoved', self.device_removed_callback) + + # + def unRegisterDeviceCallbacks(self): + # setup the callbacks for when the gdl changes + self.hal_manager.remove_signal_receiver(self.device_added_callback,'DeviceAdded') + self.hal_manager.remove_signal_receiver(self.device_removed_callback,'DeviceRemoved') + + # + def device_removed_callback(self,udi): + log.debug('UDI %s was removed',udi) + self.show_dict(self.udi_dict) + for key in self.udi_dict: + udi_info = self.udi_dict[key] + if udi_info['udi'] == udi: + device = udi_info['device'] + major = udi_info['major'] + minor = udi_info['minor'] + self.change_xenstore( "remove", device, major, minor) + + # Adds device to dictionary if not already there + def device_added_callback(self,udi): + log.debug('UDI %s was added', udi) + self.show_dict(self.udi_dict) + dev_obj = self.bus.get_object ('org.freedesktop.Hal', udi) + dev = dbus.Interface (dev_obj, 'org.freedesktop.Hal.Device') + device = dev.GetProperty ('block.device') + major = dev.GetProperty ('block.major') + minor = dev.GetProperty ('block.minor') + udi_info = {} + udi_info['device'] = device + udi_info['major'] = major + udi_info['minor'] = minor + udi_info['udi'] = udi + already = 0 + cnt = 0; + for key in self.udi_dict: + info = self.udi_dict[key] + if info['udi'] == udi: + already = 1 + break + cnt = cnt + 1 + if already == 0: + self.udi_dict[cnt] = udi_info; + log.debug('UDI %s was added, device:%s major:%s minor:%s index:%d\n', udi, device, major, minor, cnt) + self.change_xenstore( "add", device, major, minor) + + # Debug helper, shows dictionary contents + def show_dict(self,dict=None): + if self.debug == 0 : + return + if dict == None : + dict = self.udi_dict + for key in dict: + log.debug('udi_info %s udi_info:%s',key,dict[key]) + + # Set or clear xenstore media-present depending on the action argument + # for every vbd that has this block device + def change_xenstore(self,action, device, major, minor): + for type in DEVICE_TYPES: + path = self.dbpath + '/' + type + domains = xstransact.List(path) + log.debug('domains: %s', domains) + for domain in domains: # for each domain + devices = xstransact.List( path + '/' + domain) + log.debug('devices: %s',devices) + for device in devices: # for each vbd device + str = device.split('/') + vbd_type = None; + vbd_physical_device = None + vbd_media = None + vbd_device_path = path + '/' + domain + '/' + device + listing = xstransact.List(vbd_device_path) + for entry in listing: # for each entry + item = path + '/' + entry + value = xstransact.Read( vbd_device_path + '/' + entry) + log.debug('%s=%s',item,value) + if item.find('media-present') != -1: + vbd_media = item; + vbd_media_path = item + if item.find('physical-device') != -1: + vbd_physical_device = value; + if item.find('type') != -1: + vbd_type = value; + if vbd_type is not None and vbd_physical_device is not None and vbd_media is not None : + inode = vbd_physical_device.split(':') + imajor = parse_hex(inode[0]) + iminor = parse_hex(inode[1]) + log.debug("action:%s major:%s- minor:%s- imajor:%s- iminor:%s- inode: %s", + action,major,minor, imajor, iminor, inode) + if int(imajor) == int(major) and int(iminor) == int(minor): + if action == "add": + xs_dict = {'media': "1"} + xstransact.Write(vbd_device_path, 'media-present', "1" ) + log.debug("wrote xenstore media-present 1 path:%s",vbd_media_path) + else: + xstransact.Write(vbd_device_path, 'media-present', "0" ) + log.debug("wrote xenstore media 0 path:%s",vbd_media_path) + +def mylog( fmt, *args): + f = open('/tmp/haldaemon.log', 'a') + print >>f, "HalDaemon ", fmt % args + f.close() + + +def parse_hex(val): + try: + if isinstance(val, types.StringTypes): + return int(val, 16) + else: + return val + except ValueError: + return None + +if __name__ == "__main__": + watcher = HalDaemon() + watcher.run() + print 'Falling off end' + + Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/Hald.py =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/Hald.py @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +#============================================================================ +# This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of version 2.1 of the GNU Lesser General Public +# License as published by the Free Software Foundation. +# +# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# Lesser General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public +# License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA +#============================================================================ +# Copyright (C) 2007 Pat Campbell +# Copyright (C) 2007 Novell Inc. +#============================================================================ + +import errno +import types +import os +import sys +import time +import signal +from traceback import print_exc + +from xen.xend.XendLogging import log + +class Hald: + def __init__(self): + self.ready = False + self.running = True + + def run(self): + """Starts the HalDaemon process + """ + self.ready = True + try: + myfile = self.find("xen/xend/server/HalDaemon.py") + args = (["python", myfile ]) + self.pid = self.daemonize("python", args ) + #log.debug( "%s %s pid:%d", "Hald.py starting ", args, self.pid ) + except: + self.pid = -1 + log.debug("Unable to start HalDaemon process") + + def shutdown(self): + """Shutdown the HalDaemon process + """ + log.debug("%s pid:%d", "Hald.shutdown()", self.pid) + self.running = False + self.ready = False + if self.pid != -1: + try: + os.kill(self.pid, signal.SIGINT) + except: + print_exc() + + def daemonize(self,prog, args): + """Runs a program as a daemon with the list of arguments. Returns the PID + of the daemonized program, or returns 0 on error. + Copied from xm/create.py instead of importing to reduce coupling + """ + r, w = os.pipe() + pid = os.fork() + + if pid == 0: + os.close(r) + w = os.fdopen(w, 'w') + os.setsid() + try: + pid2 = os.fork() + except: + pid2 = None + if pid2 == 0: + os.chdir("/") + env = os.environ.copy() + env['PYTHONPATH'] = self.getpythonpath() + for fd in range(0, 256): + try: + os.close(fd) + except: + pass + os.open("/dev/null", os.O_RDWR) + os.dup2(0, 1) + os.dup2(0, 2) + os.execvpe(prog, args, env) + os._exit(1) + else: + w.write(str(pid2 or 0)) + w.close() + os._exit(0) + os.close(w) + r = os.fdopen(r) + daemon_pid = int(r.read()) + r.close() + os.waitpid(pid, 0) + #log.debug( "daemon_pid: %d", daemon_pid ) + return daemon_pid + + def getpythonpath(self): + str = " " + for p in sys.path: + if str != " ": + str = str + ":" + p + else: + if str != "": + str = p + return str + + def find(self,path, matchFunc=os.path.isfile): + """Find a module in the sys.path + From web page: http://aspn.activestate.com/ASPN/Cookbook/Python/Recipe/52224 + """ + for dirname in sys.path: + candidate = os.path.join(dirname, path) + if matchFunc(candidate): + return candidate + raise Error("Can't find file %s" % path) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + watcher = Hald() + watcher.run() + time.sleep(10) + watcher.shutdown() Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvServer.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvServer.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvServer.py @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ from xen.web.SrvDir import SrvDir from SrvRoot import SrvRoot from XMLRPCServer import XMLRPCServer +from xen.xend.server.Hald import Hald xoptions = XendOptions.instance() @@ -252,6 +253,8 @@ def _loadConfig(servers, root, reload): if xoptions.get_xend_unix_xmlrpc_server(): servers.add(XMLRPCServer(XendAPI.AUTH_PAM, False)) + servers.add(Hald()) + def create(): root = SrvDir() Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include "exec-all.h" #include "sysemu.h" +#include "console.h" #include "hw.h" #include "pci.h" #include "qemu-timer.h" @@ -596,6 +597,21 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv #endif bs = bdrv_new(dev); + + /* if cdrom physical put a watch on media-present */ + if (bdrv_get_type_hint(bs) == BDRV_TYPE_CDROM) { + if (drv && !strcmp(drv, "phy")) { + if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/media-present", bpath) != -1) { + if (bdrv_is_inserted(bs)) + xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, "1", strlen("1")); + else { + xs_write(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, "0", strlen("0")); + } + xs_watch(xsh, buf, "media-present"); + } + } + } + /* check if it is a cdrom */ if (danger_type && !strcmp(danger_type, "cdrom")) { bdrv_set_type_hint(bs, BDRV_TYPE_CDROM); @@ -1086,6 +1102,50 @@ static void xenstore_process_vcpu_set_ev return; } +static void xenstore_process_media_change_event(char **vec) +{ + char *media_present = NULL; + unsigned int len; + + media_present = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, vec[XS_WATCH_PATH], &len); + + if (media_present) { + BlockDriverState *bs; + char *buf = NULL, *cp = NULL, *path = NULL, *dev = NULL; + + path = strdup(vec[XS_WATCH_PATH]); + cp = strstr(path, "media-present"); + if (cp){ + *(cp-1) = '\0'; + pasprintf(&buf, "%s/dev", path); + dev = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); + if (dev) { + if ( !strncmp(dev, "xvd", 3)) { + memmove(dev, dev+1, strlen(dev)); + dev[0] = 'h'; + dev[1] = 'd'; + } + bs = bdrv_find(dev); + if (!bs) { + term_printf("device not found\n"); + return; + } + if (strcmp(media_present, "0") == 0 && bs) { + bdrv_close(bs); + } + else if (strcmp(media_present, "1") == 0 && + bs != NULL && bs->drv == NULL) { + if (bdrv_open(bs, bs->filename, 0 /* snapshot */) < 0) { + fprintf(logfile, "%s() qemu: could not open cdrom disk '%s'\n", + __func__, bs->filename); + } + bs->media_changed = 1; + } + } + } + } +} + void xenstore_process_event(void *opaque) { char **vec, *offset, *bpath = NULL, *buf = NULL, *drv = NULL, *image = NULL; @@ -1121,6 +1181,11 @@ void xenstore_process_event(void *opaque xenstore_watch_callbacks[i].cb(vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN], xenstore_watch_callbacks[i].opaque); + if (!strcmp(vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN], "media-present")) { + xenstore_process_media_change_event(vec); + goto out; + } + hd_index = drive_name_to_index(vec[XS_WATCH_TOKEN]); if (hd_index == -1) { fprintf(stderr,"medium change watch on `%s' -" ++++++ change-vnc-passwd.patch ++++++ Add support of change-vnc-password while vm is running. Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ DriveInfo drives_table[MAX_DRIVES+1]; int nb_drives; enum vga_retrace_method vga_retrace_method = VGA_RETRACE_DUMB; int vga_ram_size; -static DisplayState *display_state; +DisplayState *display_state; int nographic; static int curses; static int sdl; Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c @@ -2627,6 +2627,7 @@ int vnc_display_password(DisplayState *d if (password && password[0]) { if (!(vs->password = qemu_strdup(password))) return -1; + vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC; } return 0; Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "qemu-xen.h" #include "xen_backend.h" +extern DisplayState *display_state; struct xs_handle *xsh = NULL; static char *media_filename[MAX_DRIVES+1]; static QEMUTimer *insert_timer = NULL; @@ -940,6 +941,19 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_ } else if (!strncmp(command, "continue", len)) { fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: continue after state save\n"); xen_pause_requested = 0; + } else if (!strncmp(command, "chgvncpasswd", len)) { + fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: change vnc passwd\n"); + if (pasprintf(&path, + "/local/domain/0/backend/vfb/%u/0/vncpasswd", domid) == -1) { + fprintf(logfile, "out of memory reading dm command parameter\n"); + goto out; + } + par = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, &len); + if (!par) + goto out; + if (vnc_display_password(display_state, par) == 0) + xenstore_record_dm_state("vncpasswdchged"); + free(par); } else if (!strncmp(command, "usb-add", len)) { fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: usb-add a usb device\n"); if (pasprintf(&path, Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1506,6 +1506,20 @@ class XendDomainInfo: target = max_target self.setMemoryTarget(target) + def chgvncpasswd(self, passwd): + if self._stateGet() != DOM_STATE_HALTED: + path = '/local/domain/0/backend/vfb/%u/0/' % self.getDomid() + xstransact.Write(path, 'vncpasswd', passwd) + self.image.signalDeviceModel("chgvncpasswd", "vncpasswdchged") + + for dev_uuid, (dev_type, dev_info) in self.info['devices'].items(): + if dev_type == 'vfb': + dev_info['vncpasswd'] = passwd + dev_info['other_config']['vncpasswd'] = passwd + self.info.device_update(dev_uuid, cfg_xenapi = dev_info) + break + xen.xend.XendDomain.instance().managed_config_save(self) + def setMemoryTarget(self, target): """Set the memory target of this domain. @param target: In MiB. Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/XMLRPCServer.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/XMLRPCServer.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/XMLRPCServer.py @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ methods = ['device_create', 'device_conf 'destroyDevice','getDeviceSxprs', 'setMemoryTarget', 'setName', 'setVCpuCount', 'shutdown', 'send_sysrq', 'getVCPUInfo', 'waitForDevices', - 'getRestartCount', 'getBlockDeviceClass'] + 'getRestartCount', 'getBlockDeviceClass', 'chgvncpasswd'] exclude = ['domain_create', 'domain_restore'] Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ """Grand unified management application for Xen. """ +import getpass import atexit import cmd import os @@ -281,6 +282,9 @@ SUBCOMMAND_HELP = { 'getenforce' : ('', 'Returns the current enforcing mode for the Flask XSM module (Enforcing,Permissive)'), 'setenforce' : ('[ (Enforcing|1) | (Permissive|0) ]', 'Modifies the current enforcing mode for the Flask XSM module'), + #change vnc password + 'change-vnc-passwd' : ('<Domain>',\ + 'Change vnc password'), } SUBCOMMAND_OPTIONS = { @@ -406,6 +410,7 @@ common_commands = [ "usb-del", "domstate", "vcpu-set", + "change-vnc-passwd", ] domain_commands = [ @@ -443,6 +448,7 @@ domain_commands = [ "vcpu-list", "vcpu-pin", "vcpu-set", + "change-vnc-passwd", ] host_commands = [ @@ -3806,6 +3812,10 @@ def xm_cpupool_migrate(args): else: server.xend.cpu_pool.migrate(domname, poolname) +def xm_chgvncpasswd(args): + arg_check(args, "change-vnc-passwd", 1) + pwd = getpass.getpass("Enter new password: ") + server.xend.domain.chgvncpasswd(args[0], pwd) commands = { "shell": xm_shell, @@ -3914,6 +3924,8 @@ commands = { "usb-del": xm_usb_del, #domstate "domstate": xm_domstate, + #change vnc password: + "change-vnc-passwd": xm_chgvncpasswd, } ## The commands supported by a separate argument parser in xend.xm. ++++++ change_home_server.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -3155,6 +3155,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo: self._cleanup_phantom_devs(paths) self._cleanupVm() + if "change_home_server" in self.info: + chs = self.info["change_home_server"] + if (type(chs) is str and chs == "False") or \ + (type(chs) is bool and chs is False): + self.setChangeHomeServer(None) if ("transient" in self.info["other_config"] and \ bool(self.info["other_config"]["transient"])) or \ ("change_home_server" in self.info and \ ++++++ check_device_status.patch ++++++ Improve check_device_status to handle HA cases In HA environment, sometimes xenstore status has changed but ev.wait() cannot get the signal, it will wait until timeout, thus incorrect device status is returned. To fix this problem, we do not depend on ev.wait() result, but read xenstore directly to get correct device status. Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py @@ -149,7 +149,10 @@ class DevController: (status, err) = self.waitForBackend(devid) if status == Timeout: - self.destroyDevice(devid, False) + #Clean timeout backend resource + dev = self.convertToDeviceNumber(devid) + self.writeBackend(dev, HOTPLUG_STATUS_NODE, HOTPLUG_STATUS_ERROR) + self.destroyDevice(devid, True) raise VmError("Device %s (%s) could not be connected. " "Hotplug scripts not working." % (devid, self.deviceClass)) @@ -554,7 +557,17 @@ class DevController: xswatch(statusPath, hotplugStatusCallback, ev, result) - ev.wait(DEVICE_CREATE_TIMEOUT) + for i in range(1, 50): + ev.wait(DEVICE_CREATE_TIMEOUT/50) + status = xstransact.Read(statusPath) + if status is not None: + if status == HOTPLUG_STATUS_ERROR: + result['status'] = Error + elif status == HOTPLUG_STATUS_BUSY: + result['status'] = Busy + else: + result['status'] = Connected + break err = xstransact.Read(backpath, HOTPLUG_ERROR_NODE) @@ -571,7 +584,12 @@ class DevController: xswatch(statusPath, deviceDestroyCallback, ev, result) - ev.wait(DEVICE_DESTROY_TIMEOUT) + for i in range(1, 50): + ev.wait(DEVICE_DESTROY_TIMEOUT/50) + status = xstransact.Read(statusPath) + if status is None: + result['status'] = Disconnected + break return result['status'] ++++++ checkpoint-rename.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst dominfo.destroy() dominfo.testDeviceComplete() try: - dominfo.setName(domain_name, False) + dominfo.setName(domain_name) except VmError: # Ignore this. The name conflict (hopefully) arises because we # are doing localhost migration; if we are doing a suspend of a ++++++ del_usb_xend_entry.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1298,8 +1298,15 @@ class XendDomainInfo: frontpath = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).frontendPath(dev) backpath = xstransact.Read(frontpath, "backend") thread.start_new_thread(self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).finishDeviceCleanup, (backpath, path)) - - rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, force) + if deviceClass =='vusb': + dev = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).convertToDeviceNumber(devid) + state = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).readBackend(dev, 'state') + if state == '1': + rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, True) + else: + rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, force) + else: + rc = self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).destroyDevice(devid, force) if not force and rm_cfg: # The backend path, other than the device itself, # has to be passed because its accompanied frontend ++++++ disable-xl-when-using-xend-fix.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxl/xl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/libxl/xl.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/libxl/xl.c @@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ #include "libxlutil.h" #include "xl.h" -#define XEND_LOCK { "/var/lock/subsys/xend", "/var/lock/xend" } - xentoollog_logger_stdiostream *logger; int dryrun_only; int force_execution; @@ -199,7 +197,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) int ret; void *config_data = 0; int config_len = 0; - const char *locks[] = XEND_LOCK; while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "+vfN")) >= 0) { switch (opt) { @@ -252,8 +249,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) goto xit; } if (cspec->modifies && !dryrun_only) { - for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(locks)/sizeof(locks[0]); i++) { - if (!access(locks[i], F_OK) && !force_execution) { + if ((system("/usr/sbin/xend status") == 0) && strcmp(cmd, "help")) { + if (!force_execution) { fprintf(stderr, "xend is running, which may cause unpredictable results when using\n" "this xl command. Please shut down xend before continuing.\n\n" ++++++ disable_emulated_device.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c @@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int __devinit platform_pci_init(s platform_mmio = mmio_addr; platform_mmiolen = mmio_len; + /* + * Disconnect the emulated devices. + */ + outl(1, (ioaddr + 4)); + ret = init_hypercall_stubs(); if (ret < 0) goto out; ++++++ domUloader.py ++++++ #!/usr/bin/env python # domUloader.py """Loader for kernel and (optional) ramdisk from domU filesystem Given a physical disk (or disk image) for a domU and the path of a kernel and optional ramdisk, copies the kernel and ramdisk from the domU disk to a temporary location in dom0. The --entry parameter specifies the location of the kernel (and optional ramdisk) within the domU filesystem. dev is the disk as seen by domU. Filenames are relative to that filesystem. The disk is passed as the last parameter. It must be a block device or raw disk image. More complex disk images (QCOW, VMDK, etc) must already be configured via blktap and presented as a block device. The script writes an sxpr specifying the locations of the copied kernel and ramdisk into the file specified by --output (default is stdout). Limitations: - It is assumed both kernel and ramdisk are on the same filesystem. - domUs might use LVM; the script currently does not have support for setting up LVM mappings for domUs; it's not trivial and we might risk namespace conflicts. If you want to use LVM inside domUs, set up a small non-LVM boot partition and specify it in bootentry. The script uses kpartx (multipath-tools) to create mappings for devices that are exported as whole disk devices that are partitioned. (c) 01/2006 Novell Inc License: GNU GPL Author: Kurt Garloff """ import os, sys, getopt from stat import * from xen.xend import sxp import tempfile import time import xnloader # Global options quiet = False verbose = False dryrun = False tmpdir = '/var/lib/xen/tmp' in_args = '' # kpartx, left to its own devices, does not consistently pick the # same partition separator. Explicitly specify it. kpartx_args = '-p -part' # Helper functions def kpartx_has_opt(opt): """ Return True if kpartx supports option opt, otherwise False""" have_opt = True kpartx_cmd = 'kpartx -' + opt + ' 2>&1' p = os.popen(kpartx_cmd) for line in p.readlines(): if line.find('invalid option') >= 0: have_opt = False break p.close() return have_opt def error(s): print >> sys.stderr, "domUloader error: %s" % s def verbose_print(s): if verbose: print >> sys.stderr, "domUloader: %s" % s def traildigits(strg): """Return the trailing digits, used to split the partition number off""" idx = len(strg)-1 while strg[idx].isdigit(): if len == 0: return strg idx -= 1 return strg[idx+1:] def getWholedisk(part): while len(part) and part[len(part)-1].isdigit(): part = part[:-1] return part #def isWholedisk(domUname): # """Determines whether dev is a wholedisk dev""" # return not domUname[-1:].isdigit() # If available, add '-f' option (bnc#613584) if kpartx_has_opt('f'): kpartx_args += ' -f' class Wholedisk: "Class representing a whole disk that may have partitions" def __init__(self, vdev, pdev): "c'tor: set up" # Initialize object; will not raise: self.ldev = None self.vdev = vdev self.pdev = pdev self.mapped = 0 self.partitions = [] self.pcount = 0 self.lvm = False # Finish initialization; may raise: self.is_blk = (S_ISBLK(os.stat(pdev)[ST_MODE])) self.pcount = self.scanpartitions() def physdev(self): """Gets the physical device used to access the device from dom0""" if self.ldev: return self.ldev return self.pdev def findPart(self, vdev): "Find device dev in list of partitions" if len(vdev) > 5 and vdev[:5] == "/dev/": vdev = vdev[5:] for part in self.partitions: if vdev == part.vdev: return part if len(self.partitions): return self.partitions[0] return None def loopsetup(self): """Sets up the loop mapping for a disk image. Will raise if no loopbacks are available. """ if not self.is_blk and not self.ldev: # Loops through all loopback devices, attempting to # find a free one to set up. Don't scan for free and # then try to set it up as a separate step - too racy! i = 0 while True: ldev = '/dev/loop%i' % (i) if not os.path.exists(ldev): break i += 1 fd = os.popen("losetup %s '%s' 2> /dev/null" % (ldev, self.pdev)) if not fd.close(): verbose_print("losetup %s '%s'" % (ldev, self.pdev)) self.ldev = ldev break if not self.ldev: raise RuntimeError("No free loop device found") def loopclean(self): """Delete the loop mapping. Will never raise. """ if self.ldev: verbose_print("losetup -d %s" % self.ldev) # Even seemingly innocent queries like "losetup /dev/loop0" # can temporarily block the loopback and cause transient # failures deleting the loopback, hence the retry logic. retries = 10 while retries: fd = os.popen("losetup -d %s" % self.ldev) if not fd.close(): self.ldev = None break else: # Mappings may not have been deleted due to race # between udev and dm - see bnc#379032. Causes # loop devices to leak. Call kpartx -d again os.system("kpartx %s -d '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) time.sleep(0.1) retries -= 1 def scanlvmpartitions(self): pcount = 0 verbose_print("vgchange -ay '%s'" % (self.vdev)) ret = os.system("vgchange -ay '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) >> 8 if not ret: self.lvm = True verbose_print("lvscan | grep '/dev/%s'" % (self.vdev)) fd = os.popen("lvscan | grep '/dev/%s'" % (self.vdev)) for line in fd.readlines(): line = line.strip() (t1, lvname, t2) = line.split('\'') pname = lvname[lvname.rfind('/')+1:] pname = pname.strip() pname = "/dev/mapper/" + self.vdev + "-" + pname verbose_print("Found partition: vdev %s, pdev %s" % (self.vdev, pname)) self.partitions.append(Partition(self, self.vdev, pname)) pcount += 1 fd.close() verbose_print("vgchange -an '%s'" % (self.vdev)) os.system("vgchange -an '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) else: verbose_print("vgchange -ay %s ... failed: -%d" % (self.vdev, ret)) return pcount def scanpartitions(self): """Scan device for partitions (kpartx -l) and set up data structures, Returns number of partitions found.""" self.loopsetup() # TODO: We could use fdisk -l instead and look at the type of # partitions; this way we could also detect LVM and support it. verbose_print("kpartx %s -l '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) fd = os.popen("kpartx %s -l '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) pcount = 0 for line in fd.readlines(): line = line.strip() verbose_print("kpartx -l: %s" % (line,)) (pname, params) = line.split(' : ') pname = pname.strip() pno = int(traildigits(pname)) #if pname.rfind('/') != -1: # pname = pname[pname.rfind('/')+1:] #pname = self.pdev[:self.pdev.rfind('/')] + '/' + pname pname = "/dev/mapper/" + pname verbose_print("Found partition: vdev %s, pdev %s" % ('%s%i' % (self.vdev, pno), pname)) self.partitions.append(Partition(self, '%s%i' % (self.vdev, pno), pname)) pcount += 1 fd.close() # Try lvm if not pcount: pcount = self.scanlvmpartitions() # Add self to partition table if not pcount: if self.ldev: ref = self else: ref = None self.partitions.append(Partition(ref, self.vdev, self.pdev)) return pcount def activatepartitions(self): "Set up loop mapping and device-mapper mappings" verbose_print("activatepartitions") if not self.mapped: self.loopsetup() if self.pcount: verbose_print("kpartx %s -a '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) fd = os.popen("kpartx %s -a '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) fd.close() if self.pcount and self.lvm: verbose_print("vgchange -ay '%s'" % (self.vdev)) ret = os.system("vgchange -ay '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) >> 8 if not ret: verbose_print("lvchange -ay '%s'" % (self.vdev)) os.system("lvchange -ay '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) self.mapped += 1 def partitionsdeactivated(self): "Return True if partition mappings have been removed, False otherwise" for part in self.partitions: if os.access(part.pdev, os.F_OK): return False return True def deactivatepartitions(self): """Remove device-mapper mappings and loop mapping. Will never raise. """ verbose_print("deactivatepartitions") if not self.mapped: return self.mapped -= 1 if not self.mapped: if self.pcount: retries = 10 while retries and not self.partitionsdeactivated(): verbose_print("kpartx %s -d '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) os.system("kpartx %s -d '%s'" % (kpartx_args, self.physdev())) time.sleep(0.1) retries -= 1 if retries == 0: error("unable to remove partition mappings with kpartx -d") if self.pcount and self.lvm: verbose_print("lvchange -an '%s'" % (self.vdev)) ret = os.system("lvchange -an '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) >> 8 if ret: time.sleep(0.3) os.system("lvchange -an '/dev/%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) verbose_print("vgchange -an '%s'" % (self.vdev)) ret = os.system("vgchange -an '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) >> 8 if ret: time.sleep(0.3) os.system("vgchange -an '%s' > /dev/null 2>&1" % (self.vdev)) self.loopclean() def __del__(self): "d'tor: clean up" self.deactivatepartitions() self.loopclean() def __repr__(self): "string representation for debugging" strg = "[" + self.vdev + "," + self.pdev + "," if self.ldev: strg += self.ldev strg += "," + str(self.pcount) + ",mapped %ix]" % self.mapped return strg class Partition: """Class representing a domU filesystem (partition) that can be mounted in dom0""" def __init__(self, whole = None, vdev = None, pdev = None): "c'tor: setup" self.wholedisk = whole self.vdev = vdev self.pdev = pdev self.mountpoint = None def __del__(self): "d'tor: cleanup" if self.mountpoint: self.umount() # Not needed: Refcounting will take care of it. #if self.wholedisk: # self.wholedisk.deactivatepartitions() def __repr__(self): "string representation for debugging" strg = "[" + self.vdev + "," + self.pdev + "," if self.mountpoint: strg += "mounted on " + self.mountpoint + "," else: strg += "not mounted," if self.wholedisk: return strg + self.wholedisk.__repr__() + "]" else: return strg + "]" def mount(self, fstype = None, options = "ro"): "mount filesystem, sets self.mountpoint" if self.mountpoint: return if self.wholedisk: self.wholedisk.activatepartitions() mtpt = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix = "%s." % self.vdev, dir = tmpdir) mopts = "" if fstype: mopts += " -t %s" % fstype if options: mopts += " -o %s" % options verbose_print("mount %s '%s' %s" % (mopts, self.pdev, mtpt)) fd = os.popen("mount %s '%s' %s" % (mopts, self.pdev, mtpt)) err = fd.close() if err: try: os.rmdir(mtpt) except: pass raise RuntimeError("Error %i from mount %s '%s' on %s" % \ (err, mopts, self.pdev, mtpt)) self.mountpoint = mtpt def umount(self): """umount filesystem at self.mountpoint""" if not self.mountpoint: return verbose_print("umount %s" % self.mountpoint) fd = os.popen("umount %s" % self.mountpoint) err = fd.close() try: os.rmdir(self.mountpoint) except: pass if err: error("Error %i from umount %s" % (err, self.mountpoint)) else: self.mountpoint = None if self.wholedisk: self.wholedisk.deactivatepartitions() def parseEntry(entry): "disects bootentry and returns vdev, kernel, ramdisk" def bad(): raise RuntimeError, "Malformed --entry" fsspl = entry.split(':') if len(fsspl) != 2: bad() vdev = fsspl[0] entry = fsspl[1] enspl = entry.split(',') if len(enspl) not in (1, 2): bad() # Prepend '/' if missing kernel = enspl[0] if kernel == '': bad() if kernel[0] != '/': kernel = '/' + kernel ramdisk = None if len(enspl) > 1: ramdisk = enspl[1] if ramdisk != '' and ramdisk[0] != '/': ramdisk = '/' + ramdisk return vdev, kernel, ramdisk def copyFile(src, dst): "Wrapper for shutil.filecopy" import shutil verbose_print("cp %s %s" % (src, dst)) stat = os.stat(src) if stat.st_size > 16*1024*1024: raise RuntimeError("Too large file %s (%s larger than 16MB)" \ % (src, stat.st_size)) try: shutil.copyfile(src, dst) except: os.unlink(dst) raise() def copyKernelAndRamdisk(disk, vdev, kernel, ramdisk): """Finds vdev in list of partitions, mounts the partition, copies kernel [and ramdisk] off to dom0 files, umounts the parition again, and returns sxpr pointing to these copies.""" verbose_print("copyKernelAndRamdisk(%s, %s, %s, %s)" % (disk, vdev, kernel, ramdisk)) if dryrun: return "linux (kernel kernel.dummy) (ramdisk ramdisk.dummy)" part = disk.findPart(vdev) if not part: raise RuntimeError("Partition '%s' does not exist" % vdev) part.mount() try: (fd, knm) = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix = "kernel.", dir = tmpdir) os.close(fd) copyFile(part.mountpoint + kernel, knm) except: os.unlink(knm) part.umount() raise if not quiet: print "Copy kernel %s from %s to %s for booting" % (kernel, vdev, knm) sxpr = "linux (kernel %s)" % knm if ramdisk: try: (fd, inm) = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix = "ramdisk.", dir = tmpdir) os.close(fd) copyFile(part.mountpoint + ramdisk, inm) except: os.unlink(knm) os.unlink(inm) part.umount() raise sxpr += "(ramdisk %s)" % inm part.umount() xnloader.patch_netware_loader(knm) return sxpr def main(argv): "Main routine: Parses options etc." global quiet, dryrun, verbose, tmpdir, in_args def usage(): "Help output (usage info)" global verbose, quiet, dryrun print >> sys.stderr, "domUloader usage: domUloader [--output=fd] [--quiet] [--dryrun] [--verbose]\n" +\ "[--args] [--help] --entry=dev:kernel[,ramdisk] physdisk [virtdisk]\n" +\ "\n" +\ "dev format: hd[a-p][0-9]*, xvd[a-p][0-9]*, LVM-vgname-lvname\n" print >> sys.stderr, __doc__ try: (optlist, args) = getopt.gnu_getopt(argv, 'qvh', \ ('entry=', 'output=', 'tmpdir=', 'args=', 'kernel=', 'ramdisk=', 'help', 'quiet', 'dryrun', 'verbose')) except: usage() sys.exit(1) entry = None output = None pdisk = None vdisk = None for (opt, oarg) in optlist: if opt in ('-h', '--help'): usage() sys.exit(1) elif opt in ('-q', '--quiet'): quiet = True elif opt in ('-n', '--dryrun'): dryrun = True elif opt in ('-v', '--verbose'): verbose = True elif opt == '--output': output = oarg elif opt == '--entry': entry = oarg elif opt == '--tmpdir': tmpdir = oarg elif opt == '--args': in_args = oarg verbose_print(str(argv)) if args: if len(args) == 2: pdisk = args[1] elif len(args) == 3: pdisk = args[1] vdisk = args[2] if not entry or not pdisk: usage() sys.exit(1) if output is None or output == "-": fd = sys.stdout.fileno() else: fd = os.open(output, os.O_WRONLY) if not os.access(tmpdir, os.X_OK): os.mkdir(tmpdir) os.chmod(tmpdir, 0750) vdev, kernel, ramdisk = parseEntry(entry) if vdev[:vdev.find('-')] == "LVM": vdev = vdev.split('-')[1] if not vdisk: vdisk = getWholedisk(vdev) verbose_print("vdisk not specified; guessing '%s' based on '%s'" % (vdisk, vdev)) if not vdev.startswith(vdisk): error("Virtual disk '%s' does not match entry '%s'" % (vdisk, entry)) sys.exit(1) disk = Wholedisk(vdisk, pdisk) r = 0 try: sxpr = copyKernelAndRamdisk(disk, vdev, kernel, ramdisk) if in_args: sxpr += "(args '%s')" % in_args os.write(fd, sxpr) except Exception, e: error(str(e)) r = 1 for part in disk.partitions: part.wholedisk = None del disk return r # Call main if called (and not imported) if __name__ == "__main__": r = 1 try: r = main(sys.argv) except Exception, e: error(str(e)) sys.exit(r) ++++++ domu-usb-controller.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py @@ -1875,7 +1875,14 @@ class XendConfig(dict): ports = sxp.child(dev_sxp, 'port') for port in ports[1:]: try: - num, bus = port + # When ['port' ['1','']] is saved into sxp file, it will become (port (1 )) + # If using this sxp file, here variable "port" will be port=1, + # we should process it, otherwise, it will report error. + if len(port) == 1: + num = port[0] + bus = "" + else: + num, bus = port dev_config['port-%i' % int(num)] = str(bus) except TypeError: pass ++++++ etc_pam.d_xen-api ++++++ #%PAM-1.0 auth required pam_listfile.so onerr=fail item=user \ sense=allow file=/etc/xen/xenapiusers auth include common-auth account include common-account password include common-password session include common-session ++++++ hibernate.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/ssdt_s3.asl =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/ssdt_s3.asl +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/ssdt_s3.asl @@ -20,13 +20,9 @@ DefinitionBlock ("SSDT_S3.aml", "SSDT", 2, "Xen", "HVM", 0) { - /* Must match piix emulation */ - Name (\_S3, Package (0x04) - { - 0x01, /* PM1a_CNT.SLP_TYP */ - 0x01, /* PM1b_CNT.SLP_TYP */ - 0x0, /* reserved */ - 0x0 /* reserved */ - }) + /* + * Turn off support for s3 sleep state to deal with SVVP tests. + * This is what MSFT does on HyperV. + */ } Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/ssdt_s4.asl =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/ssdt_s4.asl +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/hvmloader/acpi/ssdt_s4.asl @@ -20,13 +20,9 @@ DefinitionBlock ("SSDT_S4.aml", "SSDT", 2, "Xen", "HVM", 0) { - /* Must match piix emulation */ - Name (\_S4, Package (0x04) - { - 0x00, /* PM1a_CNT.SLP_TYP */ - 0x00, /* PM1b_CNT.SLP_TYP */ - 0x00, /* reserved */ - 0x00 /* reserved */ - }) + /* + * Turn off support for s4 sleep state to deal with SVVP tests. + * This is what MSFT does on HyperV. + */ } ++++++ hv_extid_compatibility.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ XENAPI_PLATFORM_CFG_TYPES = { 'nographic': int, 'nomigrate': int, 'pae' : int, + 'extid': int, 'rtc_timeoffset': int, 'parallel': str, 'serial': str, @@ -523,6 +524,8 @@ class XendConfig(dict): self['platform']['acpi_firmware'] = "" if 'timer_mode' not in self['platform']: self['platform']['timer_mode'] = 1 + if 'extid' in self['platform'] and int(self['platform']['extid']) == 1: + self['platform']['viridian'] = 1 if 'viridian' not in self['platform']: self['platform']['viridian'] = 0 if 'rtc_timeoffset' not in self['platform']: Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py @@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): self.apic = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('apic', 0)) self.acpi = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('acpi', 0)) + self.extid = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('extid', 0)) self.guest_os_type = vmConfig['platform'].get('guest_os_type') self.memory_sharing = int(vmConfig['memory_sharing']) try: Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py @@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ gopts.var('viridian', val='VIRIDIAN', use="""Expose Viridian interface to x86 HVM guest? (Default is 0).""") +gopts.var('extid', val='EXTID', + fn=set_int, default=0, + use="Specify extention ID for a HVM domain.") + gopts.var('acpi', val='ACPI', fn=set_int, default=1, use="Disable or enable ACPI of HVM domain.") @@ -1120,7 +1124,7 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals): 'timer_mode', 'usb', 'usbdevice', 'vcpus', 'vnc', 'vncconsole', 'vncdisplay', 'vnclisten', - 'vncunused', 'viridian', 'vpt_align', + 'vncunused', 'vpt_align', 'watchdog', 'watchdog_action', 'xauthority', 'xen_extended_power_mgmt', 'xen_platform_pci', 'memory_sharing' ] @@ -1130,6 +1134,10 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals): config_image.append([a, vals.__dict__[a]]) if vals.vncpasswd is not None: config_image.append(['vncpasswd', vals.vncpasswd]) + if vals.extid and vals.extid == 1: + config_image.append(['viridian', vals.extid]) + elif vals.viridian: + config_image.append(['viridian', vals.viridian]) def make_config(vals): ++++++ init.pciback ++++++ #!/bin/bash # # Copyright (c) 2001 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany. All rights reserved. # # /etc/init.d/pciback # ### BEGIN INIT INFO # Provides: pciback # Required-Start: $syslog $network # Should-Start: $null # Required-Stop: $syslog $network # Should-Stop: $null # Default-Start: 3 5 # Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 # Description: bind PCI devices to pciback ### END INIT INFO . /etc/rc.status . /etc/sysconfig/pciback rc_reset load_pciback() { if ! lsmod | grep -qi "pciback" then echo "Loading pciback ..." modprobe pciback fi } unload_pciback() { if lsmod | grep -qi "pciback" then echo "Unloading pciback ..." modprobe -r pciback fi } bind_dev_to_pciback() { for DEVICE in ${XEN_PCI_HIDE_LIST} do local DRV=`echo ${DEVICE} | /usr/bin/cut -d "," -f 1` local PCIID=`echo ${DEVICE} | /usr/bin/cut -d "," -f 2` if ! ls /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/${PCIID} > /dev/null 2>&1 then echo "Binding ${PCIID} ..." if ls /sys/bus/pci/drivers/${DRV}/${PCIID} > /dev/null 2>&1 then echo -n ${PCIID} > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/${DRV}/unbind fi echo -n ${PCIID} > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/new_slot echo -n ${PCIID} > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/bind fi done } unbind_dev_from_pciback() { for DEVICE in ${XEN_PCI_HIDE_LIST} do local DRV=`echo ${DEVICE} | /usr/bin/cut -d "," -f 1` local PCIID=`echo ${DEVICE} | /usr/bin/cut -d "," -f 2` if ls /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/${PCIID} > /dev/null then echo "Unbinding ${PCIID} ..." echo -n ${PCIID} > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/unbind fi done } test "uname -r" | grep xen && exit 0 case $1 in start) echo "Starting pciback ..." echo load_pciback bind_dev_to_pciback rc_status -v -r ;; stop) echo "Stopping pciback ..." echo unbind_dev_from_pciback unload_pciback rc_status -v ;; reload|restart) echo "Stopping pciback ..." echo unbind_dev_from_pciback unload_pciback echo "Starting pciback ..." echo load_pciback bind_dev_to_pciback ;; status) if lsmod | grep -qi pciback then echo echo "pciback: loaded" echo echo "Currently bound devices ..." echo "-----------------------------" ls /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback | grep ^0000 echo else echo "pciback: not loaded" fi ;; *) echo "Usage: $0 [start|stop|restart|reload|status]" exit 1 ;; esac ++++++ init.xen_loop ++++++ # Increase the number of loopback devices available for vm creation options loop max_loop=64 ++++++ init.xend ++++++ #!/bin/bash # # xend Starts and stops the Xen management daemon # # chkconfig: 35 98 01 # description: Starts and stops the Xen management daemon # ### BEGIN INIT INFO # Provides: xend # Required-Start: $syslog $network $remote_fs # Should-Start: iscsi $time # Required-Stop: $syslog $network $remote_fs # Should-Stop: iscsi $time # Default-Start: 3 5 # Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 # Short-Description: Starts and stops the Xen management daemon # Description: Starts and stops the Xen management daemon. xend is needed # to create and manage VMs on Xen. ### END INIT INFO . /etc/rc.status rc_reset XEND=`pidof -x /usr/sbin/xend` await_daemons_up() { i=1 rets=10 xend status while [ $? -ne 0 -a $i -lt $rets ]; do sleep 1 echo -n . i=$(($i + 1)) xend status done } xend_abort() { echo -n "xend " rc_failed $1 rc_status -v rc_exit } cleanup() { rm -f /var/lib/xen/tmp/* 2>/dev/null rm -f /var/lib/xen/xenbl* 2>/dev/null } check() { if [ "$1" == status ]; then if [ ! -e /proc/xen/capabilities ]; then xend_abort 3 fi else if [ `id -u` != 0 ]; then xend_abort 4 fi if [ ! -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] || ! grep control_d /proc/xen/capabilities >/dev/null 2>&1; then if [ "$1" == stop ] || [ "$1" == try-restart ]; then xend_abort 0 else xend_abort 6 fi fi fi } case "$1" in start) check $1 echo -n "Starting xend " if [ ! -z "$XEND" ]; then echo -n "(already running pid $XEND) " else cleanup fi xend start await_daemons_up ;; stop) check $1 echo -n "Stopping xend " if [ -z "$XEND" ]; then echo -n "(not running) " xend stop rc_reset else echo -n "(pid $XEND) " xend stop cleanup rc_reset fi ;; status) check $1 echo -n "Checking status of xend " if [ ! -z "$XEND" ]; then echo -n "(pid $XEND) " fi checkproc /usr/sbin/xend ;; restart|reload) check $1 echo -n "Restarting xend " if [ -z "$XEND" ]; then echo -n "(not running) " else echo -n "(old pid $XEND) " fi xend restart await_daemons_up ;; try-restart) check $1 $0 status if [ $? = 0 ]; then $0 restart else rc_reset fi ;; *) echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|try-restart|reload|status}" rc_failed 2 rc_exit esac rc_status -v rc_exit ++++++ init.xendomains ++++++ #!/bin/bash # # xendomains Starts and stops Xen VMs # # chkconfig: 35 99 00 # description: Starts and stops Xen VMs # ### BEGIN INIT INFO # Provides: xendomains # Required-Start: $syslog $remote_fs xenstored xenconsoled # Should-Start: xend iscsi o2cb ocfs2 # Required-Stop: $syslog $remote_fs xenstored xenconsoled # Should-Stop: xend iscsi # Default-Start: 3 5 # Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 # Short-Description: Starts and stops Xen VMs # Description: Starts and stops Xen VMs automatically when the # host starts and stops. ### END INIT INFO . /etc/rc.status rc_reset RETCODE_FILE=/tmp/xendomains.rc.$$ xm_cmd=echo # See docs/misc/distro_mapping.txt if [ -d /var/lock/subsys ]; then LOCKFILE=/var/lock/subsys/xendomains else LOCKFILE=/var/lock/xendomains fi if [ -d /etc/sysconfig ]; then XENDOM_CONFIG=/etc/sysconfig/xendomains else XENDOM_CONFIG=/etc/default/xendomains fi test -r $XENDOM_CONFIG || { echo "$XENDOM_CONFIG not existing"; if [ "$1" = "stop" ]; then exit 0; else exit 6; fi; } . "$XENDOM_CONFIG" shopt -s dotglob nullglob smart_term=1 if [ -z "$esc" ]; then smart_term=0 rc_timer_on() { (trap "exit 0" TERM; sleep $1) & _rc_timer_pid=$! } rc_timer_off() { if [ -n "$_rc_timer_pid" ]; then kill -TERM $_rc_timer_pid > /dev/null 2>&1 fi unset _rc_timer_pid } fi xendomains_abort() { echo -n "xendomains " rc_failed $1 rc_status -v rc_exit } check() { XEND=`pidof -x /usr/sbin/xend` if [ -z "$XEND" ]; then xm_cmd="xl -f" XEND="xl" else xm_cmd="xm" fi if [ "$1" = status ]; then if [ ! -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] || [ ! -r "$XENDOM_CONFIG" ] || [ -z "$XEND" ]; then xendomains_abort 3 fi else if [ `id -u` != 0 ]; then xendomains_abort 4 fi if [ ! -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] || [ -z "$XEND" ] || ! grep control_d /proc/xen/capabilities >/dev/null 2>&1; then if [ "$1" = stop ] || [ "$1" = restart ]; then xendomains_abort 0 else xendomains_abort 6 fi fi if [ ! -r "$XENDOM_CONFIG" ]; then xendomains_abort 6 fi fi } dir_contains_something() { [ -d "$1" ] || return 1 local dirfiles=( "$1"/* ) [ ${#dirfiles[@]} != 0 ] } get_name_from_cfg() { if grep -q "^name" "$1";then NM=`grep '^name[ ]*=' "$1" | sed -e 's/^name[ ]*=[ ]*['\''"]\([^'\''"]*\)['\''"].*$/\1/'` elif grep -q "(name " "$1";then NM=`grep '(name ' "$1" | sed -e 's/^ *//' | cut -d " " -f 2 | sed -e 's/)//'` fi } running_auto_names() { unset AUTONAMES[@] if ! dir_contains_something "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO"; then return fi for dom in "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO"/*; do get_name_from_cfg "$dom" AUTONAMES+=("$NM") done } parseln() { name=${1:0:$((${#1}-36))} name=${name%% *} rest="${1: -36}" id=${rest:0:4} id=`echo $id` mem=${rest:4:6} mem=`echo $mem` vcpu=${rest:10:6} vcpu=`echo $vcpu` state=${rest:16:11} state=`echo $state` tm=${rest:27} tm=`echo $tm` } xm_list() { TERM=vt100 ${xm_cmd} list | grep -v '^Name *ID' } is_cfg_running() { get_name_from_cfg "$1" while read LN; do parseln "$LN" [ "$id" = 0 ] && continue if [ "$name" = "$NM" ]; then [ -z "$state" ] && return 1 return 0 fi done < <(xm_list) return 1 } start() { if [ -f "$LOCKFILE" ]; then echo -n "xendomains already running (lockfile exists)" rc_reset rc_status -v return 0 fi local printed=0 if [ "$XENDOMAINS_RESTORE" = "true" ] && dir_contains_something "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE"; then mkdir -p $(dirname "$LOCKFILE") touch "$LOCKFILE" echo "Restoring saved Xen domains" printed=1 for dom in "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE"/*; do echo -n " ${dom##*/}: " ${xm_cmd} restore "$dom" >/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rc_failed else rc_reset rm -f "$dom" fi rc_status -v done fi if dir_contains_something "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO"; then touch "$LOCKFILE" echo "Starting auto Xen domains" printed=1 for dom in "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO"/*; do echo -n " ${dom##*/}: " if is_cfg_running "$dom"; then rc_status -s else if grep -q "^name" "$dom";then ${xm_cmd} create --quiet --defconfig "$dom" elif grep -q "(name .*" "$dom";then ${xm_cmd} create --quiet --config "$dom" fi if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rc_failed else usleep $XENDOMAINS_CREATE_USLEEP rc_reset fi rc_status -v fi done fi if [ $printed -eq 0 ]; then echo -n "Starting xendomains" rc_failed 6 # not configured rc_status -v fi } is_zombie_state() { [ "$1" = "-b---d" ] || [ "$1" = "-----d" ] } any_non_zombies() { while read LN; do parseln "$LN" [ "$id" = 0 ] && continue [ -z "$state" ] && continue is_zombie_state "$state" || return 0 done < <(xm_list) return 1 } migrate_with_watchdog() { (${xm_cmd} migrate "$@" ; echo $? > "$RETCODE_FILE") >/dev/null 2>&1 & watchdog_xm $! } save_with_watchdog() { (${xm_cmd} save "$@" ; echo $? > "$RETCODE_FILE") >/dev/null 2>&1 & watchdog_xm $! } shutdown_with_watchdog() { (${xm_cmd} shutdown -w "$@" ; echo $? > "$RETCODE_FILE") >/dev/null 2>&1 & watchdog_xm $! } get_return_code() { local RC=127 [ -r "$RETCODE_FILE" ] && RC=`head -c10 "$RETCODE_FILE"` rm -f "$RETCODE_FILE" return $RC } # $1: The PID to wait on. watchdog_xm() { local col=$((COLUMNS-11)) if [ -z "$XENDOMAINS_STOP_MAXWAIT" ] || [ "$XENDOMAINS_STOP_MAXWAIT" = "0" ]; then wait $1 >/dev/null 2>&1 get_return_code return fi rc_timer_on $XENDOMAINS_STOP_MAXWAIT $col while true; do # Prefer "jobs" over "ps": faster and no false positives pid=`jobs -l | grep " $1 Running"` if [ -z "$pid" ]; then break fi pid=`jobs -l | grep " $_rc_timer_pid Running"` if [ -z "$pid" ]; then disown $1 # To avoid the "Terminated..." message kill $1 >/dev/null 2>&1 fi sleep 1 done rc_timer_off if [ $smart_term -ne 0 ]; then echo -en "\015${esc}[${col}C " fi get_return_code } stop() { echo "Shutting down Xen domains" if [ "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO_ONLY" = "true" ]; then running_auto_names fi local printed=0 while read LN; do parseln "$LN" [ "$id" = 0 ] && continue [ -z "$state" ] && continue printed=1 if [ "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO_ONLY" = "true" ]; then is_auto_domain=0 for n in "${AUTONAMES[@]}"; do if [ "$name" = "$n" ]; then is_auto_domain=1 break fi done if [ $is_auto_domain -eq 0 ]; then echo -n " $name: " rc_status -s continue fi fi if [ -n "$XENDOMAINS_SYSRQ" ]; then for sysrq in $XENDOMAINS_SYSRQ; do echo -n " $name: " echo -n "sending sysrq '$sysrq'... " ${xm_cmd} sysrq $id $sysrq if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rc_failed else rc_reset fi rc_status -v # usleep just ignores empty arg usleep $XENDOMAINS_USLEEP done fi if is_zombie_state "$state"; then echo -n " $name: " echo -n "destroying zombie... " ${xm_cmd} destroy $id rc_reset rc_status -v continue fi if [ -n "$XENDOMAINS_MIGRATE" ]; then echo -n " $name: " echo -n "migrating... " migrate_with_watchdog $id "$XENDOMAINS_MIGRATE" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rc_failed rc_status -v else rc_reset rc_status -v continue fi fi if [ -n "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE" ]; then echo -n " $name: " echo -n "saving... " save_with_watchdog $id "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE/$name" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rm -f "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE/$name" rc_failed rc_status -v else rc_reset rc_status -v continue fi fi if [ -n "$XENDOMAINS_SHUTDOWN" ]; then echo -n " $name: " echo -n "shutting down... " shutdown_with_watchdog $id $XENDOMAINS_SHUTDOWN if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rc_failed else rc_reset fi rc_status -v fi done < <(xm_list) if [ -n "$XENDOMAINS_SHUTDOWN_ALL" ] && any_non_zombies ; then echo -n " others: shutting down... " shutdown_with_watchdog $XENDOMAINS_SHUTDOWN_ALL if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then rc_failed else rc_reset fi rc_status -v fi if [ $printed -eq 0 ]; then echo -e "${rc_done_up}" fi # Unconditionally delete lock file rm -f "$LOCKFILE" } check_domain_up() { while read LN; do parseln "$LN" [ "$id" = 0 ] && continue if [ "$name" = "$1" ]; then [ -z "$state" ] && return 1 return 0 fi done < <(xm_list) return 1 } check_all_domains_up() { any_auto=0 any_save=0 dir_contains_something "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO" && any_auto=1 dir_contains_something "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE" && any_save=1 if [ $any_auto -eq 0 ] && [ $any_save -eq 0 ]; then rc_reset rc_status -v return fi echo if [ $any_auto -ne 0 ]; then for nm in "$XENDOMAINS_AUTO"/*; do get_name_from_cfg "$nm" echo -n " $nm: " if check_domain_up "$NM"; then rc_reset else rc_failed 2 fi rc_status -v done fi if [ $any_save -ne 0 ]; then for nm in "$XENDOMAINS_SAVE"/*; do echo -n " $nm: " rc_failed 3 rc_status -v done fi } # This does NOT necessarily restart all running domains: instead it # stops all running domains and then boots all the domains specified in # AUTODIR. If other domains have been started manually then they will # not get restarted. restart() { "$0" stop start } case "$1" in start) check $1 start ;; stop) check $1 stop ;; restart|reload) check $1 restart ;; try-restart) check $1 "$0" status if [ $? = 0 ]; then "$0" restart else rc_reset rc_status -v fi ;; status) check $1 echo -n "Checking status of Xen domains" if [ ! -f "$LOCKFILE" ]; then rc_failed 3 rc_status -v else check_all_domains_up fi ;; *) echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|try-restart|reload|status}" rc_failed 2 ;; esac rc_exit ++++++ ioemu-7615-qcow2-fix-alloc_cluster_link_l2.patch ++++++ qcow2 corruption: Fix alloc_cluster_link_l2 (Kevin Wolf) This patch fixes a qcow2 corruption bug introduced in SVN Rev 5861. L2 tables are big endian, so entries must be converted before being passed to functions. This bug is easy to trigger. The following script will create and destroy a qcow2 image (the header is gone after three loop iterations): #!/bin/bash qemu-img create -f qcow2 test.qcow 1M for i in $(seq 1 10); do qemu-system-x86_64 -hda test.qcow -monitor stdio > /dev/null 2>&1 < Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block-qcow2.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block-qcow2.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block-qcow2.c @@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ static int alloc_cluster_link_l2(BlockDr goto err; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) - free_any_clusters(bs, old_cluster[i], 1); + free_any_clusters(bs, be64_to_cpu(old_cluster[i]) & ~QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED, 1); ret = 0; err: ++++++ ioemu-bdrv-open-CACHE_WB.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, drv = blktap_drivers[i].drv; DPRINTF("%s driver specified\n", drv ? drv->format_name : "No"); - /* Open the image */ - if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, flags, drv) != 0) { + /* Open the image + * Use BDRV_O_CACHE_WB for write-through caching, + * no flags for write-back caching + */ + if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, flags|BDRV_O_CACHE_WB, drv) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not open image file %s\n", path); return -ENOMEM; } ++++++ ioemu-blktap-barriers.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -360,6 +360,15 @@ static void qemu_send_responses(void* op } /** + * Callback function for AIO flush + */ +static void qemu_flush_response(void* opaque, int ret) { + if (ret != 0) { + DPRINTF("aio_flush: ret = %d (%s)\n", ret, strerror(-ret)); + } +} + +/** * Callback function for the IO message pipe. Reads requests from the ring * and processes them (call qemu read/write functions). * @@ -378,6 +387,7 @@ static void handle_blktap_iomsg(void* pr blkif_t *blkif = s->blkif; tapdev_info_t *info = s->ring_info; int page_size = getpagesize(); + int sync; struct aiocb_info *aiocb_info; @@ -410,7 +420,7 @@ static void handle_blktap_iomsg(void* pr /* Don't allow writes on readonly devices */ if ((s->flags & TD_RDONLY) && - (req->operation == BLKIF_OP_WRITE)) { + (req->operation != BLKIF_OP_READ)) { blkif->pending_list[idx].status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR; goto send_response; } @@ -431,7 +441,7 @@ static void handle_blktap_iomsg(void* pr DPRINTF("Sector request failed:\n"); DPRINTF("%s request, idx [%d,%d] size [%llu], " "sector [%llu,%llu]\n", - (req->operation == BLKIF_OP_WRITE ? + (req->operation != BLKIF_OP_READ ? "WRITE" : "READ"), idx,i, (long long unsigned) @@ -444,8 +454,14 @@ static void handle_blktap_iomsg(void* pr blkif->pending_list[idx].secs_pending += nsects; - switch (req->operation) + sync = 0; + switch (req->operation) { + case BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER: + sync = 1; + bdrv_aio_flush(s->bs, qemu_flush_response, NULL); + /* fall through */ + case BLKIF_OP_WRITE: aiocb_info = malloc(sizeof(*aiocb_info)); @@ -465,6 +481,10 @@ static void handle_blktap_iomsg(void* pr DPRINTF("ERROR: bdrv_write() == NULL\n"); goto send_response; } + + if (sync) + bdrv_aio_flush(s->bs, qemu_flush_response, NULL); + break; case BLKIF_OP_READ: ++++++ ioemu-blktap-fv-init.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_machine_fv.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_machine_fv.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_machine_fv.c @@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ void qemu_invalidate_entry(uint8_t *buff #endif /* defined(MAPCACHE) */ +extern void init_blktap(void); static void xen_init_fv(ram_addr_t ram_size, int vga_ram_size, const char *boot_device, @@ -295,6 +296,11 @@ static void xen_init_fv(ram_addr_t ram_s } #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_STUBDOM + /* Initialize tapdisk client */ + init_blktap(); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM /* the hvmop is not supported on older hypervisors */ xc_set_hvm_param(xc_handle, domid, HVM_PARAM_DM_DOMAIN, DOMID_SELF); #endif ++++++ ioemu-blktap-image-format.patch ++++++

From 5ac882a6d7499e4a36103db071203bf4d1ddfe1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Wolf Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:26:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/6] ioemu: Use the image format sent by blktapctrl

Currently the blktap backend in ioemu lets qemu guess which format an image is in. This was a security problem and the blktap backend doesn't work any more since this was fixed in qemu. This patch changes ioemu to respect the format it gets from blktapctrl. Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf --- hw/xen_blktap.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- hw/xen_blktap.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -218,9 +218,10 @@ static int map_new_dev(struct td_state * return -1; } -static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, char *path, int readonly) +static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, char *path, int driver, int readonly) { BlockDriverState* bs; + BlockDriver* drv; char* devname; static int devnumber = 0; int i; @@ -230,7 +231,22 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, bs = bdrv_new(devname); free(devname); - if (bdrv_open(bs, path, 0) != 0) { + /* Search for disk driver */ + for (i = 0; blktap_drivers[i].idnum >= 0; i++) { + if (blktap_drivers[i].idnum == driver) + break; + } + + if (blktap_drivers[i].idnum < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not find image format id %d\n", driver); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + drv = blktap_drivers[i].drv; + DPRINTF("%s driver specified\n", drv ? drv->format_name : "No"); + + /* Open the image */ + if (bdrv_open2(bs, path, 0, drv) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not open image file %s\n", path); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -521,7 +537,7 @@ static void handle_blktap_ctrlmsg(void* s = state_init(); /*Open file*/ - if (s == NULL || open_disk(s, path, msg->readonly)) { + if (s == NULL || open_disk(s, path, msg->drivertype, msg->readonly)) { msglen = sizeof(msg_hdr_t); msg->type = CTLMSG_IMG_FAIL; msg->len = msglen; Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.h @@ -52,4 +52,18 @@ typedef struct fd_list_entry { int init_blktap(void); +typedef struct disk_info { + int idnum; + struct BlockDriver *drv; +} disk_info_t; + +static disk_info_t blktap_drivers[] = { + { DISK_TYPE_AIO, &bdrv_raw }, + { DISK_TYPE_SYNC, &bdrv_raw }, + { DISK_TYPE_VMDK, &bdrv_vmdk }, + { DISK_TYPE_QCOW, &bdrv_qcow }, + { DISK_TYPE_QCOW2, &bdrv_qcow2 }, + { -1, NULL } +}; + #endif /*XEN_BLKTAP_H_*/ ++++++ ioemu-blktap-zero-size.patch ++++++

From cb982fd919a52ff86f01025d0f92225bc7b2a956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Wolf Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:44:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 5/6] ioemu: Fail on too small blktap disks

The blktap infrastructure doesn't seems to be able to cope with images that are smaller than a sector, it produced hangs for me. Such an image isn't really useful anyway, so just fail gracefully. Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf --- hw/xen_blktap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -256,6 +256,12 @@ static int open_disk(struct td_state *s, s->size = bs->total_sectors; s->sector_size = 512; + if (s->size == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: Disk image %s is too small\n", + path); + return -ENOMEM; + } + s->info = ((s->flags & TD_RDONLY) ? VDISK_READONLY : 0); #ifndef QEMU_TOOL Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ class DevController: (devid, self.deviceClass)) elif status == Error: - self.destroyDevice(devid, False) + self.destroyDevice(devid, True) if err is None: raise VmError("Device %s (%s) could not be connected. " "Backend device not found." % ++++++ ioemu-debuginfo.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ endif install: all $(if $(BUILD_DOCS),install-doc) mkdir -p "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)" ifneq ($(TOOLS),) - $(INSTALL) -m 755 -s $(TOOLS) "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)" + $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(TOOLS) "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)" endif ifneq ($(BLOBS),) mkdir -p "$(DESTDIR)$(datadir)" Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile.target =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile.target +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/Makefile.target @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ clean: install: all install-hook ifneq ($(PROGS),) - $(INSTALL) -m 755 -s $(PROGS) "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)" + $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(PROGS) "$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)" endif # Include automatically generated dependency files ++++++ ioemu-disable-emulated-ide-if-pv.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-xen.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-xen.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-xen.h @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ #ifndef QEMU_XEN_H #define QEMU_XEN_H +#include "hw/boards.h" + /* vl.c */ extern int restore; extern int vga_ram_size; @@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ void handle_buffered_pio(void); /* xenstore.c */ void xenstore_init(void); uint32_t xenstore_read_target(void); -void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int domid); +void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int domid, QEMUMachine *machine); int xenstore_parse_disable_pf_config(void); int xenstore_fd(void); void xenstore_process_event(void *opaque); Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c @@ -5862,9 +5862,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **e if ((msg = xenbus_read(XBT_NIL, "domid", &domid_s))) fprintf(stderr,"Can not read our own domid: %s\n", msg); else - xenstore_parse_domain_config(atoi(domid_s)); + xenstore_parse_domain_config(atoi(domid_s), machine); #else - xenstore_parse_domain_config(domid); + xenstore_parse_domain_config(domid, machine); #endif /* CONFIG_STUBDOM */ } Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ void xenstore_init(void) } } -void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hvm_domid) +void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hvm_domid, QEMUMachine *machine) { char **e_danger = NULL; char *buf = NULL; @@ -740,11 +740,19 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv #endif - drives_table[nb_drives].bdrv = bs; - drives_table[nb_drives].used = 1; - media_filename[nb_drives] = strdup(bs->filename); - nb_drives++; - + if (machine == &xenfv_machine) { + drives_table[nb_drives].bdrv = bs; + drives_table[nb_drives].used = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM + media_filename[nb_drives] = strdup(danger_buf); +#else + media_filename[nb_drives] = strdup(bs->filename); +#endif + nb_drives++; + } else { + qemu_aio_flush(); + bdrv_close(bs); + } } #ifdef CONFIG_STUBDOM ++++++ ioemu-disable-scsi.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c @@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ static void platform_ioport_write(void * case 4: fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect IDE hard disk...\n"); ide_unplug_harddisks(); + fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect SCSI hard disk...\n"); + pci_unplug_scsi(); fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect netifs...\n"); pci_unplug_netifs(); fprintf(logfile, "Shutdown taps...\n"); Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-xen.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-xen.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/qemu-xen.h @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ void unset_vram_mapping(void *opaque); #endif void pci_unplug_netifs(void); +void pci_unplug_scsi(void); void destroy_hvm_domain(void); void unregister_iomem(target_phys_addr_t start); Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pci.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pci.c @@ -871,6 +871,50 @@ void pci_unplug_netifs(void) } } +void pci_unplug_scsi(void) +{ + PCIBus *bus; + PCIDevice *dev; + PCIIORegion *region; + int x; + int i; + + /* We only support one PCI bus */ + for (bus = first_bus; bus; bus = NULL) { + for (x = 0; x < 256; x++) { + dev = bus->devices[x]; + if (dev && + dev->config[0xa] == 0 && + dev->config[0xb] == 1 +#ifdef CONFIG_PASSTHROUGH + && test_pci_devfn(x) != 1 +#endif + ) { + /* Found a scsi disk. Remove it from the bus. Note that + we don't free it here, since there could still be + references to it floating around. There are only + ever one or two structures leaked, and it's not + worth finding them all. */ + bus->devices[x] = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < PCI_NUM_REGIONS; i++) { + region = &dev->io_regions[i]; + if (region->addr == (uint32_t)-1 || + region->size == 0) + continue; + fprintf(logfile, "region type %d at [%x,%x).\n", + region->type, region->addr, + region->addr+region->size); + if (region->type == PCI_ADDRESS_SPACE_IO) { + isa_unassign_ioport(region->addr, region->size); + } else if (region->type == PCI_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEM) { + unregister_iomem(region->addr); + } + } + } + } + } +} + typedef struct { PCIDevice dev; PCIBus *bus; ++++++ ioemu-vnc-resize.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c @@ -1751,6 +1751,25 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState } set_encodings(vs, (int32_t *)(data + 4), limit); + + /* + * The initialization of a VNC connection can race with xenfb changing + * the resolution. This happens when the VNC connection is already + * established, but the client has not yet advertised has_resize, so it + * won't get notified of the switch. + * + * Therefore we resend the resolution as soon as the client has sent its + * encodings. + */ + if (vs->has_resize) { + /* Resize the VNC window */ + vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* msg id */ + vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); + vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */ + vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->serverds.width, vs->serverds.height, -223); + + vnc_flush(vs); + } break; case 3: if (len == 1) ++++++ ioemu-watchdog-ib700-timer.patch ++++++ Subject: qdev: convert watchdogs From: Markus Armbruster armbru@redhat.com Fri Aug 21 10:31:34 2009 +0200 Date: Thu Aug 27 20:35:24 2009 -0500: Git: 09aaa1602f9381c0e0fb539390b1793e51bdfc7b * THIS IS ONLY THE BUG FIX PART OF THE UPSTREAM PATCH * Fixes ib700 not to use vm_clock before it is initialized: in wdt_ib700_init(), called from register_watchdogs(), which runs before init_timers(). The bug made ib700_write_enable_reg() crash in qemu_del_timer(). Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/wdt_ib700.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/wdt_ib700.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/wdt_ib700.c @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static int ib700_load(QEMUFile *f, void /* Create and initialize a virtual IB700 during PC creation. */ static void ib700_pc_init(PCIBus *unused) { + timer = qemu_new_timer(vm_clock, ib700_timer_expired, NULL); register_savevm("ib700_wdt", -1, 0, ib700_save, ib700_load, NULL); register_ioport_write(0x441, 2, 1, ib700_write_disable_reg, NULL); @@ -108,5 +109,4 @@ static WatchdogTimerModel model = { void wdt_ib700_init(void) { watchdog_add_model(&model); - timer = qemu_new_timer(vm_clock, ib700_timer_expired, NULL); } ++++++ ioemu-watchdog-linkage.patch ++++++ Subject: Move watchdog, watchdog_action, give them internal linkage From: Markus Armbruster armbru@redhat.com Fri Aug 21 10:31:32 2009 +0200 Date: Thu Aug 27 20:30:23 2009 -0500: Git: 88b3be201acf64e0bd19782bebd533901c951c87 Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/watchdog.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/watchdog.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/watchdog.c @@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ #include "sysemu.h" #include "hw/watchdog.h" +/* Possible values for action parameter. */ +#define WDT_RESET 1 /* Hard reset. */ +#define WDT_SHUTDOWN 2 /* Shutdown. */ +#define WDT_POWEROFF 3 /* Quit. */ +#define WDT_PAUSE 4 /* Pause. */ +#define WDT_DEBUG 5 /* Prints a message and continues running. */ +#define WDT_NONE 6 /* Do nothing. */ + +static WatchdogTimerModel *watchdog; +static int watchdog_action = WDT_RESET; static LIST_HEAD(watchdog_list, WatchdogTimerModel) watchdog_list; void watchdog_add_model(WatchdogTimerModel *model) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/watchdog.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/watchdog.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/watchdog.h @@ -27,13 +27,6 @@ extern void wdt_i6300esb_init(void); extern void wdt_ib700_init(void); -/* Possible values for action parameter. */ -#define WDT_RESET 1 /* Hard reset. */ -#define WDT_SHUTDOWN 2 /* Shutdown. */ -#define WDT_POWEROFF 3 /* Quit. */ -#define WDT_PAUSE 4 /* Pause. */ -#define WDT_DEBUG 5 /* Prints a message and continues running. */ -#define WDT_NONE 6 /* Do nothing. */ struct WatchdogTimerModel { LIST_ENTRY(WatchdogTimerModel) entry; @@ -50,10 +43,6 @@ struct WatchdogTimerModel { }; typedef struct WatchdogTimerModel WatchdogTimerModel; -/* in vl.c */ -extern WatchdogTimerModel *watchdog; -extern int watchdog_action; - /* in hw/watchdog.c */ extern int select_watchdog(const char *p); extern int select_watchdog_action(const char *action); Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vl.c @@ -250,8 +250,6 @@ int no_shutdown = 0; int cursor_hide = 1; int graphic_rotate = 0; int daemonize = 0; -WatchdogTimerModel *watchdog = NULL; -int watchdog_action = WDT_RESET; const char *option_rom[MAX_OPTION_ROMS]; int nb_option_roms; int semihosting_enabled = 0; ++++++ ioemu-watchdog-support.patch ++++++ ++++ 963 lines (skipped) ++++++ ipxe-enable-nics.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/etherboot/Config =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/firmware/etherboot/Config +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/etherboot/Config @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +NICS = rtl8139 8086100e eepro100 e1000 pcnet32 10ec8029 CFLAGS += -UPXE_DHCP_STRICT CFLAGS += -DPXE_DHCP_STRICT ++++++ kernel-boot-hvm.patch ++++++ Direct kernel boot to HVM guests has regression from xen-3.3 to xen-4.0. Foreport this feature to latest qemu-xen. Make a fake boot sector with given kernel and initrd, which could be accessed by hvmloader. Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.c @@ -596,6 +596,16 @@ int bdrv_read(BlockDriverState *bs, int6 if (bdrv_check_request(bs, sector_num, nb_sectors)) return -EIO; + + if (sector_num == 0 && bs->boot_sector_enabled && nb_sectors > 0) { + memcpy(buf, bs->boot_sector_data, 512); + sector_num++; + nb_sectors--; + buf += 512; + if (nb_sectors == 0) + return 0; + } + if (drv->bdrv_pread) { int ret, len; len = nb_sectors * 512; @@ -631,6 +641,10 @@ int bdrv_write(BlockDriverState *bs, int if (bdrv_check_request(bs, sector_num, nb_sectors)) return -EIO; + if (sector_num == 0 && bs->boot_sector_enabled && nb_sectors > 0) { + memcpy(bs->boot_sector_data, buf, 512); + } + if (drv->bdrv_pwrite) { int ret, len, count = 0; len = nb_sectors * 512; @@ -934,6 +948,16 @@ void bdrv_guess_geometry(BlockDriverStat } } +/* force a given boot sector. */ +void bdrv_set_boot_sector(BlockDriverState *bs, const uint8_t *data, int size) +{ + bs->boot_sector_enabled = 1; + if (size > 512) + size = 512; + memcpy(bs->boot_sector_data, data, size); + memset(bs->boot_sector_data + size, 0, 512 - size); +} + void bdrv_set_geometry_hint(BlockDriverState *bs, int cyls, int heads, int secs) { @@ -1464,6 +1488,14 @@ BlockDriverAIOCB *bdrv_aio_read(BlockDri if (bdrv_check_request(bs, sector_num, nb_sectors)) return NULL; + /* XXX: we assume that nb_sectors == 0 is suppored by the async read */ + if (sector_num == 0 && bs->boot_sector_enabled && nb_sectors > 0) { + memcpy(buf, bs->boot_sector_data, 512); + sector_num++; + nb_sectors--; + buf += 512; + } + ret = drv->bdrv_aio_read(bs, sector_num, buf, nb_sectors, cb, opaque); if (ret) { @@ -1489,6 +1521,10 @@ BlockDriverAIOCB *bdrv_aio_write(BlockDr if (bdrv_check_request(bs, sector_num, nb_sectors)) return NULL; + if (sector_num == 0 && bs->boot_sector_enabled && nb_sectors > 0) { + memcpy(bs->boot_sector_data, buf, 512); + } + ret = drv->bdrv_aio_write(bs, sector_num, buf, nb_sectors, cb, opaque); if (ret) { Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block_int.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block_int.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block_int.h @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ struct BlockDriverState { BlockDriver *drv; /* NULL means no media */ void *opaque; + int boot_sector_enabled; + uint8_t boot_sector_data[512]; + char filename[1024]; char backing_file[1024]; /* if non zero, the image is a diff of this file image */ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pc.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pc.c @@ -474,45 +474,28 @@ static void bochs_bios_init(void) /* Generate an initial boot sector which sets state and jump to a specified vector */ -static void generate_bootsect(uint8_t *option_rom, - uint32_t gpr[8], uint16_t segs[6], uint16_t ip) +static void generate_bootsect(uint32_t gpr[8], uint16_t segs[6], uint16_t ip) { - uint8_t rom[512], *p, *reloc; - uint8_t sum; + uint8_t bootsect[512], *p; int i; + int hda; + + hda = drive_get_index(IF_IDE, 0, 0); + if (hda == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "A disk image must be given for 'hda' when booting " + "a Linux kernel\n(if you really don't want it, use /dev/zero)\n"); + exit(1); + } + memset(bootsect, 0, sizeof(bootsect)); - memset(rom, 0, sizeof(rom)); - - p = rom; - /* Make sure we have an option rom signature */ - *p++ = 0x55; - *p++ = 0xaa; - - /* ROM size in sectors*/ - *p++ = 1; - - /* Hook int19 */ - - *p++ = 0x50; /* push ax */ - *p++ = 0x1e; /* push ds */ - *p++ = 0x31; *p++ = 0xc0; /* xor ax, ax */ - *p++ = 0x8e; *p++ = 0xd8; /* mov ax, ds */ - - *p++ = 0xc7; *p++ = 0x06; /* movvw _start,0x64 */ - *p++ = 0x64; *p++ = 0x00; - reloc = p; - *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x00; - - *p++ = 0x8c; *p++ = 0x0e; /* mov cs,0x66 */ - *p++ = 0x66; *p++ = 0x00; - - *p++ = 0x1f; /* pop ds */ - *p++ = 0x58; /* pop ax */ - *p++ = 0xcb; /* lret */ - - /* Actual code */ - *reloc = (p - rom); + /* Copy the MSDOS partition table if possible */ + bdrv_read(drives_table[hda].bdrv, 0, bootsect, 1); + /* Make sure we have a partition signature */ + bootsect[510] = 0x55; + bootsect[511] = 0xaa; + /* Actual code */ + p = bootsect; *p++ = 0xfa; /* CLI */ *p++ = 0xfc; /* CLD */ @@ -542,13 +525,7 @@ static void generate_bootsect(uint8_t *o *p++ = segs[1]; /* CS */ *p++ = segs[1] >> 8; - /* sign rom */ - sum = 0; - for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(rom) - 1); i++) - sum += rom[i]; - rom[sizeof(rom) - 1] = -sum; - - memcpy(option_rom, rom, sizeof(rom)); + bdrv_set_boot_sector(drives_table[hda].bdrv, bootsect, sizeof(bootsect)); } static long get_file_size(FILE *f) @@ -565,8 +542,7 @@ static long get_file_size(FILE *f) return size; } -static void load_linux(uint8_t *option_rom, - const char *kernel_filename, +static void load_linux(const char *kernel_filename, const char *initrd_filename, const char *kernel_cmdline) { @@ -632,7 +608,9 @@ static void load_linux(uint8_t *option_r /* Special pages are placed at end of low RAM: pick an arbitrary one and * subtract a suitably large amount of padding (64kB) to skip BIOS data. */ - xc_get_hvm_param(xc_handle, domid, HVM_PARAM_BUFIOREQ_PFN, &end_low_ram); + //xc_get_hvm_param(xc_handle, domid, HVM_PARAM_BUFIOREQ_PFN, &end_low_ram); + /* BUFIO Page beyond last_pfn, use 0x7ffc instead. Fix ME. */ + end_low_ram = 0x7ffc; end_low_ram = (end_low_ram << 12) - (64*1024); /* highest address for loading the initrd */ @@ -721,7 +699,7 @@ static void load_linux(uint8_t *option_r memset(gpr, 0, sizeof gpr); gpr[4] = cmdline_addr-real_addr-16; /* SP (-16 is paranoia) */ - generate_bootsect(option_rom, gpr, seg, 0); + generate_bootsect(gpr, seg, 0); #endif } @@ -932,14 +910,6 @@ vga_bios_error: int size, offset; offset = 0; - if (linux_boot) { - option_rom_offset = qemu_ram_alloc(TARGET_PAGE_SIZE); - load_linux(phys_ram_base + option_rom_offset, - kernel_filename, initrd_filename, kernel_cmdline); - cpu_register_physical_memory(0xd0000, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE, - option_rom_offset | IO_MEM_ROM); - offset = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE; - } for (i = 0; i < nb_option_roms; i++) { size = get_image_size(option_rom[i]); @@ -973,6 +943,9 @@ vga_bios_error: bochs_bios_init(); + if (linux_boot) + load_linux(kernel_filename, initrd_filename, kernel_cmdline); + cpu_irq = qemu_allocate_irqs(pic_irq_request, NULL, 1); i8259 = i8259_init(cpu_irq[0]); ferr_irq = i8259[13]; Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/block.h @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ int64_t bdrv_getlength(BlockDriverState void bdrv_get_geometry(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t *nb_sectors_ptr); void bdrv_guess_geometry(BlockDriverState *bs, int *pcyls, int *pheads, int *psecs); int bdrv_commit(BlockDriverState *bs); +void bdrv_set_boot_sector(BlockDriverState *bs, const uint8_t *data, int size); /* async block I/O */ typedef struct BlockDriverAIOCB BlockDriverAIOCB; typedef void BlockDriverCompletionFunc(void *opaque, int ret); ++++++ kmp_filelist ++++++ %defattr (-,root,root) /lib/modules/%2-%1 /etc/modprobe.d/xen_pvdrivers-%1.conf ++++++ libxen_permissive.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxen/src/xen_common.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxen/src/xen_common.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxen/src/xen_common.c @@ -904,8 +904,15 @@ static void parse_into(xen_session *s, x 0 != strcmp((char *)value_node->children->name, "struct") || value_node->children->children == NULL) { +#if PERMISSIVE + fprintf(stderr, + "Expected Map from the server, but didn't get one\n"); + ((arbitrary_map **)value)[slot] = NULL; +#else + server_error(s, "Expected Map from the server, but didn't get it"); +#endif } else { ++++++ log-guest-console.patch ++++++ Add code to support logging xen-domU console, as what xenconsoled does. Log info will be saved in /var/log/xen/console/guest-domUname.log. Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu --- hw/xen_console.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_console.c @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ #include "qemu-char.h" #include "xen_backend.h" +static int log_guest = 0; + struct buffer { uint8_t *data; size_t consumed; @@ -54,8 +56,24 @@ struct XenConsole { void *sring; CharDriverState *chr; int backlog; + int log_fd; }; +static int write_all(int fd, const char* buf, size_t len) +{ + while (len) { + ssize_t ret = write(fd, buf, len); + if (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + len -= ret; + buf += ret; + } + + return 0; +} + static void buffer_append(struct XenConsole *con) { struct buffer *buffer = &con->buffer; @@ -83,6 +101,15 @@ static void buffer_append(struct XenCons intf->out_cons = cons; xen_be_send_notify(&con->xendev); + if (con->log_fd != -1) { + int logret; + logret = write_all(con->log_fd, buffer->data + buffer->size - size, size); + if (logret < 0) { + xen_be_printf(&con->xendev, 1, "Write to log failed on domain %d: %d (%s)\n", + con->xendev.dom, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + } + if (buffer->max_capacity && buffer->size > buffer->max_capacity) { /* Discard the middle of the data. */ @@ -176,6 +203,37 @@ static void xencons_send(struct XenConso } } +static int create_domain_log(struct XenConsole *con) +{ + char *logfile; + char *path, *domname; + int fd; + const char *logdir = "/var/log/xen/console"; + + path = xs_get_domain_path(xenstore, con->xendev.dom); + domname = xenstore_read_str(path, "name"); + free(path); + if (!domname) + return -1; + + if (mkdir(logdir, 0755) && errno != EEXIST) + { + xen_be_printf(&con->xendev, 1, "Directory %s does not exist and fail to create it!", logdir); + return -1; + } + + if (asprintf(&logfile, "%s/guest-%s.log", logdir, domname) < 0) + return -1; + qemu_free(domname); + + fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0644); + free(logfile); + if (fd == -1) + xen_be_printf(&con->xendev, 1, "Failed to open log %s: %d (%s)", logfile, errno, strerror(errno)); + + return fd; +} + /* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xendev) @@ -183,6 +241,7 @@ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xe struct XenConsole *con = container_of(xendev, struct XenConsole, xendev); char *type, *dom, label[32]; const char *output; + char *logenv = NULL; /* setup */ dom = xs_get_domain_path(xenstore, con->xendev.dom); @@ -209,6 +268,10 @@ static int con_init(struct XenDevice *xe con->chr = qemu_chr_open(label, output, NULL); xenstore_store_pv_console_info(con->xendev.dev, con->chr, output); + logenv = getenv("XENCONSOLED_TRACE"); + if (logenv != NULL && strlen(logenv) == strlen("guest") && !strcmp(logenv, "guest")) { + log_guest = 1; + } return 0; } @@ -246,6 +309,9 @@ static int con_initialise(struct XenDevi con->xendev.remote_port, con->xendev.local_port, con->buffer.max_capacity); + con->log_fd = -1; + if (log_guest) + con->log_fd = create_domain_log(con); return 0; } @@ -266,6 +332,12 @@ static void con_disconnect(struct XenDev xc_gnttab_munmap(xendev->gnttabdev, con->sring, 1); con->sring = NULL; } + + if (con->log_fd != -1) { + close(con->log_fd); + con->log_fd = -1; + } + } static void con_event(struct XenDevice *xendev) ++++++ logrotate.conf ++++++ compress missingok /var/log/xen/xend*.log { rotate 5 size 1M notifempty copytruncate } /var/log/xen/domain-builder-ng.log /var/log/xen/xen-hotplug.log { rotate 2 size 100k notifempty copytruncate } /var/log/xen/qemu-dm.*.log { rotate 0 monthly } ++++++ magic_ioport_compat.patch ++++++ Make our PV drivers work with older hosts that do not recognize the new PV driver protocol. Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c @@ -321,7 +321,10 @@ static int check_platform_magic(struct d if (magic != XEN_IOPORT_MAGIC_VAL) { err = "unrecognised magic value"; - goto no_dev; + /* + * Older backend; just return 0 to be compatible. + */ + return 0; } protocol = inb(XEN_IOPORT_PROTOVER); ++++++ minios-fixups.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/extras/mini-os/lib/math.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/extras/mini-os/lib/math.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/extras/mini-os/lib/math.c @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ __qdivrem(u_quad_t uq, u_quad_t vq, u_qu * and thus * m = 4 - n <= 2 */ + tmp.ul[H] = tmp.ul[L] = 0; tmp.uq = uq; u[0] = 0; u[1] = HHALF(tmp.ul[H]); ++++++ multi-xvdp.patch ++++++ Allow multiple bootloader loopback devices Starting several domains concurrently can fail due to using a single bootloader loopback device. This patch creates a list of bootloader loopback devices so more than one instance of bootloader can be run concurrently. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ from xen.xend.XendPSCSI import XendPSCSI from xen.xend.XendDSCSI import XendDSCSI, XendDSCSI_HBA MIGRATE_TIMEOUT = 30.0 -BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE = '/dev/xvdp' +BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICES = ['/dev/xvd' + chr(x) for x in range(ord('z'), ord('d'), -1)] xc = xen.lowlevel.xc.xc() xoptions = XendOptions.instance() @@ -3324,33 +3324,38 @@ class XendDomainInfo: # This is a file, not a device. pygrub can cope with a # file if it's raw, but if it's QCOW or other such formats # used through blktap, then we need to mount it first. - - log.info("Mounting %s on %s." % - (fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE)) - - vbd = { - 'mode': 'RW', - 'device': BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, - } - - from xen.xend import XendDomain - dom0 = XendDomain.instance().privilegedDomain() - mounted_vbd_uuid = dom0.create_vbd(vbd, disk); - vbd_uuid = dom0.create_vbd(vbd, disk) - dom0._waitForDeviceFrontUUID(vbd_uuid) - fn = BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE - + # Try all possible loopback_devices + for loopback_device in BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICES: + log.info("Mounting %s on %s." % (fn, loopback_device)) + vbd = { 'mode' : 'RW', 'device' : loopback_device, } + try: + from xen.xend import XendDomain + dom0 = XendDomain.instance().privilegedDomain() + mounted_vbd_uuid = dom0.create_vbd(vbd, disk) + dom0._waitForDeviceFrontUUID(mounted_vbd_uuid) + fn = loopback_device + break + except VmError, e: + if str(e).find('already connected.') != -1: + continue + elif str(e).find('isn\'t accessible') != -1: + dom0.destroyDevice('vbd', loopback_device, force = True, rm_cfg = True) + continue + else: + raise + else: + raise try: blcfg = bootloader(blexec, fn, self, False, bootloader_args, kernel, ramdisk, args) finally: if mounted: log.info("Unmounting %s from %s." % - (fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE)) + (fn, loopback_device)) if devtype in ['tap', 'tap2']: - dom0.destroyDevice('tap', BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, rm_cfg = True) + dom0.destroyDevice('tap', loopback_device, rm_cfg = True) else: - dom0.destroyDevice('vbd', BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, rm_cfg = True) + dom0.destroyDevice('vbd', loopback_device, rm_cfg = True) if blcfg is None: msg = "Had a bootloader specified, but can't find disk" log.error(msg) ++++++ network-nat-open-SuSEfirewall2-FORWARD.patch ++++++ Open SuSEfirewall2 FORWARD rule when use xen nat Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-nat =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-nat +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/network-nat @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ function dhcp_stop() op_start() { echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ${netdev} -j MASQUERADE + iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT [ "$dhcp" != 'no' ] && dhcp_start } @@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ op_start() { op_stop() { [ "$dhcp" != 'no' ] && dhcp_stop iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -o ${netdev} -j MASQUERADE + iptables -P FORWARD DROP } ++++++ pvdrv-import-shared-info.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/evtchn.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/evtchn.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/evtchn.c @@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ #include #endif +#ifndef shared_info_area void *shared_info_area; +#endif #define is_valid_evtchn(x) ((x) != 0) #define evtchn_from_irq(x) (irq_evtchn[irq].evtchn) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c @@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ static uint64_t callback_via; static int __devinit init_xen_info(void) { struct xen_add_to_physmap xatp; - extern void *shared_info_area; #ifdef __ia64__ xencomm_initialize(); @@ -84,6 +83,7 @@ static int __devinit init_xen_info(void) setup_xen_features(); +#ifndef shared_info_area shared_info_frame = alloc_xen_mmio(PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT; xatp.domid = DOMID_SELF; xatp.idx = 0; @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static int __devinit init_xen_info(void) ioremap(shared_info_frame << PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_SIZE); if (shared_info_area == NULL) panic("can't map shared info\n"); +#else + shared_info_frame = __pa(shared_info_area) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + printk(KERN_INFO "Using kernel provided shared info (pfn=%lx)\n", + shared_info_frame); +#endif return 0; } Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.h +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.h @@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ unsigned long alloc_xen_mmio(unsigned long len); void platform_pci_resume(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_ENLIGHTEN_SPINLOCKS +#define shared_info_area xen_shared_info +#endif +extern void *shared_info_area; + extern struct pci_dev *xen_platform_pdev; #endif /* _XEN_PLATFORM_PCI_H */ ++++++ pvdrv_emulation_control.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c @@ -365,6 +365,19 @@ static void platform_ioport_write(void * net_tap_shutdown_all(); fprintf(logfile, "Done.\n"); break; + case 8: + if (val ==1 ) { + fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect IDE hard disk...\n"); + ide_unplug_harddisks(); + fprintf(logfile, "Done.\n"); + } else if (val == 2) { + fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect netifs...\n"); + pci_unplug_netifs(); + fprintf(logfile, "Shutdown taps...\n"); + net_tap_shutdown_all(); + fprintf(logfile, "Done.\n"); + } + break; default: fprintf(logfile, "Write to bad port %x (base %x) on evtchn device.\n", addr, ioport_base); ++++++ pygrub-netware-xnloader.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import fsimage import grub.GrubConf import grub.LiloConf import grub.ExtLinuxConf +import xnloader PYGRUB_VER = 0.6 FS_READ_MAX = 1024 * 1024 @@ -735,6 +736,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__": if len(data) == 0: os.close(tfd) del datafile + if file_to_read == "/nwserver/xnloader.sys": + xnloader.patch_netware_loader(ret) return ret try: os.write(tfd, data) ++++++ qemu-dm-segfault.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/ide.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/ide.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/ide.c @@ -935,8 +935,9 @@ static inline void ide_dma_submit_check( static inline void ide_set_irq(IDEState *s) { - BMDMAState *bm = s->bmdma; - if (!s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ + BMDMAState *bm; + if (!s || !s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ + bm = s->bmdma; if (!(s->cmd & IDE_CMD_DISABLE_IRQ)) { if (bm) { bm->status |= BM_STATUS_INT; @@ -1224,14 +1225,14 @@ static void ide_read_dma_cb(void *opaque int n; int64_t sector_num; + if (!s || !s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ + if (ret < 0) { dma_buf_commit(s, 1); ide_dma_error(s); return; } - if (!s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ - n = s->io_buffer_size >> 9; sector_num = ide_get_sector(s); if (n > 0) { @@ -1335,6 +1336,8 @@ static void ide_write_flush_cb(void *opa BMDMAState *bm = opaque; IDEState *s = bm->ide_if; + if (!s) return; /* yikes */ + if (ret != 0) { ide_dma_error(s); return; @@ -1366,13 +1369,13 @@ static void ide_write_dma_cb(void *opaqu int n; int64_t sector_num; + if (!s || !s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ + if (ret < 0) { if (ide_handle_write_error(s, -ret, BM_STATUS_DMA_RETRY)) return; } - if (!s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ - n = s->io_buffer_size >> 9; sector_num = ide_get_sector(s); if (n > 0) { @@ -1429,7 +1432,7 @@ static void ide_flush_cb(void *opaque, i { IDEState *s = opaque; - if (!s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see below) */ + if (!s || !s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see below) */ if (ret) { /* We are completely doomed. The IDE spec does not permit us @@ -1686,7 +1689,7 @@ static void ide_atapi_cmd_read_dma_cb(vo IDEState *s = bm->ide_if; int data_offset, n; - if (!s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ + if (!s || !s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ if (ret < 0) { ide_atapi_io_error(s, ret); @@ -2365,7 +2368,7 @@ static void cdrom_change_cb(void *opaque IDEState *s = opaque; uint64_t nb_sectors; - if (!s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ + if (!s || !s->bs) return; /* ouch! (see ide_flush_cb) */ bdrv_get_geometry(s->bs, &nb_sectors); s->nb_sectors = nb_sectors; ++++++ qemu-ifup-set-mtu.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux @@ -20,4 +20,11 @@ then fi ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 up + +mtu="`ip link show $bridge | awk '/mtu/ { print $5 }'`" +if [ -n "$mtu" ] && [ "$mtu" -gt 0 ] +then + ip link set $1 mtu $mtu || : +fi + brctl addif $bridge $1 || true ++++++ qemu-security-etch1.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/ne2000.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/ne2000.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/ne2000.c @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int ne2000_can_receive(void *opaq NE2000State *s = opaque; if (s->cmd & E8390_STOP) - return 1; + return 0; return !ne2000_buffer_full(s); } Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pc.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/pc.c @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ static void bochs_bios_write(void *opaqu case 0x400: case 0x401: fprintf(stderr, "BIOS panic at rombios.c, line %d\n", val); - exit(1); + /* according to documentation, these can be safely ignored */ + break; case 0x402: case 0x403: #ifdef DEBUG_BIOS @@ -436,8 +437,9 @@ static void bochs_bios_write(void *opaqu /* LGPL'ed VGA BIOS messages */ case 0x501: case 0x502: + /* according to documentation, these can be safely ignored */ fprintf(stderr, "VGA BIOS panic, line %d\n", val); - exit(1); + break; case 0x500: case 0x503: #ifdef DEBUG_BIOS ++++++ serial-split.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/misc/serial-split/Makefile =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/misc/serial-split/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +CC ?= gcc +CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Os +CFILES = $(wildcard *.c) +OBJS = $(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(wildcard *.c)) +TARGET = serial-split + +all: $(TARGET) + +install: all + install -d $(DESTDIR)/usr/bin + install -s $(TARGET) $(DESTDIR)/usr/bin/ + +clean: + rm *.o $(TARGET) *~ + +$(TARGET): $(OBJS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ + +%.o: %.c Makefile + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $< Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/misc/serial-split/serial-split.c =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/misc/serial-split/serial-split.c @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +/* + * serial-split.c + * pdb / console splitter + * + * Copyright 2005 Charles Coffing + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 + * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + */ + +/* + * Typical setup: + * + * Development box Xen box + * ...-----+ +-----... + * +---------+ | | + * | gdb | | | + * | |\ high | | + * +---------+ \ | | + * \+-----------+ | serial | +------------------+ + * | splitter |------------| Xen | + * /+-----------+ | | | - pdb (com1H)| + * +---------+ / | | | - printk (com1) | + * | console |/ low | | +------------------+ + * | viewer | | | + * +---------+ | | + * ...-----+ +-----... + */ + + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +const unsigned int DefaultLowPort = 12010; +const unsigned int DefaultBaud = 115200; +const char DefaultSerialDevice[] = "/dev/ttyS0"; + +#define DEBUG 0 +#define MAX(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(b):(a)) + + +static int cook_baud(int baud) +{ + int cooked_baud = 0; + switch (baud) + { + case 50: cooked_baud = B50; break; + case 75: cooked_baud = B75; break; + case 110: cooked_baud = B110; break; + case 134: cooked_baud = B134; break; + case 150: cooked_baud = B150; break; + case 200: cooked_baud = B200; break; + case 300: cooked_baud = B300; break; + case 600: cooked_baud = B600; break; + case 1200: cooked_baud = B1200; break; + case 1800: cooked_baud = B1800; break; + case 2400: cooked_baud = B2400; break; + case 4800: cooked_baud = B4800; break; + case 9600: cooked_baud = B9600; break; + case 19200: cooked_baud = B19200; break; + case 38400: cooked_baud = B38400; break; + case 57600: cooked_baud = B57600; break; + case 115200: cooked_baud = B115200; break; + } + return cooked_baud; +} + + +static int start_listener(unsigned short port) +{ + int fd; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + int on = 1; + + if ((fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) + { + perror("socket"); + goto out1; + } + + setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof (on)); + + memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_port = htons (port); + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) + { + perror("bind"); + goto out2; + } + + if (listen(fd, 1) < 0) + { + perror("listen"); + goto out2; + } + + fprintf(stderr, "Listening on port %d\n", port); + + return fd; + +out2: + close(fd); +out1: + return -1; +} + + +static int accept_conn(int fd) +{ + int on = 1; + int new_fd; + struct sockaddr_in from; + socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from); + + new_fd = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); + if (new_fd < 0) + perror("accept"); + ioctl(new_fd, FIONBIO, &on); + + fprintf(stderr, "Accepted connection on %d\n", new_fd); + + return new_fd; +} + + +static void close_conn(int * fd) +{ + shutdown(*fd, 2); + close(*fd); + *fd = -1; +} + + +static int receive_data(int * fd, char * buf, ssize_t max_bytes, int * poll) +{ + ssize_t bytes; + if ((bytes = read(*fd, buf, max_bytes)) < 0) + { + perror("read"); + *poll = 1; + return 0; + } + else if (bytes == 0) + { + close_conn(fd); + *poll = 0; + return 0; + } + else + { + if (bytes == max_bytes) + *poll = 1; + else + *poll = 0; +#if DEBUG + { + ssize_t i; + fprintf(stderr, "Received %d bytes on %d:\n", bytes, *fd); + for (i = 0; i < bytes; ++ i) + { + if ((i & 0xf) == 0) + printf(" "); + printf("%02x", buf[i] & 0xff); + if (((i+1) & 0xf) == 0 || i + 1 == bytes) + printf("\n"); + else + printf(" "); + } + } +#endif + return bytes; + } +} + + +static void set_high_bit(char * buf, size_t bytes) +{ + size_t i; + for(i = 0; i < bytes; ++ i) + buf[i] |= 0x80; +} + + +static void clear_high_bit(char * buf, size_t bytes) +{ + size_t i; + for(i = 0; i < bytes; ++ i) + buf[i] &= 0x7f; +} + + +static int open_serial(char const * serial_dev, int baud) +{ + struct termios newsertio; + int serial_fd; + memset(&newsertio, 0, sizeof(newsertio)); + + if ((serial_fd = open(serial_dev, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK)) < 0) + { + perror(serial_dev); + return -1; + } + + newsertio.c_cflag = baud | CS8 | CLOCAL | CREAD; + newsertio.c_iflag = IGNBRK | IGNPAR; /* raw input */ + newsertio.c_oflag = 0; /* raw output */ + newsertio.c_lflag = 0; /* no echo, no signals */ + newsertio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; + newsertio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; + tcflush(serial_fd, TCIFLUSH); + tcsetattr(serial_fd, TCSANOW, &newsertio); + + fprintf(stderr, "Listening on %s\n", serial_dev); + + return serial_fd; +} + + +static void main_loop(int serial_fd, int low_listener, int high_listener) +{ + fd_set rdfds; + int low_poll = 0, high_poll = 0, serial_poll = 0; + int low_fd = -1, high_fd = -1; + + while(1) + { + char buf[1024]; + ssize_t bytes; + int max; + + FD_ZERO(&rdfds); + FD_SET(low_fd < 0 ? low_listener : low_fd, &rdfds); + FD_SET(high_fd < 0 ? high_listener : high_fd, &rdfds); + FD_SET(serial_fd, &rdfds); + + max = MAX(low_fd, low_listener); + max = MAX(max, high_fd); + max = MAX(max, high_listener); + max = MAX(max, serial_fd); + + if (select(max + 1, &rdfds, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0) + { + perror("select"); + continue; + } + + if (FD_ISSET(low_listener, &rdfds)) + { + assert(low_fd < 0); + low_fd = accept_conn(low_listener); + } + + if (FD_ISSET(high_listener, &rdfds)) + { + assert(high_fd < 0); + high_fd = accept_conn(high_listener); + } + + if (low_poll || (low_fd >= 0 && FD_ISSET(low_fd, &rdfds))) + { + if ((bytes = receive_data(&low_fd, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), + &low_poll)) > 0) + { + clear_high_bit(&buf[0], bytes); + if (write(serial_fd, &buf[0], bytes) < 0) + perror("write"); + } + } + + if (high_poll || (high_fd >= 0 && FD_ISSET(high_fd, &rdfds))) + { + if ((bytes = receive_data(&high_fd, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), + &high_poll)) > 0) + { + set_high_bit(&buf[0], bytes); + if (write(serial_fd, &buf[0], bytes) < 0) + perror("write"); + } + } + + if (serial_poll || FD_ISSET(serial_fd, &rdfds)) + { + if ((bytes = receive_data(&serial_fd, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), + &serial_poll)) > 0) + { + ssize_t i; + for (i = 0; i < bytes; ++ i) + { + if (buf[i] & 0x80) + { + if (high_fd >= 0) + { + buf[i] &= 0x7f; + if ((write(high_fd, &buf[i], 1)) < 0) + { + perror("write"); + close_conn(&high_fd); + high_poll = 0; + } + } + } + else + { + if (low_fd >= 0) + { + if ((write(low_fd, &buf[i], 1)) < 0) + { + perror("write"); + close_conn(&low_fd); + low_poll = 0; + } + } + } + } + } + } + } +} + + +static void usage() +{ + printf( +"Description:\n" +" Splits the serial port between two TCP ports. Bytes read from the\n" +" serial port will be delivered to one of the two TCP ports (high or\n" +" low) depending on whether the high bit is set. Bytes written to the\n" +" TCP ports will be forwarded to the serial port; the high bit will be\n" +" set or cleared to denote the source.\n" +"Usage:\n" +" serial-split [-d<serial-device>] [-b<baud>]\n" +" [-l<low-port>] [-h<high-port>]\n" +"Parameters:\n" +" -d<serial-device> Defaults to %s.\n" +" -b<baud> Baud rate of the serial port. Defaults to %d.\n" +" Also assumes 8N1.\n" +" -l<low-port> Low TCP port. Defaults to %d, or one less than\n" +" the high port.\n" +" -h<high-port> High TCP port. Defaults to %d, or one more than\n" +" the low port.\n", +DefaultSerialDevice, DefaultBaud, DefaultLowPort, DefaultLowPort + 1); + + exit(1); +} + + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int cooked_baud = cook_baud(DefaultBaud); + char const * serial_dev = DefaultSerialDevice; + int low_port = -1, high_port = -1; + int serial_fd, low_listener, high_listener; + + while ( --argc != 0 ) + { + char *p = argv[argc]; + if ( *(p++) != '-' ) + usage(); + switch (*(p++)) + { + case 'b': + if ( (cooked_baud = cook_baud(atoi(p))) == 0 ) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad baud rate\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'd': + serial_dev = p; + break; + case 'l': + if ((low_port = atoi(p)) <= 0) + usage(); + break; + case 'h': + if ((high_port = atoi(p)) <= 0) + usage(); + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + + if (low_port == -1 && high_port == -1) + low_port = DefaultLowPort; + if (low_port == -1) + low_port = high_port - 1; + if (high_port == -1) + high_port = low_port + 1; + + if ((serial_fd = open_serial(serial_dev, cooked_baud)) < 0 || + (low_listener = start_listener(low_port)) < 0 || + (high_listener = start_listener(high_port)) < 0) + exit(1); + + main_loop(serial_fd, low_listener, high_listener); + + return 0; +} + ++++++ stdvga-cache.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/stdvga.c @@ -135,7 +135,10 @@ static int stdvga_outb(uint64_t addr, ui /* When in standard vga mode, emulate here all writes to the vram buffer * so we can immediately satisfy reads without waiting for qemu. */ - s->stdvga = (s->sr[7] == 0x00); + s->stdvga = + (s->sr[7] == 0x00) && /* standard vga mode */ + (s->gr[6] == 0x05); /* misc graphics register w/ MemoryMapSelect=1 + * 0xa0000-0xaffff (64k region), AlphaDis=1 */ if ( !prev_stdvga && s->stdvga ) { ++++++ supported_module.diff ++++++ Make our PV drivers "Novell supported modules" Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/Module.supported =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/Module.supported @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +xen-vbd +xen-platform-pci +xen-vnif +xenbus +xen-balloon +xen-scsi ++++++ suspend_evtchn_lock.patch ++++++ Fix problems that suspend eventchannel lock file might be obselete for some reason like segment fault or other abnormal exit, and once obselete lock file exists, it might affact latter save process. Have discussed with upstream, for some reason not accepted. http://xen.1045712.n5.nabble.com/Re-PATCH-improve-suspend-evtchn-lock-proces... Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_suspend.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_suspend.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_suspend.c @@ -16,8 +16,43 @@ #include "xc_private.h" #include "xenguest.h" +#include +#ifdef __MINIOS__ +extern int kill (__pid_t __pid, int __sig); +#endif #define SUSPEND_LOCK_FILE "/var/lib/xen/suspend_evtchn" +/* cleanup obsolete suspend lock file which is unlinked for any reason, +so that current process can get lock */ +static void clean_obsolete_lock(int domid) +{ + int fd, pid, n; + char buf[128]; + char suspend_file[256]; + + snprintf(suspend_file, sizeof(suspend_file), "%s_%d_lock.d", + SUSPEND_LOCK_FILE, domid); + fd = open(suspend_file, O_RDWR); + + if (fd < 0) + return; + + n = read(fd, buf, 127); + + close(fd); + + if (n > 0) + { + sscanf(buf, "%d", &pid); + /* pid does not exist, this lock file is obsolete, just delete it */ + if ( kill(pid,0) ) + { + unlink(suspend_file); + return; + } + } +} + static int lock_suspend_event(xc_interface *xch, int domid) { int fd, rc; @@ -27,6 +62,7 @@ static int lock_suspend_event(xc_interfa snprintf(suspend_file, sizeof(suspend_file), "%s_%d_lock.d", SUSPEND_LOCK_FILE, domid); + clean_obsolete_lock(domid); mask = umask(022); fd = open(suspend_file, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_RDWR, 0666); if (fd < 0) @@ -41,6 +77,9 @@ static int lock_suspend_event(xc_interfa rc = write_exact(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); close(fd); + if(rc) + unlink(suspend_file); + return rc; } @@ -127,8 +166,7 @@ int xc_suspend_evtchn_init(xc_interface return suspend_evtchn; cleanup: - if (suspend_evtchn != -1) - xc_suspend_evtchn_release(xch, xce, domid, suspend_evtchn); + xc_suspend_evtchn_release(xch, xce, domid, suspend_evtchn); return -1; } ++++++ sysconfig.pciback ++++++ ## Path: System/Virtualization ## Type: string ## Default: "" # # Space delimited list of PCI devices to late bind to pciback # Format: <driver>,<PCI ID> # #XEN_PCI_HIDE_LIST="e1000,0000:0b:00.0 e1000,0000:0b:00.1" XEN_PCI_HIDE_LIST="" ++++++ tapdisk-ioemu-logfile.patch ++++++

From 903a145f3eace5e3ae914f0335ab6c4e33635d2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Wolf Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:36:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 4/6] tapdisk-ioemu: Write messages to a logfile

Typically, tapdisk-ioemu runs as a daemon and messages to stderr are simply lost. Write them to a logfile instead. Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf --- tapdisk-ioemu.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c @@ -78,15 +78,22 @@ int main(void) struct timeval tv; void *old_fd_start = NULL; - logfile = stderr; - + /* Daemonize */ + if (fork() != 0) + exit(0); + bdrv_init(); init_blktap(); - /* Daemonize */ - if (fork() != 0) - exit(0); - + logfile = fopen("/var/log/xen/tapdisk-ioemu.log", "a"); + if (logfile) { + setbuf(logfile, NULL); + fclose(stderr); + stderr = logfile; + } else { + logfile = stderr; + } + /* * Main loop: Pass events to the corrsponding handlers and check for * completed aio operations. ++++++ tapdisk-ioemu-shutdown-fix.patch ++++++

From 9062564d79cb45029403cc998b48410e42ead924 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Wolf Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 16:45:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 6/6] tapdisk-ioemu: Fix shutdown condition

Even when opening the only image a tapdisk-ioemu instance is responsible for fails, it can't immediately shut down. blktapctrl still wants to communicate with tapdisk-ioemu and close the disk. This patch changes tapdisk-ioemu to count the connections to blktapctrl rather than the number of opened disk images. Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf --- hw/xen_blktap.c | 5 ++++- tapdisk-ioemu.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_blktap.c @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ int read_fd; int write_fd; static pid_t process; +int connected_disks = 0; fd_list_entry_t *fd_start = NULL; static void handle_blktap_iomsg(void* private); @@ -541,6 +542,7 @@ static void handle_blktap_ctrlmsg(void* /* Allocate the disk structs */ s = state_init(); + connected_disks++; /*Open file*/ if (s == NULL || open_disk(s, path, msg->drivertype, msg->readonly)) { @@ -591,7 +593,8 @@ static void handle_blktap_ctrlmsg(void* case CTLMSG_CLOSE: s = get_state(msg->cookie); if (s) unmap_disk(s); - break; + connected_disks--; + break; case CTLMSG_PID: memset(buf, 0x00, MSG_SIZE); Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/tapdisk-ioemu.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ extern void qemu_aio_init(void); extern void qemu_aio_poll(void); extern void *fd_start; +extern int connected_disks; int domid = 0; FILE* logfile; @@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ int main(void) int max_fd; fd_set rfds; struct timeval tv; - void *old_fd_start = NULL; + int old_connected_disks = 0; /* Daemonize */ if (fork() != 0) @@ -128,11 +129,17 @@ int main(void) pioh = &ioh->next; } + if (old_connected_disks != connected_disks) + fprintf(stderr, "connected disks: %d => %d\n", + old_connected_disks, connected_disks); + /* Exit when the last image has been closed */ - if (old_fd_start != NULL && fd_start == NULL) + if (old_connected_disks != 0 && connected_disks == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Last image is closed, exiting.\n"); exit(0); + } - old_fd_start = fd_start; + old_connected_disks = connected_disks; } return 0; } ++++++ tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons @@ -54,21 +54,27 @@ do_start () { local time=0 local timeout=30 - modprobe xen-evtchn 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-gntdev 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-gntalloc 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-blkback 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-netback 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-pciback 2>/dev/null - modprobe evtchn 2>/dev/null - modprobe gntdev 2>/dev/null - modprobe netbk 2>/dev/null - modprobe blkbk 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-scsibk 2>/dev/null - modprobe usbbk 2>/dev/null - modprobe pciback 2>/dev/null - modprobe xen-acpi-processor 2>/dev/null - modprobe blktap2 2>/dev/null || modprobe blktap 2>/dev/null + #modprobe xen-evtchn 2>/dev/null + #modprobe xen-gntdev 2>/dev/null + #modprobe xen-gntalloc 2>/dev/null + #modprobe xen-blkback 2>/dev/null + #modprobe xen-netback 2>/dev/null + #modprobe xen-pciback 2>/dev/null + modprobe evtchn 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe gntdev 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe gntalloc 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe netbk 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe blkbk 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe xen-scsibk 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe usbbk 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe pciback 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe xen-acpi-processor 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe blktap2 2>/dev/null || true + modprobe blktap 2>/dev/null || true + # xenblk (frontend module) is needed in dom0, allowing it to use vbds + modprobe xenblk 2>/dev/null || true + # support xl create pv guest with qcow/qcow2 disk image + modprobe nbd max_part=8 2>/dev/null || true mkdir -p /var/run/xen if ! `xenstore-read -s / >/dev/null 2>&1` ++++++ tmp_build.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/Makefile @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ $(CLIENTS_DOMU): xenstore xenstore: xenstore_client.o $(LIBXENSTORE) $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $< $(LDLIBS_libxenstore) $(SOCKET_LIBS) -o $@ $(APPEND_LDFLAGS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,--build-id=uuid $< -L. -lxenstore $(SOCKET_LIBS) -o domu-$@ xenstore-control: xenstore_control.o $(LIBXENSTORE) $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $< $(LDLIBS_libxenstore) $(SOCKET_LIBS) -o $@ $(APPEND_LDFLAGS) @@ -121,10 +122,11 @@ install: all $(INSTALL_PROG) xenstore-control $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) xenstore $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR) set -e ; for c in $(CLIENTS) ; do \ - ln -f $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/xenstore $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/$${c} ; \ + ln -fs /usr/bin/xenstore $(DESTDIR)/usr/bin/$${c} ; \ done + $(INSTALL_PROG) domu-xenstore $(DESTDIR)/bin for client in $(CLIENTS_DOMU); do \ - $(INSTALL_PROG) $$client $(DESTDIR)/bin/$${client/domu-}; \ + ln -fs /bin/domu-xenstore $(DESTDIR)/bin/$${client/domu-}; \ done $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) libxenstore.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) ++++++ tools-watchdog-support.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py @@ -535,6 +535,21 @@ gopts.var('usbdevice', val='NAME', fn=set_value, default='', use="Name of USB device to add?") +gopts.var('watchdog', val='NAME', + fn=set_value, default='', + use="Watchdog device to use. May be ib700 or i6300esb") + +gopts.var('watchdog_action', val='reset|shutdown|poweroff|pause|none|dump', + fn=set_value, default="reset", + use="""Action when watchdog timer expires: + - reset: Default, forcefully reset the guest; + - shutdown: Gracefully shutdown the guest (not recommended); + - poweroff: Forcefully power off the guest; + - pause: Pause the guest; + - none: Do nothing; + - dump: Automatically dump the guest; + """) + gopts.var('description', val='NAME', fn=set_value, default='', use="Description of a domain") @@ -1097,6 +1112,7 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals): 'usb', 'usbdevice', 'vcpus', 'vnc', 'vncconsole', 'vncdisplay', 'vnclisten', 'vncunused', 'viridian', 'vpt_align', + 'watchdog', 'watchdog_action', 'xauthority', 'xen_extended_power_mgmt', 'xen_platform_pci', 'memory_sharing' ] Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py @@ -1113,7 +1113,9 @@ class sxp2xml: 'xen_platform_pci', 'tsc_mode' 'description', - 'nomigrate' + 'nomigrate', + 'watchdog', + 'watchdog_action' ] platform_configs = [] Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py @@ -855,7 +855,8 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): dmargs = [ 'boot', 'fda', 'fdb', 'soundhw', 'localtime', 'serial', 'stdvga', 'isa', - 'acpi', 'usb', 'usbdevice', 'gfx_passthru' ] + 'acpi', 'usb', 'usbdevice', 'gfx_passthru', + 'watchdog', 'watchdog_action' ] for a in dmargs: v = vmConfig['platform'].get(a) @@ -863,6 +864,7 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): # python doesn't allow '-' in variable names if a == 'stdvga': a = 'std-vga' if a == 'keymap': a = 'k' + if a == 'watchdog_action': a = 'watchdog-action' # Handle booleans gracefully if a in ['localtime', 'std-vga', 'isa', 'usb', 'acpi']: Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py @@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ XENAPI_PLATFORM_CFG_TYPES = { 'xen_platform_pci': int, "gfx_passthru": int, 'oos' : int, + 'watchdog': str, + 'watchdog_action': str, } # Xen API console 'other_config' keys. Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c @@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ static char ** libxl__build_device_model "-usbdevice", b_info->u.hvm.usbdevice, NULL); } } + if (b_info->u.hvm.watchdog || b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action) { + flexarray_append(dm_args, "-watchdog"); + if (b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action) { + flexarray_vappend(dm_args, "-watchdog-action", b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action, NULL); + } + } if (b_info->u.hvm.soundhw) { flexarray_vappend(dm_args, "-soundhw", b_info->u.hvm.soundhw, NULL); } @@ -455,6 +461,12 @@ static char ** libxl__build_device_model "-usbdevice", b_info->u.hvm.usbdevice, NULL); } } + if (b_info->u.hvm.watchdog || b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action) { + flexarray_append(dm_args, "-watchdog"); + if (b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action) { + flexarray_vappend(dm_args, "-watchdog-action", b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action, NULL); + } + } if (b_info->u.hvm.soundhw) { flexarray_vappend(dm_args, "-soundhw", b_info->u.hvm.soundhw, NULL); } Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl @@ -322,6 +322,8 @@ libxl_domain_build_info = Struct("domain ("usbdevice", string), ("soundhw", string), ("xen_platform_pci", libxl_defbool), + ("watchdog", string), + ("watchdog_action", string), ])), ("pv", Struct(None, [("kernel", string), ("slack_memkb", MemKB), Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c @@ -1417,6 +1417,8 @@ skip_vfb: xlu_cfg_replace_string (config, "soundhw", &b_info->u.hvm.soundhw, 0); xlu_cfg_get_defbool(config, "xen_platform_pci", &b_info->u.hvm.xen_platform_pci, 0); + xlu_cfg_replace_string (config, "watchdog", &b_info->u.hvm.watchdog, 0); + xlu_cfg_replace_string (config, "watchdog_action", &b_info->u.hvm.watchdog_action, 0); } xlu_cfg_destroy(config); ++++++ udev-rules.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.rules =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.rules +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/xen-backend.rules @@ -13,4 +13,5 @@ KERNEL=="blktap-control", NAME="xen/blkt KERNEL=="gntdev", NAME="xen/%k", MODE="0600" KERNEL=="pci_iomul", NAME="xen/%k", MODE="0600" KERNEL=="tapdev[a-z]*", NAME="xen/blktap-2/tapdev%m", MODE="0600" -SUBSYSTEM=="net", KERNEL=="vif*-emu", ACTION=="add", ENV{UDEV_CALL}="1", RUN+="/etc/xen/scripts/vif-setup $env{ACTION} type_if=tap" +SUBSYSTEM=="net", KERNEL=="vif*-emu", ACTION=="add", ENV{UDEV_CALL}="1", TEST=="/proc/xen" RUN+="/etc/xen/scripts/vif-setup $env{ACTION} type_if=tap" +KERNELS=="xen", KERNEL=="xvd*", SUBSYSTEM=="block", OPTIONS+="last_rule" ++++++ usb-list.patch ++++++ "usb-hc-create" does not check usb-ver parameter. It allows 2/2.0/2.0usb/2.0aaa. While low level driver doing hc create, it gets an integer by vssanf %d from usb-ver string, so there is no problem. But 2/2.0/2.0usb/2.0aaa will be saved into VM config. After that, while doing "usb-list", it cannot handle "2.0/2.0usb/2.0aaa" and will cause error: Idx BE state usb-ver BE-path Error: Invalid argument. Usage: xm usb-list <Domain> This patch is to let "usb-list" handle all usb-ver cases as low level driver does and won't cause error. About this problem, I've submitted two patches to upstream before, but got no response. Information could be referred to: http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/xen/devel/178406?search_string=usb-lis... http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/xen/devel/181021?search_string=usb-lis... Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py @@ -2629,10 +2629,22 @@ def xm_usb_list(args): ni = parse_dev_info(x[1]) ni['idx'] = int(x[0]) usbver = sxp.child_value(x[1], 'usb-ver') + + substr = re.search("^\d{1,}", usbver) + if substr: + usbver = substr.group() + else: + print "Unknown usb-ver" + continue + if int(usbver) == 1: ni['usb-ver'] = 'USB1.1' - else: + elif int(usbver) == 2: ni['usb-ver'] = 'USB2.0' + else: + print "Unknown usb-ver" + continue + print "%(idx)-3d %(backend-id)-3d %(state)-5d %(usb-ver)-7s %(be-path)-30s " % ni ports = sxp.child(x[1], 'port') ++++++ vif-bridge-no-iptables.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge @@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ case "$command" in ;; esac -if [ "$type_if" = vif ]; then - handle_iptable -fi +#if [ "$type_if" = vif ]; then +# handle_iptable +#fi call_hooks vif post ++++++ vif-bridge-tap-fix.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jim Fehlig # Date 1319581952 21600 # Node ID 74da2a3a1db1476d627f42e4a99e9e720cc6774d # Parent 6c583d35d76dda2236c81d9437ff9d57ab02c006 Prevent vif-bridge from adding user-created tap interfaces to a bridge Exit vif-bridge script if there is no device info in xenstore, preventing it from adding user-created taps to bridges. Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-bridge @@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ dir=$(dirname "$0") . "$dir/vif-common.sh" +mac=$(xenstore_read_default "$XENBUS_PATH/mac" "") +if [ -z "$mac" ] +then + log debug "No device details in $XENBUS_PATH, exiting." + exit 0 +fi + bridge=${bridge:-} bridge=$(xenstore_read_default "$XENBUS_PATH/bridge" "$bridge") ++++++ vif-route-ifup.patch ++++++ --- tools/examples/xend-config.sxp | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile | 2 +- tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp @@ -200,6 +200,26 @@ #(network-script network-route) #(vif-script vif-route) +# SuSE users note: +# If using a routed network configuration it is advised to NOT use +# network-route and vif-route scripts but instead use sysconfig scripts +# in dom0 and vif-route-ifup script to "connect" the domU vif to dom0. +# Since this configuration requires a vif sysconfig script in dom0, a static +# vif name must be used. E.g. in dom0 the vif sysconfig script +# (/etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-xen1.0) may contain +# +# NAME='XEN vm 1 virtual interface 0' +# BOOTPROTO='static' +# STARTMODE='hotplug' +# ... +# +# The corresponding domain vif configuration would contain e.g. +# vif=[ 'mac=00:16:3e:aa:bb:cc,script=vif-route-ifup,vifname=xen1.0', ] +# +# If the vif-route-ifup script will be used for all domains, it can be +# set here as the default vif script, alleviating the need for +# 'script=' in domain vif configuration. +#(vif-script vif-route-ifup) ## Use the following if network traffic is routed with NAT, as an alternative # to the settings for bridged networking given above. Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG = init.d/sysconfig. # Xen script dir and scripts to go there. XEN_SCRIPTS = network-bridge vif-bridge -XEN_SCRIPTS += network-route vif-route +XEN_SCRIPTS += network-route vif-route vif-route-ifup XEN_SCRIPTS += network-nat vif-nat XEN_SCRIPTS += vif2 XEN_SCRIPTS += vif-setup Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#!/bin/bash +#============================================================================ +# /etc/xen/vif-route-ifup +# +# Script for configuring a vif in routed mode. +# The hotplugging system will call this script if it is specified either in +# the device configuration given to Xend, or the default Xend configuration +# in /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp. If the script is specified in neither of those +# places, then vif-bridge is the default. +# +# Usage: +# vif-route-ifup (add|remove|online|offline) +# +# Environment vars: +# dev vif interface name (required). +#============================================================================ + +dir=$(dirname "$0") +. "$dir/vif-common.sh" + +case "$command" in + online) + ifup ${dev} + ;; + offline) + do_without_error ifdown ${dev} + ;; +esac + +log debug "Successful vif-route-ifup $command for ${dev}." +if [ "$command" = "online" ] +then + success +fi ++++++ x86-cpufreq-report.patch ++++++ --- a/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -643,6 +643,41 @@ ret_t do_platform_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xe } break; + case XENPF_get_cpu_freq: + case XENPF_get_cpu_freq_min: + case XENPF_get_cpu_freq_max: + { + struct vcpu *v; + const struct cpufreq_policy *policy; + + if ( op->u.get_cpu_freq.vcpu >= current->domain->max_vcpus || + !(v = current->domain->vcpu[op->u.get_cpu_freq.vcpu]) ) + { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + policy = per_cpu(cpufreq_cpu_policy, v->processor); + switch ( op->cmd & -!!policy ) + { + case XENPF_get_cpu_freq: + op->u.get_cpu_freq.freq = policy->cur; + break; + case XENPF_get_cpu_freq_min: + op->u.get_cpu_freq.freq = policy->min; + break; + case XENPF_get_cpu_freq_max: + op->u.get_cpu_freq.freq = policy->max; + break; + default: + op->u.get_cpu_freq.freq = 0; + break; + } + if ( copy_field_to_guest(u_xenpf_op, op, u.get_cpu_freq.freq) ) + ret = -EFAULT; + } + break; + default: ret = -ENOSYS; break; --- a/xen/include/public/platform.h +++ b/xen/include/public/platform.h @@ -505,6 +505,16 @@ struct xenpf_core_parking { typedef struct xenpf_core_parking xenpf_core_parking_t; DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xenpf_core_parking_t); +#define XENPF_get_cpu_freq ('N' << 24) +#define XENPF_get_cpu_freq_min (XENPF_get_cpu_freq + 1) +#define XENPF_get_cpu_freq_max (XENPF_get_cpu_freq_min + 1) +struct xenpf_get_cpu_freq { + /* IN variables */ + uint32_t vcpu; + /* OUT variables */ + uint32_t freq; /* in kHz */ +}; + /* * ` enum neg_errnoval * ` HYPERVISOR_platform_op(const struct xen_platform_op*); @@ -531,6 +541,7 @@ struct xen_platform_op { struct xenpf_cpu_hotadd cpu_add; struct xenpf_mem_hotadd mem_add; struct xenpf_core_parking core_parking; + struct xenpf_get_cpu_freq get_cpu_freq; uint8_t pad[128]; } u; }; ++++++ x86-dom-print.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/xen/arch/x86/domain.c @@ -152,15 +152,30 @@ void dump_pageframe_info(struct domain * printk("Memory pages belonging to domain %u:\n", d->domain_id); - if ( d->tot_pages >= 10 ) + if ( d->tot_pages >= 10 && d->is_dying < DOMDYING_dead ) { printk(" DomPage list too long to display\n"); } else { + unsigned long total[PGT_type_mask + / (PGT_type_mask & -PGT_type_mask) + 1] = {}; + spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock); page_list_for_each ( page, &d->page_list ) { + unsigned int index = (page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) + / (PGT_type_mask & -PGT_type_mask); + + if ( ++total[index] > 16 ) + { + switch ( page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask ) + { + case PGT_none: + case PGT_writable_page: + continue; + } + } printk(" DomPage %p: caf=%08lx, taf=%" PRtype_info "\n", _p(page_to_mfn(page)), page->count_info, page->u.inuse.type_info); ++++++ x86-extra-trap-info.patch ++++++ --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/entry.S @@ -410,8 +410,10 @@ UNLIKELY_END(bounce_vm86_3) _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft24, domain_crash_synchronous) _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft25, domain_crash_synchronous) +.section .rodata, "a", @progbits domain_crash_synchronous_string: .asciz "domain_crash_sync called from entry.S (%lx)\n" +.previous domain_crash_synchronous: pushl $domain_crash_synchronous_string --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S @@ -435,22 +435,35 @@ UNLIKELY_END(bounce_failsafe) jz domain_crash_synchronous movq %rax,UREGS_rip+8(%rsp) ret - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft2, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft3, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft4, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft5, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft6, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft7, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft8, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft9, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft10, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft11, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft12, domain_crash_synchronous) - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft13, domain_crash_synchronous) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft2, domain_crash_page_fault_32) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft3, domain_crash_page_fault_24) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft4, domain_crash_page_fault_8) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft5, domain_crash_page_fault_16) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft6, domain_crash_page_fault) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft7, domain_crash_page_fault) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft8, domain_crash_page_fault_24) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft9, domain_crash_page_fault_16) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft10, domain_crash_page_fault_8) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft11, domain_crash_page_fault) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft12, domain_crash_page_fault_8) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lft13, domain_crash_page_fault) +.section .rodata, "a", @progbits domain_crash_synchronous_string: .asciz "domain_crash_sync called from entry.S\n" +.previous +domain_crash_page_fault_32: + addq $8,%rsi +domain_crash_page_fault_24: + addq $8,%rsi +domain_crash_page_fault_16: + addq $8,%rsi +domain_crash_page_fault_8: + addq $8,%rsi +domain_crash_page_fault: + movq %rsi,%rdi + call show_page_walk ENTRY(domain_crash_synchronous) # Get out of the guest-save area of the stack. GET_CPUINFO_FIELD(CPUINFO_guest_cpu_user_regs,%rax) ++++++ x86-ioapic-ack-default.patch ++++++ Change default IO-APIC ack mode for single IO-APIC systems to old-style. --- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c @@ -2043,7 +2043,10 @@ void __init setup_IO_APIC(void) io_apic_irqs = ~PIC_IRQS; printk("ENABLING IO-APIC IRQs\n"); - printk(" -> Using %s ACK method\n", ioapic_ack_new ? "new" : "old"); + if (!directed_eoi_enabled && !ioapic_ack_forced) { + ioapic_ack_new = (nr_ioapics > 1); + printk(" -> Using %s ACK method\n", ioapic_ack_new ? "new" : "old"); + } /* * Set up IO-APIC IRQ routing. ++++++ xen-api-auth.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAuthSessions.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAuthSessions.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendAuthSessions.py @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ class XendAuthSessions: # if PAM doesn't exist, let's ignore it return False - pam_auth.start("login") + pam_auth.start("xen-api") pam_auth.set_item(PAM.PAM_USER, username) def _pam_conv(auth, query_list, user_data = None): ++++++ xen-changeset.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/xen/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/xen/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +export XEN_CHANGESET = unavailable # This is the correct place to edit the build version. # All other places this is stored (eg. compile.h) should be autogenerated. export XEN_VERSION = 4 @@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ delete-unfresh-files: @rm -f $@1 $@2 # compile.h contains dynamic build info. Rebuilt on every 'make' invocation. -include/xen/compile.h: include/xen/compile.h.in .banner +include/xen/compile.h: include/xen/compile.h.in @sed -e 's/@@date@@/$(shell LC_ALL=C date)/g' \ -e 's/@@time@@/$(shell LC_ALL=C date +%T)/g' \ -e 's/@@whoami@@/$(XEN_WHOAMI)/g' \ @@ -122,10 +123,9 @@ include/xen/compile.h: include/xen/compi -e 's/@@version@@/$(XEN_VERSION)/g' \ -e 's/@@subversion@@/$(XEN_SUBVERSION)/g' \ -e 's/@@extraversion@@/$(XEN_EXTRAVERSION)/g' \ - -e 's!@@changeset@@!$(shell ((hg parents --template "{date|date} {rev}:{node|short}" >/dev/null && hg parents --template "{date|date} {rev}:{node|short}") || echo "unavailable") 2>/dev/null)!g' \ + -e 's!@@changeset@@!$(XEN_CHANGESET)!g' \ < include/xen/compile.h.in > $@.new - @grep \" .banner >> $@.new - @grep -v \" .banner + tools/figlet/figlet -d tools/figlet Xen $(XEN_FULLVERSION) >> $@.new @mv -f $@.new $@ include/asm-$(TARGET_ARCH)/asm-offsets.h: arch/$(TARGET_ARCH)/asm-offsets.s ++++++ xen-cpupool-xl-config-format.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/cpupool.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/cpupool.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/cpupool.py @@ -157,9 +157,17 @@ def make_cpus_config(cfg_cpus): # ["0,2","1,3"] -> [[0,2],[1,3]] # ["0-3,^1","1-4,^2"] -> [[0,2,3],[1,3,4]] try: - for c in cfg_cpus: - cpus = cnv(c) - cpus_list.append(cpus) + cpus_str = "" + list_len = len(cfg_cpus) + n = 0 + while n < list_len: + if type(cfg_cpus[n]) != str: + raise SyntaxError('cpus = %s' % cfg_cpus) + cpus_str += cfg_cpus[n] + n += 1 + if n < list_len: + cpus_str += ', ' + cpus_list = cnv(cpus_str) except ValueError, e: raise err('cpus = %s: %s' % (cfg_cpus, e)) else: ++++++ xen-destdir.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/Makefile @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenctrl) CLIENTS := xenstore-exists xenstore-list xenstore-read xenstore-rm xenstore-chmod CLIENTS += xenstore-write xenstore-ls xenstore-watch +CLIENTS_DOMU := $(patsubst xenstore-%,domu-xenstore-%,$(CLIENTS)) XENSTORED_OBJS = xenstored_core.o xenstored_watch.o xenstored_domain.o xenstored_transaction.o xs_lib.o talloc.o utils.o tdb.o hashtable.o @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ endif all: $(ALL_TARGETS) .PHONY: clients -clients: xenstore $(CLIENTS) xenstore-control +clients: xenstore $(CLIENTS) $(CLIENTS_DOMU) xenstore-control ifeq ($(CONFIG_SunOS),y) xenstored_probes.h: xenstored_probes.d @@ -66,6 +67,9 @@ xenstored.a: $(XENSTORED_OBJS) $(CLIENTS): xenstore ln -f xenstore $@ +$(CLIENTS_DOMU): xenstore + ln -f xenstore $@ + xenstore: xenstore_client.o $(LIBXENSTORE) $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) $< $(LDLIBS_libxenstore) $(SOCKET_LIBS) -o $@ $(APPEND_LDFLAGS) @@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ clean: rm -f *.a *.o *.opic *.so* xenstored_probes.h rm -f xenstored xs_random xs_stress xs_crashme rm -f xs_tdb_dump xenstore-control init-xenstore-domain - rm -f xenstore $(CLIENTS) + rm -f xenstore $(CLIENTS) $(CLIENTS_DOMU) $(RM) $(DEPS) .PHONY: TAGS @@ -110,6 +114,7 @@ install: all $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR) $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)/xenstore-compat + $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)/bin $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)/var/run/xenstored $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)/var/lib/xenstored $(INSTALL_PROG) xenstored $(DESTDIR)$(SBINDIR) @@ -118,6 +123,9 @@ install: all set -e ; for c in $(CLIENTS) ; do \ ln -f $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/xenstore $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/$${c} ; \ done + for client in $(CLIENTS_DOMU); do \ + $(INSTALL_PROG) $$client $(DESTDIR)/bin/$${client/domu-}; \ + done $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) libxenstore.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR) ln -sf libxenstore.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libxenstore.so.$(MAJOR) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile @@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ install: all install-initd install-scrip .PHONY: install-initd install-initd: [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) - [ -d $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR) ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR) + [ -d $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates ] || $(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XEND_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENDOMAINS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) - $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xendomains + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENDOMAINS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(XENCOMMONS_INITD) $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) - $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)$(SYSCONFIG_DIR)/xencommons + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(XENCOMMONS_SYSCONFIG) $(DESTDIR)/var/adm/fillup-templates/ $(INSTALL_PROG) init.d/xen-watchdog $(DESTDIR)$(INITD_DIR) .PHONY: install-scripts Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/etherboot/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/firmware/etherboot/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/firmware/etherboot/Makefile @@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ all: $(ROMS) $(MAKE) -C $D/src bin/$(*F).rom $T: - if ! wget -O _$T $(IPXE_TARBALL_URL); then \ - $(GIT) clone $(IPXE_GIT_URL) $D.git; \ - (cd $D.git && $(GIT) archive --format=tar --prefix=$D/ \ - $(IPXE_GIT_TAG) | gzip >../_$T); \ - rm -rf $D.git; \ - fi + #if ! wget -O _$T $(IPXE_TARBALL_URL); then \ + # $(GIT) clone $(IPXE_GIT_URL) $D.git; \ + # (cd $D.git && $(GIT) archive --format=tar --prefix=$D/ \ + # $(IPXE_GIT_TAG) | gzip >../_$T); \ + # rm -rf $D.git; \ + #fi mv _$T $T $D/src/arch/i386/Makefile: $T Config ++++++ xen-disable-qemu-monitor.diff ++++++ CVE-2007-0998 - remote compromise of dom0 Rather than completely disabling QEMU's console (which would remove the "sendkey" command, among other useful things), remove all console commands that can read/write dom0's state. Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/monitor.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/monitor.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/monitor.c @@ -1497,6 +1497,7 @@ static const term_cmd_t term_cmds[] = { "device|all", "commit changes to the disk images (if -snapshot is used) or backing files" }, { "info", "s?", do_info, "subcommand", "show various information about the system state" }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_CLIENT { "q|quit", "", do_quit, "", "quit the emulator" }, { "eject", "-fB", do_eject, @@ -1509,6 +1510,7 @@ static const term_cmd_t term_cmds[] = { "filename", "output logs to 'filename'" }, { "log", "s", do_log, "item1[,...]", "activate logging of the specified items to '/tmp/qemu.log'" }, +#endif { "savevm", "s?", do_savevm, "tag|id", "save a VM snapshot. If no tag or id are provided, a new snapshot is created" }, { "loadvm", "s", do_loadvm, @@ -1538,8 +1540,10 @@ static const term_cmd_t term_cmds[] = { "", "reset the system" }, { "system_powerdown", "", do_system_powerdown, "", "send system power down event" }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_CLIENT { "sum", "ii", do_sum, "addr size", "compute the checksum of a memory region" }, +#endif { "usb_add", "s", do_usb_add, "device", "add USB device (e.g. 'host:bus.addr' or 'host:vendor_id:product_id')" }, { "usb_del", "s", do_usb_del, @@ -1558,6 +1562,7 @@ static const term_cmd_t term_cmds[] = { "state", "change mouse button state (1=L, 2=M, 4=R)" }, { "mouse_set", "i", do_mouse_set, "index", "set which mouse device receives events" }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_CLIENT #ifdef HAS_AUDIO { "wavcapture", "si?i?i?", do_wav_capture, "path [frequency bits channels]", @@ -1565,6 +1570,7 @@ static const term_cmd_t term_cmds[] = { #endif { "stopcapture", "i", do_stop_capture, "capture index", "stop capture" }, +#endif { "memsave", "lis", do_memory_save, "addr size file", "save to disk virtual memory dump starting at 'addr' of size 'size'", }, { "pmemsave", "lis", do_physical_memory_save, @@ -1646,6 +1652,7 @@ static const term_cmd_t info_cmds[] = { "", "show KVM information", }, { "usb", "", usb_info, "", "show guest USB devices", }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_CLIENT { "usbhost", "", usb_host_info, "", "show host USB devices", }, { "profile", "", do_info_profile, @@ -1677,6 +1684,7 @@ static const term_cmd_t info_cmds[] = { { "migrate", "", do_info_migrate, "", "show migration status" }, { "balloon", "", do_info_balloon, "", "show balloon information" }, +#endif { NULL, NULL, }, }; ++++++ xen-domUloader.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/DevController.py @@ -592,6 +592,31 @@ class DevController: return (Missing, None) + def waitForFrontend(self, devid): + def frontendStatusCallback(statusPath, ev, result): + status = xstransact.Read(statusPath) + log.debug("frontendStatusCallback %s = %s" % (statusPath, status)) + try: + status = int(status) + if status == xenbusState['Connected']: + result['status'] = Connected + elif status == xenbusState['Closed']: + result['status'] = Error + else: + raise + except: + return 1 + ev.set() + return 0 + frontpath = self.frontendPath(devid) + statusPath = frontpath + '/state' + ev = Event() + result = { 'status': Timeout } + xswatch(statusPath, frontendStatusCallback, ev, result) + ev.wait(5) + return result['status'] + + def backendPath(self, backdom, devid): """Construct backend path given the backend domain and device id. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendBootloader.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendBootloader.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendBootloader.py @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. # -import os, select, errno, stat, signal, tty +import os, select, errno, stat, signal, tty, time import random import shlex from xen.xend import sxp @@ -38,8 +38,25 @@ def bootloader(blexec, disk, dom, quiet msg = "Bootloader isn't executable" log.error(msg) raise VmError(msg) - if not os.access(disk, os.R_OK): - msg = "Disk isn't accessible" + + # domUloader requires '--entry=foo' in blargs, which is derived from + # 'bootargs' entry in domain configuration file. Ensure it exists + # here so a reasonable error message can be returned. + if blexec.find('domUloader.py') != -1: + if blargs.find('entry') == -1: + msg = "domUloader requires specification of bootargs" + log.error(msg) + raise VmError(msg) + + avail = False + for i in xrange(1, 500): + avail = os.access(disk, os.R_OK) + if avail: + break + time.sleep(.1) + + if not avail: + msg = "Disk '%s' isn't accessible" % disk log.error(msg) raise VmError(msg) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -2349,6 +2349,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo: deviceClass, config = self.info['devices'].get(dev_uuid) self._waitForDevice(deviceClass, config['devid']) + def _waitForDeviceFrontUUID(self, dev_uuid): + deviceClass, config = self.info['devices'].get(dev_uuid) + self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).waitForFrontend(config['devid']) + def _waitForDevice_destroy(self, deviceClass, devid, backpath): return self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).waitForDevice_destroy( devid, backpath) @@ -3299,7 +3303,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo: from xen.xend import XendDomain dom0 = XendDomain.instance().privilegedDomain() mounted_vbd_uuid = dom0.create_vbd(vbd, disk); - dom0._waitForDeviceUUID(mounted_vbd_uuid) + vbd_uuid = dom0.create_vbd(vbd, disk) + dom0._waitForDeviceFrontUUID(vbd_uuid) fn = BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE try: @@ -3309,10 +3314,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo: if mounted: log.info("Unmounting %s from %s." % (fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE)) - _, vbd_info = dom0.info['devices'][mounted_vbd_uuid] - dom0.destroyDevice(dom0.getBlockDeviceClass(vbd_info['devid']), - BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, force = True) - + if devtype in ['tap', 'tap2']: + dom0.destroyDevice('tap', BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, rm_cfg = True) + else: + dom0.destroyDevice('vbd', BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE, rm_cfg = True) if blcfg is None: msg = "Had a bootloader specified, but can't find disk" log.error(msg) ++++++ xen-fixme-doc.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 @@ -333,16 +333,10 @@ at hda1, which is the root filesystem. =item I<NFS Root> -FIXME: write me - =item I<LVM Root> -FIXME: write me - =item I<Two Networks> -FIXME: write me - =back =head1 SEE ALSO Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xm.pod.1 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xm.pod.1 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xm.pod.1 @@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ scheduling by the Xen hypervisor. =item B -FIXME: Why would you ever see this state? +The guest has requested to be shutdown, rebooted or suspended, and the +domain is in the process of being destroyed in response. =item B @@ -312,8 +313,6 @@ restart on crash. See L f The domain is in process of dying, but hasn't completely shutdown or crashed. -FIXME: Is this right? - =back B<NOTES> @@ -737,8 +736,6 @@ Xen ships with a number of domain schedu time with the B parameter on the Xen command line. By default B<credit> is used for scheduling. -FIXME: we really need a scheduler expert to write up this section. - =over 4 =item B<sched-credit> [ B<-d> I<domain-id> [ B<-w>[B<=>I<WEIGHT>] | B<-c>[B<=>I<CAP>] ] ] @@ -788,8 +785,6 @@ The normal EDF scheduling usage in nanos The normal EDF scheduling usage in nanoseconds -FIXME: these are lame, should explain more. - =item I<latency-hint> Scaled period if domain is doing heavy I/O. @@ -939,9 +934,6 @@ the default setting in xend-config.sxp f Passes the specified IP Address to the adapter on creation. -FIXME: this currently appears to be B<broken>. I'm not sure under what -circumstances this should actually work. - =item BI<macaddr> The MAC address that the domain will see on its Ethernet device. If @@ -967,9 +959,6 @@ Removes the network device from the doma I<devid> is the virtual interface device number within the domain (i.e. the 3 in vif22.3). -FIXME: this is currently B<broken>. Network devices aren't completely -removed from domain 0. - =item B<network-list> [B<-l>|B<--long>]> I<domain-id> List virtual network interfaces for a domain. The returned output is ++++++ xen-hvm-default-bridge.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.h +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.h @@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ void net_host_device_add(const char *dev void net_host_device_remove(int vlan_id, const char *device); #ifndef DEFAULT_NETWORK_SCRIPT -#define DEFAULT_NETWORK_SCRIPT "/etc/qemu-ifup" -#define DEFAULT_NETWORK_DOWN_SCRIPT "/etc/qemu-ifdown" +#define DEFAULT_NETWORK_SCRIPT "/etc/xen/qemu-ifup" +#define DEFAULT_NETWORK_DOWN_SCRIPT "/etc/xen/qemu-ifdown" #endif #ifdef __sun__ #define SMBD_COMMAND "/usr/sfw/sbin/smbd" Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/net.c @@ -1764,9 +1764,10 @@ int net_client_init(const char *device, } if (get_param_value(script_arg, sizeof(script_arg), "scriptarg", p) == 0 && get_param_value(script_arg, sizeof(script_arg), "bridge", p) == 0) { /* deprecated; for xend compatibility */ - pstrcpy(script_arg, sizeof(script_arg), ""); + ret = net_tap_init(vlan, device, name, ifname, setup_script, NULL, NULL); + } else { + ret = net_tap_init(vlan, device, name, ifname, setup_script, down_script, script_arg); } - ret = net_tap_init(vlan, device, name, ifname, setup_script, down_script, script_arg); } } else #endif Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py @@ -912,11 +912,13 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): mac = devinfo.get('mac') if mac is None: raise VmError("MAC address not specified or generated.") - bridge = devinfo.get('bridge', 'xenbr0') + bridge = devinfo.get('bridge', None) model = devinfo.get('model', 'rtl8139') ret.append("-net") - ret.append("nic,vlan=%d,macaddr=%s,model=%s" % - (nics, mac, model)) + net = "nic,vlan=%d,macaddr=%s,model=%s" % (nics, mac, model) + if bridge: + net += ",bridge=%s" % bridge + ret.append(net) vifname = "vif%d.%d-emu" % (self.vm.getDomid(), nics-1) ret.append("-net") if osdep.tapif_script is not None: Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/i386-dm/qemu-ifup-Linux @@ -1,36 +1,22 @@ #!/bin/sh -#. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions -#ulimit -c unlimited - echo 'config qemu network with xen bridge for ' $* +# If bridge is not specified, try device with default route. bridge=$2 +if [ -z "$bridge" ]; then + bridge=$(ip route list | awk '/^default / { print $NF }') +fi -# -# Old style bridge setup with netloop, used to have a bridge name -# of xenbrX, enslaving pethX and vif0.X, and then configuring -# eth0. -# -# New style bridge setup does not use netloop, so the bridge name -# is ethX and the physical device is enslaved pethX -# -# So if... -# -# - User asks for xenbrX -# - AND xenbrX doesn't exist -# - AND there is a ethX device which is a bridge -# -# ..then we translate xenbrX to ethX -# -# This lets old config files work without modification -# -if [ ! -e "/sys/class/net/$bridge" ] && [ -z "${bridge##xenbr*}" ] +# Exit if $bridge is not a bridge. Exit with 0 status +# so qemu-dm process is not terminated. No networking in +# vm is bad but not catastrophic. The vm could still run +# cpu and disk IO workloads. +# Include an useful error message in qemu-dm log file. +if [ ! -e "/sys/class/net/${bridge}/bridge" ] then - if [ -e "/sys/class/net/eth${bridge#xenbr}/bridge" ] - then - bridge="eth${bridge#xenbr}" - fi + echo "WARNING! ${bridge} is not a bridge. qemu-ifup exiting. VM may not have a functioning networking stack." + exit 0 fi ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 up ++++++ xen-hvm-default-pae.diff ++++++ PAE must be on for 64-on-64 to work at all. Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py @@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ class X86_HVM_ImageHandler(HVMImageHandl def configure(self, vmConfig): HVMImageHandler.configure(self, vmConfig) - self.pae = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('pae', 0)) + self.pae = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('pae', 1)) self.vramsize = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('videoram',4)) * 1024 def buildDomain(self): ++++++ xen-ioemu-hvm-pv-support.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/hw/xen_platform.c @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ #include "qemu-xen.h" #include "net.h" #include "xen_platform.h" +#include "sysemu.h" +#include #include #include @@ -335,11 +337,51 @@ static void xen_platform_ioport_writeb(v } } +static uint32_t ioport_base; + +static void platform_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) +{ + DECLARE_DOMCTL; + int rc; + + if (val == 0) + qemu_invalidate_map_cache(); + + switch (addr - ioport_base) { + case 0: + fprintf(logfile, "Init hypercall page %x, addr %x.\n", val, addr); + domctl.domain = (domid_t)domid; + domctl.u.hypercall_init.gmfn = val; + domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_hypercall_init; + rc = xc_domctl(xc_handle, &domctl); + fprintf(logfile, "result -> %d.\n", rc); + break; + case 4: + fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect IDE hard disk...\n"); + ide_unplug_harddisks(); + fprintf(logfile, "Disconnect netifs...\n"); + pci_unplug_netifs(); + fprintf(logfile, "Shutdown taps...\n"); + net_tap_shutdown_all(); + fprintf(logfile, "Done.\n"); + break; + default: + fprintf(logfile, "Write to bad port %x (base %x) on evtchn device.\n", + addr, ioport_base); + break; + } +} + static void platform_ioport_map(PCIDevice *pci_dev, int region_num, uint32_t addr, uint32_t size, int type) { + ioport_base = addr; + + register_ioport_write(addr, 16, 4, platform_ioport_write, NULL); +/* PCIXenPlatformState *d = (PCIXenPlatformState *)pci_dev; register_ioport_write(addr, size, 1, xen_platform_ioport_writeb, d); register_ioport_read(addr, size, 1, xen_platform_ioport_readb, d); +*/ } static uint32_t platform_mmio_read(void *opaque, target_phys_addr_t addr) ++++++ xen-managed-pci-device.patch ++++++ pci passthrough: handle managed pci devices Handle managed pci devices for libvirt usage. If a pci device is set "managed=1", it will be made assignable (unbound from original driver and bind to pcistub driver) before vm start and reattach to original driver after vm shut off. FATE#313570 Note: This patch was rejected upstream since xend is deprecated. See the following thread for details http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2013-01/msg01145.html Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu --- a/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/util/pci.py @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ from xen.xend import sxp from xen.xend.XendConstants import AUTO_PHP_SLOT from xen.xend.XendSXPDev import dev_dict_to_sxp from xen.xend.XendLogging import log +from xen.xend.xenstore.xstransact import xstransact +from xen.xend.XendError import XendError # for 2.3 compatibility try: @@ -27,9 +29,11 @@ try: except NameError: from sets import Set as set +XS_PCIBACK_PATH = '/xm/pciback' PROC_PCI_PATH = '/proc/bus/pci/devices' PROC_PCI_NUM_RESOURCES = 7 +SYSFS_PCI_DRVS_PATH = 'bus/pci/drivers' SYSFS_PCI_DEVS_PATH = '/bus/pci/devices' SYSFS_PCI_DEV_RESOURCE_PATH = '/resource' SYSFS_PCI_DEV_CONFIG_PATH = '/config' @@ -161,7 +165,7 @@ def PCI_BDF(domain, bus, slot, func): def check_pci_opts(opts): def f((k, v)): - if k not in ['msitranslate', 'power_mgmt'] or \ + if k not in ['msitranslate', 'power_mgmt', 'managed'] or \ not v.lower() in ['0', '1', 'yes', 'no']: raise PciDeviceParseError('Invalid pci option %s=%s: ' % (k, v)) @@ -427,6 +431,9 @@ def __pci_dict_to_fmt_str(fmt, dev): def pci_dict_to_bdf_str(dev): return __pci_dict_to_fmt_str('%04x:%02x:%02x.%01x', dev) +def pci_dict_to_xs_bdf_str(dev): + return __pci_dict_to_fmt_str('%04x-%02x-%02x-%01x', dev) + def pci_dict_to_xc_str(dev): return __pci_dict_to_fmt_str('0x%x, 0x%x, 0x%x, 0x%x', dev) @@ -561,6 +568,115 @@ def find_all_assignable_devices(): dev_list = dev_list + [dev] return dev_list +def pci_assignable_add(dev): + '''detach pci device from driver that we need to unbind from and rebind + to pciback driver, then it can be assigned to guest. + ''' + sysfs_mnt = find_sysfs_mnt() + pcidev_path = sysfs_mnt + SYSFS_PCI_DEVS_PATH + pciback_path = sysfs_mnt + SYSFS_PCIBACK_PATH + + # See if the device exists + pci_bdf = pci_dict_to_bdf_str(dev) + path = pcidev_path + '/' + pci_bdf + if not os.path.exists(path): + log.debug("Pci device %s doesn't exist" % pci_bdf) + return -1 + + # Check to see if it's already assigned to pciback + path = pciback_path + '/' + pci_bdf + if os.path.exists(path): + log.debug("Pci device %s is already assigned to pciback" % pci_bdf) + return 0 + + # Check to see if there's already a driver that we need to unbind from + path = pcidev_path + '/' + pci_bdf + '/driver' + drv_path = None + if os.path.exists(path): + drv_path = os.path.realpath(path).replace(" ", "\ ") + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/unbind' % (pci_bdf, drv_path) + if os.system(cmd): + log.debug("Couldn't unbind device") + return -1; + + # Store driver_path for rebinding to dom0 + if drv_path is not None: + xs_pci_bdf = pci_dict_to_xs_bdf_str(dev) + path = XS_PCIBACK_PATH + '/' + xs_pci_bdf + xstransact.Mkdir(path) + xstransact.Write(path, 'driver_path', drv_path) + else: + log.debug("Not bound to a driver, will not be rebound") + + # Bind to pciback + try: + # Scan through /sys/.../pciback/slots looking for pcidev's BDF + slots = os.popen('cat %s/slots' % pciback_path).read() + if re.search(pci_bdf, slots) is None: + # write bdf to new_slot + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/new_slot' % (pci_bdf, pciback_path) + if os.system(cmd): + raise XendError("Couldn't add device to pciback new_slot") + + # Bind to pciback + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/bind' % (pci_bdf, pciback_path) + if os.system(cmd): + raise XendError("Couldn't bind device to pciback") + except XendError: + # rebind to original driver + if drv_path is not None: + log.debug("Rebind to original driver") + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/bind' % (pci_bdf, drv_path) + if os.system(cmd): + log.debug("Failed to rebind") + return -1 + + return 0 + +def pci_assignable_remove(dev): + '''unbind pci device from pciback, and rebind to host pci driver where it + was detached from in pci-assignable-add. + ''' + sysfs_mnt = find_sysfs_mnt() + pcidrv_path = sysfs_mnt + SYSFS_PCI_DRVS_PATH + pciback_path = sysfs_mnt + SYSFS_PCIBACK_PATH + pci_bdf = pci_dict_to_bdf_str(dev) + + # Unbind from pciback + path = pciback_path + '/' + pci_bdf + if os.path.exists(path): + # unbind + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/unbind' % (pci_bdf, pciback_path) + if os.system(cmd): + log.debug("Couldn't unbind device to pciback") + return -1 + + # remove slots if necessary + slots = os.popen('cat %s/slots' % pciback_path).read() + if re.search(pci_bdf, slots): + # write bdf to remove_slot + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/remove_slot' % (pci_bdf, pciback_path) + if os.system(cmd): + log.debug("Couldn't remove pciback slot") + return -1 + else: + log.debug("Not bound to pciback") + + # Rebind if necessary + xs_pci_bdf = pci_dict_to_xs_bdf_str(dev) + path = XS_PCIBACK_PATH + '/' + xs_pci_bdf + drv_path = xstransact.Read(path, 'driver_path') + if drv_path: + cmd = 'echo %s > %s/bind' % (pci_bdf, drv_path) + if os.system(cmd): + log.debug("Couldn't rebind to driver %s" % drv_path) + return -1 + xstransact.Remove(path) + else: + log.debug("Counldn't find path for original driver. Not rebinding") + + return 0 + def transform_list(target, src): ''' src: its element is pci string (Format: xxxx:xx:xx.x). target: its element is pci string, or a list of pci string. --- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -303,7 +303,8 @@ def dom_get(dom): return None from xen.xend.server.pciif import parse_pci_name, PciDevice,\ - get_assigned_pci_devices, get_all_assigned_pci_devices + get_assigned_pci_devices, get_all_assigned_pci_devices,\ + prepare_host_pci_devices, reattach_host_pci_devices def do_FLR(domid, is_hvm): @@ -317,6 +318,20 @@ def do_FLR(domid, is_hvm): "parse it's resources - "+str(e)) dev.do_FLR(is_hvm, xoptions.get_pci_dev_assign_strict_check()) +def prepare_domain_pci_devices(domconfig): + ordered_refs = domconfig.ordered_device_refs() + for dev_uuid in ordered_refs: + devclass, devconfig = domconfig['devices'][dev_uuid] + if devclass == 'pci': + prepare_host_pci_devices(devconfig) + +def reattach_domain_pci_devices(domconfig): + ordered_refs = domconfig.ordered_device_refs() + for dev_uuid in ordered_refs: + devclass, devconfig = domconfig['devices'][dev_uuid] + if devclass == 'pci': + reattach_host_pci_devices(devconfig) + class XendDomainInfo: """An object represents a domain. @@ -470,6 +485,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: if self._stateGet() in (XEN_API_VM_POWER_STATE_HALTED, XEN_API_VM_POWER_STATE_SUSPENDED, XEN_API_VM_POWER_STATE_CRASHED): try: + prepare_domain_pci_devices(self.info); XendTask.log_progress(0, 30, self._constructDomain) XendTask.log_progress(31, 60, self._initDomain) @@ -496,6 +512,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: state = self._stateGet() if state in (DOM_STATE_SUSPENDED, DOM_STATE_HALTED): try: + prepare_domain_pci_devices(self.info) self._constructDomain() try: @@ -712,6 +729,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo: the device. """ + if self.domid is None: + return self.iommu_check_pod_mode() # Test whether the devices can be assigned @@ -851,6 +870,9 @@ class XendDomainInfo: if self.domid is not None: try: + if dev_type == 'pci': + prepare_host_pci_devices(dev_config_dict) + dev_config_dict['devid'] = devid = \ self._createDevice(dev_type, dev_config_dict) if dev_type == 'tap2': @@ -864,6 +886,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: if dev_type == 'pci': for dev in dev_config_dict['devs']: XendAPIStore.deregister(dev['uuid'], 'DPCI') + reattach_host_pci_devices(dev_config_dict) elif dev_type == 'vscsi': for dev in dev_config_dict['devs']: XendAPIStore.deregister(dev['uuid'], 'DSCSI') @@ -908,6 +931,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo: dev_config = pci_convert_sxp_to_dict(dev_sxp) dev = dev_config['devs'][0] + # For attach only. For boot, prepare work has been done already in earlier stage. + if self.domid is not None and pci_state == 'Initialising' and pci_sub_state != 'Booting': + prepare_host_pci_devices(dev_config) + stubdomid = self.getStubdomDomid() # Do HVM specific processing if self.info.is_hvm(): @@ -984,6 +1011,9 @@ class XendDomainInfo: new_dev_sxp = dev_control.configuration(devid) self.info.device_update(dev_uuid, new_dev_sxp) + if pci_state == 'Closing': + reattach_host_pci_devices(dev_config) + # If there is no device left, destroy pci and remove config. if num_devs == 0: if self.info.is_hvm(): @@ -3170,6 +3200,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: log.debug("%s KiB need to add to Memory pool" %self.alloc_mem) MemoryPool.instance().increase_memory(self.alloc_mem) + reattach_domain_pci_devices(self.info) self._cleanup_phantom_devs(paths) self._cleanupVm() --- a/tools/python/xen/xend/server/pciif.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/server/pciif.py @@ -86,6 +86,48 @@ def get_all_assigned_pci_devices(domid = pci_str_list = pci_str_list + get_assigned_pci_devices(int(d)) return pci_str_list +def reattach_host_pci_devices(devconfig): + pci_dev_list = devconfig.get('devs', []) + for pci_dev in pci_dev_list: + managed = 0 + pci_opts_config = pci_dev.get('opts', []) + for opt in pci_opts_config: + if opt[0] == 'managed': + managed = opt[1] + if managed: + if pci_assignable_remove(pci_dev) != 0: + raise VmError('pci_assignable_remove failed') + +def detach_host_pci_devices(devconfig): + pci_dev_list = devconfig.get('devs', []) + reattach = 0 + for pci_dev in pci_dev_list: + managed = 0 + pci_opts_config = pci_dev.get('opts', []) + for opt in pci_opts_config: + if opt[0] == 'managed': + managed = opt[1] + if managed: + if pci_assignable_add(pci_dev) != 0: + log.debug('pci_assignable_add failed') + reattach = 1 + break + + if reattach: + reattach_host_pci_devices(devconfig) + raise VmError('detach_host_pci_devices failed') + +def prepare_host_pci_devices(devconfig): + # Test whether the device used by other domain + pci_dev_list = devconfig.get('devs', []) + for pci_dev in pci_dev_list: + pci_name = pci_dict_to_bdf_str(pci_dev) + if pci_name in get_all_assigned_pci_devices(): + raise VmError("failed to assign device %s that has" + " already been assigned to other domain." % pci_name) + # Detach 'managed' devices + detach_host_pci_devices(devconfig) + class PciController(DevController): def __init__(self, vm): ++++++ xen-max-free-mem.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py @@ -949,11 +949,35 @@ class XendNode: info['cpu_mhz'] = info['cpu_khz'] / 1000 - # physinfo is in KiB, need it in MiB - info['total_memory'] = info['total_memory'] / 1024 - info['free_memory'] = info['free_memory'] / 1024 + configured_floor = xendoptions().get_dom0_min_mem() * 1024 + from xen.xend import balloon + try: + kernel_floor = balloon.get_dom0_min_target() + except: + kernel_floor = 0 + dom0_min_mem = max(configured_floor, kernel_floor) + dom0_mem = balloon.get_dom0_current_alloc() + extra_mem = 0 + if dom0_min_mem > 0 and dom0_mem > dom0_min_mem: + extra_mem = dom0_mem - dom0_min_mem + info['free_memory'] = info['free_memory'] + info['scrub_memory'] + info['max_free_memory'] = info['free_memory'] + extra_mem info['free_cpus'] = len(XendCPUPool.unbound_cpus()) + # Convert KiB to MiB, rounding down to be conservative + info['total_memory'] = info['total_memory'] / 1024 + info['free_memory'] = info['free_memory'] / 1024 + info['max_free_memory'] = info['max_free_memory'] / 1024 + + # FIXME: These are hard-coded to be the inverse of the getXenMemory + # functions in image.py. Find a cleaner way. + info['max_para_memory'] = info['max_free_memory'] - 4 + if info['max_para_memory'] < 0: + info['max_para_memory'] = 0 + info['max_hvm_memory'] = int((info['max_free_memory']-12) * (1-2.4/1024)) + if info['max_hvm_memory'] < 0: + info['max_hvm_memory'] = 0 + ITEM_ORDER = ['nr_cpus', 'nr_nodes', 'cores_per_socket', @@ -964,6 +988,9 @@ class XendNode: 'total_memory', 'free_memory', 'free_cpus', + 'max_free_memory', + 'max_para_memory', + 'max_hvm_memory', ] if show_numa != 0: Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/balloon.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/balloon.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/balloon.py @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ SLEEP_TIME_GROWTH = 0.1 # label actually shown in the PROC_XEN_BALLOON file. #labels = { 'current' : 'Current allocation', # 'target' : 'Requested target', +# 'min-target' : 'Minimum target', +# 'max-target' : 'Maximum target', # 'low-balloon' : 'Low-mem balloon', # 'high-balloon' : 'High-mem balloon', # 'limit' : 'Xen hard limit' } @@ -69,6 +71,23 @@ def get_dom0_target_alloc(): raise VmError('Failed to query target memory allocation of dom0.') return kb +def get_dom0_min_target(): + """Returns the minimum amount of memory (in KiB) that dom0 will accept.""" + + kb = _get_proc_balloon('min-target') + if kb == None: + raise VmError('Failed to query minimum target memory allocation of dom0.') + return kb + +def get_dom0_max_target(): + """Returns the maximum amount of memory (in KiB) that is potentially + visible to dom0.""" + + kb = _get_proc_balloon('max-target') + if kb == None: + raise VmError('Failed to query maximum target memory allocation of dom0.') + return kb + def free(need_mem, dominfo): """Balloon out memory from the privileged domain so that there is the specified required amount (in KiB) free. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1475,6 +1475,27 @@ class XendDomainInfo: self.info['abort_if_busy'] = str(abort_if_busy) self.info['log_save_progress'] = str(log_save_progress) + def capAndSetMemoryTarget(self, target): + """Potentially lowers the requested target to the largest possible + value (i.e., caps it), and then sets the memory target of this domain + to that value. + @param target in MiB. + """ + max_target = 0 + if self.domid == 0: + try: + from balloon import get_dom0_max_target + max_target = get_dom0_max_target() / 1024 + except: + # It's nice to cap the max at sane values, but harmless to set + # them high. Carry on. + pass + if max_target and target > max_target: + log.debug("Requested memory target %d MiB; maximum reasonable is %d MiB.", + target, max_target) + target = max_target + self.setMemoryTarget(target) + def setMemoryTarget(self, target): """Set the memory target of this domain. @param target: In MiB. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/SrvDomain.py @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ class SrvDomain(SrvDir): def op_mem_target_set(self, _, req): - return self.call(self.dom.setMemoryTarget, + return self.call(self.dom.capAndSetMemoryTarget, [['target', 'int']], req) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/osdep.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/osdep.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/osdep.py @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ def _linux_balloon_stat_proc(label): xend2linux_labels = { 'current' : 'Current allocation', 'target' : 'Requested target', + 'min-target' : 'Minimum target', + 'max-target' : 'Maximum target', 'low-balloon' : 'Low-mem balloon', 'high-balloon' : 'High-mem balloon', 'limit' : 'Xen hard limit' } ++++++ xen-migration-bridge-check.patch ++++++ bnc#757525 Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/netif.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/server/netif.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/server/netif.py @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import os import random import re +import commands from xen.xend import XendOptions, sxp from xen.xend.server.DevController import DevController @@ -101,6 +102,14 @@ class NetifController(DevController): def __init__(self, vm): DevController.__init__(self, vm) + def createDevice(self, config): + bridge = config.get('bridge') + if bridge is not None: + bridge_result = commands.getstatusoutput("/sbin/ifconfig %s" % bridge) + if bridge_result[0] != 0: + raise VmError('Network bridge does not exist: %s' % bridge) + DevController.createDevice(self, config) + def getDeviceDetails(self, config): """@see DevController.getDeviceDetails""" ++++++ xen-minimum-restart-time.patch ++++++ References: bnc#661298 Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConstants.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConstants.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConstants.py @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ DOM_STATES_OLD = [ SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT = (60.0 * 5) """Minimum time between domain restarts in seconds.""" -MINIMUM_RESTART_TIME = 60 +MINIMUM_RESTART_TIME = 10 RESTART_IN_PROGRESS = 'xend/restart_in_progress' DUMPCORE_IN_PROGRESS = 'xend/dumpcore_in_progress' ++++++ xen-no-dummy-nfs-ip.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py @@ -1342,9 +1342,8 @@ def preprocess_access_control(vals): def preprocess_ip(vals): if vals.ip or vals.dhcp != 'off': - dummy_nfs_server = '127.0.255.255' ip = (vals.ip - + ':' + (vals.nfs_server or dummy_nfs_server) + + ':' + (vals.nfs_server or '') + ':' + vals.gateway + ':' + vals.netmask + ':' + vals.hostname ++++++ xen-paths.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ gopts.opt('quiet', short='q', use="Quiet.") gopts.opt('path', val='PATH', - fn=set_value, default='.:' + auxbin.xen_configdir(), + fn=set_value, default='.:' + auxbin.xen_configdir() + "/vm", use="Search path for configuration scripts. " "The value of PATH is a colon-separated directory list.") Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xm.pod.1 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xm.pod.1 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xm.pod.1 @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ in the config file. See L format, and possible options used in either the configfile or for I<vars>. I<configfile> can either be an absolute path to a file, or a relative -path to a file located in /etc/xen. +path to a file located in /etc/xen/vm. Create will return B<as soon> as the domain is started. This B<does not> mean the guest OS in the domain has actually booted, or is @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ B<EXAMPLES> xm create Fedora4 -This creates a domain with the file /etc/xen/Fedora4, and returns as +This creates a domain with the file /etc/xen/vm/Fedora4, and returns as soon as it is run. =item I<without config file> Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ xmdomain.cfg - xm domain config file for =head1 SYNOPSIS - /etc/xen/myxendomain - /etc/xen/myxendomain2 - /etc/xen/auto/myxenautostarted + /etc/xen/auto/ + /etc/xen/examples/ + /etc/xen/vm/ =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ The B<xm>(1) program uses python executa domains to create from scratch. Each of these config files needs to contain a number of required options, and may specify many more. -Domain configuration files live in /etc/xen by default, if you store +Domain configuration files live in /etc/xen/vm by default. If you store config files anywhere else the full path to the config file must be specified in the I<xm create> command. /etc/xen/auto is a special case. Domain config files in that directory will be started automatically at system boot if the xendomain init script is enabled. The contents of /etc/xen/auto -should be symlinks to files in /etc/xen to allow I<xm create> to be +should be symlinks to files in /etc/xen/vm to allow I<xm create> to be used without full paths. Options are specified by I statements in the ++++++ xen-qemu-iscsi-fix.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/xenstore.c @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv char *buf = NULL; char *fpath = NULL, *bpath = NULL, *btype = NULL, *dev = NULL, *params = NULL, *drv = NULL; - int i, ret, is_tap; + int i, j, ret, is_tap; unsigned int len, num, hd_index, pci_devid = 0; BlockDriverState *bs; BlockDriver *format; @@ -534,12 +534,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv continue; free(danger_type); danger_type = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, danger_buf, &len); - if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/params", bpath) == -1) - continue; - free(params); - params = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); - if (params == NULL) - continue; + /* read the name of the device */ if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/type", bpath) == -1) continue; @@ -547,6 +542,35 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv drv = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); if (drv == NULL) continue; + + free(params); + if (!strcmp(drv,"iscsi") || !strcmp(drv, "npiv") || + !strcmp(drv,"dmmd")) { + if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/node", bpath) == -1) + continue; + + /* wait for block-[iscsi|npiv|dmmd] script to complete and populate the + * node entry. try 30 times (30 secs) */ + for (j = 0; j < 30; j++) { + params = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); + if (params != NULL) + break; + sleep(1); + } + if (params == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "qemu: %s device not found -- timed out \n", drv); + continue; + } + } + else + { + if (pasprintf(&buf, "%s/params", bpath) == -1) + continue; + params = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, buf, &len); + if (params == NULL) + continue; + } + /* Obtain blktap sub-type prefix */ if ((!strcmp(drv, "tap") || !strcmp(drv, "qdisk")) && params[0]) { char *offset = strchr(params, ':'); @@ -664,6 +688,12 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv format = &bdrv_host_device; else format = &bdrv_raw; + } else if (!strcmp(drv,"iscsi")) { + format = &bdrv_raw; + } else if (!strcmp(drv,"npiv")) { + format = &bdrv_raw; + } else if (!strcmp(drv,"dmmd")) { + format = &bdrv_raw; } else { format = bdrv_find_format(drv); if (!format) { ++++++ xen-updown.sh ++++++ #!/bin/bash # usage () { echo $@ echo "usage: $0 [<config>] <interface> [-o <options>]" echo "" echo "Options are:" echo " debug : be verbose" echo " rc : indicates that we are called from rcnetwork" echo "" echo "Any another options are ignored" exit $R_USAGE } xm_cmd="xm" pidof -x /usr/sbin/xend >/dev/null 2>&1 || xm_cmd="xl" ###################################################################### # change the working direcory and source some common files # R_INTERNAL=1 # internal error, e.g. no config or missing scripts cd /etc/sysconfig/network || exit $R_INTERNAL test -f ./config && . ./config test -f scripts/functions && . scripts/functions || exit $R_INTERNAL ###################################################################### # check arguments and how we are called (in case of links) # SCRIPTNAME=${0} debug $* case $1 in ""|-h|*help*) usage ;; esac CONFIG="$1" shift if [ "x$1" != x -a "x$1" != "x-o" ] ; then INTERFACE="$1" else INTERFACE="$CONFIG" fi shift test "x$1" = "x-o" && shift DEBUG=no RUN_FROM_RC=no while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do case $1 in debug) DEBUG=yes ;; rc) RUN_FROM_RC=yes ;; *) debug unknown option $1 ;; esac shift done # usage: ifprint message.... ifprint() { func=$1 ; shift test "x$func" = x && return 1 if [ "$RUN_FROM_RC" = yes -a "$INTERFACE" != all ] ; then $func "`printf " %-9s " "$INTERFACE"`$*" else $func "$*" fi } # # xen related code # # check if xen is running is_xend_running() { test -x /etc/init.d/xend && \ /etc/init.d/xend status &>/dev/null && return 0 return 1 } exit_if_xend_not_running() { is_xend_running || { debug "$0: xend is not running - nothing to do" exit 0 } } # (modified) functions from /etc/init.d/xendomains parseln() { name=${1:0:$((${#1}-36))} name=${name%% *} rest="${1: -36}" id=${rest:0:4} id=`echo $id` mem=${rest:4:6} mem=`echo $mem` vcpu=${rest:10:6} vcpu=`echo $vcpu` state=${rest:16:11} state=`echo $state` tm=${rest:27} tm=`echo $tm` } xm_list() { TERM=vt100 ${xm_cmd} list | grep -v '^Name *ID' } # For the specified vm, return a list of vifs that are connected to $INTERFACE list_vifs() { id=$1 vifs=() for vif in $(ls -1 "/sys/class/net/$INTERFACE/brif/" 2>/dev/null) ; do eval BRIDGE_PORTS="" `grep "^[[:space:]]*BRIDGE_PORTS=" \ "/etc/sysconfig/network/ifcfg-$INTERFACE" 2>/dev/null` for p in $BRIDGE_PORTS ; do test "x$p" = "x$vif" && continue 2 done case $vif in (tap${id}\.*|vif${id}\.*) vifs=(${vifs[@]} ${vif}) ;; esac done echo "${vifs[@]}" } # Write list of concerned vifs to state file save_sysconfig_state() { [ -d "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/" ] || \ mkdir -p "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/" || return 1 rm -f "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/$INTERFACE" && { echo "VIFS='${vifs[@]}'" } > "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/$INTERFACE" } case $SCRIPTNAME in *if-up.d*) exit_if_xend_not_running if test -f "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/$INTERFACE" ; then . "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/$INTERFACE" for vif in ${VIFS}; do test -d "/sys/class/net/${vif}" || continue test -d "/sys/class/net/${INTERFACE}/brif/${vif}" && \ continue if ! is_iface_up ${vif} ; then ip link set dev ${vif} up || continue fi brctl addif ${INTERFACE} ${vif} &>/dev/null done # remove sysconfig state rm -f "${RUN_FILES_BASE}/xen/$INTERFACE" fi ;; *if-down.d*) exit_if_xend_not_running test -d "/sys/class/net/$INTERFACE/brif/" || exit 0 # Remember vifs attached to $INTERFACE vifs=() num=0 while read LN; do parseln "$LN" [ "$id" = 0 ] && continue [ -z "$state" ] && continue vifs=(${vifs[@]} $(list_vifs $id)) done < <(xm_list) [ -z "${vifs[*]}" ] || save_sysconfig_state ;; *) usage ;; esac ++++++ xen-xm-top-needs-root.diff ++++++ From: Charles Coffing Upstream: no Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/main.py @@ -2201,6 +2201,10 @@ def xm_debug_keys(args): def xm_top(args): arg_check(args, "top", 0) + # A hack to get a clear error message if ran as non-root + if os.geteuid() != 0: + raise IOError() + os.system('xentop') def xm_dmesg(args): ++++++ xen-xmexample-vti.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/Makefile @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ XEN_CONFIGS += xmexample.hvm XEN_CONFIGS += xmexample.hvm-stubdom XEN_CONFIGS += xmexample.pv-grub XEN_CONFIGS += xmexample.nbd -XEN_CONFIGS += xmexample.vti XEN_CONFIGS += xlexample.hvm XEN_CONFIGS += xlexample.pvlinux XEN_CONFIGS += xend-pci-quirks.sxp ++++++ xen-xmexample.diff ++++++ Change various example paths in the config files to match SUSE. Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample1 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample1 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample1 @@ -7,11 +7,17 @@ #============================================================================ #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Kernel image file. -kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.10-xenU" - -# Optional ramdisk. -#ramdisk = "/boot/initrd.gz" +# Kernel image file and (optional) ramdisk (initrd). +kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-xen" +ramdisk = "/boot/initrd-xen" + +# Or use a bootloader instead of kernel/ramdisk to get the kernel from domU FS +# domUloader bootloader example: +#bootloader = "/usr/lib/xen/boot/domUloader.py" +#bootentry = "hda2:/vmlinuz-xen,/initrd-xen" +# pygrub bootloader example: +#bootloader="/usr/bin/pygrub" +#bootargs="" # The domain build function. Default is 'linux'. #builder='linux' @@ -49,11 +55,11 @@ name = "ExampleDomain" # # or optionally override backend, bridge, ip, mac, script, type, or vifname: # -# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=xenbr0' ] +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=br0' ] # # or more than one interface may be configured: # -# vif = [ '', 'bridge=xenbr1' ] +# vif = [ '', 'bridge=br1' ] vif = [ '' ] @@ -131,7 +137,7 @@ disk = [ 'phy:hda1,hda1,w' ] #hostname= "vm%d" % vmid # Set root device. -root = "/dev/hda1 ro" +root = "/dev/hda1" # Root device for nfs. #root = "/dev/nfs" @@ -140,8 +146,8 @@ root = "/dev/hda1 ro" # Root directory on the nfs server. #nfs_root = '/full/path/to/root/directory' -# Sets runlevel 4. -extra = "4" +# Extra arguments to pass to the kernel. +extra = "" #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Configure the behaviour when a domain exits. There are three 'reasons' Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample2 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample2 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample2 @@ -35,11 +35,17 @@ xm_vars.var('vmid', xm_vars.check() #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Kernel image file. -kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.10-xenU" - -# Optional ramdisk. -#ramdisk = "/boot/initrd.gz" +# Kernel image file and (optional) ramdisk (initrd). +kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-xen" +ramdisk = "/boot/initrd-xen" + +# Or use a bootloader instead of kernel/ramdisk to get the kernel from domU FS +# domUloader bootloader example: +#bootloader = "/usr/lib/xen/boot/domUloader.py" +#bootentry = "hda2:/vmlinuz-xen,/initrd-xen" +# pygrub bootloader example: +#bootloader="/usr/bin/pygrub" +#bootargs="" # The domain build function. Default is 'linux'. #builder='linux' @@ -80,11 +86,11 @@ vcpus = 4 # make your domain a 4-way # # or optionally override backend, bridge, ip, mac, script, type, or vifname: # -# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=xenbr0' ] +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=br0' ] # # or more than one interface may be configured: # -# vif = [ '', 'bridge=xenbr1' ] +# vif = [ '', 'bridge=br1' ] vif = [ '' ] @@ -167,7 +173,7 @@ disk = [ 'phy:sda%d,sda1,w' % (7+vmid), #hostname= "vm%d" % vmid # Set root device. -root = "/dev/sda1 ro" +root = "/dev/sda1" # Root device for nfs. #root = "/dev/nfs" @@ -176,8 +182,8 @@ root = "/dev/sda1 ro" # Root directory on the nfs server. #nfs_root = '/full/path/to/root/directory' -# Sets runlevel 4 and the device for /usr. -extra = "4 VMID=%d usr=/dev/sda6" % vmid +# Sets the device for /usr. +extra = "VMID=%d usr=/dev/sda6" % vmid #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Configure the behaviour when a domain exits. There are three 'reasons' Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample3 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample3 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample3 @@ -35,11 +35,17 @@ xm_vars.var('vmid', xm_vars.check() #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -# Kernel image file. -kernel = "/path/to/domU/kernel" +# Kernel image file and (optional) ramdisk (initrd). +kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-xen" +ramdisk = "/boot/initrd-xen" -# Optional ramdisk. -#ramdisk = "/boot/initrd.gz" +# Or use a bootloader instead of kernel/ramdisk to get the kernel from domU FS +# domUloader bootloader example: +#bootloader = "/usr/lib/xen/boot/domUloader.py" +#bootentry = "hda2:/vmlinuz-xen,/initrd-xen" +# pygrub bootloader example: +#bootloader="/usr/bin/pygrub" +#bootargs="" # The domain build function. Default is 'linux'. #builder='linux' Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm @@ -64,11 +64,26 @@ name = "ExampleHVMDomain" #cpus = "0-3,5,^1" # all vcpus run on cpus 0,2,3,5 #cpus = ["2", "3"] # VCPU0 runs on CPU2, VCPU1 runs on CPU3 -# Optionally define mac and/or bridge for the network interfaces. -# Random MACs are assigned if not given. -#vif = [ 'type=ioemu, mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=xenbr0, model=ne2k_pci' ] -# type=ioemu specify the NIC is an ioemu device not netfront -vif = [ 'type=ioemu, bridge=xenbr0' ] +#---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Define network interfaces. + +# By default, no network interfaces are configured. You may have one created +# with sensible defaults using an empty vif clause: +# +# vif = [ '' ] +# +# or optionally override backend, bridge, ip, mac, script, type, model, +# or vifname. +# +# An emulated RealTek 8139 network interface can be configured with: +# +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, type=ioemu, model=rtl8139, bridge=br0' ] +# +# A para-virtual network interface can be configured with: +# +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, type=netfront, bridge=br0' ] +# +vif = [ '' ] #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Define the disk devices you want the domain to have access to, and @@ -78,7 +93,7 @@ vif = [ 'type=ioemu, bridge=xenbr0' ] # and MODE is r for read-only, w for read-write. #disk = [ 'phy:hda1,hda1,r' ] -disk = [ 'file:/var/images/min-el3-i386.img,hda,w', ',hdc:cdrom,r' ] +disk = [ 'file:/var/lib/xen/images/disk.img,ioemu:hda,w', ',hdc:cdrom,r' ] #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Configure the behaviour when a domain exits. There are three 'reasons' Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 @@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ file. The kernel image for the domain. The format of the parameter is the fully qualified path to the kernel image file, -i.e. I. +i.e. I. =item B<ramdisk> The initial ramdisk for the domain. The format of the parameter is -the fully qualified path to the initrd, i.e. I. On +the fully qualified path to the initrd, i.e. I. On many Linux distros you will not need a ramdisk if using the default xen kernel. @@ -321,14 +321,14 @@ configured. They should not be consider =item I<A Loopback File as Root> - kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-2.6-xenU" + kernel = "/boot/vmlinuz-xen" memory = 128 name = "MyLinux" - root = "/dev/hda1 ro" - disk = [ "file:/var/xen/mylinux.img,hda1,w" ] + root = "/dev/hda1" + disk = [ "file:/var/lib/xen/images/MyLinux/hda1,hda1,w" ] This creates a domain called MyLinux with 128 MB of memory using a -default xen kernel, and the file /var/xen/mylinux.img loopback mounted +default xen kernel, and the file hda1 loopback mounted at hda1, which is the root filesystem. =item I<NFS Root> Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xm.pod.1 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xm.pod.1 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xm.pod.1 @@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ soon as it is run. =item I<without config file> - xm create /dev/null ramdisk=initrd.img \ - kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.12.6-xenU \ + xm create /dev/null ramdisk=initrd-xen \ + kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-xen \ name=ramdisk vif='' vcpus=1 \ memory=64 root=/dev/ram0 Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm-stubdom =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm-stubdom +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.hvm-stubdom @@ -55,11 +55,26 @@ name = "xmexample.hvm" #cpus = "0-3,5,^1" # all vcpus run on cpus 0,2,3,5 #cpus = ["2", "3"] # VCPU0 runs on CPU2, VCPU1 runs on CPU3 -# Optionally define mac and/or bridge for the network interfaces. -# Random MACs are assigned if not given. -#vif = [ 'type=ioemu, mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=xenbr0, model=ne2k_pci' ] -# type=ioemu specify the NIC is an ioemu device not netfront -vif = [ 'type=ioemu, bridge=xenbr0' ] +#---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Define network interfaces. + +# By default, no network interfaces are configured. You may have one created +# with sensible defaults using an empty vif clause: +# +# vif = [ '' ] +# +# or optionally override backend, bridge, ip, mac, script, type, model, +# or vifname. +# +# An emulated RealTek 8139 network interface can be configured with: +# +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, type=ioemu, model=rtl8139, bridge=br0' ] +# +# A para-virtual network interface can be configured with: +# +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, type=netfront, bridge=br0' ] +# +vif = [ '' ] #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Define the disk devices you want the domain to have access to, and Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.pv-grub =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample.pv-grub +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.pv-grub @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ name = "ExampleDomain" # # or optionally override backend, bridge, ip, mac, script, type, or vifname: # -# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=xenbr0' ] +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=br0' ] # # or more than one interface may be configured: # -# vif = [ '', 'bridge=xenbr1' ] +# vif = [ '', 'bridge=br1' ] vif = [ '' ] Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.vti =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xmexample.vti +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xmexample.vti @@ -40,11 +40,26 @@ name = "ExampleVTIDomain" # In Windows OS, smaller size shows better performance. #vhpt = 23 -# Optionally define mac and/or bridge for the network interfaces. -# Random MACs are assigned if not given. -#vif = [ 'type=ioemu, mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, bridge=xenbr0, model=ne2k_pci' ] -# type=ioemu specify the NIC is an ioemu device not netfront -vif = [ 'type=ioemu, bridge=xenbr0' ] +#---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Define network interfaces. + +# By default, no network interfaces are configured. You may have one created +# with sensible defaults using an empty vif clause: +# +# vif = [ '' ] +# +# or optionally override backend, bridge, ip, mac, script, type, model, +# or vifname. +# +# An emulated RealTek 8139 network interface can be configured with: +# +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, type=ioemu, model=rtl8139, bridge=br0' ] +# +# A para-virtual network interface can be configured with: +# +# vif = [ 'mac=00:16:3e:00:00:11, type=netfront, bridge=br0' ] +# +vif = [ '' ] #---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Define the disk devices you want the domain to have access to, and Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xl.pod.1 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/docs/man/xl.pod.1 +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/docs/man/xl.pod.1 @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ The B<xl> program is the new tool for ma domains. The program can be used to create, pause, and shutdown domains. It can also be used to list current domains, enable or pin VCPUs, and attach or detach virtual block devices. -The old B<xm> tool is deprecated and should not be used. +The B<xm> tool continues to be supported on SLE11 platforms +and should still be used. The basic structure of every B<xl> command is almost always: ++++++ xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Mar 28 15:36:07 2013 +0100 files: tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c description: tools/libxc: print stats if migration is aborted Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering --- tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c @@ -1536,6 +1536,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in ERROR("Live migration aborted, as requested. (guest too busy?)" " total_sent %lu iter %d, max_iters %u max_factor %u", total_sent, iter, max_iters, max_factor); + print_stats(xch, dom, sent_this_iter, &time_stats, &shadow_stats, 1); rc = 1; goto out; } ++++++ xen.migrate.tools-xc_document_printf_calls_in_xc_restore.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Wed Mar 06 16:42:02 2013 +0100 files: tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c description: tools/xc: document printf calls in xc_restore Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering diff -r e5ae0e680b5c -r 49b90990442a tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c --- a/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c +++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) if ( ret == 0 ) { + /* xend expects this output, part of protocol */ printf("store-mfn %li\n", store_mfn); if ( !hvm ) printf("console-mfn %li\n", console_mfn); ++++++ xen.migrate.tools-xc_print_messages_from_xc_save_with_xc_report.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Wed Mar 06 16:32:08 2013 +0100 files: tools/libxc/xc_private.h tools/xcutils/xc_save.c description: tools/xc: print messages from xc_save with xc_report Make use of xc_report in xc_save to log also pid if some error occoured. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering diff -r 7af4246a6e1c -r e5ae0e680b5c tools/libxc/xc_private.h --- a/tools/libxc/xc_private.h +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_private.h @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void xc_report_progress_step(xc_interfac /* anamorphic macros: struct xc_interface *xch must be in scope */ +#define WPRINTF(_f, _a...) xc_report(xch, xch->error_handler, XTL_WARN,0, _f , ## _a) #define IPRINTF(_f, _a...) xc_report(xch, xch->error_handler, XTL_INFO,0, _f , ## _a) #define DPRINTF(_f, _a...) xc_report(xch, xch->error_handler, XTL_DETAIL,0, _f , ## _a) #define DBGPRINTF(_f, _a...) xc_report(xch, xch->error_handler, XTL_DEBUG,0, _f , ## _a) diff -r 7af4246a6e1c -r e5ae0e680b5c tools/xcutils/xc_save.c --- a/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c +++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ * */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -51,16 +53,17 @@ static int compat_suspend(void) * receive the acknowledgement from the subscribe event channel. */ static int evtchn_suspend(void) { + xc_interface *xch = si.xch; int rc; rc = xc_evtchn_notify(si.xce, si.suspend_evtchn); if (rc < 0) { - warnx("failed to notify suspend request channel: %d", rc); + WPRINTF("failed to notify suspend request channel: %d", rc); return 0; } - if (xc_await_suspend(si.xch, si.xce, si.suspend_evtchn) < 0) { - warnx("suspend failed"); + if (xc_await_suspend(xch, si.xce, si.suspend_evtchn) < 0) { + WPRINTF("suspend failed"); return 0; } @@ -104,20 +107,27 @@ static int suspend(void* data) static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domid, unsigned int enable, void *data) { + xc_interface *xch = si.xch; struct xs_handle *xs; char *path, *p, *ret_str, *cmd_str, **watch; unsigned int len; struct timeval tv; fd_set fdset; - if ((xs = xs_daemon_open()) == NULL) - errx(1, "Couldn't contact xenstore"); - if (!(path = strdup("/local/domain/0/device-model/"))) - errx(1, "can't get domain path in store"); + if ((xs = xs_daemon_open()) == NULL) { + PERROR("Couldn't contact xenstore"); + exit(1); + } + if (!(path = strdup("/local/domain/0/device-model/"))) { + PERROR("can't get domain path in store"); + exit(1); + } if (!(path = realloc(path, strlen(path) + 10 - + strlen("/logdirty/cmd") + 1))) - errx(1, "no memory for constructing xenstore path"); + + strlen("/logdirty/cmd") + 1))) { + PERROR("no memory for constructing xenstore path"); + exit(1); + } snprintf(path + strlen(path), 11, "%i", domid); strcat(path, "/logdirty/"); p = path + strlen(path); @@ -126,16 +136,22 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi /* Watch for qemu's return value */ strcpy(p, "ret"); if (!xs_watch(xs, path, "qemu-logdirty-ret")) - errx(1, "can't set watch in store (%s)\n", path); + { + ERROR("can't set watch in store (%s)\n", path); + exit(1); + } - if (!(cmd_str = strdup( enable == 0 ? "disable" : "enable"))) - errx(1, "can't get logdirty cmd path in store"); + if (!(cmd_str = strdup( enable == 0 ? "disable" : "enable"))) { + PERROR("can't get logdirty cmd path in store"); + exit(1); + } /* Tell qemu that we want it to start logging dirty page to Xen */ strcpy(p, "cmd"); - if (!xs_write(xs, XBT_NULL, path, cmd_str, strlen(cmd_str))) - errx(1, "can't write to store path (%s)\n", - path); + if (!xs_write(xs, XBT_NULL, path, cmd_str, strlen(cmd_str))) { + PERROR("can't write to store path (%s)\n", path); + exit(1); + } /* Wait a while for qemu to signal that it has service logdirty command */ read_again: @@ -144,8 +160,10 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi FD_ZERO(&fdset); FD_SET(xs_fileno(xs), &fdset); - if ((select(xs_fileno(xs) + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &tv)) != 1) - errx(1, "timed out waiting for qemu logdirty response.\n"); + if ((select(xs_fileno(xs) + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &tv)) != 1) { + PERROR("timed out waiting for qemu logdirty response.\n"); + exit(1); + } watch = xs_read_watch(xs, &len); free(watch); @@ -166,6 +184,7 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi int main(int argc, char **argv) { + xc_interface *xch; unsigned int maxit, max_f, lflags; int io_fd, ret, port; struct save_callbacks callbacks; @@ -186,26 +205,26 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) lvl = si.flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG ? XTL_DEBUG: XTL_DETAIL; lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID | XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags); - si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0); + xch = si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0); if (!si.xch) - errx(1, "failed to open control interface"); + errx(1, "[%lu] failed to open control interface", (unsigned long)getpid()); si.xce = xc_evtchn_open(NULL, 0); if (si.xce == NULL) - warnx("failed to open event channel handle"); + WPRINTF("failed to open event channel handle"); else { port = xs_suspend_evtchn_port(si.domid); if (port < 0) - warnx("failed to get the suspend evtchn port\n"); + WPRINTF("failed to get the suspend evtchn port\n"); else { si.suspend_evtchn = xc_suspend_evtchn_init(si.xch, si.xce, si.domid, port); if (si.suspend_evtchn < 0) - warnx("suspend event channel initialization failed, " + WPRINTF("suspend event channel initialization failed, " "using slow path"); } } ++++++ xen.migrate.tools-xc_rework_xc_save.cswitch_qemu_logdirty.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Wed Mar 06 17:05:10 2013 +0100 files: tools/xcutils/xc_save.c description: tools/xc: rework xc_save.c:switch_qemu_logdirty Rework code in switch_qemu_logdirty, fix also memleak. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering diff -r 49b90990442a -r 1ea501d60264 tools/xcutils/xc_save.c --- a/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c +++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ * */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include @@ -109,8 +110,10 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi { xc_interface *xch = si.xch; struct xs_handle *xs; - char *path, *p, *ret_str, *cmd_str, **watch; + char *path, *dir_p, *ret_str, **watch; + const char *cmd_str; unsigned int len; + int ret, again; struct timeval tv; fd_set fdset; @@ -118,65 +121,56 @@ static int switch_qemu_logdirty(int domi PERROR("Couldn't contact xenstore"); exit(1); } - if (!(path = strdup("/local/domain/0/device-model/"))) { - PERROR("can't get domain path in store"); + + ret = asprintf(&path, "/local/domain/0/device-model/%i/logdirty/ret", domid); + if (ret < 0) { + ERROR("Couldn't construct xenstore path"); exit(1); } - if (!(path = realloc(path, strlen(path) - + 10 - + strlen("/logdirty/cmd") + 1))) { - PERROR("no memory for constructing xenstore path"); - exit(1); - } - snprintf(path + strlen(path), 11, "%i", domid); - strcat(path, "/logdirty/"); - p = path + strlen(path); - + /* Pointer to directory */ + dir_p = path + ret - 3; /* Watch for qemu's return value */ - strcpy(p, "ret"); - if (!xs_watch(xs, path, "qemu-logdirty-ret")) - { - ERROR("can't set watch in store (%s)\n", path); + if (!xs_watch(xs, path, "qemu-logdirty-ret")) { + PERROR("can't set watch in store (%s)", path); exit(1); } - if (!(cmd_str = strdup( enable == 0 ? "disable" : "enable"))) { - PERROR("can't get logdirty cmd path in store"); + cmd_str = enable ? "enable" : "disable"; + + /* Tell qemu that we want it to start logging dirty pages to Xen */ + strcpy(dir_p, "cmd"); + if (!xs_write(xs, XBT_NULL, path, cmd_str, strlen(cmd_str))) { + PERROR("can't write to store path (%s)", path); exit(1); } - /* Tell qemu that we want it to start logging dirty page to Xen */ - strcpy(p, "cmd"); - if (!xs_write(xs, XBT_NULL, path, cmd_str, strlen(cmd_str))) { - PERROR("can't write to store path (%s)\n", path); - exit(1); - } + /* Restore initial path */ + strcpy(dir_p, "ret"); + /* Wait a while for qemu to signal that it has serviced logdirty command */ + do { + tv.tv_sec = 5; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(xs_fileno(xs), &fdset); + errno = 0; - /* Wait a while for qemu to signal that it has service logdirty command */ - read_again: - tv.tv_sec = 5; - tv.tv_usec = 0; - FD_ZERO(&fdset); - FD_SET(xs_fileno(xs), &fdset); - - if ((select(xs_fileno(xs) + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &tv)) != 1) { - PERROR("timed out waiting for qemu logdirty response.\n"); - exit(1); - } - - watch = xs_read_watch(xs, &len); - free(watch); - - strcpy(p, "ret"); - ret_str = xs_read(xs, XBT_NULL, path, &len); - if (ret_str == NULL || strcmp(ret_str, cmd_str)) + if ((select(xs_fileno(xs) + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &tv)) != 1) { + PERROR("timed out waiting for qemu logdirty response."); + exit(1); + } + + watch = xs_read_watch(xs, &len); + free(watch); + + ret_str = xs_read(xs, XBT_NULL, path, &len); + again = ret_str == NULL || strcmp(ret_str, cmd_str); + WPRINTF("Got '%s' from logdirty%s.\n", ret_str, again ? ", retrying" : ""); + free(ret_str); /* Watch fired but value is not yet right */ - goto read_again; + } while (again); free(path); - free(cmd_str); - free(ret_str); return 0; } ++++++ xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Mar 28 15:36:02 2013 +0100 files: tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py description: tools/xend: move assert to exception block The two assert in restore trigger sometimes after hundreds of migrations. If they trigger the destination host will not destroy the newly created, still empty guest. After a second migration attempt to this host there will be two guets with the same name and uuid. This situation is poorly handled by the xm tools. With this change the guest will be destroyed. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering --- tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -262,9 +262,6 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus store_port = dominfo.getStorePort() console_port = dominfo.getConsolePort() - assert store_port - assert console_port - # if hvm, pass mem size to calculate the store_mfn if is_hvm: apic = int(dominfo.info['platform'].get('apic', 0)) @@ -276,6 +273,9 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus pae = 0 try: + assert store_port + assert console_port + restore_image = image.create(dominfo, dominfo.info) memory = restore_image.getRequiredAvailableMemory( dominfo.info['memory_dynamic_max'] / 1024) ++++++ xen.migrate.tools_add_xm_migrate_--log_progress_option.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Wed Mar 06 17:05:15 2013 +0100 files: tools/libxc/xenguest.h tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py tools/xcutils/xc_save.c description: tools: add xm migrate --log_progress option xc_domain_save does print progress messages. These verbose messages are disabled per default to avoid flood in xend.log. Sometimes it is helpful to see progress when migrating large and busy guests. So add a new option to xm migrate to actually enable the printing of progress messsages. xl migrate is not modified with this change because it does not use the stdio logger. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering diff -r 29c66a248f5b -r d8ef4a83760f tools/libxc/xenguest.h --- a/tools/libxc/xenguest.h +++ b/tools/libxc/xenguest.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #define XCFLAGS_STDVGA (1 << 3) #define XCFLAGS_CHECKPOINT_COMPRESS (1 << 4) #define XCFLAGS_DOMSAVE_ABORT_IF_BUSY (1 << 5) +#define XCFLAGS_PROGRESS (1 << 6) #define X86_64_B_SIZE 64 #define X86_32_B_SIZE 32 diff -r 29c66a248f5b -r d8ef4a83760f tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py --- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -121,16 +121,19 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst max_iters = dominfo.info.get('max_iters', "0") max_factor = dominfo.info.get('max_factor', "0") abort_if_busy = dominfo.info.get('abort_if_busy', "0") + log_save_progress = dominfo.info.get('log_save_progress', "0") if max_iters == "None": max_iters = "0" if max_factor == "None": max_factor = "0" if abort_if_busy == "None": abort_if_busy = "0" + if log_save_progress == "None": + log_save_progress = "0" cmd = [xen.util.auxbin.pathTo(XC_SAVE), str(fd), str(dominfo.getDomid()), max_iters, max_factor, - str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) ) ] + str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) | (int(log_save_progress) << 6) ) ] log.debug("[xc_save]: %s", string.join(cmd)) def saveInputHandler(line, tochild): diff -r 29c66a248f5b -r d8ef4a83760f tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py --- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py @@ -1832,17 +1832,18 @@ class XendDomain: log.exception(ex) raise XendError(str(ex)) - def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy): + def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress): """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain. @param domid: Domain ID or Name @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend + @param log_save_progress: Log progress of migrate to xend.log """ dominfo = self.domain_lookup_nr(domid) if not dominfo: raise XendInvalidDomain(str(domid)) - dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy) + dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress) def domain_maxmem_set(self, domid, mem): """Set the memory limit for a domain. diff -r 29c66a248f5b -r d8ef4a83760f tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py --- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1459,17 +1459,19 @@ class XendDomainInfo: pci_conf = self.info['devices'][dev_uuid][1] return map(pci_dict_to_bdf_str, pci_conf['devs']) - def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy): + def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress): """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain. @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend + @param log_save_progress: Log progress of migrate to xend.log """ log.debug("Setting migration constraints of domain %s (%s) to '%s' '%s' '%s'.", self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy) self.info['max_iters'] = str(max_iters) self.info['max_factor'] = str(max_factor) self.info['abort_if_busy'] = str(abort_if_busy) + self.info['log_save_progress'] = str(log_save_progress) def setMemoryTarget(self, target): """Set the memory target of this domain. diff -r 29c66a248f5b -r d8ef4a83760f tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py --- a/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py +++ b/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py @@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ gopts.opt('abort_if_busy', short='A', fn=set_true, default=0, use="Abort migration instead of doing final suspend.") +gopts.opt('log_progress', + fn=set_true, default=0, + use="Log progress of migration to xend.log") + def help(): return str(gopts) @@ -95,7 +99,8 @@ def main(argv): server.xend.domain.migrate_constraints_set(dom, opts.vals.max_iters, opts.vals.max_factor, - opts.vals.abort_if_busy) + opts.vals.abort_if_busy, + opts.vals.log_progress) server.xend.domain.migrate(dom, dst, opts.vals.live, opts.vals.port, opts.vals.node, diff -r 29c66a248f5b -r d8ef4a83760f tools/xcutils/xc_save.c --- a/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c +++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c @@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) si.suspend_evtchn = -1; lvl = si.flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG ? XTL_DEBUG: XTL_DETAIL; - lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID | XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; + lflags = XTL_STDIOSTREAM_SHOW_PID; + lflags |= si.flags & XCFLAGS_PROGRESS ? 0 : XTL_STDIOSTREAM_HIDE_PROGRESS; l = (xentoollog_logger *)xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, lvl, lflags); xch = si.xch = xc_interface_open(l, 0, 0); if (!si.xch) ++++++ xen.migrate.tools_set_migration_constraints_from_cmdline.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Wed Mar 06 17:05:14 2013 +0100 files: docs/man/xl.pod.1 tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c tools/libxc/xenguest.h tools/libxl/Makefile tools/libxl/libxl.c tools/libxl/libxl.h tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c tools/libxl/xl_cmdtable.c tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py description: tools: set migration constraints from cmdline Add new options to xm/xl migrate to control the process of migration. The intention is to optionally abort the migration if it takes too long to migrate a busy guest due to the high number of dirty pages. Currently the guest is suspended to transfer the remaining dirty pages. This transfer can take too long, which can confuse the guest if its suspended for too long. -M <number> Number of iterations before final suspend (default: 30) --max_iters <number> -m <factor> Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend (default: 3*RAM) --max_factor <factor> -A Abort migration instead of doing final suspend. --abort_if_busy The changes to libxl change the API, handle LIBXL_API_VERSION == 0x040200. TODO: eventually add also --min_remaining (default value 50) in a seperate patch v6: - update the LIBXL_API_VERSION handling for libxl_domain_suspend change it to an inline function if LIBXL_API_VERSION is defined to 4.2.0 - rename libxl_save_properties to libxl_domain_suspend_properties - rename ->xlflags to ->flags within that struct v5: - adjust libxl_domain_suspend prototype, move flags, max_iters, max_factor into a new, optional struct libxl_save_properties - rename XCFLAGS_DOMSAVE_NOSUSPEND to XCFLAGS_DOMSAVE_ABORT_IF_BUSY - rename LIBXL_SUSPEND_NO_FINAL_SUSPEND to LIBXL_SUSPEND_ABORT_IF_BUSY - rename variables no_suspend to abort_if_busy - rename option -N/--no_suspend to -A/--abort_if_busy - update xl.1, extend description of -A option v4: - update default for no_suspend from None to 0 in XendCheckpoint.py:save - update logoutput in setMigrateConstraints - change xm migrate defaults from None to 0 - add new options to xl.1 - fix syntax error in XendDomain.py:domain_migrate_constraints_set - fix xm migrate -N option name to match xl migrate v3: - move logic errors in libxl__domain_suspend and fixed help text in cmd_table to separate patches - fix syntax error in XendCheckpoint.py - really pass max_iters and max_factor in libxl__xc_domain_save - make libxl_domain_suspend_0x040200 declaration globally visible - bump libxenlight.so SONAME from 2.0 to 2.1 due to changed libxl_domain_suspend v2: - use LIBXL_API_VERSION and define libxl_domain_suspend_0x040200 - fix logic error in min_reached check in xc_domain_save - add longopts - update --help text - correct description of migrate --help text Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering --- tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c | 13 ++++++++++++- tools/libxc/xenguest.h | 1 + tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py | 14 ++++++++++++-- tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py | 12 ++++++++++++ tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py | 12 ++++++++++++ tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c @@ -813,6 +813,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in int rc = 1, frc, i, j, last_iter = 0, iter = 0; int live = (flags & XCFLAGS_LIVE); int debug = (flags & XCFLAGS_DEBUG); + int abort_if_busy = (flags & XCFLAGS_DOMSAVE_ABORT_IF_BUSY); int superpages = !!hvm; int race = 0, sent_last_iter, skip_this_iter = 0; unsigned int sent_this_iter = 0; @@ -1525,10 +1526,20 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in if ( live ) { + int min_reached = sent_this_iter + skip_this_iter < 50; if ( (iter >= max_iters) || - (sent_this_iter+skip_this_iter < 50) || + min_reached || (total_sent > dinfo->p2m_size*max_factor) ) { + if ( !min_reached && abort_if_busy ) + { + ERROR("Live migration aborted, as requested. (guest too busy?)" + " total_sent %lu iter %d, max_iters %u max_factor %u", + total_sent, iter, max_iters, max_factor); + rc = 1; + goto out; + } + DPRINTF("Start last iteration\n"); last_iter = 1; Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xenguest.h +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #define XCFLAGS_HVM (1 << 2) #define XCFLAGS_STDVGA (1 << 3) #define XCFLAGS_CHECKPOINT_COMPRESS (1 << 4) +#define XCFLAGS_DOMSAVE_ABORT_IF_BUSY (1 << 5) #define X86_64_B_SIZE 64 #define X86_32_B_SIZE 32 Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -118,9 +118,19 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst # enabled. Passing "0" simply uses the defaults compiled into # libxenguest; see the comments and/or code in xc_linux_save() for # more information. + max_iters = dominfo.info.get('max_iters', "0") + max_factor = dominfo.info.get('max_factor', "0") + abort_if_busy = dominfo.info.get('abort_if_busy', "0") + if max_iters == "None": + max_iters = "0" + if max_factor == "None": + max_factor = "0" + if abort_if_busy == "None": + abort_if_busy = "0" cmd = [xen.util.auxbin.pathTo(XC_SAVE), str(fd), - str(dominfo.getDomid()), "0", "0", - str(int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2)) ] + str(dominfo.getDomid()), + max_iters, max_factor, + str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) ) ] log.debug("[xc_save]: %s", string.join(cmd)) def saveInputHandler(line, tochild): Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py @@ -1832,6 +1832,18 @@ class XendDomain: log.exception(ex) raise XendError(str(ex)) + def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy): + """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain. + @param domid: Domain ID or Name + @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend + @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend + @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend + """ + dominfo = self.domain_lookup_nr(domid) + if not dominfo: + raise XendInvalidDomain(str(domid)) + dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy) + def domain_maxmem_set(self, domid, mem): """Set the memory limit for a domain. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1459,6 +1459,18 @@ class XendDomainInfo: pci_conf = self.info['devices'][dev_uuid][1] return map(pci_dict_to_bdf_str, pci_conf['devs']) + def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy): + """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain. + @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend + @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend + @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend + """ + log.debug("Setting migration constraints of domain %s (%s) to '%s' '%s' '%s'.", + self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy) + self.info['max_iters'] = str(max_iters) + self.info['max_factor'] = str(max_factor) + self.info['abort_if_busy'] = str(abort_if_busy) + def setMemoryTarget(self, target): """Set the memory target of this domain. @param target: In MiB. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py @@ -55,6 +55,18 @@ gopts.opt('change_home_server', short='c fn=set_true, default=0, use="Change home server for managed domains.") +gopts.opt('max_iters', val='max_iters', + fn=set_int, default=0, + use="Number of iterations before final suspend (default: 30).") + +gopts.opt('max_factor', val='max_factor', + fn=set_int, default=0, + use="Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend (default: 3*RAM).") + +gopts.opt('abort_if_busy', + fn=set_true, default=0, + use="Abort migration instead of doing final suspend.") + def help(): return str(gopts) @@ -80,6 +92,10 @@ def main(argv): server.xenapi.VM.migrate(vm_ref, dst, bool(opts.vals.live), other_config) else: + server.xend.domain.migrate_constraints_set(dom, + opts.vals.max_iters, + opts.vals.max_factor, + opts.vals.abort_if_busy) server.xend.domain.migrate(dom, dst, opts.vals.live, opts.vals.port, opts.vals.node, ++++++ xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch ++++++ user: Olaf Hering date: Thu Mar 28 15:42:14 2013 +0100 files: docs/man/xl.pod.1 tools/libxc/Makefile tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c tools/libxc/xenguest.h tools/libxl/libxl.c tools/libxl/libxl.h tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c tools/libxl/xl_cmdtable.c tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py tools/xcutils/xc_save.c description: tools: set number of dirty pages during migration If a guest is really busy it will not reach the low number of remaining 50 dirty pages for the final suspend. As a result the guest is either suspendend for a long time during the final transfer, or if the number of iterations is increased the migration will take a long time. Add a new option xm/xl migrate --min_remaing <pages> to increase the default from command line. The default of 50 is 200kb, which is appearently an arbitrary number. With todays network speeds a larger block of memory can be transfered quickly without causing too much suspension time. This knob gives the admin the chance to adapt the suspension time to the given workload. The existing default of 50 pages is not altered by this change. Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering --- tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c | 2 +- tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c | 6 ++++-- tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c | 2 +- tools/libxc/xenguest.h | 2 +- tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c | 2 +- tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c | 2 +- tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py | 5 ++++- tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py | 5 +++-- tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py | 8 +++++--- tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py | 5 +++++ tools/xcutils/xc_save.c | 11 ++++++----- 11 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ out: int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters, - uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags, + uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags, struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm, unsigned long vm_generationid_addr) { Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ */ #define DEF_MAX_ITERS 29 /* limit us to 30 times round loop */ #define DEF_MAX_FACTOR 3 /* never send more than 3x p2m_size */ +#define DEF_MIN_REMAINING 50 /* low water mark of dirty pages */ struct save_ctx { unsigned long hvirt_start; /* virtual starting address of the hypervisor */ @@ -803,7 +804,7 @@ static int save_tsc_info(xc_interface *x } int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters, - uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags, + uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags, struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm, unsigned long vm_generationid_addr) { @@ -914,6 +915,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in /* If no explicit control parameters given, use defaults */ max_iters = max_iters ? : DEF_MAX_ITERS; max_factor = max_factor ? : DEF_MAX_FACTOR; + min_remaining = min_remaining ? : DEF_MIN_REMAINING; if ( !get_platform_info(xch, dom, &ctx->max_mfn, &ctx->hvirt_start, &ctx->pt_levels, &dinfo->guest_width) ) @@ -1526,7 +1528,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in if ( live ) { - int min_reached = sent_this_iter + skip_this_iter < 50; + int min_reached = sent_this_iter + skip_this_iter < min_remaining; if ( (iter >= max_iters) || min_reached || (total_sent > dinfo->p2m_size*max_factor) ) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters, - uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags, + uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags, struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm, unsigned long vm_generationid_addr) { Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xenguest.h +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct save_callbacks { * @return 0 on success, -1 on failure */ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters, - uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags /* XCFLAGS_xxx */, + uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags /* XCFLAGS_xxx */, struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm, unsigned long vm_generationid_addr); Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) helper_setcallbacks_save(&helper_save_callbacks, cbflags); startup("save"); - r = xc_domain_save(xch, io_fd, dom, max_iters, max_factor, flags, + r = xc_domain_save(xch, io_fd, dom, max_iters, max_factor, 0, flags, &helper_save_callbacks, hvm, genidad); complete(r); Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int checkpoint_start(checkpoint_state* s callbacks->switch_qemu_logdirty = noop_switch_logdirty; - rc = xc_domain_save(s->xch, fd, s->domid, 0, 0, flags, callbacks, hvm, + rc = xc_domain_save(s->xch, fd, s->domid, 0, 0, 0, flags, callbacks, hvm, vm_generationid_addr); if (hvm) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -120,19 +120,22 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst # more information. max_iters = dominfo.info.get('max_iters', "0") max_factor = dominfo.info.get('max_factor', "0") + min_remaining = dominfo.info.get('min_remaining', "0") abort_if_busy = dominfo.info.get('abort_if_busy', "0") log_save_progress = dominfo.info.get('log_save_progress', "0") if max_iters == "None": max_iters = "0" if max_factor == "None": max_factor = "0" + if min_remaining == "None": + min_remaining = "0" if abort_if_busy == "None": abort_if_busy = "0" if log_save_progress == "None": log_save_progress = "0" cmd = [xen.util.auxbin.pathTo(XC_SAVE), str(fd), str(dominfo.getDomid()), - max_iters, max_factor, + max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) | (int(log_save_progress) << 6) ) ] log.debug("[xc_save]: %s", string.join(cmd)) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py @@ -1832,18 +1832,19 @@ class XendDomain: log.exception(ex) raise XendError(str(ex)) - def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress): + def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress): """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain. @param domid: Domain ID or Name @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend + @param min_remaining: Number of dirty pages before final suspend @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend @param log_save_progress: Log progress of migrate to xend.log """ dominfo = self.domain_lookup_nr(domid) if not dominfo: raise XendInvalidDomain(str(domid)) - dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress) + dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress) def domain_maxmem_set(self, domid, mem): """Set the memory limit for a domain. Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1459,17 +1459,19 @@ class XendDomainInfo: pci_conf = self.info['devices'][dev_uuid][1] return map(pci_dict_to_bdf_str, pci_conf['devs']) - def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress): + def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress): """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain. @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend + @param min_remaining: Number of dirty pages before final suspend @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend @param log_save_progress: Log progress of migrate to xend.log """ - log.debug("Setting migration constraints of domain %s (%s) to '%s' '%s' '%s'.", - self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy) + log.debug("Setting migration constraints of domain %s (%s) to '%s' '%s' '%s' '%s'.", + self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy) self.info['max_iters'] = str(max_iters) self.info['max_factor'] = str(max_factor) + self.info['min_remaining'] = str(min_remaining) self.info['abort_if_busy'] = str(abort_if_busy) self.info['log_save_progress'] = str(log_save_progress) Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py @@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ gopts.opt('max_factor', val='max_factor' fn=set_int, default=0, use="Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend (default: 3*RAM).") +gopts.opt('min_remaining', val='min_remaining', + fn=set_int, default=0, + use="Number of dirty pages before final suspend (default: 50).") + gopts.opt('abort_if_busy', fn=set_true, default=0, use="Abort migration instead of doing final suspend.") @@ -99,6 +103,7 @@ def main(argv): server.xend.domain.migrate_constraints_set(dom, opts.vals.max_iters, opts.vals.max_factor, + opts.vals.min_remaining, opts.vals.abort_if_busy, opts.vals.log_progress) server.xend.domain.migrate(dom, dst, opts.vals.live, Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c @@ -179,20 +179,21 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { xc_interface *xch; - unsigned int maxit, max_f, lflags; + unsigned int maxit, max_f, min_r, lflags; int io_fd, ret, port; struct save_callbacks callbacks; xentoollog_level lvl; xentoollog_logger *l; - if (argc != 6) - errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid maxit maxf flags", argv[0]); + if (argc != 7) + errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid maxit maxf minr flags", argv[0]); io_fd = atoi(argv[1]); si.domid = atoi(argv[2]); maxit = atoi(argv[3]); max_f = atoi(argv[4]); - si.flags = atoi(argv[5]); + min_r = atoi(argv[5]); + si.flags = atoi(argv[6]); si.suspend_evtchn = -1; @@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) memset(&callbacks, 0, sizeof(callbacks)); callbacks.suspend = suspend; callbacks.switch_qemu_logdirty = switch_qemu_logdirty; - ret = xc_domain_save(si.xch, io_fd, si.domid, maxit, max_f, si.flags, + ret = xc_domain_save(si.xch, io_fd, si.domid, maxit, max_f, min_r, si.flags, &callbacks, !!(si.flags & XCFLAGS_HVM), 0); if (si.suspend_evtchn > 0) ++++++ xen.sles11sp1.fate311487.xen_platform_pci.dmistring.patch ++++++ References: fate#311487 Provide a modalias entry in xen-plaform-pci.ko to allow early autoloading in initrd based on /sys/class/dmi/id/modalias Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering --- unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/unmodified_drivers/linux-2.6/platform-pci/platform-pci.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -477,6 +478,18 @@ static struct pci_device_id platform_pci MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, platform_pci_tbl); +static const struct dmi_system_id platform_dmi_tbl[] = { + { + .ident = "Xen PV-on-HVM", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Xen"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "HVM domU"), + }, + }, + { }, +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(dmi, platform_dmi_tbl); + static struct pci_driver platform_driver = { name: DRV_NAME, probe: platform_pci_init, ++++++ xen_pvdrivers.conf ++++++ # Install the paravirtualized drivers install libata /sbin/modprobe xen-vbd 2>&1 |:; /sbin/modprobe --ignore-install libata install ata_piix /sbin/modprobe xen-vbd 2>&1 |:; /sbin/modprobe --ignore-install ata_piix install 8139cp /sbin/modprobe xen-vnif 2>&1 |:; /sbin/modprobe --ignore-install 8139cp install 8139too /sbin/modprobe xen-vnif 2>&1 |:; /sbin/modprobe --ignore-install 8139too ++++++ xenapi-console-protocol.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -3956,6 +3956,14 @@ class XendDomainInfo: if not config.has_key('backend'): config['backend'] = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" + if dev_class == 'console': + if not config.has_key('protocol'): + con_type = config.get('type', '') + if con_type == 'vnc': + config['protocol'] = 'rfb' + elif con_type == 'sdl': + config['protocol'] = 'rdp' + return config def get_dev_property(self, dev_class, dev_uuid, field): ++++++ xenconsole-no-multiple-connections.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/console/client/main.c +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/console/client/main.c @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int get_pty_fd(struct xs_handle * * Assumes there is already a watch set in the store for this path. */ { struct timeval tv; + struct flock lock; fd_set watch_fdset; int xs_fd = xs_fileno(xs), pty_fd = -1; int start, now; @@ -122,6 +123,12 @@ static int get_pty_fd(struct xs_handle * if (pty_fd == -1) err(errno, "Could not open tty `%s'", pty_path); + memset(&lock, 0, sizeof(lock)); + lock.l_type = F_WRLCK; + lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + if (fcntl(pty_fd, F_SETLK, &lock) != 0) + err(errno, "Could not lock tty '%s'", + pty_path); free(pty_path); } } ++++++ xend-config-enable-dump-comment.patch ++++++ bnc#684305 --- tools/examples/xend-config.sxp | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp @@ -250,6 +250,9 @@ (dom0-cpus 0) # Whether to enable core-dumps when domains crash. +# This setting overrides the per-domain dump value 'on_crash' and causes a +# core dump on all crashed domains. For finer grain control, it is best to +# disable this setting (which is default) and use the per-domain controls. #(enable-dump no) # The tool used for initiating virtual TPM migration ++++++ xend-config.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/sysconfig.xendomains @@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ XENDOMAINS_RESTORE=true # Note that the script tries to be clever if both RESTORE and AUTO are # set: It will first restore saved domains and then only start domains # in AUTO which are not running yet. -# Note that the name matching is somewhat fuzzy. # XENDOMAINS_AUTO=/etc/xen/auto Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp @@ -58,11 +58,12 @@ #(xend-http-server no) -#(xend-unix-server no) +(xend-unix-server yes) #(xend-tcp-xmlrpc-server no) #(xend-unix-xmlrpc-server yes) +# Only enable xend-relocation-server on trusted networks as it lacks +# encryption and authentication. #(xend-relocation-server no) -(xend-relocation-server yes) #(xend-relocation-ssl-server no) #(xend-udev-event-server no) @@ -170,7 +171,12 @@ # two fake interfaces per guest domain. To do things like this, write # yourself a wrapper script, and call network-bridge from it, as appropriate. # -(network-script network-bridge) +# SuSE users note: +# On openSUSE >= 11.1 and SLES >= 11, networks should be configured using +# native platform tool - YaST. vif-bridge and qemu-ifup can be used to +# connect vifs to the YaST-managed networks. +#(network-script network-bridge) +(network-script ) # The script used to control virtual interfaces. This can be overridden on a # per-vif basis when creating a domain or a configuring a new vif. The @@ -203,7 +209,7 @@ # dom0-min-mem is the lowest permissible memory level (in MB) for dom0. # This is a minimum both for auto-ballooning (as enabled by # enable-dom0-ballooning below) and for xm mem-set when applied to dom0. -(dom0-min-mem 196) +(dom0-min-mem 512) # Whether to enable auto-ballooning of dom0 to allow domUs to be created. # If enable-dom0-ballooning = no, dom0 will never balloon out. ++++++ xend-console-port-restore.patch ++++++ Pass console_port to completeRestore() so that console/port is written to xenstore. See bnc#706574 From: Chunyan Liu Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus restore_image.setCpuid() # xc_restore will wait for source to close connection - - dominfo.completeRestore(handler.store_mfn, handler.console_mfn) + dominfo.completeRestore(handler.store_mfn, handler.console_mfn, console_port) # # We shouldn't hold the domains_lock over a waitForDevices Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -3078,7 +3078,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: # TODO: recategorise - called from XendCheckpoint # - def completeRestore(self, store_mfn, console_mfn): + def completeRestore(self, store_mfn, console_mfn, console_port): log.debug("XendDomainInfo.completeRestore") @@ -3089,6 +3089,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: self.image = image.create(self, self.info) if self.image: self.image.createDeviceModel(True) + self.console_port = console_port self._storeDomDetails() self._registerWatches() self.refreshShutdown() ++++++ xend-core-dump-loc.diff ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -2320,7 +2320,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: # To prohibit directory traversal based_name = os.path.basename(self.info['name_label']) - coredir = "/var/xen/dump/%s" % (based_name) + coredir = "/var/lib/xen/dump/%s" % (based_name) if not os.path.exists(coredir): try: mkdir.parents(coredir, stat.S_IRWXU) ++++++ xend-cpuid.patch ++++++ Only add cpuid and cpuid_check to sexpr once When converting a XendConfig object to sexpr, cpuid and cpuid_check were being emitted twice in the resulting sexpr. The first conversion writes incorrect sexpr, causing parsing of the sexpr to fail when xend is restarted and domain sexpr files in /var/lib/xend/domains/<dom-uuid> are read and parsed. This patch skips the first conversion, and uses only the custom cpuid{_check} conversion methods called later. It is not pretty, but is the least invasive fix in this complex code. Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py @@ -1126,6 +1126,10 @@ class XendConfig(dict): else: for name, typ in XENAPI_CFG_TYPES.items(): if name in self and self[name] not in (None, []): + # Skip cpuid and cpuid_check. Custom conversion + # methods for these are called below. + if name in ("cpuid", "cpuid_check"): + continue if typ == dict: s = self[name].items() elif typ == list: ++++++ xend-devid-or-name.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # User Jim Fehlig # Date 1284948067 21600 # Node ID 4674ad11feef87a6a57b99313966e0e121588e1c # Parent 5393151a737b023476f4e571effc547e758cf8c8 xend: Fix device_configure The semantics of XendDomainInfo.py:device_configure() changed with xen upstream c/s 19610. Previously this method would take a devid in actual id *or* name form, e.g. it would accept '5632' or 'hdc'. This patch restores that behavior. Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1203,6 +1203,9 @@ class XendDomainInfo: except ValueError: pass devid = dev_control.convertToDeviceNumber(dev) + else: + # devid could be a name, e.g. hdc + devid = dev_control.convertToDeviceNumber(devid) dev_info = self._getDeviceInfo_vbd(devid) if dev_info is None: raise VmError("Device %s not connected" % devid) ++++++ xend-disable-internal-logrotate.patch ++++++ Disable internal logging and enable the logrotate.conf from the xen package. This allows larger xend.log files --- tools/python/xen/xend/XendLogging.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendLogging.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendLogging.py +++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendLogging.py @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if 'TRACE' not in logging.__dict__: log = logging.getLogger("xend") -MAX_BYTES = 1 << 20 # 1MB +MAX_BYTES = 0 BACKUP_COUNT = 5 STDERR_FORMAT = "[%(name)s] %(levelname)s (%(module)s:%(lineno)d) %(message)s" ++++++ xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch ++++++ Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ # path /<xend-domain-lock-path>/<vm-uuid> # Return 0 on success, non-zero on error. # -# lock-util [-s] path" +# lock-util [-s] -i <vm uuid> path" # -s Lock status. If lock is acquired, print any contents # on stdout and return 0. Return non-zero if lock is # available. @@ -383,6 +383,11 @@ # #(xend-domain-lock-utility domain-lock) +# Some locking mechanism provide cluster wide locking service like sfex. +# And that requires a shared locking device. +#(xend-domain-lock-utility domain-lock-sfex) +#(xend-domain-lock-device "/dev/iwmvg/hbdevice") + # If we have a very big scsi device configuration, start of xend is slow, # because xend scans all the device paths to build its internal PSCSI device # list. If we need only a few devices for assigning to a guest, we can reduce Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ XEN_SCRIPTS += xen-hotplug-cleanup XEN_SCRIPTS += external-device-migrate XEN_SCRIPTS += vscsi XEN_SCRIPTS += domain-lock vm-monitor +XEN_SCRIPTS += domain-lock-sfex XEN_SCRIPT_DATA = xen-script-common.sh locking.sh logging.sh XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += xen-hotplug-common.sh xen-network-common.sh vif-common.sh XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-common.sh vtpm-hotplug-common.sh Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ basedir=$(dirname "$0") usage() { echo "usage: domain-lock [-l|-u] -n <vm name> -i <vm uuid> -p <physical host> path" - echo "usage: domain-lock [-s] path" + echo "usage: domain-lock [-s] -i <vm uuid> path" echo "" echo "-l lock" echo "-u unlock" Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock-sfex =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock-sfex @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# pre-condition +# 1. device is ready: logical volume activated if used +# 2. device already initialized +# 3. index is assigned correctly + +#error code: +# 0: success +# 1: error + +if [ `uname -m` = "x86_64" ]; then + SFEX_DAEMON=/usr/lib64/heartbeat/sfex_daemon +else + SFEX_DAEMON=/usr/lib/heartbeat/sfex_daemon +fi +SFEX_INIT=/usr/sbin/sfex_init +COLLISION_TIMEOUT=1 +LOCK_TIMEOUT=3 +MONITOR_INTERVAL=2 +LOCAL_LOCK_FILE=/var/lock/sfex + +usage() { + echo "usage: domain-lock-sfex [-l|-u|-s] -i <vm uuid> -x <sfex device>" + echo "" + echo "-l lock" + echo "-u unlock" + echo "-s status (default)" + echo "-i Virtual Machine Id or UUID" + echo "-x SFEX device which used for sfex lock" + exit 1 +} + +get_lock_host() { + local rscname=$1 + local device=$2 + r=`$SFEX_DAEMON -s -u $rscname $device` + echo $r +} + +get_status() { + local rscname=$1 + if /usr/bin/pgrep -f "$SFEX_DAEMON .* ${rscname} " > /dev/null 2>&1; then + return 0 + else + return 1 + fi +} + +acquire_lock() { + local rscname=$1 + local device=$2 + get_status $rscname + ## We assume xend will take care to avoid starting same VM twice on the same machine. + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + return 0 + fi + $SFEX_DAEMON -c $COLLISION_TIMEOUT -t $LOCK_TIMEOUT -m $MONITOR_INTERVAL -u $rscname $device + rc=$? + if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then + return $rc + fi + sleep 4 + get_status $rscname + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + return 0 + fi + return 1 +} + +# release has to success +release_lock(){ + local rscname=$1 + + ## If the lock is already released + get_status $rscname + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + return 0 + fi + + pid=`/usr/bin/pgrep -f "$SFEX_DAEMON .* ${rscname} "` + /bin/kill $pid + + count=0 + while [ $count -lt 10 ] + do + get_status $rscname + if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then + return 0 + fi + count=`expr $count + 1` + sleep 1 + done + + /bin/kill -9 $pid + while : + do + get_status $rscname + if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then + break; + fi + sleep 1 + done + + return 0 +} + +mode="status" + +while getopts ":lusn:i:p:x:" opt; do +case $opt in +l ) +mode="lock" +;; +u ) +mode="unlock" +;; +s ) +mode="status" +;; +n ) +vm_name=$OPTARG +;; +i ) +vm_uuid=$OPTARG +;; +p ) +vm_host=$OPTARG +;; +x ) +vm_sfex_device=$OPTARG +;; +\? ) +usage +;; +esac +done + +shift $(($OPTIND - 1)) +[ -z $vm_uuid ] && usage +[ -z $vm_sfex_device ] && usage + +case $mode in +lock ) + ( + flock -x 200 + acquire_lock $vm_uuid $vm_sfex_device + rc=$? + flock -u 200 + exit $rc + ) 200>$LOCAL_LOCK_FILE-$vm_uuid +;; +unlock ) + ( + flock -x 200 + release_lock $vm_uuid + rc=$? + flock -u 200 + exit $rc + ) 200>$LOCAL_LOCK_FILE-$vm_uuid +;; +status ) + get_lock_host $vm_uuid $vm_sfex_device +;; +esac + Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -4583,8 +4583,14 @@ class XendDomainInfo: # Return name of host contained in lock file. def get_lock_host(self, path): - fin = os.popen(xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility() + \ - ' -s ' + path, 'r') + lock_cmd = '%s -s -i %s ' % \ + (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ + self.info['uuid']) + lock_dev = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_device() + if lock_dev: + lock_cmd += '-x %d ' % lock_dev + lock_cmd += path + fin = os.popen(lock_cmd, 'r') hostname = "unknown" try: @@ -4606,6 +4612,16 @@ class XendDomainInfo: path = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_path() path = os.path.join(path, self.get_uuid()) + lock_cmd = '%s -l -p %s -n %s -i %s ' % \ + (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ + XendNode.instance().get_name(), \ + self.info['name_label'], \ + self.info['uuid']) + lock_dev = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_device() + if lock_dev: + lock_cmd += '-x %d ' % lock_dev + lock_cmd += path + try: if not os.path.exists(path): mkdir.parents(path, stat.S_IRWXU) @@ -4613,12 +4629,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: log.exception("%s could not be created." % path) raise XendError("%s could not be created." % path) - status = os.system('%s -l -p %s -n %s -i %s %s' % \ - (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ - XendNode.instance().get_name(), \ - self.info['name_label'], \ - self.info['uuid'], \ - path)) + status = os.system(lock_cmd) >> 8 if status != 0: log.debug("Failed to aqcuire lock: status = %d" % status) raise XendError("The VM is locked and appears to be running on host %s." % self.get_lock_host(path)) @@ -4635,12 +4646,18 @@ class XendDomainInfo: path = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_path() path = os.path.join(path, self.get_uuid()) - status = os.system('%s -u -p %s -n %s -i %s %s' % \ - (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ - XendNode.instance().get_name(), \ - dom_name, \ - self.info['uuid'], \ - path)) + + lock_cmd = '%s -u -p %s -n %s -i %s ' % \ + (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ + XendNode.instance().get_name(), \ + dom_name, \ + self.info['uuid']) + lock_dev = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_device() + if lock_dev: + lock_cmd += '-x %d ' % lock_dev + lock_cmd += path + + status = os.system(lock_cmd) >> 8 if status != 0: log.exception("Failed to release lock: status = %s" % status) try: Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendNode.py @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ class XendNode: self._init_cpu_pools() + self._init_lock_devices() def _init_networks(self): # Initialise networks @@ -382,6 +383,17 @@ class XendNode: XendCPUPool.recreate_active_pools() + def _init_lock_devices(self): + if xendoptions().get_xend_domain_lock(): + if xendoptions().get_xend_domain_lock_utility().endswith("domain-lock-sfex"): + lock_device = xendoptions().get_xend_domain_lock_device() + if not lock_device: + raise XendError("The block device for sfex is not properly configured") + status = os.system("lvchange -ay %s" % lock_device) >> 8 + if status != 0: + raise XendError("The block device for sfex could not be initialized") + + def add_network(self, interface): # TODO log.debug("add_network(): Not implemented.") Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py @@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ class XendOptions: """Default script to acquire/release domain lock""" xend_domain_lock_utility = auxbin.scripts_dir() + "/domain-lock" + """Default block device for lock service""" + xend_domain_lock_device = "" + def __init__(self): self.configure() @@ -430,6 +433,8 @@ class XendOptions: else: return self.xend_domain_lock_utility + def get_xend_domain_lock_device(self): + return self.get_config_string('xend-domain-lock-device', self.xend_domain_lock_device) def get_vnc_tls(self): return self.get_config_string('vnc-tls', self.xend_vnc_tls) ++++++ xend-domain-lock.patch ++++++ --- tools/examples/xend-config.sxp | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile | 1 tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/hotplug/Linux/vm-monitor | 41 +++++++++++++++ tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py | 3 + tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py | 29 +++++++++++ 7 files changed, 290 insertions(+) Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp @@ -324,6 +324,65 @@ # device assignment could really work properly even after we do this. #(pci-passthrough-strict-check yes) +# Domain Locking +# In a multihost environment, domain locking provides a simple mechanism that +# prevents simultaneously running a domain on more than one host. +# +# If enabled, xend will execute a external lock utility (defined below) +# on each domain start and stop event. Disabled by default. Set to yes +# to enable domain locking. +# +#(xend-domain-lock no) + +# Path where domain lock is stored if xend-domain-lock is enabled. +# Note: This path must be accessible to all VM Servers participating +# in domain locking, e.g. by specifying a shared mount point. +# Lock is placed in /<xend-domain-lock-path>/<domain-uuid>. +# Default is /var/lib/xen/images/vm_locks/ +# +#(xend-domain-lock-path /var/lib/images/vm_locks) + +# External locking utility called by xend for acquiring/releasing +# domain lock. By default /etc/xen/scripts/domain-lock will be used +# if xend-domain-lock is set to yes. Set to path of custom locking +# utility to override the default. +# +# Synopsis of lock-util: +# lock-util [-l|-u] -n <vm name> -i <vm uuid> -p <physical host> path" +# -l Acquire (create) lock +# -u Remove lock +# -n vm-name Name of domain +# -i vm-id Id or UUID of domain +# -p phy-host Name of physical host (dom0) +# path /<xend-domain-lock-path>/<vm-uuid> +# Return 0 on success, non-zero on error. +# +# lock-util [-s] path" +# -s Lock status. If lock is acquired, print any contents +# on stdout and return 0. Return non-zero if lock is +# available. +# path /<xend-domain-lock-path>/<vm-uuid> +# If lock is acquired, print any contents on stdout and return 0. +# Return non-zero if lock is available. +# +# Default lock-util behavior: +# On domain start event, domain-lock will create and flock(1) +# /<xend-domain-lock-path>/<vm-uuid>/lock. Every two seconds it +# will write <vm-name>, <vm-id>, <vm-host>, and <tick> to the lock. +# <tick> is running counter. +# On domain stop event, domain-lock will unlock and remove +# /<xend-domain-lock-path>/<vm-uuid>/lock. +# +# Note: If xend-domain-lock-path is a cluster-unaware file system, +# administrator intervention may be required to remove stale +# locks. Consider two hosts using NFS for xend-domain-lock-path +# when HostA, running vm1, crashes. HostB could not acquire a +# lock for vm1 since the NFS server holds an exclusive lock +# acquired by HostA. The lock file must be manually removed +# before starting vm1 on HostB. +# +#(xend-domain-lock-utility domain-lock) + # If we have a very big scsi device configuration, start of xend is slow, # because xend scans all the device paths to build its internal PSCSI device # list. If we need only a few devices for assigning to a guest, we can reduce Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ XEN_SCRIPTS += vtpm vtpm-delete XEN_SCRIPTS += xen-hotplug-cleanup XEN_SCRIPTS += external-device-migrate XEN_SCRIPTS += vscsi +XEN_SCRIPTS += domain-lock vm-monitor XEN_SCRIPT_DATA = xen-script-common.sh locking.sh logging.sh XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += xen-hotplug-common.sh xen-network-common.sh vif-common.sh XEN_SCRIPT_DATA += block-common.sh vtpm-common.sh vtpm-hotplug-common.sh Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/domain-lock @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +basedir=$(dirname "$0") + +usage() { + echo "usage: domain-lock [-l|-u] -n <vm name> -i <vm uuid> -p <physical host> path" + echo "usage: domain-lock [-s] path" + echo "" + echo "-l lock" + echo "-u unlock" + echo "-s status (default)" + echo "-n Virtual Machine name" + echo "-i Virtual Machine Id or UUID" + echo "-p Virtual Machine Server (physical host) name" + echo "path A per-VM, unique location where external lock will be managed" + exit 1 +} + +remove_lock(){ + local path=$1/lock + local name=$2 + + pid=`ps -efwww | grep vm-monitor | grep $name | awk '{print $2}'` + if [ -n "$pid" ]; then + kill $pid + rm -f $path + fi +} + +get_status(){ + local path=$1/lock + [ -f $path ] || exit 1 + + rc=`flock -xn $path /bin/true` + cat $path + exit $rc +} + +mode="status" + +while getopts ":lusn:i:p:" opt; do + case $opt in + l ) + mode="lock" + ;; + u ) + mode="unlock" + ;; + s ) + mode="status" + ;; + p ) + vm_host=$OPTARG + ;; + n ) + vm_name=$OPTARG + ;; + i ) + vm_uuid=$OPTARG + ;; + \? ) + usage + ;; + esac +done + +shift $(($OPTIND - 1)) +vm_path=$1 + +case $mode in + lock ) + [ -z "$vm_path" ] || [ -z "$vm_name" ] || [ -z "$vm_uuid" ] || [ -z "$vm_host" ] && usage + $basedir/set-lock $vm_path $vm_name $vm_uuid $vm_host + ;; + unlock ) + [ -z "$vm_path" ] || [ -z "$vm_name" ] || [ -z "$vm_uuid" ] || [ -z "$vm_host" ] && usage + remove_lock $vm_path $vm_name $vm_uuid $vm_host + ;; + status ) + [ -z "$vm_path" ] && usage + get_status $vm_path + ;; +esac Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vm-monitor =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vm-monitor @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +basedir=$(dirname "$0") +HA_TICK=2 + +monitor() { + local path=$1 + local name=$2 + local uuid=$3 + local host=$4 + local count=0 + path=$path/lock + + while : + do + echo "name=$name uuid=$uuid host=$host count=$count" > $path + count=$(($count+1)) + sleep $HA_TICK + done& +} + +create_lock() { + local path=$1/lock + local rc=0 + + [ -f $path ] || touch $path + flock -x -w $HA_TICK $path $basedir/vm-monitor $* + rc=$? + if [ $rc -eq 1 ]; then + echo `cat $path` + exit 1 + else + exit $rc + fi +} + +if [ $0 = "$basedir/set-lock" ]; then + create_lock $* +elif [ $0 = "$basedir/vm-monitor" ]; then + monitor $* +fi Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -139,6 +139,11 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) | (int(log_save_progress) << 6) ) ] log.debug("[xc_save]: %s", string.join(cmd)) + # It is safe to release the domain lock at this point if not + # checkpointing + if checkpoint == False: + dominfo.release_running_lock(domain_name) + def saveInputHandler(line, tochild): log.debug("In saveInputHandler %s", line) if line == "suspend": @@ -203,6 +208,9 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst log.exception("Save failed on domain %s (%s) - resuming.", domain_name, dominfo.getDomid()) dominfo.resumeDomain() + # Reacquire the domain lock + if checkpoint == False: + dominfo.acquire_running_lock() try: dominfo.setName(domain_name) @@ -369,6 +377,7 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus if not paused: dominfo.unpause() + dominfo.acquire_running_lock() return dominfo except Exception, exn: dominfo.destroy() Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo: if self._stateGet() in (XEN_API_VM_POWER_STATE_HALTED, XEN_API_VM_POWER_STATE_SUSPENDED, XEN_API_VM_POWER_STATE_CRASHED): try: prepare_domain_pci_devices(self.info); + self.acquire_running_lock(); XendTask.log_progress(0, 30, self._constructDomain) XendTask.log_progress(31, 60, self._initDomain) @@ -3066,6 +3067,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo: self._stateSet(DOM_STATE_HALTED) self.domid = None # Do not push into _stateSet()! + + try: + self.release_running_lock() + except: + log.exception("Failed to release domain lock.") finally: self.refresh_shutdown_lock.release() @@ -4575,6 +4581,74 @@ class XendDomainInfo: def has_device(self, dev_class, dev_uuid): return (dev_uuid in self.info['%s_refs' % dev_class.lower()]) + # Return name of host contained in lock file. + def get_lock_host(self, path): + fin = os.popen(xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility() + \ + ' -s ' + path, 'r') + hostname = "unknown" + + try: + tokens = fin.readline().split() + for token in tokens: + item = token.split('=') + if item[0] == 'host': + hostname = item[1] + return hostname + finally: + fin.close() + + # Acquire a lock for the domain. No-op if domain locking is turned off. + def acquire_running_lock(self): + if not xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock(): + return + + log.debug("Acquiring lock for domain %s" % self.info['name_label']) + path = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_path() + path = os.path.join(path, self.get_uuid()) + + try: + if not os.path.exists(path): + mkdir.parents(path, stat.S_IRWXU) + except: + log.exception("%s could not be created." % path) + raise XendError("%s could not be created." % path) + + status = os.system('%s -l -p %s -n %s -i %s %s' % \ + (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ + XendNode.instance().get_name(), \ + self.info['name_label'], \ + self.info['uuid'], \ + path)) + if status != 0: + log.debug("Failed to aqcuire lock: status = %d" % status) + raise XendError("The VM is locked and appears to be running on host %s." % self.get_lock_host(path)) + + # Release lock for domain. No-op if domain locking is turned off. + def release_running_lock(self, name = None): + if not xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock(): + return + + dom_name = self.info['name_label'] + if name: + dom_name = name + log.debug("Releasing lock for domain %s" % dom_name) + + path = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_path() + path = os.path.join(path, self.get_uuid()) + status = os.system('%s -u -p %s -n %s -i %s %s' % \ + (xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_utility(), \ + XendNode.instance().get_name(), \ + dom_name, \ + self.info['uuid'], \ + path)) + if status != 0: + log.exception("Failed to release lock: status = %s" % status) + try: + if len(os.listdir(path)) == 0: + shutil.rmtree(path) + except: + log.exception("Failed to remove unmanaged directory %s." % path) + def __str__(self): return '<domain id=%s name=%s memory=%s state=%s>' % \ (str(self.domid), self.info['name_label'], Index: xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.3-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py +++ xen-4.2.3-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendOptions.py @@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ class XendOptions: use loose check automatically if necessary.""" pci_dev_assign_strict_check_default = True + """Default for the flag indicating whether xend should create + a lock file for domains when they are started.""" + xend_domain_lock = 'no' + + """Default domain lock storage path.""" + xend_domain_lock_path_default = '/var/lib/xen/images/vm_locks' + + """Default script to acquire/release domain lock""" + xend_domain_lock_utility = auxbin.scripts_dir() + "/domain-lock" + + def __init__(self): self.configure() @@ -401,6 +412,24 @@ class XendOptions: else: return None + def get_xend_domain_lock(self): + """Get the flag indicating whether xend should create a lock file + for domains when they are started.""" + return self.get_config_bool("xend-domain-lock", self.xend_domain_lock) + + def get_xend_domain_lock_path(self): + """ Get the path for domain lock storage + """ + return self.get_config_string("xend-domain-lock-path", self.xend_domain_lock_path_default) + + def get_xend_domain_lock_utility(self): + s = self.get_config_string('xend-domain-lock-utility') + + if s: + return os.path.join(auxbin.scripts_dir(), s) + else: + return self.xend_domain_lock_utility + def get_vnc_tls(self): return self.get_config_string('vnc-tls', self.xend_vnc_tls) ++++++ xend-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch ++++++ fate#313584: pass bios information to XEN HVM guest Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py @@ -491,6 +491,14 @@ gopts.var('nfs_root', val="PATH", fn=set_value, default=None, use="Set the path of the root NFS directory.") +gopts.var('smbios_firmware', val='FILE', + fn=set_value, default=None, + use="Path to a file that contains extra SMBIOS firmware structures.") + +gopts.var('acpi_firmware', val='FILE', + fn=set_value, default=None, + use="Path to a file that contains extra ACPI firmware tables.") + gopts.var('device_model', val='FILE', fn=set_value, default=None, use="Path to device model program.") @@ -1097,6 +1105,7 @@ def configure_hvm(config_image, vals): 'boot', 'cpuid', 'cpuid_check', 'device_model', 'display', + 'smbios_firmware', 'acpi_firmware', 'fda', 'fdb', 'gfx_passthru', 'guest_os_type', 'hap', 'hpet', Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/xenapi_create.py @@ -1086,6 +1086,8 @@ class sxp2xml: 'apic', 'boot', 'device_model', + 'smbios_firmware', + 'acpi_firmware', 'loader', 'fda', 'fdb', Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #============================================================================ -import os, os.path, string +import os, os.path, string, struct, stat import re import math import time @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ class ImageHandler: self.device_model = vmConfig['platform'].get('device_model') + self.smbios_firmware =(str(vmConfig['platform'].get('smbios_firmware'))) + self.acpi_firmware =(str(vmConfig['platform'].get('acpi_firmware'))) self.display = vmConfig['platform'].get('display') self.xauthority = vmConfig['platform'].get('xauthority') self.vncconsole = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('vncconsole', 0)) @@ -945,6 +947,38 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): self.vm.getDomid() ]) return args + def _readFirmwareFile(self, filename): + # Sanity check + if filename is None or filename.strip() == "": + size = struct.pack('i', int(0)) + return size + "" + + log.debug("Reading firmware file %s", filename) + # Open + try: + fd = os.open(filename, os.O_RDONLY) + except Exception, e: + raise VmError('Unable to open firmware file %s' % filename) + + # Validate file size + statinfo = os.fstat(fd) + if statinfo.st_size == 0 or statinfo.st_size > sys.maxint: + os.close(fd) + raise VmError('Firmware file %s is an invalid size' % filename) + if not stat.S_ISREG(statinfo.st_mode): + os.close(fd) + raise VmError('Firmware file %s is an invalid file type' % filename) + size = struct.pack('i', statinfo.st_size) + + # Read entire file + try: + buf = os.read(fd, statinfo.st_size) + except Exception, e: + os.close(fd) + raise VmError('Failed reading firmware file %s' % filename) + os.close(fd) + return size+buf + def buildDomain(self): store_evtchn = self.vm.getStorePort() @@ -960,6 +994,8 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): log.debug("vcpu_avail = %li", self.vm.getVCpuAvail()) log.debug("acpi = %d", self.acpi) log.debug("apic = %d", self.apic) + log.debug("smbios_firmware= %s", self.smbios_firmware) + log.debug("acpi_firmware = %s", self.acpi_firmware) rc = xc.hvm_build(domid = self.vm.getDomid(), image = self.loader, @@ -968,7 +1004,9 @@ class HVMImageHandler(ImageHandler): vcpus = self.vm.getVCpuCount(), vcpu_avail = self.vm.getVCpuAvail(), acpi = self.acpi, - apic = self.apic) + apic = self.apic, + smbios_firmware= self._readFirmwareFile(self.smbios_firmware), + acpi_firmware = self._readFirmwareFile(self.acpi_firmware)) rc['notes'] = { 'SUSPEND_CANCEL': 1 } rc['store_mfn'] = xc.hvm_get_param(self.vm.getDomid(), Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ XENAPI_PLATFORM_CFG_TYPES = { 'apic': int, 'boot': str, 'device_model': str, + 'smbios_firmware': str, + 'acpi_firmware': str, 'loader': str, 'display' : str, 'fda': str, @@ -515,6 +517,10 @@ class XendConfig(dict): self['platform']['nomigrate'] = 0 if self.is_hvm(): + if 'smbios_firmware' not in self['platform']: + self['platform']['smbios_firmware'] = "" + if 'acpi_firmware' not in self['platform']: + self['platform']['acpi_firmware'] = "" if 'timer_mode' not in self['platform']: self['platform']['timer_mode'] = 1 if 'viridian' not in self['platform']: Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c @@ -954,18 +954,23 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_hvm_build(XcObject struct hvm_info_table *va_hvm; uint8_t *va_map, sum; #endif - int i; - char *image; + int i, datalen; + char *image, *smbios_str, *acpi_str; int memsize, target=-1, vcpus = 1, acpi = 0, apic = 1; + PyObject *acpi_firmware = NULL; + PyObject *smbios_firmware = NULL; PyObject *vcpu_avail_handle = NULL; uint8_t vcpu_avail[(HVM_MAX_VCPUS + 7)/8]; + struct xc_hvm_build_args hvm_args = {}; static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "memsize", "image", "target", "vcpus", - "vcpu_avail", "acpi", "apic", NULL }; - if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "iis|iiOii", kwd_list, + "vcpu_avail", "acpi", "apic", + "smbios_firmware", "acpi_firmware", NULL }; + if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "iis|iiOiiOO", kwd_list, &dom, &memsize, &image, &target, &vcpus, - &vcpu_avail_handle, &acpi, &apic) ) + &vcpu_avail_handle, &acpi, + &apic, &smbios_firmware, &acpi_firmware) ) return NULL; memset(vcpu_avail, 0, sizeof(vcpu_avail)); @@ -996,8 +1001,38 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_hvm_build(XcObject if ( target == -1 ) target = memsize; - if ( xc_hvm_build_target_mem(self->xc_handle, dom, memsize, - target, image) != 0 ) + memset(&hvm_args, 0, sizeof(struct xc_hvm_build_args)); + hvm_args.mem_size = (uint64_t)memsize << 20; + hvm_args.mem_target = (uint64_t)target << 20; + hvm_args.image_file_name = image; + + if ( PyString_Check(smbios_firmware ) ) + { + smbios_str = PyString_AsString(smbios_firmware); + if ( smbios_str ) + { + datalen = *(int *)smbios_str; + if ( datalen ) { + hvm_args.smbios_module.data = &((uint8_t *)smbios_str)[4]; + hvm_args.smbios_module.length = (uint32_t)datalen; + } + } + } + + if ( PyString_Check(acpi_firmware ) ) + { + acpi_str = PyString_AsString(acpi_firmware); + if (acpi_str) + { + datalen = *(int *)acpi_str; + if ( datalen ) { + hvm_args.acpi_module.data = &((uint8_t *)acpi_str)[4]; + hvm_args.acpi_module.length = (uint32_t)datalen; + } + } + } + + if ( xc_hvm_build(self->xc_handle, dom, &hvm_args) != 0 ) return pyxc_error_to_exception(self->xc_handle); #if !defined(__ia64__) Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/docs/man/xmdomain.cfg.pod.5 @@ -243,6 +243,25 @@ this the xen kernel must be compiled wit This defaults to 1, meaning running the domain as a UP. +=item B + +Specify a path to a file that contains extra ACPI firmware tables to pass in to +a guest. The file can contain several tables in their binary AML form +concatenated together. Each table self describes its length so no additional +information is needed. These tables will be added to the ACPI table set in the +guest. Note that existing tables cannot be overridden by this feature. For +example this cannot be used to override tables like DSDT, FADT, etc. + +=item B + +Specify a path to a file that contains extra SMBIOS firmware structures to pass +in to a guest. The file can contain a set DMTF predefined structures which will +override the internal defaults. Not all predefined structures can be overridden, +only the following types: 0, 1, 2, 3, 11, 22, 39. The file can also contain any +number of vendor defined SMBIOS structures (type 128 - 255). Since SMBIOS +structures do not present their overall size, each entry in the file must be +preceded by a 32b integer indicating the size of the next structure. + =back =head1 DOMAIN SHUTDOWN OPTIONS Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/README.sxpcfg =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/README.sxpcfg +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/README.sxpcfg @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ image - vncunused (HVM) - device_model + - smbios_firmware + - acpi_firmware - display - xauthority - vncconsole Index: xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/README.XendConfig =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.2-testing.orig/tools/python/README.XendConfig +++ xen-4.2.2-testing/tools/python/README.XendConfig @@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ otherConfig image.vncdisplay image.vncunused image.hvm.device_model + image.hvm.smbios_firmware + image.hvm.apci_firmware image.hvm.display image.hvm.xauthority image.hvm.vncconsole ++++++ xend-migration-domname-fix.patch ++++++ setName() writes the new name to xenstore/Dompath too, so that those read domname from xenstore (like 'virsh list') could get correct value. 2nd hunk prevents writing xenstore if not "checkpoint", otherwise, vm destroyed but there is still VM entry in xenstore. Signed-off-by: Chunyan Liu Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py @@ -1963,6 +1963,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo: self.info['name_label'] = name if to_store: self.storeVm("name", name) + if self.dompath: + self.storeDom("name", name) def getName(self): return self.info['name_label'] Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py =================================================================== --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py @@ -188,7 +188,10 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst dominfo.destroy() dominfo.testDeviceComplete() try: - dominfo.setName(domain_name) + if checkpoint: + dominfo.setName(domain_name) + else: + dominfo.setName(domain_name, False) except VmError: # Ignore this. The name conflict (hopefully) arises because we # are doing localhost migration; if we are doing a suspend of a ++++++ xend-pvscsi-recognize-also-SCSI-CDROM-devices.patch ++++++