June 2002 - openSUSE Security - openSUSE Mailing Lists

who can chown in /home
by Gero Lindenblatt 29 Jun '02

29 Jun '02

Dear friends, i am noticing that every once in a while that rwx--xr-x /home root users..... ist changed back to rwxr-xr-x /home root root ..... I know these information is no very precise. sorry for that. Here my question: Is there a program under SUSE 7.2 that does this ? or can only root do this or one of his skripts ? also, today the server was down and the mqueue ist very full. is this any hint ? thanks a lot GL ______________________________________________________________________________ FreeMail in der Premiumversion! Mit mehr Speicher, mehr Leistung, mehr Erlebnis und mehr Pramie. Jetzt unter http://club.web.de/?mc=021105

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UDP security
by Pacifico Chavez 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

Getting messages like: kernel: UDP: short packet: 556/548 other numbers also frequently show up: 0/141 1900/141 What could this be? ----------------------------------------------------------- Pacifico -----------------------------------------------------------

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Apache worm in the wild - forwarded from debian-security
by Christoph Wegener 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

Hi everybody, FYI: here is a little summary from debian-security from this day concerning the "apache worm".... Enjoy and have a happy weekend ;)) Christoph ------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: Domas Mituzas <domas.mituzas(a)microlink.lt> To: freebsd-security(a)FreeBSD.ORG Cc: bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com, os_bsd(a)konferencijos.lt Subject: Fwd: Apache worm in the wild Date: 28.6.2002 13:01:32 Hi, our honeypot systems trapped new apache worm(+trojan) in the wild. It traverses through the net, and installs itself on all vulnerable apaches it finds. No source code available yet, but I put the binaries into public place, and more investigation is to be done. http://dammit.lt/apache-worm/ Regards, Domas Mituzas Central systems @ MicroLink Data To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message -------- End of forwarded message -------- On Fri, Jun 28, 2002 at 01:01:32PM +0200, Domas Mituzas wrote: Hi, > our honeypot systems trapped new apache worm(+trojan) in the wild. It > traverses through the net, and installs itself on all vulnerable apaches > it finds. No source code available yet, but I put the binaries into public Wow, an interesting puppy. I just ran it through dasm to get the assembler dump. The executable is not even stripped, and makes an interesting read, as it gives lots of information. It looks like it was either coded by someone with little experience or in a hurry, and there are several system calls like this one: Possible reference to string: "/usr/bin/uudecode -p /tmp/.uua > /tmp/.a;killall -9 .a;chmod +x /tmp/.a;killall -9 .a;/ tmp/.a %s;exit;" I wonder how many variants of this kind of thing we'll see, but I assume most people running Apache have upgraded already. Cheers, -- Miguel Mendez - flynn(a)energyhq.homeip.net GPG Public Key :: http://energyhq.homeip.net/files/pubkey.txt EnergyHQ :: http://www.energyhq.tk Of course it runs NetBSD! ------ Start of forwarded message ------- From: Brett Glass <brett(a)lariat.org> To: flynn(a)energyhq.homeip.net, Domas Mituzas <domas.mituzas(a)microlink.lt> Cc: freebsd-security(a)FreeBSD.ORG, bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com, os_bsd(a)konferencijos.lt Subject: Fwd: Re: Apache worm in the wild Date: 28.6.2002 19:27:13 At 05:38 AM 6/28/2002, flynn(a)energyhq.homeip.net wrote: >I wonder how many variants of this kind of thing we'll see, but I assume most people >running Apache have upgraded already. Upgrading Apache may prevent your system from being taken over, but it doesn't necessarily prevent it from being DoSed. One of my Apache servers, which had been upgraded to 2.0.39, went berserk on June 25th, spawning the maximum number of child processes and then locking up. The server did not appear to have been infiltrated, but the logs were filled with megabytes of messages indicating that the child processes were repeatedly trying to free chunks of memory that were already free. Probably the result of an attempted exploit going awry. (It could have been aimed at Linux, or at a different version of Apache; can't tell. But clearly it got somewhere, though not all the way.) --Brett To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message -------- End of forwarded message -------- ------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: "wink" <wink(a)deceit.org> To: "Domas Mituzas" <domas.mituzas(a)microlink.lt>, freebsd-security(a)FreeBSD.ORG Cc: bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com, os_bsd(a)konferencijos.lt Subject: Fwd: Re: Apache worm in the wild Date: 28.6.2002 20:10:05 Running strings on the binary amongst other things produces an ip address (12.127.17.71) that resolves to dns-rs1.bgtmo.ip.att.net, and also: FreeBSD 4.5 x86 / Apache/1.3.22-24 (Unix) FreeBSD 4.5 x86 / Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) I went ahead and touch'ed .a, .uua, and .log in /tmp and chflags to set them immutable as I didn't see any real error handling on failed i/o operations. Some other strings not mentioned yet are: rm -rf /tmp/.a;cat > /tmp/.uua << __eof__; mv /tmp/tmp /tmp/init;export PATH="/tmp";init %s that's all i have time for at the moment. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo(a)FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message -------- End of forwarded message -------- -- .-. Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum /v\ L I N U X Lehrstuhl fuer Biophysik // \\ >Penguin Computing< c/o Christoph Wegener /( )\ Gebaeude ND 04/Nord ^^-^^ D-44780 Bochum, GERMANY Tel: +49 (234) 32-25754 Fax: +49 (234) 32-14626 mailto:cwe@bph.ruhr-uni-bochum.de http://www.bph.ruhr-uni-bochum.de

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SUID / scanimage
by Oliver Block 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

Hi, what are the problems thas can result from setting scanimage and xscanimage SUID? bye Oliver __________________________________________________________________ Gesendet von Yahoo! Mail - http://mail.yahoo.de Yahoo! präsentiert als offizieller Sponsor das Fußball-Highlight des Jahres: - http://www.FIFAworldcup.com

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RE: [suse-security] Re: [suse-security-announce] SuSE SecurityAnnouncement: OpenSSH (SuSE-SA:2002:023)
by Ryan Swenson 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

Hello, Since SuSE's announcment I have seen only how do I fix my ssh, how do I backport to earlier version? Why is my 3.3 not working, 3.3 has a buffer overflow. --- Redhat our neighbor handled this extremely well by putting this through their QA teams and found that there were many many issues with 3.3; they found that just by configuring counter-active options in the sshd.config would prevent such exploits without making the mistake to have their customers go to version 3.3 and not in many cases be able to support backward compatibility. Now that there are official advisories from OpenSSH/OpenBSD and Security Organizations they are informing all that 3.4 fixes bugs, a buffer overflow in 3.3, and yes provides additional security mechanisms. Does SuSE have a Security QA that reviews the new unfounded code releases and feautures? Is this how you treat all customers by responding offensively as or like below. We will opt to most likely no longer QA or include SuSE in our R&D projects. Redhat has a better grip on customer interaction, security erratta, updates, and customer satisfaction. If you would like newline characters which I could care less about, write a damn German anal retentive script to parse through my emails. Ryan S. P.s. Your security mailing lists could improve should you want customers to beleive your teams have a handle on interacting with their customers. Assuring them when you have sound suggestions for security and provide updates when warranted is also key. Its important not to forget that those who are on these lists may have huge partnerships with you, or buy considerably but it takes only one misrepresentation to do away with this relationship. Perhaps you do not care but then again its your business. -----Original Message----- From: Roman Drahtmueller [mailto:draht@suse.de] Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2002 6:01 PM To: Ryan Swenson Cc: Suse-security mailingliste Subject: RE: [suse-security] Re: [suse-security-announce] SuSE SecurityAnnouncement: OpenSSH (SuSE-SA:2002:023) > > FYI -SuSE Gang > > > http://online.securityfocus.com/advisories/4230 > > > Vendor security teams should investigate the validity of their claims before suggesting all its customers obtain a workaround version released just a short while ago. What exactly is your problem? Correct me if I misunderstand you. If you read that stuff a bit more carefully, you'd know that this was the only thing we could do, except for sitting there and do nothing. The fact that these packages were of preliminary nature is nothing new. There will be another sweep of them along your way. (Your mail lacks newline characters) Roman. -- - - | Roman Drahtmüller <draht(a)suse.de> // "You don't need eyes to see, | SuSE Linux AG - Security Phone: // you need vision!" | Nürnberg, Germany +49-911-740530 // Maxi Jazz, Faithless | - -

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susefirewall2 on web
by Carlos Carrera 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

friends, where find SuSefirewall2 with administration on WEB ??? Thanks

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Firewall problems in Suse 8.0
by Thomas Nyman 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

Hi good people, I recently switched to Suse 8.0 on my server but I'm having a little problem...acutally its a whopper of a problem...if I run SuSEfirewall2 it will masguerade etc and allow connections to the internet....but I can't get it to allow my clients on the internal network to access popfix on the server (i.e smtp)...it looks like I can pop the server (port 110), although I'll admit I'm not sure since there are no mails to collect (but I'm not getting any errors). On the server itself I can connect to postfix via telnet localhost 25 and everything seems to work but if I try to do a telnet to the server from a client it doesnt work (whic is good because I dont want telnet). On my previous server (Red Hat 7.2) I ran a firewall script for iptables that worked fine....sooo..I figured skip SuSEfirewall2 and run the old script..but that doesnt work either and whats more if I do a port scan I find that I have ports availabe or at least not in stealth mode that where always in stealth mode before, this despite running the very same script that I had before. There is something about suse 8.0 and iptables that I'm not getting. I have master.internet.server with two nics, eth0 is connected to the internet and eth1 is connected to a local lan (192.168.1 net). On the master.internet.server I run postfix, other than that the clients should be able to surf on the internet, i.e do www connections. Which is what my old script basically did. I'm hoping someone can point me the right or perhaps has a functioning script that as defaukt disallows everything and masqs the internal network, allows www and allows smtp. My mailserver is down right now so any quick answers would appreciated and I'll make sure Santa Clause hears about it :) Thomas

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[Re: [suse-security] Open-SSH-3.4p1 and Kernel 2.0.x]
by Thierry Lombardot 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

I just wanted to report the same problem as Christoph pointed with open-SSH-3.4p1 and kernel 2.0.x, after standard compilation: # /usr/sbin/sshd > This platform does not support both privilege separation and compression > compression disabled > Privilege separation user sshd does not exist > > ----------------- And this is an advice from an openssh developper: The issue is your using Linux 2.2 or below kernel which does not support the required mmap() features we need. This issue will be addressed in the next release. Until then just diable compression. -> This is still not working. Any comments? Th. Christoph Wegener wrote: >Hi, >does anybody have a kernel 2.0.x and Open-SSH-3.4p1 running _WITH_ SepPriv activated?!? >I always get an mm error even when compression is turned off... :(( > >Thanx for any hint >Christoph >-- > .-. Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum > /v\ L I N U X Lehrstuhl fuer Biophysik > // \\ >Penguin Computing< c/o Christoph Wegener > /( )\ Gebaeude ND 04/Nord > ^^-^^ D-44780 Bochum, GERMANY > >Tel: +49 (234) 32-25754 Fax: +49 (234) 32-14626 >mailto:cwe@bph.ruhr-uni-bochum.de http://www.bph.ruhr-uni-bochum.de > > > > >

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Re: [suse-security] Open-SSH-3.4p1 and Kernel 2.0.x
by Christoph Wegener 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

Hi Andy, if you would have read my email carefully you would have noticed that in fact I HAVE turned of compression! Thanx anyway - greetings Christoph 27.7.2002 18:35:34, Andy Moore <andy(a)nexusdata.co.uk> wrote: >set compression off in the sshd_config > >On Thu, 2002-06-27 at 15:11, Christoph Wegener wrote: >> Hi, >> does anybody have a kernel 2.0.x and Open-SSH-3.4p1 running _WITH_ SepPriv activated?!? >> I always get an mm error even when compression is turned off... :(( >> >> Thanx for any hint >> Christoph -- .-. Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum /v\ L I N U X Lehrstuhl fuer Biophysik // \\ >Penguin Computing< c/o Christoph Wegener /( )\ Gebaeude ND 04/Nord ^^-^^ D-44780 Bochum, GERMANY Tel: +49 (234) 32-25754 Fax: +49 (234) 32-14626 mailto:cwe@bph.ruhr-uni-bochum.de http://www.bph.ruhr-uni-bochum.de

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SuSE Security Announcement: OpenSSH (SuSE-SA:2002:023)
by Olaf Kirch 28 Jun '02

28 Jun '02

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ SuSE Security Announcement Package: openssh Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2002:023 Date: Tue Jun 25 2002 Affected products: 6.4, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8.0 SuSE Linux Database Server, SuSE eMail Server III, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server, SuSE Linux Firewall on CD Vulnerability Type: unknown Severity (1-10): 9 SuSE default package: yes Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: unknown vulnerability in the OpenSSH daemon. problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds 3) standard appendix (further information) ______________________________________________________________________________ 1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information There's a new vulnerabilty in the OpenSSH daemon, of which we were notified yesterday. The OpenSSH/OpenBSD team has asked Linux vendors to upgrade their platforms to OpenSSH 3.3, and change the configuration to use the relatively new "Privilege Separation" code. According to their information, 3.3 does not fix the vulnerability, but using privilege separation prevents exploits. We were not given any additional information on the nature of the vulnerability. Setting PrivilegeSeparation to on causes large portions of the daemon to run in a so-called "chroot jail", i.e. in a very restricted environment. An attacker breaking this part of the SSH daemon will *not* obtain full root privilege (as he would if sshd ran without this option), but will find himself in an empty directory, inside a process running as a non privileged user (he can still do some harm this way, but it's a far cry from full root powers). The SuSE security team has prepared RPMs that upgrade OpenSSH to version 3.3p1 on all SuSE Linux platforms. Based on the information we've been given, we are unable to provide updates containing a complete fix, nor can we guarantee that the workaround using privilege separation is enough to protect you. Given these imponderabilities, we suggest to you to take additional precautions until details of the vulnerability have been published, and we have been able to assess it: - if you do not need external access to your SSH daemons, turn off the SSH service on these machine completely, or block external access at the firewall. - if you do need external access to your SSH daemons, make sure you restrict the hosts that it will talk to by setting appropriate firewall rules. If, for some reason, you cannot configure your firewall to block external SSH access, you can also restrict access through /etc/hosts.allow; the following will allow connections from hosts with IP addresses 1.2.3.4, from hosts on the clas C IP network 192.168.5.0, and from hosts in the foo.net DNS domain, while rejecting any other connections. sshd : 1.2.3.4 : allow sshd : 192.168.5.0/255.255.255.0 : allow sshd : *.foo.net : allow sshd : ALL : deny As soon as we are given the relevant details, the SuSE security team will publish a follow-up advisory, and another openssh update, as required. Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement. If you are running nscd (enabled by default since SuSE Linux 7.0), the name service caching daemon, shut down the daemon prior to upgrading (this works around a bug in the groupadd command): rcnscd stop Then, install the package using the following command to apply the update: rpm -Fvh openssh*.rpm After upgrading, please restart the SSH server by executing the following command as super user: rcsshd restart Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages are being offered to install from the maintenance web. Special notice concerning SuSE Linux 6.4 and 7.0: SuSE Linux 6.4 ceased to be supported a week or two ago. However, given the potential impact of this problem, we decided to issue update packages for 6.4 as well. These are in the process of getting built, and will show up on our FTP server soon. Users of SuSE Linux 6.4 and 7.0, please also note that crypto update packages for these platforms are always made available through ftp.suse.de only, not ftp.suse.com, due to the crypto laws that were in effect in the US at the time of the original release of the product. i386 Intel Platform SuSE-8.0 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-6.i386.patch… aa29ca8bcedf674605c69d3ebb20456c ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-6.i386.rpm 568b475b982721e62f557557c59624fb source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/8.0/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-6.src.rpm 5a533bd017d86346986904b0c9e6c3e5 SuSE-7.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-6.i386.rpm 86b3182d742afba08a99bb04ae91f70f source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.3/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-6.src.rpm 4d017a1b4a49d0da63ca18c817961b48 SuSE-7.2 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-6.i386.rpm d559ad7d04162a32c58fa07b480be820 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-6.src.rpm 90a4577e90d31ab9c393269c94f4fe86 SuSE-7.1 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-6.i386.rpm 3f5999291e0959ebbc1afbd152d3b1f0 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-6.src.rpm 73c1b72c4616253d8292fad76ef0b41b SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-6.i386.rpm b670aa96ceaa97a33cd4b2009492e1ea source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-6.src.rpm 8f77876f90ef86a2e6fb8e23c34fbd6f Sparc Platform SuSE-7.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.sparc.rpm d1306f869119e076bcb1693d8de837e4 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.3/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm 6495e65b671b788cb62f8dcfd7f81f45 SuSE-7.1 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.1/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.sparc.rpm ae8c8de1505ed2ac56fc5ec20041819c source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.1/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm 16425d92da3c9fa9feeee0322a216b1b SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.0/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.sparc.rpm 05a40abfdbd42b5465e367a187a3393c source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.0/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm bf000a597b2cc3b33517887fa50f0504 AXP Alpha Platform SuSE-7.1 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.alpha.rpm 478503f40c0ef3ed2d5b3ea40dd74e32 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm e8b93a73622386a95497d0418d2bfa50 SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.alpha.rpm 3001c656fb57915c4bb5dcd5fa8de76d source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm 2fd9646fa24b5298d37a79902230c826 PPC Power PC Platform SuSE-7.3 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.ppc.rpm 77dd425d361dc084bad50feefdf1f94c source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.3/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm 8a928dc956cd107ee91d72fe4b4a8bc6 SuSE-7.1 ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.ppc.rpm ddbc79c387273ddd0da636c7df951c85 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm ef9f5de04c632490fe77b96e06892f01 SuSE-7.0 ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/sec1/openssh-3.3p1-4.ppc.rpm 67867b11cefc77dca95aaeb130012507 source rpm: ftp://ftp.suse.de/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/zq1/openssh-3.3p1-4.src.rpm 76e2f4d9fb52cc5c7220f52108614542 ______________________________________________________________________________ 2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds: - mozilla Cross-dependencies between mozilla and other packages in SuSE Linux products keep us from providing version upgrades for the mozilla packages. Fixing security bugs in our packages is usually done by adding the necessary patches to the existing version to ensure the compatibility and consistency that is expected from our products. In some cases (as with the mozilla package) the complexity of the issue does not allow to add patches any more. By consequence, security related issues in mozilla cannot be addressed. As a service to our user community, we provide packages of newer mozilla versions at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/mozilla/. These packages have been verified to run fine; they are not located in the update directory of the distribution in question because we cannot make any claims about the compatibility with the other packages in the product. Security-aware users are encouraged to install the packages from the projects/ directory. - ghostscript RedHat released a security announcement concerning a problem in ghostscript, which could be exploited to gain privilege of the print server user. We are investigating whether SuSE Linux is affected. - kernel netfilter update we are in the process of preparing a kernel update that will include a security fix for a minor netfilter bug. - fetchmail we are in the process of releasing a security update for fetchmail that corrects a vulnerability that could be exploited by hostile mail servers. ______________________________________________________________________________ 3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information - Package authenticity verification: SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package. 1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key security(a)suse.de), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless. 2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "build(a)suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de . - SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe: suse-security(a)suse.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-subscribe(a)suse.com>. suse-security-announce(a)suse.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <suse-security-announce-subscribe(a)suse.com>. For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <suse-security-info(a)suse.com> or <suse-security-faq(a)suse.com> respectively. ===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <security(a)suse.com> or <security(a)suse.de>. The <security(a)suse.de> public key is listed below. ===================================================================== ______________________________________________________________________________ The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory. Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security(a)suse.de> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build(a)suse.de> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3in Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBPRiUcney5gA9JdPZAQFEmAf9H0OsASl3qLpG/XurLiFsQ5Iapxc1Z/wj rHcAaa9IrfvsQ6t3q6y+k4nQJRsmoH4K3x3eTRJMu6z7OUJnpQV67LnjFpjo7c43 u+e47XfEtRpqH7wnA7glf7m+ABy7L1oFGnJgBv7Opj9NwwAbjjoKhibmOoJmA53A Wp1pw+gZV1p64jYhSHHlZRQ7Xa+vG4vnp15Jf8ehX2Z7wxFpQBWKA7onmsvN54Q8 ufvw5v26rnAGnZEsxWErP+c+ZT6Iz98hzopaexhKCCTlIWl/MwOVx9VGjsWg+sm/ xZbBW73lCfTkG4sJBL0bxBLDBBR7KNk3LTxB9ysxYP5fRVMXeLXM3g== =ZKKJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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